










THE BALANCING OF CREDITOR INTERESTS IN BUSINESS RESCUE PROVISIONS 
OF THE COMPANIES ACT 2008 
BY 
ZOLANI P. BUBA 
submitted in fulfillment of the of the requirement for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) 
at the 
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN









wnThe copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be
published without full acknowledgement of the source.
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only.
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms
of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author.
2 
DECLARATION 
I declare that this dissertation is my own work and has not been submitted in any form for 
another degree or diploma at any University or other institution of tertiary education. 
Information derived from the published or unpublished work of others has been 
acknowledged in the text and in a list of references given. 
All legal references are detailed as at January 2017. 
…………………………..   22/05/2017 
Signature Date 





The integrated global economy has presented challenges as well as opportunities for 
companies and their surrounding communities. This has resulted in many jurisdictions having 
to re-evaluate the question of company failure and how best to deal with it.  
 The South African context has seen the enactment of a new Companies Act, ushering 
in a rescue regime which evidences a significant departure from its predecessor; judicial 
management. Contained within Chapter 6 of the Companies Act of 2008, business rescue 
adopts a fresh approach to company resuscitation. With relatively easy access to the 
procedure, business rescue caters for the restructure of the business, debt or its equity to 
ensure either a return to solvency or a better return to creditors than in liquidation. 
 The new regime is further underpinned by the 2008 Act purpose provision, which 
envisages an efficient business rescue procedure and further mandates that the resolution of 
financial distress be conducted in a manner that balances the rights and interests of all 
relevant stakeholders. It is in this light, that this study explores the interplay between section 
7(k) and Chapter 6 of the new Act. Specifically, the work sets out to critique the manner in 
which our new business rescue regime balances competing stakeholder interests in its 
provisions and investigates whether current provisions provide an adequate framework for 
this to be done in a manner that enhances the regime’s ability to return a financially distressed 
company to a position of solvency, as a primary objective. 
 After discussing the previous judicial management regime and exploring the 
mechanics of Chapter 6, a comparative study of similar procedures in the United Kingdom 
and the United States is undertaken. The study further identifies a number of weaknesses and 
makes recommendation for improvement. 














-’Can a man change his stars?’ 
                                 - ‘Yes William. If he believes enough, a man can do anything…’ 
     --- Extract from the movie A Knights Tale 
 
And with that exchange between William and his father, I am taken back to home: Langa 
Township, not too distant from the prestigious University of Cape Town and clearly visible 
from Jameson Hall steps. The absence of its ‘twin towers’ now strikingly unfamiliar. I am 
taken back to early school morning where my paternal grandmother would make my siblings 
and I share our bath water from those old enamel washing tubs, the infamous waskom. I, the 
boy, having to wash last in now lukewarm water littered with soap scum. While I was 
unconvinced and sceptical regarding the water’s cleansing efficacy, here I now stand: To my 
paternal grandmother, a domestic unwittingly charged with the responsibility of raising her 
son’s (my father) many children, I express my undying gratitude: Thobeka Jane Maqhubela 
(nee Buba), thank you.   
To my standard three teacher, Z. Mulder (wherever you may now be), thank you. You 
introduced me to the English language while permitting me to retain my sense of identity. 
Those Roald Dahl books planted the seeds that resulted in this work. I further salute my 
primary and high school teachers, who were incredibly supportive of me, constantly 
encouraging, seeing in me more than I could see in myself.  
I would like to thank my employer the South African Revenue Service for the immensely 
supportive environment I have been afforded while writing this work. A specific thanks to 
Vuyisile Ngqulana; you contributed to this work being completed within this period of time. 
Thank you for insisting I move. My ‘chain-breaking crew’ (Mrs T.Sesane and T.Mabasa): 
may we continue to break more chains as we proceed in life and in our careers (To Ms 
D.Ritchie for sharing of ideas and constantly sharing views and forwarding me literature and 
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case law and the rest of my colleagues in H.O.) To my guys in the regions: consistently 
presenting me with legal, procedural and strategic problems requiring some sort of solution-  
your contribution to this work is more important than any of you will ever realise. 
I would like to thank my family (siblings, cousins), my extended family (you know who you 
are) and those who have become a constant presence in my life. To Prof. Hugh Corder and 
Judge Dennis Davis; thank you for your consistent and unrelenting support. Thank you to Ms 
A. G. Shaw for taking time out from her busy schedule to proof-read and comment on this 
work. A further word of thanks to Philip Mindlin for his views and comments on certain parts 
of this work.  
If not anything else this work, to me, is an affirmation of the strength of human will.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BUSINESS RESCUE, AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 
The company law reform process began in 2004, culminating in the enactment of the 
Companies Act of 2008. It had as its objective the overhauling of South Africa’s company 
law regime.  The vision and objective of the new company law dispensation was contained in 
the Department of Trade and Industry Paper dated May 2004 entitled ‘South Africa for the 
21
st
 Century: Guidelines for Corporate law Reform’.
1
  
There was a clear desire on the part of government to align company law with 
prevailing international trends.  Changes to the company law regime in England (from which 
a large volume of our company law originates) were cited as a factor which prompted the 
need for company law reform. A further motivation was to ensure that our company law 
regime be aligned with the enactment of the Constitution of South Africa.
2
 
The socio-political framework within which the new company regime was to be 
developed is important for two reasons. It provides context for the paradigmatic shift 
regarding the purpose of company law within the South African context, evidencing a clear 
shift from its historical roots where law’s purpose was simply to create a framework 
regulating commercial transactions between two or more parties. It is this aspect that enables 
a theoretical platform for an analysis into the nature of the corporation, and an appropriate 
framework within which the new company law regime is to develop. 
The second reason is that this provides a basis for understanding the ‘rights and duty 
language’ permeating through the Companies Act of 2008, what this means within the 
context of the new company law framework as well as how it impacts on the analysis to be 
engaged in later chapters. Prior to putting forward the hypothesis that the thesis advances, a 
brief reference to contemporary history is necessary. This reference allows for an 
understanding of what the legislature sought to achieve in its overhaul of South Africa’s 
company law. It is important to understand the context in which this change came about to 
                                                     
1
 It is to be noted that prior to this at least two other law reform initiatives had been engaged in for the overhaul 
of both rescue as well as insolvency law. Around 2000 Cabinet approved a draft Insolvency and Business 
Recovery Bill, which was drafted by the Centre for Advanced Corporate Insolvency Law at the University of 
Pretoria resulting in the document titled Final Report Containing Proposals on a Unified Insolvency Act 
published in August 2000. This was combined with the Law Reform Commission’s draft Insolvency Bill. The 
second initiative consisted of a plan communicated by the Chief State Law Adviser, of government’s intention 
to make available R 2 billion a year to assist in the rescuing of companies, which was succeeded by rumours 
of a new Business Recovery Bill. Even though both efforts seemed to fizzle out without formal explanation, 
the Department of Trade and Industry’s Guidelines on Corporate Law Reform emerged thereafter. For further 
reading on this aspect see Anneli Loubser Some Comparative Aspects of Corporate Rescue in South African 
Company Law (LLD Thesis University of Pretoria 2010). 
2
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
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assess the consequences that have arisen as a result, in the form of the current legislative 
provisions.  
In 1992 the King Committee
3
 was formed. Its purpose was to consider corporate 
governance in South Africa and promote standards consistent with international best 
practices.
4
 In its consideration of South Africa’s corporate governance framework, the 
committee advocated an integrated approach which emphasised good governance in the 
interests of a wide range of stakeholders.
5
 It incorporated principles of good financial, social, 
environmental and ethical practices.
6
  In this way the King Committee formalised the 




Articulating its recommendations in relation to the responsibility of the corporation 
towards its stakeholders, the committee stated: 
       …The modern approach is for a board to identify the company’s stakeholders, including its shareowners, 
and to agree policies as to how the relationship with those stakeholders should be advanced and managed 
in the interests of the company. Wherever the term “stakeholder” is applied in this Report, it is used in the 
sense enunciated in this paragraph…Boards have to consider not only the regulatory aspect, but also 
industry and market standards, industry reputation, the investigative media, and the attitudes of customers, 
suppliers, consumers, employees, investors and the communities (local, national and international), ethical 
pressure groups, public opinion, public confidence, political opinion etc…The inclusive approach 
recognizes that stakeholders such as the community in which the company operates, its customers, its 
employees and its suppliers need to be considered when developing the strategy of a company. The 




As may be observed, the definition of stakeholder is expansive.
9
 Due to its broad 
nature, it encompasses a number of parties who may hold interchangeable positions in 
relation to the debtor company, and provides a framework for the thesis’ emphasis on the 
treatment of creditor interests specifically as well as how this potentially influences the 
efficacy of our regime.
10
 The King Committee’s recommendations were echoed in the King 
                                                     
3
 Institute of Directors ‘King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa 2002: King Committee on 
Corporate Governance' (Published March 2002). It is to be noted that the history of South African company 
law extends back much further than this period. The historical aspect is canvassed in greater detail in chapter 
2. 
4
 Institute of Directors (2002) at 7. 
5






 Institute of Directors at 7-8. 
9
 The Oxford online dictionary defines the term as ‘...2. A person with an interest or concern in something, 
especially a business 3. Denoting a type of organization or system in which all the members or participants are 
seen as having an interest in its success: ‘a stakeholder economy’. Available online at 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/stakeholder accessed on 19 August 2016. 
10
 Three examples which come to mind are that of a tax authority, an employee and a supplier or financier. 
While the word creditor is often applied to denote the supplier/financier, in relation to outstanding payments 
due by the debtor company, it may very well encompass the two former categories of stakeholder in respect of 
tax due as well as outstanding wage/ salary payments respectively. 
12 
 
III Report on Corporate Governance: 
       Although the board is accountable to the company itself, the board should not ignore the legitimate 
interests and expectations of its stakeholders. In the board’s decision-making process, the inclusive 
approach to corporate governance adopted in King II dictates that the board should take account of the 
legitimate interests and expectations of the company’s stakeholders in making decisions in the best 
interests of the company… It is recognized that in what is referred to as the ‘enlightened shareholder’ 
model as well as the ‘stakeholder inclusive’ model of corporate governance, the board of directors should 




The approach in King II and III framed the theoretical approach that South African 
company law would follow. This approach has been transplanted into the provisions of the 
Companies Act of 2008 which stand in stark contrast to the 1973 Act, which paid fairly 
negligible concern in its consideration of broader stakeholder constituency interests.
12
 The 
latter’s preamble simply stated the purpose of the Act as ‘To consolidate and amend the law 
relating to companies; and to provide for matters incidental thereto’.
13
  This may be 
contrasted with the 2008 Act’s emphasis on a broad stakeholder model, which is seen in its 
purpose clause and reads as follows:
14
 
       7. The purposes of this Act are to— 
   (a) promote compliance with the Bill of Rights as provided for in the 
     Constitution, in the application of company law; 
(b) promote the development of the South African economy by— 
(i) encouraging entrepreneurship and enterprise efficiency; 
(ii) creating flexibility and simplicity in the formation and maintenance of companies; and 
(iii) encouraging transparency and high standards of corporate governance as appropriate, given the   
significant role of enterprises within the social and economic life of the nation; 
(c) promote innovation and investment in the South African markets; 
(d) reaffirm the concept of the company as a means of achieving economic and social benefits; 
(e) continue to provide for the creation and use of companies, in a manner that enhances the  economic 
welfare of South Africa as a partner within the global economy; 
(f) promote the development of companies within all sectors of the economy, and encourage active 
participation in economic organisation, management and productivity; 
(g) create optimum conditions for the aggregation of capital for productive purposes, and for the 
investment of that capital in enterprises and the spreading of economic risk; 
(h) provide for the formation, operation and accountability of non-profit companies in a manner designed 
to promote, support and enhance the capacity of such companies to perform their functions; 
         (i) balance the rights and obligations of shareholders and directors within companies; 
         (j) encourage the efficient and responsible management of companies; 
(k) provide for the efficient rescue and recovery of financially distressed companies, in a manner that 
balances the rights and interests of all relevant stakeholders; and 
(l) provide a predictable and effective environment for the efficient regulation of companies. 
 
Without derogating from the importance of each of the above, it is important to 
emphasise that paragraph (d) affirms the company as a vehicle for achieving socio-economic 
benefits. Equally significantly, the rescue and recovery of financially distressed companies is 
                                                     
11
 Institute of Directors ‘King Report on Governance for South Africa’ (Published 1 September  2009) 
    at 9 and 12. 
12
 This aspect will be canvassed in subsequent chapters. 
13
 Preamble to Companies Act 61 of 1973.   
14
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 7. This aspect is discussed in Chapter 3. 
13 
 
specifically mandated. The parameters in which this should be done require that a balance be 
struck between the rights and interests of all relevant stakeholders.
15
   
These two aspects are critical. This is because the objective of returning a company to 
solvency (or financial recovery) provides a basis for testing the concept of ‘efficiency’ in 
company rescue, thus providing a response to the question: Is a return to solvency the most 
appropriate measure for evaluating the effectiveness of a rescue regime?
16
 The second 
enhances the depth of the critique, specifically directing it to the South African context by 
attempting to answer the following question: how are interests of the different stakeholders in 
a rescue to be balanced in a manner that provides both protection for relevant stakeholders 
and in an efficiency enhancing manner (i.e. in a manner that ensures that the debtor returns to 




I now turn to a brief analysis of the business rescue provisions of the Companies Act 
and the essential hypothesis to be advanced and tested in this work. Despite business rescue’s 
laudable underpinnings from both a socio-economic and business perspective, there is often 
incoherence between the desire to make the company a vehicle for enhancing socio-economic 
objectives while ensuring a regulatory environment conducive to thriving business. This is 
due to the costs attendant on welfare obligations imposed on the company. In addition, 
regulation is complex, often resulting in undesirable consequences (i.e. contrary to the 
intended objective) which were not previously foreseen. 
The influence of the labour movement and its position in relation to the rights of 
employees provides a possible basis for understanding the strong employee orientation seen 
                                                     
15
 Section 7(k). 
16
 When compared to alternative objectives such as a sale of business or a wind down. For the purpose of this 
thesis, it is assumed that it does. For further reading on this aspect see Rachel Siew Lin Lee How is 
‘efficiency’ determined in the insolvency context? Clarifying the meaning of efficiency with the conjunction of 
insolvency jurisprudence and economic methodology (PhD Thesis, University of Queensland, 2015). The 
commentator in her abstract observes how the definition is often contingent on the attributes vested upon a 
particular insolvency system:  
         ‘Just as the meaning of efficiency varies with jurisprudential context, its properties vary according to the 
economic methodology it is associated with. Schools of economic thought, like insolvency jurisprudence, 
are not homogenous, raising the possibility that one may hold to a methodological position that can 
conflict with the methodology underlying an efficiency criterion…’ 
17
 See Department of Trade and Industry ‘South African Company Law for the 21
st
 Century: Guidelines for 
Corporate Law Reform’ (GG 26493, General Notice 1183 of 23 June 2004) at 10, whose objective included 
the creation of a regulatory framework which: 
            ‘…should be consistent, effective, predictable, transparent, fair and understandable. It should provide 
flexibility and promote adaptability to an environment with fast changing technologies, economic 
opportunities and social circumstances. The regulatory scheme should not create artificial preferences 
and distortions, where these are unnecessary. And it should attempt, where practically possible, to 
balance the competing interests of economic actors and society at large.’ 
14 
 
in the business rescue provisions of the Companies Act of 2008. Van Eck et al comment on 
the influence of worker unions as a pressure group during the process:  
       …It is submitted that the momentum behind the initiatives for the urgent introduction of business rescue 
provisions in South African Insolvency legislation, currently an issue of high priority at government level, 
has similarly been fuelled by the labour movement. Thus, the foundations for such an intervention have 




 In its submission to NEDLAC Labour Market Chamber, COSATU (Congress of 
South African Trade Unions) took the following stance on the earlier Insolvency and 
Business Recovery Bill: 
       There is a need to open a debate for the inclusion of employees as creditors “holding special security”. An 
employee is paid in arrears, if the company is liquidated or liquidates itself then in effect the employee has 
“loaned” his/her work to the employer and should be considered to have a special claim for that amount. 
The same situation pertains to leave pay and bonus pay as well as all deductions from employees’ wages 
for medical aid, pension/provident fund. Amounts owing in respect of these categories constitute deferred 




Despite these submissions not having been formally recorded against what was to 
form the business rescue provisions of the Act, this view is echoed in both the Explanatory 




Within this context, the argument advanced is that South African business rescue 
provisions currently balance stakeholder interests in a manner that potentially prejudices the 
achievement of rescue and is thus contrary to the provisions of both section 7 broadly and 
section 128 of the Companies Act of 2008 specifically. Thus, the current form of business 
rescue may hinder the regime’s ability to effect a rescue in the primary sense, which denotes 
a return to a position of solvency. 
The following reasons
21
 are offered for this submission: (i) The definition of business 
rescue aggregates creditor welfare, assuming homogeneity in relation to the company’s 
creditors as if creditors fall into the same class or grouping. In this manner a quasi-utilitarian 
approach seems to find application, without strong protections for pre-business rescue 
contractual promises. The effect is that insufficient weight is accorded to different sets of 
rights which existed prior to commencement of Chapter 6 proceedings. (ii) The regime 
imposes a fiduciary duty on the practitioner towards the company only rather than towards its 
                                                     
18
 Stefan Van Eck, Andre Boraine & Lee Steyn ‘Fair Labour Practices in South African Insolvency Law’ (2004) 
121 Issue 4 SALJ 902 at 906. 
19
 COSATU submission to the NEDLAC Labour Chamber, 11 May 2004 at 4 available at 
http://www.cosatu.org.za/docs/subs/2004/busibill.pdf accessed on 1 November 2016. 
20
 Discussed later. 
21
 These are by no means the only challenges observed. A comprehensive discussion of the relevant provisions 
is engaged in at a later stage. 
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creditors as well. The consequence is that, strictly speaking, the practitioner is not obliged to 
ensure that stakeholders are treated equitably inter partes during the process as his/her 
primary duty is towards the debtor. (iii) Employees, as a category of stakeholder, are 
provided with significant protections in comparison to other unsecured creditors and, in 
certain instances, in preference to secured interests. These protections are provided 
notwithstanding those that already exist outside of company law (presumably in labour and 
insolvency law). 
 In this way the new regime fails to balance between those who should bear the costs 
of rescue versus those who benefit. For example, a creditor with real security covering the 
full liability over the debtor (and who has strong, if not full protection for its claim whether 
the debtor is revived or liquidated) may have its claim rank lower than a post-commencement 
employee wage claim (even though the employee does not have security and has more to lose 
should the rescue attempt fail).
22
  
 In the light thereof, a critique of the new regime’s perceived short-comings (from a 
drafting perspective) is provided and Chapter 6 is then evaluated in the light of approaches in 
comparative jurisdictions.  The South African approach is further compared with 
international best practices in the form of the UNCITRAL Guide on Insolvency Law.  
The dominant aim of business rescue ought to be the resuscitation of the failing 
enterprise (i.e. its return to solvency) while providing greater protection of creditors as a 
whole. One group of creditors cannot be expected to make concessions which are 
disproportionate in relation to those expected from another group.  It is not suggested that 
creditors be treated in exactly the same manner and it is recognised that protection should be 
given to the most vulnerable class. A company under business rescue often operates under 
tremendous financial constraints.   
 
1.2 PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
The fast changing economic context within which business in South Africa operates has 
presented challenges as well as opportunities. The consequences of company failure often 
have a tremendous effect on communities which rely on the affected company for 
                                                     
22
 Eric Levenstein An appraisal of the new South African business rescue procedure (LLD Thesis, University of 
Pretoria, 2016) at 116 in this regard makes similar a observation:  
      ‘But if the benefits of a successful reorganisation are shared, the risks of failure are not. Should a company 
fail for a second time, it is the creditors who will lose additional funding. A corporate reorganisation is like 
a gamble in which shareholders, creditors, managers, suppliers and employees win with success, but where 
only creditors bear the costs of failure…’  
    In the commentator’s view, it is this distribution of costs and benefits which ultimately determines how 
different stakeholders view the choice between liquidation and rescue. 
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employment, trade income as suppliers or dividend income as shareholders. Where company 
failure occurs the State loses a tax base necessary for developing or creating new 
infrastructure to facilitate further economic growth. 
A brief analysis of statistical data on company liquidations may explain the impetus 
behind the need for company law reform in this area. When the process began, compulsory 
company liquidation figures for July to September 2003 stood at 1211 as compared to a 
figure of 1050 over July to September 2002.
23
 The figures recorded a 38.7% increase in 
liquidations for September 2003 in comparison to the figure for September the previous year. 
The 38.7% increase was due to a 55.7% increase in compulsory liquidations and a 
34.2% increase in voluntary liquidations when compared to September 2002 figures. 
Generally, a 3.1% increase in liquidations overall over the first nine months of 2003 was 
recorded, when compared to the previous year over the same period. Even during the latter 
period, the percentage of compulsory liquidations (4.2%) was significantly higher than that 
seen in voluntary liquidation numbers (2.9%). Positively, these figures showed a slight 
decrease in the fourth quarter of 2004 with a 6.2% decrease in liquidations in the month of 
September 2004 when compared to September 2003. The nine month liquidation figure was 
also said to have decreased by 13.4% in comparison to the previous year. 
Compulsory liquidations occur as a result of the debtor company’s inability to 
discharge of debt. It may be concluded that these figures evidenced judicial management’s 
failure to provide a reprieve and an opportunity at a new start for the ailing debtor. A similar 
observation is made by Mongalo in his summation of the company law reform process:  
       At the time, there was already widespread acceptance that the existing judicial management process under 
chapter xv of the Companies Act of 1973 was failing the local economy as few if any, judicial 





 Company failure may be understood to impact directly on employment.
25
  The figures 
provide a framework for understanding factors which may have contributed to the pendulum 
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 Statistics South Africa Statistics of Liquidations and Insolvencies (preliminary) September 2003 (Embargoed 
until October 2003) at 1; Statistics South Africa Statistics of Liquidations and Insolvencies (preliminary) 
September 2004 (Embargoed until October 2004) at 1.  
24
 Tshepo Mongalo ‘An overview of company law reform in South Africa: From the Guidelines to the 
Companies Act 2008’ (2010) Acta Juridica xiii-xvi. The weaknesses of the judicial management regime are 
given comprehensive discussion in Chapter 3. 
25
 For a broad outline of unemployment statistics during this period, see Statistics South Africa Labour Force 
Survey September 2003 (Published 25 March 2004); South Africa Labour Force Survey September 2004 
(Published March 2005). 
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swinging in favour of employee interests within the context of a regime whose primary focus 
should be financial resuscitation.
26
 
This study enables the construction of a theory, which attempts to explain the nature, 
extent and justification for legislative intervention in the form of the business rescue regime 
within the South African context.
27
 It also develops an understanding of how different 
jurisdictions such as the United States and United Kingdom have approached the rescuing of 
businesses and why they have chosen certain approaches. Because business rescue provisions 
in the 2008 Act are a multi-jurisdictional hybrid, having largely been influenced by 
approaches in the United States and United Kingdom, the approaches in these jurisdictions 
are explored in some detail.
28
   
With this understanding, it then will be possible to critique the manner in which 
comparative jurisdictions have sought to achieve these goals as well as to analyse 
consequences that flow therefrom. This in turn, enables an assessment of the strengths and 
potential areas of improvement for business rescue legislation in South Africa. Upon the 
completion of this exercise, amendments to the current business rescue provisions are 
advocated.  
It is hoped that suggested reforms will strengthen the new regime and create an 
environment that enables the resuscitation of the company, providing for continuity as well as 
the reaping of benefits by communities within which the company operates.  
 
1.3 OBJECTIVE OF RESEARCH 
The objective of this research is to argue for a particular business rescue regime. The need to 
accelerate economic development and translate the benefits therefrom to communities in 
which companies operate provides a justification for the imposition of welfare obligations 
upon the company through legislative regulation.
29
 As a corollary, the question whether it is 
the role of the corporation or of government to fulfil these socio-economic imperatives, is 
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 Stefan Van Eck, Andre Boraine and Lee Steyn ‘Fair Labour Practices in South African Insolvency Law’ 
(2004) 121 SALJ 902 at 906.  
27
 This is developed in the next chapter 
28
 It is by no means suggested that these jurisdictions are the only ones which have had an impact on our own. In 
relation to the shifting international trend towards ‘debtor-friendly’ rescue regimes, see Richard Bradstreet  
‘The New Business Rescue: Will Creditors Sink or Swim’ (2011) 128 Issue 2 SALJ 352 at 354 who observes 
as follows: 
         ‘…The general idea is that debtor-friendly corporate rescue legislation is more likely to be successful.       
Although the forerunner of this bargain-oriented approach was the United States, this prototype 
legislation has been subject to much criticism and other jurisdictions that later followed suit have proved 
to be better sources of influence for South Africa’s reform.’ 
29
 The different theories of the corporation are explored in the next chapter and a view is put forward as to the 





 While framing the conceptual underpinning of the Companies Act of 2008 in a 
concessionary multi-stakeholder mould and conceding that the protection of multi-
stakeholder interests is essential, the thesis argues that the Companies Act fails in its own 
injunction to adequately balance these interests. It fails to create a regulatory environment 
which allows for the following question continuously to be asked: Which stakeholder is most 
deserving of protection once the company, while indebted to various stakeholders, is in 
financial distress? The pendulum has swung in favour of employee interests despite 
additional protections specifically catering to the latter outside of company law. This 
approach potentially fails to recognise that during financial distress, it is the debtor’s interests 
which are paramount even at the expense of all other interests. Once this interest is protected, 
all others benefit in consequence (whether in the short, medium or long term).
30
 Observing 
the expansive nature of the mandate imposed by section 7(k), the critique is narrowed to an 
analysis of the manner in which Chapter 6 balances the diverse interests of the company’s 
creditors when it enters business rescue proceedings. 
 
1.4 OUTLINE OF RESEARCH 
In pursuance of this objective, the thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter Two will discuss the nature of the corporation. In this discussion the chapter explores 
different theories attributable to the corporation and attempts to provide a response to the 
question of in whose interests the corporation should be managed.  
Chapter Three provides a chronological and historical analysis of judicial 
management as a company rescue procedure. To this end, the thesis contextualises factors 
which are critical to the form and substance of judicial management as well as weaknesses 
inherent in the regime. It will be necessary to analyse the use and scope of the word ‘creditor’ 
as employed in the 1973 Act as well as the manner in which various competing interests were 
treated prior to and subsequent to the granting of a judicial management order.  
Chapter Four will enter into a discussion of the 2008 Companies Act. In doing so, 
emphasis is placed on; (i) its broad objectives and what it seeks to achieve, (ii) business 
rescue provisions, focusing on the procedure, (iii) a specific analysis of the Act’s provisions 
in relation to the treatment of creditors generally in comparison to the 1973 Act and (iv) a 
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 While the treatment of employee interests in Chapter 6 of the Act is one of the central aspects critiqued, it is 
by no means the only aspect given attention. Neither is it suggested that a dilution of this category of 
stakeholder’s interests is the only intervention (or even a sufficient intervention) necessary for enhancing the 
regime’s strength and its perceived attractiveness.  
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critical analysis of the manner in which the 2008 Companies Act balances creditor rights in 
the light of the broader purposes of the Act and the specific business rescue provisions.
31
  
In analysing business rescue provisions, it is important to discuss the treatment of 
creditor interests at the pre- and post-commencement stages of the process. The chapter will 
further highlight a number of weaknesses which result in the new business rescue regime 
failing to balance multiple stakeholder interests in a manner that enhances the efficiency of 
the overall regime.  
Chapter Five enters into a comparative analysis of the United Kingdom and the 
United States’ respective approaches. The chapter highlights how these jurisdictions have 
dealt with the vexing issue of balancing creditor interest during insolvency or bankruptcy. It 
outlines specific features which have strengthened their respective rescue regimes. The 
chapter concludes with a comparison of these jurisdictions
32
 with South Africa, highlighting 
the differences in approach which may be preventing the South African regime from growing 
in strength as an efficient rescue mechanism.    
Chapter Six concludes by a summary of the thesis’ hypothesis. It considers whether 
more can be learnt and/or adopted by South Africa in order to better deal with the current 
challenges and weaknesses observed. Importantly, the chapter proposes legislative 
amendments which may facilitate a better balancing between the new Act’s purpose 
provisions in section 7 with business rescue in Chapter VI of the same Act. 
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 It is acknowledged that a ‘right’ is conceptually distinguishable from an ‘interest’. For the purpose of the 
thesis, these terms are applied interchangeably. 
32
 In light of international instruments such as the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency law.  
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CHAPTER 2: NATURE OF THE CORPORATION 
2.1. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CORPORATION: AN OUTLINE 
The development of the corporation and corporation theory may be illustrated by the 
following diagram: 
 
Era of the entrepreneur (First Phase) 





Era of the Corporate Revolution (Second Phase) 
The advent of the corporation and its emphasis on the distinction between ownership 
and control. The shareholder is perceived as the dominant (if not only) investor 




Era of the Stakeholder (Third Phase) 
At this phase theories are characterised by an implicit and explicit acknowledgement 
of a broader range of interests at stake. The corporation is viewed as seeking to 




The corporation has proven to be one of the most successful inventions in legal 
history.
1
 This success is evidenced by the fact that from the period evidencing a shift 
away from the individual entrepreneur towards the corporation as the critical legal 
and economic vehicle, its essence has been the subject of intense debate with a range 
                                                     
1
 It is observed that the word ‘corporation’ is used in the American context while ‘company’ finds 
application in many commonwealth countries including South Africa. The two terms are used 
interchangeably in this thesis.  The terms specifically exclude the close corporation, which is 
regulated by the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984. The exclusion is as a result of its peculiar and 
unique attributes. Due to the vast majority of literature emanating from the U.S. and for sake of 
consistency, I predominantly make reference to ‘corporation’ rather than ‘company’. See Henry N. 
Butler, ‘The Contractual Theory of the Corporation’ (1989) 11 George Mason University Law 
Review 99. 
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of theories attempting to explain its nature.
2
  
A discussion of theories attempting to explain the nature of the corporation 
offers the following insights: it provides both a contextual and historical background, 
the effect of which is to enhance knowledge of factors, which have played an 
influence in its inception as well as evolution.  It also enables a prediction of the 
future trajectory of corporation law as a body of law and of the corporation as an 
economic unit and legal construct.  
Despite the descriptions employed in the literature, often couched in terms of 
‘purpose’, ‘objective’ or ‘duty’, an analysis of corporation theory communicates both 
the nature of the corporation as well as how its definition is often contingent on 
historical context, geographical location, prevailing cultural attitudes and politics. A 
discussion of the shift informs the various expectations capable of attaching to the 
corporation, thus enabling a formulation with a degree of self-awareness by the 
particular analyst or even the critical analysis of existing expectations. It also allows 
for an examination of the changing nature of the corporation from an internal view, in 
terms of the manner in which it views itself
3
, versus the array of imperatives and 
duties imposed by law.  
For example, an organisation may have the singular goal of maximising the 
wealth of its shareholders (whatever this term is understood to mean). The legislature 
may, however, enact legislation compelling the corporation to consider the interests of 
a specific corporate constituency and to ensure that these interests are protected either 
within corporation law (e.g. by protecting the interests of employees during corporate 
rescue through legal provisions) or outside it (by enacting non-conflicting labour 
legislation which mandates the corporation to treat employees in a particular manner). 
An analysis of the nature of the corporation further allows for a consideration 
of these aspects and for a value judgement to be reached regarding whether external 
legislative interference on the corporation is in fact justified (or justifiable) in light of 
prevailing political, economic or social pressures. Where the interference is 
considered to be justifiable an additional set of questions may be posed: Is it too little 
or too much, and who pays for the cost of the interference? It is only once this 
                                                     
2
 For further reading see William T. Allen ‘Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business 
Corporation’ (1992) 14 Cardozo Law Review infra; Stephen Bottomley ‘Taking Corporations 
Seriously: Some Considerations for Regulation’ (1990) 19 Federal Law Review at 207. 
3
 It is acknowledged that despite being endowed with a legal persona, the corporation is not capable of 
‘seeing’ itself as an ordinary person would. This conception of ‘self-perception’ occurs through its 
board of directors and in light of the wishes (in theory) of its shareholders.  As a result, the assertion 
is not to be taken in its literal sense. 
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analysis has been completed that it is possible to begin to objectively consider the 
strengths and weaknesses of the regulatory framework applicable to corporations and 
determine the measures necessary to remedy observed weaknesses.    
An additional question that may be posed is whether this understanding of the 
corporation is contingent on a determination of its public or private nature. If the 
public interest imperatives (to be discussed later) are accepted, those same 
imperatives apply whether such entity be a public or private corporation in legal 
form.
4
  The specific legal form of the corporation, in other words, does not negate the 
existence and importance of these imperatives. 
Bottomley observes that a layered set of distinctions is drawn in liberal 
corporate theory.
5
 The first consists of a distinction between the individual and the 
group when considered through the lens of social, economic and political activity.
6
 
The second is between the public and private realms of social and political life.
7
  
These distinctions are relevant for two reasons: The first is that historically, 
traditional legal thought has tended towards a preference for individual and private 
interests over group and public interests.
8
 This may explain the emphasis on the 
entrepreneur and consequent development of the concept of the firm as a nexus of 
contracts between individual players. The second is that corporations do not neatly fit 
in the above distinctions. In certain instances corporations have been perceived as 
manifestations of individual agency and freedom (contractual theory) while in others 
they have been seen as creatures of the state, posing a threat to individual freedom 
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 It is to be noted that ‘public’ in this sense relates to whether a corporation is able to freely trade its 
shares on the open market or not. Keay seems to adopt a different view, arguing that the 
corporation’s imperatives and objectives may differ depending on whether the company is publicly or 
privately held. For further reading see Andrew Keay The Corporate Objective: Corporations, 
Globalisation and the Law (2011) United Kingdom: Edward Edgar Publishing. Easterbrook and 
Fischel argue that there are fundamental differences between closely held (i.e. private) and publicly 
held corporations, see Frank H Easterbrook and Daniel R Fischel ‘Close Corporations and Agency 
Costs’ (1986) Stanford Law Review 271. 
5
 Bottomley (1990) at 205.  
6
 Bottomley (1990) at 205.  
7
 Bottomley (1990) at 205.  
8
 Bottomley (1990) at 205.  




This chapter provides an examination of prevailing theories of the corporation, 
depicting a shift in perceiving the corporation as merely an embodiment of a nexus of 
private contracts, towards recognition of the corporation as an entity possessing a 
degree of public interest imperatives. This enquiry is relevant in contextualising the 
need for reform in light of weaknesses highlighted in Chapter 1 and provides further 
context for understanding the prism through which our new company law regime is to 
be seen.  
There is a burgeoning literature which canvasses the nature of the 
corporation.
10
 However, given the scope and objectives of this thesis, it is only 
necessary to examine the express purpose of the 2008 Act by way of the two models 
that were clearly uppermost in the minds of the drafters- the shareholder and 
stakeholder models. 
Both models attempt to provide a theory of the corporation from an internal 
perspective and examine the nature of interests prioritised by the corporation’s 
managers (from a corporate governance point of view).  In examining this aspect, the 
chapter hopes to provide some insight into the different views on the role of the 
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 On the economic theory of the firm, see Simon Deakin ‘The Corporation as Commons: Rethinking 
Property Right’ (2012) 37 Queens Law Journal 339. On contractual and concession theory, see Liam 
S O’ Mellin ‘Neither Contract nor Concession: The Public Personality of the Corporation’ (2006) 74 
George Washington Law Review at 202; Melvin A Eisenberg ‘The Conception that the Corporation is 
a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm’ (1999) 24 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 
822; William T Allen ‘Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation’ (1992) 14 
Cardozo L. Review 261, 264-65; Henry N.Butler ‘The Contractual Theory of the Corporation’ (1989) 
Geo. Mason L. Rev. at 100; M. Stokes ‘Company Law and Legal Theory’ in W Twinning (ed), Legal 
Theory and Common Law (1986); Robert C. Clark ‘Contracts, Elites and Traditions in the Making of 
Corporate Law’ (1989) 89 Columbia Law Review 1703; Robert C. Clark ‘Agency Costs Versus 
Fiduciary Duties’ in Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business (J. Pratt & R Zeckhauser eds) 
(1985) Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing at 57; Daniel R. Fischel and Frank H. 
Easterbrook ‘The Corporate Contract’ (1989) 89 Columbia Law Review at 1418, see also Frank H. 
Easterbrook ‘Managers’ Discretion and Investors’ Welfare: Theories and Evidence’ (1984) 9 
Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 540; N. Bowie ‘A Kantian Theory of Capitalism’ (1998) 
Business Ethics Quarterly 38 at 47. Benedict Sheehy ‘Scrooge- The Reluctant Shareholder: 
Theoretical Problems in the Shareholder-Stakeholder Debate’ (2006) 14 Miami Business Law Review 
at 230; Kellye Y. Testy ‘Old Questions, New Contexts: Corporate Law in Emerging Nations’ (1997) 
17 New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law at 505. 
10
 For a historical analysis of the corporation, see Ulrike Malmendier ‘Law and Finance at the Origin’ 
(2009) 47(4) Journal of Economic Literature 1076. On the modern corporation, Charles R.T 
O’Kelley ‘The Entrepreneur and the Theory of the Model Corporation’ (2006) 31 Journal of 
Corporation Law 573; Robert C. Clark ‘The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment 
Management Treatises’ (1981) 94 Harvard Law Review at 561; Mark S. Mizruchi ‘Berle and Means 
revisited: The governance and power of large US corporations’ (2004) 33 Theory and Society 579; 
Pujo Committee [US Congress, House Banking and Currency Committee] Investigation of 
Concentration and Control of Money and Credit (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1913); Ida Tarbell History of the Standard Oil Company (1905) New York: McClure, Phillips; Adam 
Winkler ‘Corporate Law or the Law of Business? Stakeholders and Corporate Governance at the End 
of History’ (2004) 67 Law & Contemporary Problems 109. 
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corporation within a society. This internal perspective is relevant as it provides an 
outline of the nature of expectations and duties which exist within the corporation. 
Further, it also allows for discerning the impact of corporation law reforms at a 
practical level, for those forming part of its constituencies.  
A conceptual link is drawn between the often-conflicting interests of the 
corporation’s managers and shareholders, government and public interest imperatives.  
In discussing this aspect, the chapter provides a response to the question relating to 
the possible interest of a government in protecting the company and why this issue is 
a priority in a developing country. In summary, without a comprehensive mapping of 
the terrain, a critique of the nature of the corporation becomes impossible. 
 
2.3. THEORIES OF THE CORPORATION  
The seminal work of Berle & Means pioneered academic scholarship in the area of 
corporation theory.
11
 Academic scholars, lawyers and economists alike have 
attributed various interpretations to their works. Due to their work having greatly 
influenced the growth of this area (as well as the different and often opposing theories 
which have developed as a result), it is only appropriate that they receive primary of 
consideration. 
Placing the development of the corporation in the American context on a 
historical continuum, Berle & Means hypothesise the origins of the ‘corporation as 
contract’ theory of the corporation: 
       …Each corporate "charter" [i.e. the certificate of incorporation] was the product of a three-fold 
negotiation involving the state and the combined associates, and between the groups of associates 
acting for themselves. It was recognised as a "contract" and has been so consistently dealt with in 
American law. The classic statement (which does not bear analysis), envisaged the result as a 





They describe factors that drove the economic revolution in the American 
context as follows: 
       Though its outline is still obscure, the central mass of the twentieth century American economic 
revolution has become discernible. Its driving forces are five: (1) immense increase in 
productivity; (2) massive collectivization of property devoted to production, with accompanying 
decline of individual decision-making and control; (3) massive dissociation of wealth from active 
management; (4) growing pressure for greater distribution of such passive wealth; (5) assertion 
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 Adolf A Berle & Gardiner C Means The Modern Corporation and Private Property revised ed  
(1967) New York: Harcourt, Brace and World Inc. 
12
 Berle & Means (1967) at 121. 
13
 Berle & Means (1967) at xxv. 
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Berle & Means consider the corporation to have been pivotal as both an 
instrument and vehicle that has become a dominant form of organisation and 
production, capable of creating and distributing a passive form of wealth.
14
 They 
observe that despite the above, it remains constrained to follow norms embodied in 
social attitudes, case law, legislation and constitutional law.
15
 They further argue that: 
       Corporations are essentially political constructs. Their perpetual life, their capacity to accumulate 
tens of billions of assets, and to draw profit from their production and their sales, has made them 





This view may have served as the impetus for the corporation as concession 
theory as the corporation is viewed as an extension of the state not only because of the 
assets it is capable of acquiring or its perpetual succession but also because of the 
responsibilities and duties imposed; not only on shareholders but on broader society. 
The writings of Berle & Means have been interpreted by some scholars as 
postulating a theory which focuses on the protection of the corporation’s shareholder 
to the exclusion of its stakeholders. In light of the apparent disdain Berle & Means 
often expressed towards the corporation’s managers (who they often referred to as its 
‘controllers’), this interpretation is not completely without foundation. However, there 
is nothing to suggest that they preferred a view emphasising shareholders’ interests to 
the exclusion of the corporation’s stakeholders.  
Illustrating the extent to which conceptions of property and ownership have 
changed in the modern corporation, Berle & Means cite Rathenau
17
, who observes the 
form that the corporation had increasingly begun to take: 
       No one is a permanent owner…the depersonalization of ownership simultaneously implies the                                     
objectification of the thing owned. The claims to ownership are subdivided in such a fashion, and 
are so mobile, that the enterprise assumes an independent life, as if it belonged to no one; it takes 
an objective existence, such as in the earlier days was embodied only in state and church, in a 
municipal corporation, in the life of a guild or religious order…The depersonalization of 
ownership, the objectification of enterprise, the detachment of property from the possessor, leads 





Viewed from a socio-analytical prism, the corporation involves a wide 
diversity of economic interests consisting of ‘owners’ supplying capital, workers who 
create, consumers who give value to the products or services created as well as 
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 Berle & Means (1967) at xxv.  
15
 Berle & Means (1967) at xxv.  
16
 Berle & Means (1967 at xxvi. 
17
 As cited in Berle & Means (1967) at 309. 
18
 Berle & Means (1967) at 309. 
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directors and managers who wield power within the organisation.
19
 Implicit in this 
argument is recognition that the corporation extends beyond the economic notion of 
the firm and its conception of the corporation as a nexus of contracts.  
The combination of a great concentration of power as well as a diversity of 
interests within the corporation has resulted in the long-fought issue of power, the 
question of how best to regulate it as well as the protection of interests within the 
corporation.
20
 Arguing that the corporation has extended beyond the maximisation of 
shareholder interest, Berle & Means constructed a fresh theory of the corporation. 
This theory views the relationship between shareholders and managers as no longer 
dialectical and conflicting but as co-existent in pursuing the furtherance of objectives 
distinct from either party. They further posit that 
       …the owners of passive property, by surrendering control and responsibility over the active 
property, have surrendered the right that the corporation should be operated in their sole 
interest…At the same time, the controlling groups, by means of the extension of corporate powers, 
have in their own interest broken the bars of tradition which require that the corporation be 
operated solely for the owners of passive property…The control groups have, rather, cleared the 
way for claims of a group far wider than either the owners or the control. They have placed the 
community in a position to demand that the modern corporation serve not alone the owners or the 
control but all society…When a convincing system of community obligations is worked out and is 





It is in this light that a discussion of the shareholder and stakeholder theories 
of the corporation must be considered. The theoretical vision of both theories extends 
the scope of the purpose of the corporation and provide important conceptual building 
blocks in constructing a theory of the corporation. 
 
2.3.1. SHAREHOLDER THEORY 
Shareholder theory proposes that the corporation exists to make money for 
shareholders.
22
 According to this view, it is made up of assets constituting private 
property which belong to its shareholders, as residual claimants, to the exclusion of 
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 Berle & Means (1967) at 310.  
20
 Berle & Means (1967) at 310.  
21
 Berle & Means (1967) at 312. 
22
 Laura Allsop ‘Should Companies be Run Purely to Serve the Interests of Shareholders?’ (2012) 1 
UK Law Students Review 61. The terms ‘shareholder value’ or ‘shareholder value maximisation’ 
have often been alluded to in the literature, with varied arguments being posited with respect to how 
the concept is to be determined. See A Rappaport Creating Shareholder Value (1986) New York: 
The Free Press at 1; C Kirchner ‘Shareholder Value: A New Standard for Corporation Conduct’ in 
K. Hopt and E Vermeersch (eds) Capital Markets and Corporation Law (2003) Oxford: Oxford 
University Press at 343.  
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other parties.
23 
 As a result of the position of shareholders, they are viewed as the most 
appropriate constituency to decide on issues affecting the corporation.
24
 Directors are 
seen as fiduciary agents who run the company on the shareholders’ behalf.
25
 Any 
action taken by directors to further interests other than those of shareholders would 
constitute a breach of trust. In short, the corporation is seen in terms of its members 
rather than as a separate entity.
26
   
Hansmann & Kraakman
27
, observing the debates concerning the contract and 
concession theories of the corporation, posit a slightly different argument for 
shareholder theory as follows: 
       In our view the traditional debate between concession and contract theorists is simply confused. 
On the one hand, corporations - whether “concessions” or contracts - should be regulated when it 
is in the public interest to do so. On the other hand, the standard model is, in effect, an assertion 





Asserting the primacy of shareholder interest in corporate law in their view 
does not infer that stakeholder interests are not to be given any protection.
29
 The 
assertion of shareholder interests entails that stakeholders (to the exception of the 
corporation’s creditors) are best protected by measures outside of corporate law.
30
 
Creditors are seen as an exception to this proposition.
31
 The basis for this is 
that corporate law should directly regulate some of the aspects of the corporation and 
its creditors.
32
 Examples of this include piercing the corporate veil and limitations on 
the distribution of dividends where there is inadequate capital.
33
 
The concession made by Hansmann & Kraakman in favour of creditors as the 
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 Allsop (2012) at 61-62, see also F. Easterbrook and D Fischel The Economic Structure of Company 
Law (1991) Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press at 36-9. Some have disagreed that 
the corporation’s shareholders are the only residual risk bearers, see G Kelly and J Parkinson ‘The 
Conceptual Foundations of the Company: a Pluralist Approach’ in J. Parkinson, A. Gamble & G. 
Kelly (eds) The Political Economy of the Company (2000) Oxford: Hart Publishing; G. Garvey and 
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 Keay (2011) at 63. 
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 This position is in line with ‘agency theory’, which views managers as overseers of the voluntary 
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shareholders. On this view shareholders are seen as best placed to guide and discipline directors 
carrying out their duties, thereby limiting shirking and other opportunistic behaviour. See T. Jones 
‘Corporate Social Responsibility Revisited Redefined’ (1980) California Management Review at 61. 
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 Allsop (2012) at 61.  
27
 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’ (2001) 89 
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only group to be protected through corporate law, as opposed to other stakeholders, 
may face certain difficulties. This difficulty is visible where the corporate 
constituency of employees is taken as an example. The employee (ordinarily 
categorised as a ‘stakeholder’ rather than ‘creditor’) may be transformed into a 
creditor in respect of unpaid salaries where the corporation faces insolvency. The 
same employee may also be a shareholder in the corporation in question. This trend is 
seen in many corporations incentivising productivity through employee share 
schemes. It is in this regard that the view expressed by Hansmann & Kraakman 
potentially runs the risk of not sufficiently recognising (or give credence to) the often-
fluid nature of interests in an organisation.
34
 
In addition to asserting the primacy of shareholder interests, Hansmann & 
Kraakman argue that shareholder theory asserts the interests of all shareholders, more 
especially minority shareholders as they require the most protection.
35
 They list 
different models (either found to have failed or having lost their normative force), 
which were at different times in history considered as alternatives to the shareholder 
model as a way of depicting the ‘progression’ towards this model as both an 
appropriate and effective corporate governance mechanism.
36
 
These consisted of the manager-oriented, labour-oriented and state-oriented 
models. The manager-oriented model found greatest application in the United States 
from the 1930s to the 1960s.
37
 It views the corporation’s managers as technocratic 
fiduciaries capable of serving the general public interest and a significant emphasis is 
placed on corporate social responsibility.
38
 Hansmann & Kraakman argue that 
experience would later show that where managers were granted significant discretion, 
they would tend to further their own interests at the expense of the corporation.
39
 
The labour-oriented model emphasises the involvement of employees in 
corporate decision-making through their representation on the corporation’s board of 
directors.
40
 This model was prominently advocated in jurisdictions such as Germany. 
After the Second World War more European countries began following Germany’s 
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approach, even if in diluted form.
41
 Hansmann & Kraakman argue that this style of 
management has fallen out of favour as a result of being associated with inefficient 
decision making, paralysis or boards that are considered weak.
42
 
The state-oriented model entails strong government involvement in the affairs 
of the corporation as a measure of ensuring that private businesses conduct their 
activities in line with public interest.
43
 This involvement would serve to avoid 
deficiencies of the market. The model found most application in post-war France and 
Japan.
44
 The State has a discretion regarding allocating credit and foreign exchange as 
well as exemptions and rules relating to competitive conduct.
45
 Hansmann & 
Kraakman observe that the shift away from this model has been as a result of the shift 
away from State socialism as a political system and model.
46
 
Three forces have been described as instrumental in shareholder theory’s 
normative popularity. These consist of the forces of logic, example and competition.
47
 
The force of logic posits four propositions, which are understood as having supported 
the shareholder theory of the corporation.  The first is that the firm’s investors cannot 
be adequately protected through contract and that their control over the firm serves as 
a measure of protection for both themselves and their investment.
48
 
The second is that if equity rights granted to the firm’s investors are strong as 
well as exclusive, this will encourage shareholders to maximise the value of the 
firm.
49
 The third is that the interest of the firm’s stakeholders can generally be 
protected through contract, with this protection being deemed sufficient.
50
 Where 
equity holders are able to maximise the firm’s value, this factor is understood to 
impact on the firm’s ability to respect its contractual obligations.
51
 The fourth is that 
where contract is inadequate to protect the firm’s stakeholders, its governance 
structure may be adapted to counter such deficiencies.
52
 Significantly, it is suggested 
that the theoretical vision of the corporation influences economic performance.
53
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With the force of example, the view is advanced that common-law countries, 
and specifically countries which have applied shareholder theory, have been found to 
economically out-perform jurisdictions applying labour and state-oriented models.
54
 
The force of competition looks at the internationalisation of both product and 
financial markets and views this factor as one that has brought about competition 
between jurisdictions adhering to different models.
55
 The view is that firms in 
jurisdictions applying shareholder theory have been characterised by access to equity 
capital at lower costs, development of new product markets, stronger emphasis on 
managerial coherence as well as rapid abandonment of inefficient investments.
56
  
The question has been posed whether the shareholders referred to by 
shareholder primacy theorists are only limited to current shareholders or are inclusive 
of future shareholders as well? Where the interests of future shareholders are to be 
considered, how are the directors of the corporation to balance between these 
interests?
57
 Unfortunately, no definitive responses seem to have been provided 
prompting some to argue that shareholder maximisation theory is not sufficiently 
sophisticated to account for the diversified nature of the corporation’s shareholders.
58
 
The conceptual debate has important implications on the question of the weighting of 
interests and the impact of this on the functioning of a business. 
 
2.3.2. STAKEHOLDER THEORY 
Stakeholder theory
59
 provides an alternative approach to the purpose of the 
corporation.
60
 It consists of aspects which are normative, descriptive and 
instrumental.
61
 The normative aspect considers the question of how those classified as 
stakeholders are to be treated.
62
 It views stakeholders as possessing inherent value and 
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thus deserving of consideration by the corporations directors in the performance of 
their duties.
63
 This normative conception is construed as a legitimacy claim, which is 
at odds with the concept of shareholder primacy.
64
 
The theory’s descriptive value is in its ability to explain corporate behaviour. 
The instrumental aspect examines how emphasis on the stakeholder impacts on the 
corporation’s performance, efficiency and success.
65
 It is premised on the notion that 
all parties who contribute to the corporation (thus having an influence on the creation 
of value within it) should benefit. In this way, stakeholder theory posits that 
corporations are managed for the benefit of and are accountable to all stakeholders.
66
  
Stakeholders are broadly defined as consisting of the corporation’s customers, 
suppliers, financiers, creditors, shareholders, employees and local communities as 
well as tax authorities.
67
 This is by no means the only definition provided for the term, 
neither is it exhaustive.
68
  The theory generally does not endorse the prioritisation of 
one stakeholder’s interests over another.
69
 An exception does occur in instances 
where the inequality in question has the effect of improving the situation of the 
stakeholder most in need.
70
 Even though stakeholders’ interests may not be identical, 
this does not necessarily infer that they are not sometimes common.
71
 The theory also 
concerns itself with the damage that externalities may have on stakeholders.
72
 
Externalities are described as: 
       …Occur[ing] when managers transfer the costs of the corporation to stakeholders and retaining 
resulting benefits for shareholders. This occurs, for example where a corporation makes workers 




Negative externalities may be seen in instances where the alleged insolvency 
of a company is used as a basis for retrenching employees in order to cut expenditure 
and increase profit. In the South African context this trend is often seen in companies 
that retrench their permanent employees on operational grounds only to subsequently 
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employ the services of a third party labour broker in order to avoid duties imposed by 
labour legislation. As a normative theory, it requires managers to balance the interests 
of all stakeholders when making decisions. 
In balancing stakeholder interests, it ought to be realised that while all 
stakeholders may be considered equal, not all claims or interests are equal in a given 
situation.
74
 Keay argues that the role of managers is determining how to balance these 
interests in a situation, while focusing on the relative contribution of the respective 
stakeholders to the corporation.
75
 
Stakeholder theory has not been without criticism. It has been argued that the 
theory fails to define stakeholders of the corporation, fails to explain how directors 
are to balance the interests of stakeholders and lacks clarity.
76
  It has also been 
criticised on the basis that it is generally impractical to apply and enforce.
77
 
Theoretical developments have occurred, where a ‘middle ground’ between the 
competing theories has been suggested. These have been in the form of progressive 
scholarship.  I briefly consider this position next.  
Progressive corporate scholarship advocates for the protection of the 
corporation’s stakeholders. However, instead of arguing for the protection of these 
corporate constituencies through corporate law, progressive corporate scholars 
advocate for the protection of this group through adjacent mandatory legal reforms.
78
 
These may take the form of laws regulating labour, workplace, securities and tax as 
well as civil rights.
79
   
Articulating the content and purpose of the duties imposed on corporate 
managers outside of corporation law, Clark argues: 
       If the legal system as a whole imposes so many duties to so many constituencies and thus 
mandates a wide ranging (though perhaps inadequate and not coherent) accommodation of diverse 
interests, what, if anything, is the real meaning of the profit maximizing norm? The answer is that 
it tells corporate managers what their residual goal is-or, in economic jargon, what the company’s 
“objective function” is. The duties to all other groups need simply be satisfied- they function as 
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In his later work Clark observes that directors of a firm, at a practical 
boardroom level, are often primarily concerned with the enhancement of shareholder 
value and that other constituencies are kept content only to the extent necessary in 
order to achieve this objective.
81
 Reformulating shareholder primacy, he argues that 
legislators ought to consider the impact of the corporation on social welfare, rather 
than making this the responsibility of corporate boards.
82
 In this restatement of 
shareholder primacy, directors retain a fiduciary duty to maximise shareholder value 
but are subject to obeying the law as well as meeting legal obligations pertaining to 
non-shareholder constituencies.
83
 In this way, directors ought to cause their 
corporations to respond to market, social as well as normative forces in a way that 




The legislative responsibility imposed would include consideration of the 
impact that corporations have on social welfare.
85
 Because the determination of the 
optimum way to maximise this social welfare often involves much guessing and 
differing legislative interventions, it is best to be left to the legislature.
86
 Despite 
observing the importance of shareholder value maximisation on the part of directors, 





 argues that viewing the corporation merely as a profit maximising 
machine is unrealistic. He applies Lon Fuller’s
89
 two models of human associations in 
constructing a theoretical typology for the corporation and observes the relevance of a 
shared associational principle in the context of the corporation as follows: 
       Each of the corporation’s constituent groups takes part in the association in order to enhance its 
own financial wellbeing. To the extent that the corporation is organized around the shared 
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commitment of the pursuit of profit, it is more likely to be driven apart than bound by the fact that 
each group seeks to maximise its own profit. Because at some point the distribution of corporate 
wealth within the corporation is a zero-sum process, this profit maximization will be in 




He rejects the model of human association based on legal principles on the 
ground that the model does not view the corporation’s role players as functioning 
human beings but rather as ‘abstracted rule bound roles’ consisting of stock-holders, 
officers and directors.
91
 The corporation is viewed as an entity with shared 
commitments and goals, which vary in nature with role players within it not merely 




According to Mitchell, it is the identification of the common goal of a 
cooperative enterprise which is essential in determining its nature.
93
 He criticises the 
goal of profit maximisation, which he sees as prevalent in the law, on the basis that it 
shifts the focus from a variety of other goals that the corporation may pursue as a 
collective enterprise.
94
 This constraining effect in the law encourages immoral 
behaviour on the part of managers (among other corporate constituents) and possesses 
the potential to negatively affect the long-term success of the corporation.
95
 A theory 
that views the nature and purpose of the corporation as solely that of maximising 
wealth for its shareholders imposes limitations on its moral ability to consider the 
effect of its conduct on others.
96
 He posits that where the corporation is broadly 
defined to include the lives of those affected by its activities, it is enabled to 
internalise many of the issues considered to be external to it (such as its impact on 
employees, creditors, suppliers, customers and the community).
97
 
Mitchell observes that according to prevailing empirical evidence, 
corporations whose productive processes create intolerable externalities are ultimately 
made to account for them, until these corporations internalise these externalities. He 
accepts the possibility of his view being incorrect but argues that such a situation 
would be highly unlikely. Acknowledging the necessity of a more comprehensive 
theory explaining his position, he posits the second response as follows: 
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        I believe that if corporate actors are left to their own devices in the society we currently have and 
have an awareness that society expects them to behave in a corporate context as complete 




Whether one agrees with the optimism expressed by Mitchell in his second 
response, it cannot be denied that the insights he shares are critical to the construction 
of a theory of the corporation. Mitchell’s theoretical model is consistent with the 
purpose provisions of the new Companies Act
99
 as it broadly mandates the pursuance 
of goals extending beyond merely profit maximisation. This approach is, in turn, later 
compared to that of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and U.K. Insolvency Act. I now turn to 
a discussion of the potential theoretical linkages that may be drawn from an analysis 
of the theories. 
 
2.3.3. POSSIBLE THEORETICAL LINKAGES 
The shareholder-stakeholder theory debate may be linked to Bottomley’s layered 
distinctions in corporate theory considered earlier, particularly his first distinction.
100
 
The individual may be seen as a representation of the singular shareholder and the 
group as the body of the corporation’s stakeholders.  
An additional linkage may be drawn between Berle & Means’ conception of 
relationships within the corporation and the corporation as concession and stakeholder 
theories. Berle & Means are at pains to emphasise a paradigm shift in thinking, in the 
form of an acknowledgement that the corporation can no longer be operated for the 
sole profitability of its shareholders.
101
 They affirm that the corporation has a duty to 
serve broader society as well.
102
  
If these suggested linkages are accepted, embedded in the public interest 
imperative conception of the corporation is the implicit acknowledgement of the 
critical role that law plays in economic development that promotes aggregate welfare. 
This economic development may arise as a result of legislative interventions, which 
impose barriers or create opportunities for both the corporation and its broader 
stakeholders. In this way, the corporation is also capable of serving as an instrument 
for this form of economic development.  
 As canvassed in the introductory chapter, this aspect may be seen in factors 
such as the corporation’s ability to contribute to employment creation, its productive 
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contribution to gross domestic product and its role as a revenue source for 
infrastructural development among others. The public interest imperative provides a 
justification for the regulation of the corporation and the imposition of welfare 
obligations upon it. From this premise (and if the corporation is accepted as 
possessive of a public interest dimension), corporation law, as a form of legislative 
regulation, ought to create an enabling environment for the corporation’s fulfilment of 
these imperatives.  
 
2.4. CONCLUSION 
In summary, the role that the corporation plays in economic development has 
provided justification for the imposition of regulatory norms for the achievement of 
socio-economic imperatives.
103
 The financial state of a corporation has a profound 
effect on the environment in which it operates, to its stakeholder base as well as the 
general economy. It is this public aspect of the corporation that necessitates both 
governmental intervention and protection, not merely because of the fact of legislative 
incorporation but because it is an association with public obligations.
104
 
There is an alternative justification for regulation. This recognises the value of 
all of the corporation’s stakeholders as a necessary concomitant for the 
competitiveness of the corporation.
105
 While managers rarely engage personally with 
shareholders, they often have to deal with employees (for example in relation to wage 
disputes), suppliers (in relation to supplies), customers (in relation to goods or 
services provided) and communities (in relation to initiatives such as corporate social 
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Which theory guides regulation best? If it is accepted that shareholder theory 
encounters conceptual difficulties in balancing between present and future 
shareholders’ interests (as observed by the theory’s critics), how is the theory to 
account for the vast nature of (often) conflicting stakeholder interests that may be 




 provides a possible response to the latter 
question. Citing Delaware Corporation law as a case study, he highlights the law of 
fiduciary duties as instrumental in resolving this issue. He further argues that a well-
developed body of case law which makes fiduciary duty obligations less open ended, 
as well as a sophisticated judiciary respected in business and legal fraternities, which 
enforces obligations within the framework of shareholder supremacy, are important 
features.
109
 Paredis considers the shareholder primacy norm to be essential in 
protecting shareholders not only against management-director abuses of power but 
also in balancing constituency interests that may conflict with the goal of maximising 
value for the firm.
110
 Stakeholder theorists have, in turn, placed emphasis that the 
interests of stakeholders in most need are to be granted primacy.
111
 
If it is accepted that all other interests are secondary or incidental to the sole 
mandate of shareholder wealth maximisation (however this term is construed), how 
are creditor interests, whose contribution to the corporation is often critical for its 
survival, to be balanced? What value do we attach to the interests of this group of 
stakeholders? What of employees, whose contribution is essential for the practical and 
efficient functioning of the corporation?  
If shareholder theory is accepted as capable of considering these aspects (even 
if incidentally), at which stage would the reconciliation of competing interests 
become possible? What are the likely implications for the theory? It is my view that 
shareholder theory fails to adequately account for the multifaceted nature of interests 
in the corporation and cannot provide a reconciliation of these various interests. This 
position is important within the context of the introductory analysis engaged in earlier 
as well as in the analysis of the Companies Act of 2008. 
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The above theoretical debates inform the paradigm through which the purpose 
provisions of the Companies Act have received discussion in the introductory chapter. 
They further provide a framework through which the analysis of Chapter 6 of the 
Companies Act of 2008 proceeds and how the latter’s critique develops in subsequent 
chapters.  The orientation of both the Act’s purpose provision and its Chapter 6 find 
greater theoretical support in stakeholder theory and this approach is broadly 
supported. However, the conceptual weaknesses highlighted in the introductory 
chapter cannot be ignored and must be addressed.   
 Despite the call for reform, it is recognised that the often divergent interests 
which come to the fore during financial hardship cannot simply be wished away. A 
successful company rescue regime will entail adaptation to a unique economy and 
country-specific attributes as well as a balance where the terrain is often unclear and 
muddy. It is for our purposes important to explore the extent (if at all) to which the 
previous regime responded to these challenges as insights gained therein will 
strengthen the conceptual foundations upon which our new business rescue regime 
will be critiqued. It is in this light, that the previous judicial management regime is 
discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3: JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
An analysis of the judicial management regime, its short-comings as well as an 
exposition of parallel developments in the area of Insolvency law and Labour 
legislation is critical to the proper critique of the Business Rescue regime in chapter 6 
of the Companies Act of 2008. 
This chapter begins by discussing the history of judicial management, 
contextualising the objectives that the system was designed to achieve. Legislative 
changes preceeding and leading up to the Companies Act of 1973’s judicial 
management provisions are outlined. Thereafter, the chapter discusses the following: 
Requirements for initiating judicial management, the effect of the regime on 
subsisting contracts, treatment of creditors, linkages between the 1973 Act and 
Insolvency Law in relation to employees. The chapter will conclude with a discussion 
of the grounds on which proceedings may be terminated as well as criticisms levied 
against judicial management.  
 
3.2. HISTORY OF JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT 
The first company legislation in South Africa was in the form of the Cape Joint Stock 
Act.
1
 This legislation substantially adopted the provisions of its English counterpart.
2
 
These pieces of legislation had already been repealed in the United Kingdom, at the 
time of their adoption in South Africa.
3
 
Judicial management was introduced into South African company law by the 
Companies Act 46 of 1926.4 The impetus behind judicial management is succinctly 
captured in the following lines: 
       A developing economy cannot lightly permit companies which help to comprise its industries and 
commercial enterprises to be dissipated by winding up and dissolution due to some temporary 
setback in cases where there is a reasonable probability that they would, if granted a moratorium, 
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The Act emulated the provisions of the Transvaal Companies Act of 1909, 
which in turn had substantially adopted the provisions of the English Companies 
(Consolidation) Act of 1908.
6
 When the Bill was tabled in Parliament in 1923, the 
following comments were made: 
       …these sections are derived from the practice in England and America under which receivers in 
equity were appointed, in the case of an important concern in regard to which there is some fear 
that it will go into liquidation; one which can pay its debts and which can be helped by someone 




The then Minister of Justice observed: 
       You might have a large wool factory getting into difficulties and which ought to be helped because 
it is an institution which helps the country. Then your court could intervene, when it is shown that 
this concern is [in]solvent, and thus help it through its difficulties…The concerns you would like 
to help with this power are industrial concerns such as factories manufacturing articles in South 




The Companies Act of 1926 introduced a regime designed to step back from 
the automatic winding up of a struggling company.
9
 The procedure would, provided 
that certain conditions were met, supersede a winding-up even where it would 
ordinarily have been just and equitable to do so.
10
  After the enactment of the 1926 
Act, a number of amendments were incorporated.11  
On the 14 October 1963 the Van Wyk de Vries Commission was appointed to 
engage in an enquiry into the efficacy of the Companies Act as well as make 
recommendations on the further amendment of its provisions.
12
 The terms of 
reference for the commission where inter alia as follows: 
(1) To consider what major amendments are required in law relating to the constitution, 
incorporation , registration, management, administration and winding up of companies and 
other associations, and matters incidental thereto…
13
 
                                                     
6
 Cilliers et al (2000) at 23. 
7
 House of Assembly Debates vol 6 1926-02-25 col 996-997 as cited in Olver ‘Judicial Management- A 
Case for Law Reform’ (1986) 49 THRHR at 84. 
8
 My emphasis. Olver (1986) at 84. 
9
  Olver (1980) at 4. 
10
 Olver (1980) at 4. 
11
 Harry Rajak and Johan Henning ‘Business Rescue for South Africa’ (1999) 116 SALJ 262  observe 
that while the process, from its inception in the 1926 Companies Act did not include a moratorium 
on the claims of creditors, it was through the Amendment Act 11 of 1932 that this protection was 
added for the debtor company. They note that this, in turn, had been inspired by the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. 
12
 Van Wyk de Vries Commission of Enquiry into the Companies Act: Main Report (RP 45 of 1970). 
See also Companies Amendment Act 23 of 1939 and Companies Amendment Act 46 of 1952 which 
had been recommended by the earlier Millin Commission. The latter commission had reported an 
increase in the number of companies incorporated, where a growth in registrations from 7 852 
companies in November 1935 to 32 000 by July 1948 was observed. The de Vries Commission at 1, 
commented on this aspect in the following: ‘…If these figures in 1948 were considered to constitute 
an enormous increase, the statistics covering the period since 1948 and up to the present must be 
considered to be startling…’ See further Olver (1980) at 9-10. 
13
 Van Wyk de Vries Commission report (1970) at 1.  
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The commission’s terms of reference were very wide, providing sufficient lee-way for 
it to introduce a number of reforms. Due to weaknesses which were found to affect 
the efficacy of the Companies Act of 1929
14
, the recommendations effectively 
resulted in the commission virtually drafting a new Companies Act
15
: 
The commission was of the view that the exercise of attempting to incorporate 
amendments into the Act, as previous commissions had attempted to do, would 
simply have contributed to further complexity and uncertainty. In relation to judicial 
management, a number of criticisms were observed. The Masters of the Supreme 
Court argued that from a statistical perspective, judicial management only succeeded 
in a small number of cases.
16
 The view was that companies which should not have 
been placed under judicial management were often so placed and the procedure was 
often abused, inevitably resulting in the winding-up and dissolution of companies.
17
 
At the time an order was granted, courts relied too heavily on the view of the 
applicants in relation to the company being able to become a successful concern.
18
 
The commission observed that even at the stage when the order was granted, there 
was no proper and reliable assessment of the company’s prospects of rehabilitation.
19
 
It was the view of the Commission that the interests of the company’s 
creditors ought to be decisive.
20
 It was further recommended that immediately after 
the Master’s appointment of the provisional judicial manager, a meeting of creditors 
and debenture holders be summoned in order to determine whether it would be 
advisable for the company to be placed under judicial management, as well as 
whether the company had reasonable prospects of becoming a successful concern.
21
 
                                                     
14
 A number of observations were made. This included the observation that the Transvaal Companies 
Act of 1909 was found to have been enacted without due regard to differences between South 
African Company Law and its British counterpart, resulting in the legislative provisions being 
inconsistent with the South African common law. Our legislation equated institutions and 
functionaries in England with those in South Africa without accounting for differences. The latter 
point is illustrated by example at 5: ‘…E.g. some provisions in our Act are less effective because the 
original corresponding provisions in the English Act rely for their effectiveness on the existence and 
function of the Board of Trade in England. There is no such body in South Africa. In cases where the 
Board of Trade has been equated with our Minister or our Registrar or even our Master of the 
Supreme Court, the results have not been satisfactory…’ 
15
 Van Wyk de Vries Commission report (1970) at 5. 
16
 Van Wyk de Vries Commission report (1970) at 145. 
17
 Van Wyk de Vries Commission report (1970) at 145. 
18
 Van Wyk de Vries Commission report (1970) at 145; RC Beuthin ‘A Legislation: The Report of the 
Company Law Commission’ (1970) Annual Survey of South African Law 246 page 268; see further 
Olver (1980) at 13.  
19
 Van Wyk de Vries Commission report (1970) at 146.  
20
 Van Wyk de Vries Commission report (1970) at 146. 
21
  Van Wyk de Vries Commission report (1970) at 146; Beuthin (1970) at 268. 
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This was cited as a critical component of the recommendations.
22
 Despite its 
weaknesses, the question regarding whether to abandon the rescue regime remained 
contested terrain.
23
 Judicial management was retained in the subsequent Companies 
Act.
24
 Having provided a brief outline of the historical aspect and context of the 1973 
Act, a discussion of the 1973 Act’s provisions relating to judicial management 
follows. 
 
3.3. RELEVANT PROVISIONS 
For the purposes of this part of the chapter, it is important that the definition of 
judicial management be discussed for two reasons.  The first is that it allows for a 
purposive interpretation of judicial management as a rescue regime.
25
 The second is 
that it provides insight into the thresholds that had to be met in order for a company to 
have recourse to judicial management.  
 Unlike the concept of ‘business recue’, which is defined in the Companies 
Act
26
, judicial management was not defined in the Companies Act of 1973. Shrand
27
 
describes judicial management as a temporary respite granted by the court to an ailing 
company in order to enable it to overcome its financial difficulties, placing such a 
company in the hands of a third party specifically appointed for this purpose.  
 Burdette
28
 describes judicial management as a mechanism that may be used 
by a company finding itself experiencing a temporary financial set-back due to either 
mismanagement or what the Act refers to as ‘any other cause’.
29
 The purpose of the 
mechanism is to restore the company to financial health.
30
  The struggling company’s 
                                                     
22
  Beuthin (1970) at 269. 
23
  This aspect is evident in the commissions main report see Main Report of the Companies Act 
Commission of Enquiry RP 45 1970 chapter xx p 145 para 51.02 where it is stated: 
       ‘The Masters of the Supreme Court have all urged the Commission to recommend the abolition of 
judicial management. They have submitted that the statistics prove that judicial management has 
been successful in only a small percentage of cases and that in many instances it should never 
have never have been resorted to. Furthermore, that the system of judicial management is being 
abused and that it proves to be the first step in an inevitable succession of events leading to the 
winding-up and ultimate dissolution of the company.’ 
24
 Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
25
 Such discussion links with the historical background briefly discussed above. 
26
 Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
27
 David Shrand The Law and Practice of Insolvency Winding-Up of Companies and Judicial 
Management (1977) Juta Publishers at 326. 
28
 DA Burdette ‘Some Initial Thoughts on the Development of a Modern and Effective Business 
Rescue Model for South Africa (Part 1)’ (2004) 16 South African Mercantile Law Journal 241. 
29
 Burdette (Part 1) at 246. See further section 427 of the Companies Act of 1973. 
30
 Burdette (Part 1) at 246. 
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, applying a creative approach to defining judicial management, 
considers the contents and requirements of both the provisional and final judicial 
management orders and reaches a conclusion similar to that of Burdette.
33
 In 
describing judicial management Loubser notes the following: 
       …One has to rely on the requirements for and contents of both a provisional and final judicial 
management order to explain its nature and purpose. Essentially, a judicial management order 
vests the management of an unsuccessful company in a judicial manager under the supervision of 





She further describes the vesting of management in a third party as well as a 
divestiture of powers of persons who are in current management of the company as 
incidences of judicial management. Judicial management only recognised the rescue 




3.4. REQUIREMENTS FOR JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT 




       (1) When any company by reason of mismanagement or for any other cause— 
          (a) is unable to pay its debts or is probably unable to meet its obligations and 
          (b) has not become or is prevented from becoming a successful concern, 
        and there is a reasonable probability that, if it is placed under judicial management, it will be    
enabled to pay its debts or meet its obligations and become a successful concern, the Court 





The provision may be distilled as follows: 
       (i)       By reason of mismanagement; 
 (a)    The company is unable to pay its debts or meet its obligations; 
 (b)    The company is prevented from becoming a successful concern; 
(ii)   A reasonable probability that if placed under judicial management, the 
company will become a successful concern; 
(iii)     It is just and equitable that the order be granted. 
                                                     
31
 Burdette (Part 1) at 246. 
32
 Anneli Loubser Some Comparative Aspects of Corporate Rescue in South African Company Law 
(LLD Thesis University of Pretoria 2010). 
33
 Loubser (2010) at 17. 
34
 Loubser (2010) at page 17. 
35
 As will be expounded upon later in the chapter.   
36
 Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
37
 Companies Act 61 of 1973, section 427(1). 
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These five aspects are relevant where a judicial management order is to be 
granted by court and are discussed in turn. 
 
3.4.1. BY REASON OF MISMANAGEMENT 
In relation to the phrase ‘by reason of mismanagement’ Loubser
38
 observes the 
following: 
       The second part of the general proviso, namely that the reason for the company’s problems could 
be mismanagement or any other cause, derives from the wording of the original provisions dating 
from 1926. However, in terms of s 195(1) of the Companies Act of 1936, mismanagement on its 
own constituted a ground for judicial management. That is not the case under the present Act. In 
the Companies Act of 1973 the reference to mismanagement thus appears to be completely 
unnecessary and meaningless, given the fact that no particular or special reasons for the financial 




   
Meskin et al put forward the view that a significant number of cases decided 
under the corresponding provisions of the 1926 Act were based on the principle of 
non-interference on the part of the courts in the internal workings of a company.
40
 As 
a result, judicial management was viewed by the courts as inappropriate where 
difficulties faced by the company were attributable to disputes between those 
controlling it.
41
 They raise doubts as to whether this approach gave effect to 
legislative intention and argue that the court in terms of section 472(1) was vested 






, argue that the cause of the temporary financial set-back may 
have been ‘mismanagement or other special circumstances’.
44
 It is not clear whether 
the authors envisage mismanagement as a separate test or whether they are simply 
making reference to the relevant section.  In Western Credit
45
, commenting on this 
                                                     
38
 Anneli Loubser ‘Judicial Management as a Business Rescue Procedure in South African Corporate 
Law’ (2004) 16 South African Mercantile Law Journal 136. 
39
 Loubser (2004) at 142. 
40
 Meskin et al Henochsberg on the Companies Act 61 of 1973 online available at: 
http://www.mylexisnexis.co.za.ezproxy.uct.ac.za/Index.aspx accessed on the 30 October 2015 at 
925. 
41
 Meskin et al op cit note 42 at 925. 
42
 Meskin et al op cit note 42 at 925. The authors do, however, concede that the cause is relevant for 
the purposes of identifying the chances of the company achieving the goals of the section. As a 
result, irreconcilable differences between directors may point to the probability of success being 
remote. 
43
 Cilliers et al (2000) at para 26.01. 
44
 My emphasis. See Harry Rajak Insolvency Law Theory and Practice (1993) London: Sweet & 
Maxwell at 305. In defining the purpose of judicial management Rajak also makes use of the term ‘or 
other special circumstances’. 
45
 Lief v Western Credit (Africa) (Pty) Ltd 1966 (3) SA 344 (W) at 348. 
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phrase, the court distinguished between instances where a judicial management order 
would be granted as opposed to an order for liquidation: 
       A winding-up order is usually granted where a company is in fact insolvent, whereas a judicial 
management order is usually granted where a solvent company has run into financial difficulties 
because of mismanagement and because there is hope that with better management it will 
overcome its difficulties… 
 
Even though the section applies the words ‘by reason of’, implying a causal 
link between mismanagement and the financial hardship consequently suffered by the 
company, the words ‘or for any other cause’ render the perceived requirement for the 




3.4.2. INABILITY TO PAY DEBTS  
The company must be unable to pay its debts or meet its obligations.
47
 Therefore in 
order to have recourse to the judicial management provisions of the Act, the company 
must be commercially insolvent.
48




Due to the 1973 Act not having defined the word ‘obligations’, it has been 
suggested that the granting of an order for judicial management required proving to 
the court that the company was in fact unlikely to be able to meet its obligations in 
future.
50
 Olver seems to be in agreement with this interpretation, arguing that the 
inability to pay debtors would also include the future inability of a company to 
perform a contractual obligation as opposed to the mere payment of a debt.
51
  
Loubser has narrowed the temporal aspect, advancing the view that the future 
being referred to must either be immediate or foreseeable.
52
 This has an effect on the 
moment at which a company can apply for judicial management, and consequently its 
                                                     
46
 It is to be noted that no reference is made to ‘special circumstances’ in section 147 as argued by 
Cilliers et al, which would lead one to conclude that no causal link between the conduct of 
management and the poor financial state of the company need be proven. 
47
 Companies Act of 1973, section 427. 
48
 Loubser (2004) at 143 views the inability to meet obligations as an alternative to the inability on the 
part of the company to pay its debts; Loubser South Comparative Aspects to Corporate Rescue in 
South African Company Law (LLD dissertation 2010 Unisa) at 22. The authors in Henochsberg on 
the Companies Act 61 of 1973 at 926 argue that the provisions of section 345 would be inapplicable 
in this context but concede that the inability could extend to obligations beyond the simple payment 
of a debt. 
49
 Bahnemann v Fritzmore Exploration (Pty) Ltd 1963 (2) SA 249 (T) at 251; Ben-Tovim v Ben-Towim 
and Others 2003 (3) SA 325 (C) at 331; Porterstraat 69 Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v PA Venter 
Worcester (Pty) Ltd 2000 (4) SA 598 (C).  
50
 Loubser (2010) at 22. 
51
 Olver (1980) at 50. 
52
 Loubser (2010) at 22. 
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perceived chances of survival or restoration to solvency once proceedings have 
commenced. 
Even though a discussion of this aspect may seem purely academic at this 
stage
53
, it remains relevant. The stage at which a corporation is able to have recourse 
to the protective mechanisms of a rescue regime often determines the probability of 
the process being successful.
54
 In the 2008 Companies Act, this aspect is clearly 
illustrated by the test of ‘financial distress’ read with the Act’s ‘reckless trading’ 
provisions.55 The test for ‘financial distress’ is forward looking. This aspect is 
comprehensively canvassed in Chapter 4. 
 
3.4.3. SUCCESSFUL CONCERN  
The 1973 Act did not indicate instances and circumstances where the company can be 
said to be ‘prevented from becoming a successful concern’.
56
 Many questions 
remained regarding the purpose of this provision as well as what it was intended to 
achieve. Loubser argues that the vagueness of the phrase added difficulty to proving 
all requirements for judicial management.
57
 She however raises the possibility of an 
alternative interpretation: 
      By contrast, the requirement could be an important and sensible alternative to the first requirement 
(albeit with some amendments to the wording), in that a company which is still able to pay its 
debts and to meet its obligations but obviously struggling to do so and probably heading for 
disaster (and clearly qualifying as a concern which is not successful), could be placed under 
judicial management at a time when its chances of being rescued are far better than they would be 




It is a requirement that it be further shown that upon the judicial management 
order being granted, the company will be capable of becoming a successful concern.59  
The enquiry in terms of the provision is whether the company would be enabled to (i) 
become a successful concern if it is placed under judicial management and whether 
(ii) it is just and equitable to grant the order.60 It has been held that a provisional order 
may not be used as a ‘fishing mechanism’ for determining whether the company will 
in fact become a successful concern.
61
 The word ‘will’ in section 432(2) has been 
                                                     
53
 In light of the new Companies Act of 2008. 
54
 Pieter Kloppers ‘A Corporate Rescue Mechanism in Need of Reform?’ (1999) 10 Stellenbosch Law 
Review at 431. 
55
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 128 read with section 22(1)&(2). 
56
 Companies Act of 1973, section 427 (1)(b). 
57
 Loubser (2004) at 144. 
58
 Loubser (2004) at 144. 
59
 Companies Act of 1973, section 427 (1). 
60
 Cilliers et al (2000) at 481. 
61
 See Noordkaap Lewnhawe Ko-operasie Bpk v Shreuder en ‘n Ander 1974 SA 102 (A) at 110; Kotze 
v Tulryk Bpk 1977 (3) SA 118 (T) at 120. 
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described as requiring the applicant to provide proof of virtual certainty that the 
company will become a successful concern.
62
 The company was required to be able to 
pay its debts or meet its obligations and become a successful concern within a 
reasonable time.
63
 The courts have, however, not sought to attach a specific time 
frame as to what would constitute a reasonable time and it is submitted that its 
determination would depend on the circumstances of the case. 
 
3.4.4. REASONABLE PROBABILITY   
The Court has discretion whether or not to grant the order for judicial management.
64
 
Cilliers et al argue that the requirement of a reasonable probability that the company 
be able to pay its debts or meet its obligations as well as become a successful concern 
only applied at the phase where the provisional judicial management order is sought.
65
 
In their view, on the return day the applicable test would simply be whether the 
company would be enabled to become a successful concern if placed under judicial 
management and whether the balances of justice and equity favour this.
66
 They view 
this test
67
 as more stringent than one of ‘reasonable probability’, which they argue 
finds application at the provisional order stage. Their basis for this view is that on the 
return day, the court is in a better position to judge the company’s prospects.
68
 As will 
be observed from a discussion of case law below, the applicable test has received 
conflicting views from the courts. 
In Weinberg and Another v Modern Motors
69
 the court cautioned that a 
determination as to whether a reasonable prospect exists constitutes a finding of fact 
based on the information before it. A confident hope as expressed in affidavits 
without concrete evidence was found to be insufficient.
70
  
 The court in Tenowitz and another v Tenny Investments
71
 , per Smalberger J 
(as he then was), said:  
                                                     
62
 Loubser (2004) at 144. The content of this section has received conflicting interpretations in the 
Tenowitz and Ex parte Onus cases supra. 
63
 See Irvin and Johnson v Oelofse Fisheries Ltd 1954 (1) SA 231 (E) at 237. 
64
 Companies Act of 1973 section 427. See generally Maynard v Office Appliance SA (Pty)(Ltd) 1929 
WLD 290. 
65
 Cilliers et al (2000) at para 26.10.  
66
 Cilliers et al (2000) at para 26.10. 
67
 That the company will become a successful concern. 
68
 Cilliers et al (2000) para 26.10. Despite their view regarding the stringency of the applicable test, 
they however note the conflicting approaches in case law. 
69
 Weinberg and Another v Modern Motors (Cape Town) Pty Ltd 1954 (3) SA 998 (C). 
70
 Weinberg supra at 390. 
71
 Tenowitz and another v Tenny Investments (Pty) Ltd supra. 
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       The test to be satisfied before a final judicial management order is granted is therefore a more 
stringent one than applies to the granting of a provisional judicial management order. The test 
propounded by section 432 of the Act for the granting of the final judicial management order is 
also more stringent than that under the s 195 of the old Companies Act 46 of 1926 which only 
postulated the reasonable probability test. The use of the word ‘will’ in s 432 of the Act would 
seem to suggest that there must be a strong probability amounting to a near certainty that the 




A different approach has been followed in other cases. In granting a final 
judicial management order it has been held that the essential question for the purposes 
of section 427 is whether the company is in fact capable of a reasonable chance of 
recovery with judicial management.
73
  The Appellate Division
74
 subsequently 
confirmed a reasonable probability as the applicable test.
75
 It held that a reasonable 
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 My emphasis. At 683. 
73
 Guttman v Sunlands Township (Pty) Ltd 1962 (2) SA 348 (C) 351-52. See Ex parte Onus (Edms) 
Bpk supra. In this case the court, per LC Steyn J (as he then was) concluded that the requirement to 
be met in seeking to obtain a final judicial management order did not differ from that required in 
obtaining a provisional order. See further Du Plooy v Onus (Edms) Bpk 1980 (4) SA 63 (O); Kotze v 
Tulryk Bpk supra; Ladybrand Hotel (Pty) Ltd v Segal 1975 (2) SA 357 (O). 
74
 Noordkaap Lewendehawe Ko-op Bpk supra at 109-110. 
75
 Ibid.  
76
 Ibid. A word of caution is to be sounded. In this case the court was asked to interpret the provisions 
of section 195 (1) of the Companies Act 46 of 1926 rather than the Companies Act of 1973. This 
notwithstanding, it is submitted that the same test would be applicable in the granting of a final 
judicial management order in terms of section 432 and that the case is reflective of the correct 
approach. 
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3.4.5. JUST AND EQUITABLE  
It must be ‘just and equitable’ for the order to be granted.
77
 The phrase is not defined 
in the 1973 Act. Further, no conditions are provided to illustrate instances where it 
can be said to have been satisfied.  Notwithstanding the fact that an applicant may be 
able to prove both part (a) and (b) of the requirements in section 427, the court retains 
discretion to not grant the order where it is of the view that to do so would not be just 
and equitable.
78
  It would seem that the dominant interpretation (and starting point) as 
to what is ‘just and equitable’ is the view that an order for judicial management is a 
special privilege to be granted in very special circumstances.
79
  
It has been argued that the content of the words ‘just and equitable’ includes 
an analysis on the part of the court as to what would be in the best interests of the 
company’s shareholders and creditors.
80
 The size and economic impact of the 
company seeking a judicial management order would constitute relevant factors in 
determining whether it would be just and equitable to grant the order.
81
 Even though 
the size of an entity is a relevant consideration in the enquiry, it is neither determinate 
nor definitive 
In judgments following upon Tobacco Auctioneers the approach followed 
seems expansive in orientation, where the ‘best interests’ of not only the company’s 
creditors but those of the company and applicants in a matter were taken into account 
in the determining what the court considered to be just and equitable.
82
 It is submitted 
further that this is a significant difference to previous constructions adopted by courts 
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 Section 427(1). It would seem that the courts have not provided a closed list of factors which would 
constitute ‘just and equitable’ circumstances, having often relied on a variety of factors in 
determining whether such circumstances exist or not. See Guttman and others v Sunlands Township 
(Pty) Ltd supra cf Tobacco Auctions Ltd v Aw Hamilton (Pvt) Ltd 1966 (2) SA 451 (R) at 453B. 
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 Burdette (Part 1) at 248; De Jager v Karoo Koeldranke & Roomys (Edms) Bpk 1956 (3) 594 (C) at 
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 See Silverman v Doornhoek Mines Ltd supra at 353; Weinberg and Another v Modern Motors (Cape 
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81
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82
 Le Roux Hotel Management supra at para 47. 
83
 See Silverman v Doornhoek Mines Ltd supra; Smith v Doornhoek Mines Ltd 1935 TPD 349; 
Ladybrand Hotel (Pty) Ltd v Segal and Another supra at 359; Kotze v Tulryk Bpk en n Ander supra 
at 122; Rustomjee v Rustomjee (Pty) Ltd 1960 (2) SA 753 (D) at 758; Ronaasen and Others v 
Ronaasen & Morgan (Pty) Ltd 1935 CPD 562 at 563. 
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3.4.6. AN ALTERNATIVE TO WINDING-UP      
The 1973 Act allowed for a winding-up order to be converted into an order for 
judicial management where the requirements of section 427(3) were satisfied. It 
would have to be shown that the conversion of winding-up proceedings to judicial 
management would result in the company becoming a successful concern and that the 
granting of the order would be just and equitable. Despite this, proceedings could not 
be initiated only on the basis that judicial management would result in a more 




3.5. AMBIT OF JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT   
Only companies could have recourse to the procedure.
85
 Persons entitled to apply for 
judicial management included the company itself and any of its creditors or 
members.
86
 The definition excluded partnerships, close corporations and Trusts. 
Loubser argues that due to the substantially higher investor funds and creditor claims 
often involved, judicial management was more geared towards large companies and 
was often too costly and inappropriate for small businesses.
87
 She further observes 
that in the case of close corporations, section 72 of the Close Corporations Act of 
1984 caters for the rescue of this enterprise through a compromise procedure which is 




3.6. JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT PROCEEDINGS 
Where an application was made to initiate judicial management, an applicant was 
required to first lodge a copy of the application (with supporting affidavits) with the 
Master of the High Court in which the judicial management application would be 
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 See Millman v Swartland Huis Meubileerders (Edms) Bpk 1972 (1) SA 741 (C). The ability of the 
regime to enable a wind up which would be more advantageous for creditors at a later stage was 
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 Loubser (2004) at 142, footnote 34. 
  51 
heard.
89
 An application could be brought by any person(s) entitled to apply for the 
company to be wound up.
90
  After lodgement with the Master, the application would 
be filed at court.  
In the initial application, it was not necessary for the applicant to inform 
creditors of the impending application for judicial management.
91
 However, section 
197B(1)
92
 requires an employer finding itself in financial difficulties which may result 
in a sequestration or winding-up to advise its employees of such circumstances. Even 
though this section
93
 does not make specific reference to judicial management, 
Loubser argues that due to its wide ambit, it would find application where an 
employer company contemplates making application for a judicial management 
order.
94
 She further observes, correctly, that this is reflective of a drafting 
inconsistency between the judicial management regime in the 1973 Companies Act 
and certain provisions of labour legislation.
95
 It was only at the stage where the final 
judicial management order was sought were the company’s creditors were required to 
be informed of the application.
96
 This aspect is important in the light of the hypothesis 
raised by the thesis and is expanded upon later in the chapter. 
 
3.6.1. THE PROVISIONAL ORDER 
Having heard the application, the court was entitled to grant a provisional order for 
judicial management and state the return day, dismiss the application or make any 
other order it considered appropriate.
97
 Custody and control of the company vested in 
the Master, who would transfer it to the provisional judicial manager and ultimately, 
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 Companies Act of 1973, section 427(2). This includes the company, contingent or prospective 
creditors, its members or all these persons jointly. 
91
 Companies Act of 1973, section 427(2). 
92
 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
93
 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, section 197B(1).  
94
 Loubser (2004) at 152. 
95
 Loubser (2004) at 152. 
96
 Companies Act of 1973, sections 431 & 432. 
97
 The return day must not exceed a period of 30 days from the granting of the provisional order for 
judicial management. See sections 432(1) and 428(1). Section 428(1) makes use of the term ‘deems 
just’. There seems to be consensus between commentators that this would not include an order for 
winding up mero motu. A specific application for the company to be wound up would have to be 
made. In the absence of such application, the court would merely discharge the provisional order. 
See Henochsberg on the 1973 Act at 941; Blackman et al Companies Act at 15-19. 
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the final judicial manager.
98
  
A meeting must be convened by the Master of the High Court or a 
magistrate.
99
 The purpose of the meeting is to conduct a discussion into the following: 
A consideration of the report by the provisional judicial manager as well as his/her 
view regarding (i) the prospects of the company becoming a successful concern as 
well as whether (ii) it is desirable to place the company under judicial management
100
 
(iii), the nomination of person(s) whose name(s) would be submitted to the Master for 
appointment as final judicial manager(s)
101
 and (iv) proving creditor claims. Creditors 
would, in addition, have had to consider whether to enter into a resolution providing 
preference for post-commencement liabilities over pre-judicial management 
unsecured liabilities in terms of section 435(1).102 
Once appointed, the duties of the provisional judicial manager would include: 
(i) assuming control of the assets of the company as well as its management (ii) 
preparing a report on the state of the company, its assets, liabilities and details of 
creditor claims (iii) providing reasons for the company’s financial problems as well as 
how he/she intends to raise capital necessary to return the company to solvency and 
(iv) expressing an opinion as to the prospects of the company becoming a successful 
concern as well as how the judicial manager intends to remove barriers currently 




3.6.2. THE FINAL ORDER 
On the return date the court was required to consider the wishes of creditors, the 
report of the provisional judicial manager as well as the number of creditor claims 
that had not been proven at the first meeting of creditors (including the value of such 
claims).
104
 Where the court was of the view that the granting of the final order would 
enable the company to become a successful concern and that it was in fact just and 
                                                     
98
 Companies Act 1973, sections 429 & 433. The reason for the vesting on the part of the Master has 
been explained on the basis of preventing the prospect of company property being dissipated during 
the periods between the granting of the order and the appointment of the provisional judicial 
manager. See Loubser (2004) at 153. 
99
 Companies Act of 1973, section 429(b)(ii). 
100
 Companies Act of 1973, section 431(2)(a) read with section 430(c). 
101
 Companies Act of 1973, section 431(2)(b). 
102
 Companies Act of 1973. It was a further requirement that the proceedings, conclusions drawn in the 
meeting as well as the reasons for conclusions drawn be recorded by the Chairman and presented to 
court. 
103
 Companies Act of 1973, section 430 (a)-(c). 
104
 Companies Act of 1973, section 432. 
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equitable to do so, it would grant the order.
105
 Factors which were considered 
included the scarcity of information presented, the merits of the application as 
gathered from the papers and the affidavits produced by both the Master and 
provisional judicial manager.
106
 The powers of the final judicial manager would be 
subject to the company’s memorandum of association, to the extent that this was not 




3.7. THE CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT 
3.7.1. MORATORIUM ON LEGAL PROCEEDINGS 
A moratorium can be described as the suspension of all claims against the company 
subject to judicial management proceedings. It does not serve to discharge the 
company from the payment of its debts but rather provides it with much needed 
breathing space during judicial management.
108
 The Act makes allowance for the 




The extent to which a moratorium was implied upon the granting of a final 
judicial management order has been the subject of much debate. Olver argues that it 
was generally accepted by authorities that judicial management implied a moratorium 
on proceedings; it was, however, still necessary for a specific order to be made.
110
  
Loubser seems to agree with this view, arguing that the 1973 Act did not provide for 
an automatic moratorium and that applications for judicial management would have to 
contain this specific prayer on the papers.
111
 
Olver further observes that where no moratorium had been granted, the 
judicial manager could raise section 434 as a defence against a pre-judicial 
management creditor wishing to enforce its claim.
112
 The section provides that any 
monies raised during the judicial management process are allocated to the costs 
associated with initiating judicial management and subsequently to the costs 
associated with the running of the business. Any excess monies would then be paid to 




 Ladybrand Hotel (Pty) Ltd v Segal and another supra. 
107
 Companies Act of 1973, section 433. 
108
 Loubser (2010) at 32. 
109
 Companies Act of 1973, section 428(2)(c). 
110
 Olver (1980) at page 66. 
111
 Loubser (2004) at 153. In her later work, Loubser (2010) at 32 observes that it is unclear whether a 
court could order a moratorium on some actions or whether the court was required to order a 
moratorium on all actions and further argues that the moratorium would most likely include a stay 
on criminal actions as well. Compare with section 133 of the new Act (71 of 2008) discussed in 
Chapter 4. For further reading, see Cilliers et al (2000) at 483. 
112
 Companies Act of 1973. Olver (1980) at 67. 
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the claims of pre-judicial management creditors. This aspect will receive further 
consideration when the 1973 Act’s treatment of creditors is discussed.  
 
3.7.2. EFFECT ON CONTRACTS 
The judicial manager could apply to court to set aside any undue preferences made to 
creditors, provided that such preferences were made while the company was unable to 
pay its debts.
113
 The provision allowed for a reversal of transactions which were 
financially prejudicial to the majority of the company’s creditors, even if made prior 
to the institution of judicial management proceedings.
114
 It has been argued that the 
judicial manager could not refuse counter performance in terms of an uncompleted 





3.7.3. TREATMENT OF CREDITORS 
In addition to the powers of creditors relating to initiating judicial management 
proceedings
116
, creditor interests were catered for in provisions relating to nomination 
of the judicial manager
117
, the application of assets after commencement and 
provisions relating to consent to preference.
118
 The judicial manager was not 




Section 434 was first introduced by the Companies Act Amendment Act
120
 in 
the form of section 197B, which provided for assets to be applied to the payment of 
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 Companies Act of 1973, section 436. 
114
 Companies Act of 1973, section 436(1). See further sections 26-34 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 
relating to dispositions without value, voidable and undue preferences to creditors, collusive 
dealings before sequestration, setting aside of improper dispositions and the voidable sale of 
business. This is to be compared to seemingly similar-but-practically toothless provisions in the 
2008 Act relating to the powers of the business rescue practitioner. They, with greatest respect, do 
not go far enough in vesting the practitioner with tangible powers to retrieve monies where 
prejudicial or suspicious transactions have been entered into by the company prior to 
commencement of business rescue proceedings. Even though relevant for the purposes of broad 
discussion, practitioner powers are not given comprehensive discussion in the thesis. 
115
 Bertelsman et al Mars The Law of Insolvency in South Africa 9
 
ed (2008) Claremont: Juta & Co. Ltd 
at 222-225. It is to be noted that the observations made therein apply within the context of 
insolvency and sequestration of an estate as opposed to judicial management proceedings. 
116
 Companies Act of 1973, section 427(2). 
117
 Companies Act of 1973, sections 429, 431(2)(b) & (4). 
118
 Companies Act of 1973, sections 434 & 435. 
119
 Companies Act of 1973, section 434(1). The courts have differed on this aspect .In Ex parte 
vermaak 1964 3 SA 175 (O) leave was granted to the judicial manager to sell all the assets of the 
company as a going concern whereas in Ex parte Paterson: In re Good Earth Estates (Pty) Ltd 
1974 4 SA 281 (E) this was refused. What is clear from both cases is that the courts have discretion 
to permit or deny such transactions. 
120
 Companies Act Amendment Act 11 of 1932. 
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the costs, charges and expenses incurred in relation to judicial management and 
thereafter, the claims of creditors in a manner similar to that of insolvency law.
121
 The 
section was later replaced by a new section 197B.
122
 Sub-section 1 of the amended 
section 197B directed the judicial manager to apply monies, which became available 
to pay the costs of judicial management as well as satisfy the claims of creditors.  
A proviso, in the form of sub-section (1) (a)
123
 provided that where the 
manager continued the business in terms of the judicial management order, monies 
were to be used in the conduct of the business. The 1939 Act provided for pre-judicial 
management creditors to be able to consent to preference.
124
 The section further 
mandated that costs of judicial management as well as the claims of creditors were to 
be paid in a manner similar to that of Insolvency law.
125
  
The recommendations of the Millin Commission introduced reforms to this 
section and occasioned a shift in emphasis.
126
  In relation to the then new section 
197B introduced by the 1939 amendment Act, the Commission expressed criticism as 
follows: 
        …This new section 197B, it should be noted, was not recommended by the Commission of 1935-
36. In our opinion it is very far from being an improvement on the previous state of the law. By 
putting the emphasis on the use of the company’s funds for the payment out of the claims of 
creditors and making the carrying on of the company’s business a secondary matter, sight was lost 
of the whole purpose of judicial management, which is the conservation and the management of 
the assets of the company in such a way as to enable it eventually to be restored to the 
shareholders as a going concern. The new section 197B, we find, has acted as a direct 
encouragement to judicial managers to make no serious attempt to carry on the company’s 
business but to proceed at once to liquidate its assets for the purpose of paying creditors such a 
dividend as may be available. Thus judicial management where it is allowed to take its course, is 
established as a process of winding-up without any kind of control by creditors or opportunity for 




In order to prevent an appointed judicial manager from liquidating the 
company once proceedings had begun, the commission recommended that a sale of 
company assets outside the ordinary course of business only be permitted where leave 
of court is granted.
128
  The Commission further proposed an amendment to section 
197B to the effect that any monies becoming available during judicial management be 
applied first to costs in involved in conducting the company’s business and then, in so 
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 Companies Act Amendment Act 11 of 1932. 
122
 Introduced by the Companies Amendment Act 23 of 1939. 
123
 Of section 197B, Companies Amendment Act 23 of 1939. 
124
 Companies Amendment Act 23 of 1939, section 197B(1)(b). See further Olver (1980) at 127. 
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 Companies Amendment Act 23 of 1939, section 197B(2). 
126
 Millin Commission Report (UG 69 of 1948) at 7. 
127
 Millin Commission Report (UG 69 of 1948) at 94. 
128
 Millin Commission Report (UG 69 of 1948) at 95. 
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far as circumstances allow, the payment of creditors.
129
 The treatment of creditor 
claims as well the different interpretations adopted in defining its ambit and limitation 
is discussed next. 
 
3.7.3.1. PRE AND POST JUDICIAL MANAGEMEN CREDITORS 
The 1973 Act does not provide a definition for the word ‘creditor’. The Concise 





 argues that section 435(1)(a) created two categories of concurrent 
creditors, consisting of those whose claims arose before judicial management and 
post-commencement concurrent creditors.
132
 As briefly observed earlier, pre-judicial 
management concurrent creditors ranked ahead of post-commencement concurrent 
creditors in terms of the payment of their claims.
133
  
The preference is exclusive of the costs of judicial management, which have a 
high priority.
134
 Post-judicial management concurrent creditors would, however, rank 
equally among themselves and in the order in which the company incurred liability in 
relation to them.
135
   If the company was subsequently to be wound up, this preference 
would continue to remain in force subject to the provisions relating to the proof of 
creditor claims in terms of the law of insolvency.
136
 Post-commencement concurrent 
creditors could not demand preference in the absence of the resolution stated above.
137
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 Subsequent to the Millin Commission proposals, the Companies Amendment Act 46 of 1952 was 
enacted into law. See Harry Rajak & Johan Henning (1999) at 265-6. 
130
 Oxford University Press South African Concise Oxford Dictionary (2009) at 271. It is to be noted 
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definition is that provided for in the word ‘independent creditor’. 
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 Shrand (1977) at 336. 
132
 Shrand (1977) at 336. 
133
 Section 434(2). Unless if pre-judicial management creditors accorded preference to post-judicial 
management creditors in a meeting, through the adoption of a resolution in terms of  section 435(1) 
read with 429(b)(ii). See generally Klopper en ‘n ander NNO v Die Meeste en andere NNO 1977 
(2) SA 477 (T).   
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 Companies Act of 1973, section 435. 
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 Companies Act of 1973, section 435 (1)(a) & (b) read with s 429 and s 431(2)(d). 
136
 Companies Act of 1973, section 435(1)(b)(i) read with section 366. 
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 See Klopper en n ander NNO v Die Meest en andere NNO supra. Here the court dealt with section 
197(B)(1) which is identical to section 435 of the 1973 Act. Providing a restrictive interpretation, 
the court found that the expression ‘costs incurred by the judicial manager’ were to be regarded 
similarly to ‘costs of administration in the winding-up’ meaning management costs and specifically 
exclusive of expenditure incurred in conducting the company’s business. I submit that this approach 
is unduly restrictive. In Norman Kennedy v Norman Kennedy Ltd 1947 (1) SA 790 (C) a wider 
interpretation was adopted.  However, the approach in Norman Kennedy was overruled by the 
Appellate division in Wire Industries Steel Products and Engineering Co (Coastal) Ltd v Surtees 
NO and Heath NO 1953 (2) SA 531 (AD). 
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This approach may be contrasted with the provisions of the Companies Act 71 
of 2008, where a preference is created by operation of law for certain categories of 
post-business rescue commencement claims in terms of section 135.
139
 The question 
to be posed therefore is how, if at all, were the interests of employees balanced as 
against the interests of other unsecured creditors during judicial management 
proceedings in terms of the 1973 Act? This question is essential to understanding 
variations in the manner in which South African legislation has dealt with the often 
unclear and contentious issue of balancing creditor rights in the Act.
140
 A discussion 
of this aspect follows. 
 
3.7.3.2. EMPLOYEES AND ‘OTHER CREDITORS’  
The 1973 Companies Act’s omission of any reference to the specific treatment of 
employees in respect of remuneration and similar payments prior to and during 
judicial management was a peculiar feature of the Act. Section 434(2) and (3) 
provides possible insight into the manner in which the 1973 Act (in its own 
provisions) sought to deal with the competing interests raised in this thesis
141
:  
       (2)  Any monies of the company becoming available to the judicial manager shall be applied by 
him in paying the costs of the judicial management and in the conduct of the company’s 
business in accordance with the judicial management order and so far as the circumstances 
permit in the payment of claims of creditors which arose before the date of the order.  
       (3) The costs of the judicial management and the claims of creditors of the company shall be paid 
mutatis mutandis in accordance with the law relating to insolvency as if those costs were costs 




  amplify the distinction drawn by the Act between the ‘costs of 
judicial management’ and those relating to ‘the conduct of the company’s business’. 
They articulate the latter in the following manner: 
       …By the [conduct of the company’s business], it is submitted, is meant that the total expenditure 
which the continuation of the company’s operation entails (e.g. in respect of employees’ wages, 
charges for the supply of essential services such as water or electricity…) including the amounts of 
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 Shrand (1977) at 336. See further Henochsberg on the Companies Act of 1973 at 950. 
139
 This aspect is discussed in Chapter 4 of the thesis in greater detail. 
140
  Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
141
 See broad discussion of this section and various amendments which culminated in it in the earlier 
part of the chapter. Michael Blackman ‘The Employee and the Insolvent Company’ (1993) 14 
Industrial Law Journal at 560. As will be seen from the discussion of the 2008 Act in later 
chapters, the ambit and degree of employee participation has been significantly enhanced. Chapter 
6 of the 2008 Companies Act ensures that employees are vested with a barrage of rights from the 
beginning of the process right up to its end both as employee creditors specifically as well as 
forming part of a broader group of the company’s creditors. 
142
 Meskin et al Henochsberg on the Companies Act of 1973. 
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all post-judicial management liabilities. It is submitted that the intention is that during the final 
judicial management, in addition to the costs of judicial management, all such expenditure must be 
discharged, i.e. in so far as it comprises the amounts of post-judicial management liabilities, even if 





In line with this view, employee wage and salary payments relating to both 
pre- and post-commencement of judicial management could in theory form part of the 
costs relating to the conduct of the company’s business rather than purely as a stand-
alone creditor claim during proceedings and in this way be eligible for preference.
144
 
 Meskin et al further observe that judicial management did not create a 
concursus creditorum
145
 and therefore the discharge of a pre-judicial management 
liability could in this way be seen ‘as an incident of the continued operation in the 
final management of a pre-judicial management contract….’
146
 Blackman seems to 
agree with this approach.
147
 In this light, it is highly doubtful whether the ranking and 
preference referred to by Shrand above in relation to pre-judicial management creditor 
claims in terms of the 1973 Act would have had any practical effect.  
Discussing the words ‘mutatis mutandis’ in section 197B(2)
148
 which was 
identical to section 434(3)
149
, the court in the Union Goldfields case
150
 said: 
      …under the provisions of sec. 197(B) (2) the law relating to insolvency must be applied with only 
such changes as the difference between the provisions of the Companies Act in relation to judicial 




It is apparent that the judicial management provisions of the 1973 Act did not 
attempt to systematically resolve competing interests between employees and other 
concurrent creditors. It would seem that employee salary claims (both pre and post 
judicial management) could in theory either be incorporated as part of the ‘cost’ of the 
process, as highlighted above
152
 or more likely as a cost incurred in conducting the 
company’s business. Alternatively, such claims could be dealt with in a manner 
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 At page 950. Compare with approaches adopted in the Klopper en ‘n ander NNO and Wire 
Industries Steel cases supra. 
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 Such approach would, it is submitted, pass the restrictive tests seen in the Norman Kennedy and 
Wire Industries cases. 
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 The locus classicus is the case of Walker v Syfrets 1911 AD 141 at 166.  
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 At page 950. See Further Rajak (1993) at 304. 
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 At page 110. 
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 However the restrictive interpretation of this aspect by the Appellate Division in Wire Industries 
cannot be ignored. 
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aligned to ranking in terms of the Insolvency Act.
153
  
In laying a foundation for a discussion of the manner in which the new 
business rescue provisions in Chapter 6 attempt to deal with the often conflicting 
interests of creditors, a closer analysis of the manner in which insolvency law treats 
creditor claims is apposite. This is due to the fact that the 1973 Companies Act makes 
a number of references to insolvency law in the judicial management procedure. Even 
more important is to contrast this approach with the 2008 Act, the provisions of which 
have a significant impact on the ranking of claims not only within the context of 




3.8. COMPANIES ACT OF 1973 AND INSOLVENCY LAW: LINKAGES 
The 1973 Act regulated the manner and purpose of the meeting of creditors convened 
by the Master.
155
 It further prescribed the application of insolvency law in relation to 
the proof of creditor claims.
156
 The winding up provisions of the 1973 Act provide 
that when a company, being wound up, is unable to pay its debts, the provisions of the 
Insolvency Act find application.
157
 The procedure for proving a claim depends on 
whether the claim in question is liquidated or conditional. Where it is a liquidated 
claim, section 44
158
 applies and section 48
159
 finds application in respect of 
conditional claims. Where a creditor is unable to prove its claim in the meeting 
mentioned above, such creditor may request that the Master convene a further special 
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  Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. 
154
 This is explored in Chapter 4. 
155
 In terms of section 429(b)(ii). 
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 Companies Act of 1973, section 431(4). 
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 See further section 366 of the Companies Act of 1973, where claims against the company being 
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 Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. 
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 Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. 
160
 Section 429 (b)(ii) of the Companies Act of 1973 read with section 42 of the Insolvency Act of 
1936. Upon the granting of a final order of sequestration/liquidation the Master is required in terms 
of section 40(1) to publish a notice convening a first meeting of creditors for the proof of claims as 
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trustee/liquidator must in addition convene a second meeting of creditors in terms of section 
40(3)(a) for the purpose of allowing for the proving of further claims and the receipt of the trustee’s 
report on the estate, among others. A further, special meeting may be convened where creditor 
claims have not been proven in the first and second creditor meetings in terms of section 42(1).  
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3.8.1. RANKING OF CREDITOR CLAIMS IN INSOLVENCY ACT 
The Insolvency Act creates a ranking of creditor claims. Claims fall into one of three 
categories, namely secured, statutorily preferent and concurrent. The ranking may 
summarily be outlined as follows, in descending order: The first is liquidation 
costs.
161
 The second is the claim of secured creditors.
162
 The third is the claim of 
preferent creditors.
163
 This claim is paid from the proceeds of unencumbered assets in 
a predetermined order.
164
 Employee remuneration (capped at a certain amount and 
time period)165 and the claim for outstanding taxes by the South African Revenue 
Services (SARS) are included in this category.
166
 The fourth category is that of 
concurrent creditors. These creditors are paid from the sale of proceeds from 
unencumbered assets after preferent claims have been paid in full. Payment is made in 
proportion to the amounts owed to them. If an excess amount remains, it must satisfy 




Having broadly explored the manner in which insolvency law deals with 
claims of creditors, a closer analysis of the Insolvency Act’s treatment of employee-
creditor claims must be entered into. In discussing the ranking of employee-creditor 
claims in insolvency law, the purpose of the discussion is to provide an analysis of the 
treatment of employee creditors within insolvency law as well as possible insight into 





3.8.2. EMPLOYEE CREDITORS IN INSOLVENCY LAW: TRENDS AND 
DEVELOPMENTS 
Developments in insolvency law (although couched within the context of 
sequestration and liquidation of an employer entity) provide an important outline of 
the increasing prominence that employees gained within the judicial management 
regime, even if indirectly. Employee claims are treated as statutorily preferent in 
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 Insolvency Act of 1936, section 97 & 98. 
162
 Insolvency Act of 1936, sections 95(1). 
163
 Insolvency Act of 1936, section 98A. 
164
 See Bertelsmann et al (2008) at 476. 
165
 This category is specifically discussed below. 
166
  Insolvency Act of 1936, section 99. 
167
  Insolvency Act of 1936, section 103. 
168
 Act 24 of 1936 and Act 61 of 1973 respectively. 
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insolvency and their payability depends on the availability of funds in free residue.
169
 
The claims consist of salary, wages, employer contributions to pension and provident 
funds, medical aid, sick leave, outstanding holiday days not taken and employee 
scheme payments among others.
170
 
 Van Eck et al
171
 observe that the effect of the replacing section 100 with 98A 
of the Insolvency Act
172
 was to elevate the preference of employee claims in relation 
to the claim of other preferent creditors such as the South African Revenue Service 
for outstanding taxes in a winding-up or sequestration. 
The 1936 Insolvency Act grants employee creditors a claim for the payment of 
wages due, dating back to maximum of three months prior to insolvency with a 
current limitation of R 12 000 per employee.
173
 It also provides a claim for accrued 
leave (holiday or paid leave of absence), which was payable in the year of insolvency 
or the previous year, whether or not such payment was due at the date of insolvency 
with a current limitation of R 4 000 per employee.
174
 An employee need not prove the 
preferential portion of his/her claim even though a liquidator may request him/her to 
submit an affidavit as proof.
175
 A concurrent portion which exceeds the statutory 
limits must be proven in the ordinary course.
176
 
As briefly observed, where an employer finds him/herself experiencing 
‘financial difficulties’
177
 which have the potential of resulting in a winding-up, the 
employer is duty bound in terms of the Labour Relations Act
178
 to advise a party 
representing employees of this fact.
179
 The purpose of consultations is to try to avoid 
or minimise dismissals on operational requirements, establish an agreed upon method 
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 Stefan Van Eck, Andre Boraine and Lee Steyn ‘Fair Labour Practices in South African Insolvency 
Law’ (2004) 121 SALJ 902 at 917; Blackman (1993).   
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 Insolvency Act of 1936, section 98A(3). 
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 These claims will be payable in terms of section 103(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act. See further 
Bertelsmann et al (2008) at 487. 
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 This term is not defined in the Labour Relations Act of 1995. 
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 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, section 197B(1). 
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applicable. See Meskin et al Insolvency Law Service Issue 40 June 2013 Lexis Nexis at 2-40(1). 
For a discussion of the Labour Relations Act provisions within the context of the transfer of a 
business in both solvent and insolvent circumstances (Transfer of an Undertaking as a Going 
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Development of Coherent Labour and Insolvency Principles on a Regional Basis in the SADC 
Countries’ in Paul J. Omar (ed.) (2008) International Insolvency: Themes and Perspectives United 
Kingdom: Ashgate Publishing Limited. 
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for effecting retrenchments as well as the amount of severance pay to be given to 
employees.
180
 A reason provided for the insertion of this provision is that with the 
increase in sequestration and liquidation of personal estates, concern was expressed 
that employees were the least informed category of persons and often found out when 




The employee-creditor has an additional claim for severance or retrenchment 
pay due where employment is terminated in terms of section 38.
182
 These amounts 
will only be payable where there is a free residue after the payment of higher-ranking 
claims.
183
 Claims for severance pay have preferent status
184
 but are capped.
185
 The 
maximum amounts for each claim are set by the by the Minister of Justice by notice 
in the Government Gazette.
186
  
Despite rights granted to employees in cases of proposed retrenchments, the 
winding-up of a company provides a liquidator with a distinct advantage.
187
 Upon the 
granting of the winding-up order, all employee contracts are automatically suspended. 
These suspended contracts automatically terminate within 45 days after a final 
liquidator has been appointed. An employee is left with a residual right to prove a 
claim for any damages sustained as a result of the termination; such claim has 
concurrent status.
188
 The liquidator may, however, contract for the rendering of 
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185
 Currently the claim is capped at R 12 000, see sections 38 (11) and 98A(1)(a)(iv) of the Insolvency 
Act read with section 41(2) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (75 of 1997); Meskin et al 
supra at 5-74(2E); see Roger G Evans ‘Preferential Treatment of Employee Creditors in Insolvency 
Law’ (2004) SA Merc Law Journal at 463.  
186
 In terms of section 98A(2). 
187
 See section 38(1) of the Insolvency Act of 1936. See further Boraine & Van Eck ‘The New 
Insolvency and Labour Legislative Package: How successful was the Intergration?’ (2003) 24 
Industrial Law Journal 1840 at 1845.   
188
 Insolvency Act of 1936, section 38(10).  
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services with employees for the purpose of continuing services to the company.
189
  
Boraine & Van Eck argue that this requirement is reflective of a change in 
approach in insolvency law to saving the whole or at least part of the business as a 
going concern and a step in the right direction.
190
 Within the context of reforms in 
insolvency law, Van Eck et al observe that the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU) expressed the view that despite reforms having had a positive 
influence on the rights of workers, they failed to go far enough in ‘radicalising’ 
insolvency law as well as ensuring that a preference stronger than that of secured 
creditors was created for workers.
191
  
Responding to the view expressed by COSATU regarding a stronger 
preference for employee creditors, they express the following concerns: 
       It may be argued that the granting of a super-priority to employee claims, which would rank above 
the claims of secured creditors, would infringe or impair the property rights, protected by section 
25 of the Constitution, of secured creditors. Another important concern is that super-priorities may 
affect credit availability by imposing higher risks for secured creditors and for potential lenders. 
Ironically, this has the potential to jeopardize prospects of investment in a business, and 





It can be said that the fear alluded to by Van Eck et al may have already 
materialised; not through further amendments to the 1936 Insolvency Act, as may 
have been expected, but through certain provisions of Chapter 6 of the new 
Companies Act. As will be seen in later chapters, it will be argued that the super 
preference created by the ranking of creditor claims is extended by those provisions to 
the law of insolvency, affecting the ranking of creditor claims and creating the super 





                                                     
189
 Section 38(9) of the Insolvency Act. Termination of contracts during the period of suspension is 
possible, provided that the liquidator consults with employee representatives or with the employee 
themselves. See further section 38(4) of the Insolvency Act. 
190
 Boraine & Van Eck (2003) at 1849.   
191
 This was prior to the enactment of the Companies Act of 2008. At page 918, see further the 
Memorandum on the Objects of the Judicial Matters Amendment Bill available at 
www.gov.za/gazette/bills/1997/b95-97.pdf  accessed 13 January 2015.  
192
 Van Eck et al (2004) at 918. 
193
 See sections 5 and 135 of the Companies Act of 2008. 
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3.9. TERMINATION OF JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT 
 An application to cancel proceedings has to be made either by the judicial manager or 
by a person having an interest in the company.
194
 There is no specific time period for 
termination of judicial management proceedings.
195
 This omission presented a real 
financial risk to the already struggling company, where unscrupulous judicial 
managers could drag proceedings in order to raise higher fees.  
If at any time during proceedings the judicial manager formed the opinion that 
continuing judicial management proceedings would not enable the company to 
become a successful concern, he/she was required to apply for the cancellation of 
judicial management and winding-up of the company.
196 
Cilliers et al, expounding on 
the procedural requirements that the judicial manager had to satisfy in an application 
for cancellation of proceedings, argue that the manager would have to show the court 
that (a) he possessed the requisite locus standi to bring the application in term of 
433(l) of the 1973 Act, (b) had formed an opinion in good faith, that the judicial 
management order be cancelled in terms of section 440(1) on the basis that continued 
operation is undesirable and that (c) the cancellation include a winding-up order on 
the grounds prayed for and in terms of section 344.
197
  
Upon a further analysis of the provisions, it appears that even though a person 
having an interest is entitled to apply for the cancellation of proceedings, only the 
judicial manager could specifically apply for the winding-up of the company.
198
  
Judicial management could continue indefinitely. In this way, the only control that the 
Act had over the judicial manager was that it compelled him/her to apply for cessation 
if continued proceedings were incapable of enabling the company to become a 
successful concern.
199
 Commentators seem to be in agreement that section 440(1), 
which could be relied upon for cancellation of proceedings, did not prescribe that a 
                                                     
194
 Companies Act of 1973, section 440. 
195
 See Keens Electrical (Jhb)(Edms)(Bpk) v Lightman Wholesaler (Edms)Bpk 1979 (4) SA 186 (T) at 
189 where the court, even though vesting upon itself the discretion to incorporate a fixed period for 
proceedings, held that it would however be undesirable to do so. In the Marsh v Plows (SA) Limited 
supra, Marais v Leighwood Hospitals (Pty) Ltd 1950 (3) SA 567 (C) and Irvin & Johnson cases the 
courts, although not specifically delimiting time frames within which judicial management 
proceedings ought to conclude, emphasised the concept of reasonable time as an important 
indicator for cessation of proceedings. 
196
 Companies Act of 1973, section 433(l). 
197
 Cilliers et al (2000) at 491; See further Ex parte Muller NO: In re PL Myburg (Edms) Bpk 1979 (2) 
SA 339 (N) at 340. The court would order cancellation of proceedings in terms of section 440(1) of 
the 1973 Act. Regarding the jurisdiction of the court to order cancellation see Ex parte Kelroe-
Cooke 1956 (2) SA 125 (N); Ex parte Bloemfontein Board of Executors Ltd (1938) 31 PH at E7. 
198
 Companies Act of 1973 sections 433(l) and 440(1). 
199
 Companies Act of 1973, section 443(1).  
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3.10. CRITICISMS OF JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT 
A summation of the short-comings of judicial management as well as the conservative 
approach adopted by the courts, was articulated in the luminous judgment of Josman 
J
201
 where he held as follows: 
       For me, sitting as a judge to try to regenerate a system which has barely worked since its initiation 
in 1926, would not only be inappropriate, but would also require me to disregard the body of 





The court was acutely aware of the constraints it faced, in the form of 
established precedent, when it was requested to rectify and revive the system of 
judicial management by the applicants in that matter. Virtually admitting defeat, it 
ultimately deferred the evaluation of judicial management to the legislature. In the 
light of the judgment, which broadly spoke to the weaknesses of judicial 
management, a brief summation of specific criticisms raised against the regime 
follows. 
Olver notes three reasons for the limited success of judicial management. He 
attributes the first to the traditional practice of appointing liquidators as judicial 
managers, notwithstanding that the duties inherent in these are diametrically opposed 
to each other.
203
 A historical reason for this practice was that judicial management, in 
terms of the 1926 Act, was traditionally associated with liquidation. This was further 
evidenced by its inclusion at the end of the chapter on winding-up in that Act.
204
  
No regulatory control existed to monitor and set qualifications for judicial 
managers.
205
 The Act further did not make provision for the removal of delinquent or 
incompetent managers.
206
 This often presented an opportunity for abuse where a 
majority creditor, able to assert control over the judicial manager, could effectively 
control the process.
207
 Rajak and Henning agree with this view, arguing that a panel 
of retired or semi-retired businesspeople would have been more effective in ensuring 
the success of the process.
208
  Secondly directors of a struggling company were 
                                                     
200
  Loubser 2010 at 42; Meskin et al at 958; Cilliers et al (2000) at para 26.43. 
201
  Le Roux Hotel Management (Pty) Ltd and anothe v E Rand (Pty) Ltd and another supra. 
202
 At para 60. 
203
 Olver (1986) at 86. 
204
 Olver (1986) at 86. 
205
 Loubser (2010) at 43. 
206
 Loubser (2010) at 43. 
207
 Loubser (2010) at 43. 
208
  Rajak and Henning (1999) at 282-5.   
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observed to be prone to applying for judicial management rather than to accept the 
prospect of liquidation.
209
 Thirdly where a provisional judicial manager was 
appointed, he/she would invariably assume the cap of liquidator.
210
 Where 
investigations warranted a recommendation in favour of liquidation, the same judicial 
manager could apply to be the company’s liquidator.
211
  
Loubser argues that South Africa’s creditor friendly insolvency system did not 
create fertile ground for judicial management to flourish.
212
 This was evident in 
instances where judicial management applications were often opposed by a creditor 




The often trivial nature of applications for judicial management are cited as 
having been a contributor, where small privately owned companies would apply for 





 disagrees with the view that judicial management was unsuited to small 
companies generally but rather attributes the failure of judicial management to the 
expensive court-supervised nature of proceedings.
216
  He argues that the court-
oriented nature of proceedings was one of the major drawbacks of the regime, where 
costs were often so high that funds, which were necessary for the success of the 
struggling company, ended up being spent on the process.
217
  
He observes that the requirement of insolvency on the part of the company 
acted as a bar to companies who wished to avail themselves for judicial management 
in order to avert insolvency.
218
 Enabling the company to enter into judicial 
management at an earlier stage would have ensured that the salvaging exercise 
produced the desired results.
219
  
                                                     
209
 Olver (1986) at 86. 
210
 Olver (1986) at 86. 
211
 With the liquidator’s fees often being higher than those of the judicial manager. See Olver (1986) at 
86. 
212
 Loubser (2007) at 157. Burdette refers to this as a ‘liquidation culture’ in Burdette ‘Unified 
Insolvency Legislation in South Africa: Obstacles in the path of the unification process’ (1999) 32 
De Jure at 56. See Bertelsmann et al (2008) at 4.  
213
 Loubser (2007) at 157. Anthony J Smits ‘Corporate administration: A proposed model’ (1999) 32 
De Jure 80. 
214
 Olver (1986) at 87. 
215
 Kloppers (1999) at 417-434. 
216
 Kloppers (1999) at 425. He suggests that the procedural aspect of judicial management should be 
subjected to scrutiny and reform; Rajak & Henning (1999) at 268 seem to agree with this view.  
217
 Pieter Kloppers ‘Judicial Management Reform Steps to Initiate a Business Rescue’ (2001) 13 SA 
Merc LJ at 371. 
218
 Kloppers (2001) at 371. 
219
 Kloppers (2001) at 371. 
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The ability of the company to pay its debts was interpreted as implying the 
payment of such debts in full.
220
 This was viewed as both a major shortcoming of the 
regime and somewhat contradictory in the light of the provisions of the 1973 Act 
relating to compromise of debts.
221
 The requirement that the company be capable of 
recovery to the point where it is capable of paying its debt in full is viewed by Rajak 
as one which is both unrealistic and outdated.
222
  
The 1973 Act did not require a reasonably detailed plan of action regarding 
how the company was to be taken out of its position of insolvency.
223
 Even though the 
judicial manager was required to have some plan of future conduct in order to 
convince the court that judicial management was indeed the viable alternative, the 
plan of future conduct was neither officially sanctioned nor required by the regime 
and therefore had no specific status.
224
 The requirement of a reasonable probability of 
success of the company as a requirement for judicial management was perceived as 
being too burdensome on the company.
225
 It has been argued that the correct test 
should rather have been that of a reasonable possibility.
226
  
The lack of an automatic moratorium on all actions and proceedings against 
the company created uncertainty as parties could not be fully certain that the court 







                                                     
220
  My emphasis. See Ben-Tovim supra at 332; Porterstraat 69 Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd supra at 616 and 
620. 
221
 Section 311. Loubser (2004) notes that sub-section 1 includes a judicial manager as being among 
the persons who may approach the court after having summoned a meeting of creditors for the 
purpose of compromising the company’s debts. 
222
 Rajak and Henning (1999) at 8. See further Rajak (1993) Insolvency Law Theory and Practice 
where the author at 307 lamented judicial management’s failure to keep abreast of developments in 
comparative jurisdictions.  
223
 Kloppers (1999) at 427. 
224
 Kloppers (1999) at 427. 
225
 Kloppers (2001) at 375-77.  
226
 Kloppers (2001) at 375-77. Burdette (1999) at 58 shares the same view, arguing that the latter test, 
alternatively the test of ‘reasonable prospect’ be applied as the appropriate threshold for judicial 
management applications. 
227
 Loubser (2010) at 43. 
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3.11. CONCLUSION 
 The judicial management regime may be said to have been ahead of its time when it 
was introduced into the Companies Act of 1926. Bradstreet
228
 observes that as a result 
of this aspect, jurisdictions such as Australia looked to judicial management in 
developing their own rescue regimes.
229
 It may be argued that this may have been a 
contributor to its perceived failure as a mechanism (mixed with a combination of 
apprehension and distrust on the part of courts and creditors), where significant role 
players were in a position to contribute to its development or lack thereof.
230
  
The courts have consistently emphasised the right ex debito justitiae of a 
creditor to have its debtor placed in liquidation.
231
 For this reason, and many others, it 
may be accepted that the company law regime in terms of the 1973 Act had a strong 
creditor orientation, which leaned more in favour of liquidation than judicial 
management. Despite its creditor focus, there is nothing to suppose that the 
liquidation of a struggling company would, by default, have been more beneficial for 
the majority of creditors’ interests. Liquidation, more often than not, serves those 
creditors who are either secured or statutorily preferent and who may not necessarily 
constitute a majority in number or value. In the light of this, it may be posited that a 
viable company has more to offer for its creditors than its immediate liquidation. It is 
this justification that had been echoed by the legislature from its inception in the 
Companies Act of 1926, which made judicial management a pioneering piece of 
rescue legislation.  
Within the procedure, employees’ claims could comprise various categories, 
with the Act having been sufficiently vague to allow the judicial manager to exercise 
his/her discretion regarding treatment, while amendments in insolvency law ensured 
that employee creditors received increasing prominence if a company ultimately was 
liquidated.  
It may, however, be argued that the judicial manager was perhaps vested with 
too much discretion and that the rights of employees during judicial management 
were not as clearly articulated as they came to be in insolvency law. This factor may 
                                                     
228
 Bradstreet (2011) at 353-4. 
229
 For further reading see Colin Anderson ‘Viewing the proposed South African business rescue 
provisions from an Australian perspective’ (2008) 11 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1 at 4. 
230
 A clear example being seen in the manner in which the regime received acceptance from the courts 
as illustrated by the jurisprudence. 
231
 See generally Bahnemann v Fritzmore Exploration case supra; Rosenbach & Co. v Singhs’s Bazaar 
(Pty) Ltd 1962 (4) SA 593 (D) at 597E-F; ABSA Bank v Rhebokskloof (Pty) Ltd  1993 (4) SA 436 
(C) at 440f-441A. 
  69 
provide a theoretical framework for understanding the extent of the involvement of 
trade unions in the drafting of the new Companies Act as well as in understanding the 
manner in which creditor interests came to be balanced in the business rescue 
provisions of the same Act. 
It cannot be denied that there were many weaknesses in the system judicial 
management. Judicial reluctance further had a compounding as well as a stifling 
effect on the natural development of the regime. One may argue that even though it 
was pioneering in its purpose and objective, in practice it proved to be a regime 
whose growth was perpetually stunted.  
Because of the maturity of both the judicial management and insolvency 
regimes, developments and amendments to these Acts have been time tested and thus 
have resulted in a logical progression, giving content to creditor interests (and 
employee creditor interests in particular). This aspect ought not have been lightly 
glossed over or placed at the altar of political expediency, in a consideration of a 
rescue regime that would replace judicial management. 
It is, however, not suggested that insolvency law is best placed to ensure the 
protection of employee interests during insolvency or a rescue (where applicable). 
Neither is it suggested that creditor rights and interests were incontrovertibly 
articulated in the provisions of the 1973 Act. The question that must be asked is: Can 
it not be said that judicial management, notwithstanding its weaknesses, sought a 
balance of creditor interests which, arguably, may be seen as potentially lacking in 
Chapter 6 of the new Companies Act? Before a response can be offered, it is 
necessary to examine the new Act.  The next chapter provides a narrative of the 
beginnings, founding principles and influences behind the new Companies Act of 
2008, as well as a discussion of the provisions of the new business rescue regime.
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CHAPTER 4: BUSINESS RESCUE PROVISIONS OF ACT 71 OF 2008  
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
As highlighted in introductory chapters, the new Companies Act has created a 
mechanism to ensure that companies undergoing temporary financial hardship should 
not have to succumb to liquidation where a temporary reprieve would have ensured a 
return to solvency.1 In this way, the new approach has evidenced a shift away from 
creditor supremacy seen in the previous regime towards a greater emphasis on the 
restoration of liquidity.2 It is this ethos that underpins the business rescue provisions 
of Chapter 6 of the new Act3 which incorporate flexible mechanisms for accessing the 
procedure, providing a much needed reprieve to the company from its creditors.  
The chapter engages in an analysis of business rescue provisions of 
Companies Act and in doing so, discusses the following: Relevant definitions for the 
purpose of Chapter 6, indicating circumstances under which the procedure may be 
initiated, consequences flowing from the proceedings with particular focus on 
management-control and the operation of a moratorium. The manner in which the Act 
regulates the provision of financing, ranking of creditor claims and the treatment of 
employees as a specific class is explored. The chapter concludes with a discussion of 
the Act’s treatment of creditor dissent as well as how this has been interpreted by the 
courts. Throughout the discussion, weaknesses observed in relation to the relevant 





4.2.1. BUSINESS RESCUE 
The definition of business rescue communicates the moment at which proceedings 
may be initiated, what the process should aim to achieve as well as the consequence 
ensuing upon commencement. ‘Business rescue’
5
 is defined as: 
       Proceedings to facilitate the rehabilitation of a company that is financially distressed by providing 
for – 
(i) the temporary supervision of the company, and of the management of its  affairs, business and 
property; 
                                                     
1
 See discussion in Chapter 1. See further the provisions of section 7 of the 2008 Act.   
2
 It may be argued that the creditor supremacy continues to underpin our rescue regime, when the 
provisions of section 128 relating to the definition of ‘business rescue’ are considered. However, 
when the definition of business rescue and the practitioner’s fiduciary duties are analysed, a higher 
premium is placed on the company’s survival (i.e. the business or the legal entity or both) rather than 
only on payment of creditors’ claims. This aspect is analysed later in the chapter. 
3
 Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
4
 The weaknesses highlighted are by no means exhaustive. It is hoped that as business rescue matures 
as a procedure, further research will develop in an attempt to resolve some of these. 
5
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 128(1)(b).  
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(ii)  a temporary moratorium on the rights of claimants against the company or in respect of the 
property in its possession; and 
(iii) the development and implementation, if approved, of a plan to rescue the company by 
restructuring its affairs, business, property, debt and other liabilities, and equity in a manner 
that maximises the likelihood of the company continuing in existence on a solvent basis or, if 
not possible for the company to so continue in existence, results in a better return for the 





It is a requirement that prior to accessing the procedure, the company be 
financially distressed.
7
 Once the condition of financial distress is satisfied, there 
follows three consequences: (i) a shift in control in favour of an appointed business 
rescue practitioner
8
, (ii) a temporary reprieve in the form of a moratorium
9
 and (iii) 
the development of a rescue plan.
10
 The purpose of the plan is to restructure the 
affairs of the debtor company with the aim of either returning the company to 




It may not be possible for the company to be returned to a position where 
debts existing prior to business recue debts are paid in full. The Act provides 
sufficient flexibility for a company to compromise its existing debt and in certain 
instances extrapolate those components capable of being salvaged
12
 to the extent that 
such course is capable of resulting in a higher return for creditors or shareholders than 
in liquidation.
13
 In order to better understand the definition’s context as well and its 
underlying purpose, it is apposite that the jurisprudence on this aspect receives 
discussion. 
There is a burgeoning jurisprudence concerning business rescue.  In Redpath 
Mining South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Piers Marsden
14
  the court had to deal with an urgent 
                                                     
6
 The anatomy of the provision has received brief introductory discussion in Chapter 1.  
7
 Discussed below. 
8
 Existing management may be retained or removed during the process. This is at the discretion of the 
business rescue practitioner. 
9
 The moratorium may operate as an interim or final moratorium, depending on the manner in which 
proceedings are initiated. 
10
 For further literature on this aspect, see Pretorius, M. and Rosslyn-Smith ‘Expectations of a business    
rescue plan: international directives for Chapter 6 implementation’ (2014) 18 (2) South African 
Business Review 108. 
11
 Farouk HI Cassim ‘Business Rescue and Compromises’ in Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2012)  
Claremont: Juta Publishers at 861-912.  
12
 For example through the sale of its business and goodwill to a third party, leaving the legal shell with 
its liabilities behind. 
13
 Section 128(1)(b)(iii).  
14
 Redpath Mining South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Piers Marsden NO and others (North Gauteng High Court) 
case no. 18486/2013 of 14 June 2014. Kgomo J made similar observations in the earlier case of 
Merchant West Working Capital Solutions (Pty) Ltd v Advanced Technologies and Engineering 
Company (Pty) Ltd and others case no. 18486/2013 of 10 May 2013.  
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application seeking to set aside a business rescue plan which had been adopted by the 
respondents as well as an order granting the applicant permission to institute legal 
proceedings against first respondent in terms of section 133(1) (b). The court, held 
that: 
       Business rescue, as the definition proclaims or exclaims, is a regime which is largely self-
administered by the company, under independent supervision within the constraints set out in 
Chapter 6 of the Act and subject to court intervention at any time on application by any of its 
stakeholders…Unlike judicial management, business rescue does not require that a company be 
restored to solvency, though this is of course one of the objectives of business rescue. As the 
definition (of business rescue) further demonstrates, business rescue is also a system that is aimed 
or geared at temporarily protecting a company against the claims of creditors so that its business 
can thereafter be disposed of (if the concern could not be saved) for maximum value as a going 
concern in order to give creditors and shareholders a better return than they would have received 




Kgomo J further noted:  
       Business rescue clearly envisages a restructuring of a company’s business, followed, if all else fail,   
by a realisation of its assets by, for example, a sale of its business to a third party followed by a 
voluntary winding-up of the company under section 80 of the Act, in accordance with the rules 




The public interest element of business rescue has also received judicial 
attention. In Koen v Wedgewood 
17
 the following was observed: 
       …It is clear that the legislature has recognised that the liquidation of companies more frequently 
than not occasions significant collateral damage, both economically and socially, with attendant 
destruction of wealth and livelihoods. It is obvious that it is in the public interest that the 
incidence of such adverse socio-economic consequences should be avoided where reasonably 
possible. Business rescue is intended to serve that public interest by providing a remedy directed 
at avoiding the deleterious consequences of liquidations in cases in which there is a reasonable 
prospect of salvaging the business of the company in financial distress, or of securing a better 




The purpose of business rescue has in other instances been couched in more 
cautious terms: 
       Section 7, in its turn, lists a wide range of purposes, including the promotion of compliance with 
the Bill of Rights as provided for in the Constitution. I respectfully agree that the Chapter as a 
whole reflects ‘a legislative preference for proceedings aimed at the restoration of viable 





                                                     
15
 Redpath at para 42-3.  
16
 Redpath at para 44. 
17
Koen and another v Wedgewood Golf and Country Estate (Pty) Ltd & others 2012 (2) SA 378 
(WCC). 
18
Koen supra at para14-15; Van Niekerk v Seriso 321 CC Case no 952/11 and 23929/11 [2012] 
ZAWCHC 63 (20 March 2012) (WCC). 
19
 My emphasis.  DH Brothers Industries (Pty) Ltd v Gribnitz NO and Others (3878/2013) [2013] 
ZAKZPHC 56; 2014 (1) SA 103 (KZP); [2014] 1 All SA 173 (KZP) (21 October 2013) at para 10; 
see Cape Point Vineyards (Pty) Ltd v Pinnacle Point Group Ltd & another (Advantage Project 
Managers (Pty) Ltd Intervening) 2011 (5) SA 600 (WCC) at 603 E-F. 
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Loubser argues that the business rescue definition implies the rescuing of the 
company as a whole as opposed to the rescue of its business or part thereof.
20
 She 
further observes that this aspect makes it more akin to judicial management except in 
so far that the definition accommodates the achievement of an alternative purpose.
21
 
Loubser’s remark above is to be viewed in light of the dictum of the court in Redpath 
Mining where the court, per Kgomo J, made the following observation:     
       Unlike during judicial management, business rescue does not require that a company be restored to 
solvency, though this is of course one of the objectives of business rescue. As the definition (of 
business rescue) further demonstrates, business rescue is also a system that is aimed or geared at 
temporarily protecting a company against the claims of creditors so that its business can be 
thereafter be disposed of…for maximum value as a going concern in order to give creditors and 
shareholders a better return than they would have received had the company been liquidated.
22
   
 
This evidences a clear departure from the earlier judicial management regime 
to one which is sensitive to the societal impact of company failure.
23
  This, it is 
submitted, in turn depicts an affirmation of the outcomes envisaged by the Companies 
Act in section 7.  
 
4.2.2. FINANCIAL DISTRESS 
The definition of business rescue is to be read with the definition of ‘financial 
distress’
24
, described as a situation where: 
(i) It appears to be reasonably unlikely that the company will be able to pay off all of its debts 
as they become due and payable within the immediately ensuing 6 months; or 
                                                     
20
 My emphasis. Loubser (2010) at 45. 
21
 That is, a better return for creditors than in liquidation. See section 128(1)(b)(ii)). Loubser (2010) at 
45. This view seems to find support in Meskin et al in Henochsberg on the Companies Act of 2008 at 
448 who argue that the use of the word ‘rehabilitation’, despite not being specifically defined in the 
Companies Act, intimates the recovery of the company to complete solvency in a manner similar to 
the previous judicial management regime. The difference with the former regime, in their view, is 
that the new Act caters for an alternative purpose, i.e. the deriving of a higher return for creditors 
than would have been received in liquidation. 
22
 At para 43.  
23
 The remarks of the court in Griessel and Another v Lizemore and Others (High Court of South 
Africa, Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg) case no. 2015/24751 of  26 August 2015 (revised 28 
August) are apposite where at para 80 the court remarked: 
 ‘If the second ground for business rescue [being a better return for shareholders or creditors than in 
liquidation] is not a qualified alternative to the first then the interests of employees will be 
ignored. The reason is that, if unqualified, the second ground is only concerned with determining 
whether creditors and shareholders will receive a better return under business rescue than on 
liquidation, leaving out of the equation the employees’ interests in retaining jobs via rehabilitating 
the company. Such a result would be inimical to one of the fundamental paradigm shifts provided 
for in the new Act; the recognition of the rights and interests of employees alongside those 
historically accorded to shareholders, directors and creditors in matters affecting the affairs of a 
company both internally and externally. It could hardly have been the intention of the legislature 
to permit the interests of employees to be by-passed in cases where a dividend return under 
business rescue through say asset stripping would be better for only creditors or shareholders than 
liquidation without first considering whether the survival of the company as a going concern was 
feasible…’ 
24
 Section 128 (1)(f)(i)(ii). 
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(ii) It appears to be reasonably likely that the company will become insolvent within the 
immediately ensuing 6 months;  
 
It appears that a reasonable prospect or probability
25
 of insolvency occurring 
within a six month period is sufficient for a company to have recourse to business 
rescue.
26
 The test for financial distress provides a degree of flexibility for companies 
as many are often commercially rather than factually insolvent.
27
 It has been argued 
that whether a company benefits from business rescue depends on whether the 
financial distress is due to internal or external factors.
28
 An internal factor may consist 
of high salary costs and over employment while an external factor might present itself 




Articulating the content of ‘financial distress’, the court in Redpath Mining has 
held that: 
       Throughout the process of business rescue the expression “financially distressed” takes centre 
stage. This makes it crucial that we define or give forth how this concept of “financially 
distressed” is set out in the Act…From the above definition it is clear that a business rescue plan 
cannot be invoked where a company is already insolvent. This is one of the aspects 
differentiating business rescue from judicial management: Proceedings can be started six months 
in advance when the tell-tale signs are starting to appear. For instance, a company that is trading 
profitably and is cash positive but does not have the wherewithal to repay a large debt which will 
become due and payable within the next six months would qualify to be classified as being 




Redpath Mining provides a helpful distinction between commercial and factual 
insolvency.
31
 Once a company is factually insolvent, it may be too late for such 
company to be rescued.
32
 Legislation therefore requires pre-emptive action on the part 




, expressing concern at 
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 See Van Dyk v Adroit Communications (Pty) Ltd and Another (68048/2013) [2013] ZAGPPHC 376 
(19 November 2013). 
26
 Cassim (2012) at 864; Gormley v West City Precinct Properties (Pty) Ltd (Anglo Irish Bank 
Corporation Ltd intervening; Anglo Irish Bank Corporation Ltd v West City Precinct Properties 
(Pty) Ltd (Case 19075/11 and 15584/11) [2012] ZAWCHC 33 (18 April 2012)(WCC).  
27
 Cassim (2012) at 864. 
28
 Bradstreet (2011) at 357. 
29
 Bradstreet (2011) at 357. 
30
 Redpath Mining supra at paras 45-7. The same sentiments were echoed in the Merchant West 
Working  Capital case at paras 7-8. 
31
 Redpath Mining at paras 45-7. On ‘commercial insolvency’ see ABSA Bank v Rhebokskloof (Pty) Ltd 
supra at 440 F-H. 
32
 Redpath supra. However see Burmeister and Another v Spitskop Village Properties Ltd and Others 
case (High Court of South Africa, Pretoria) unreported case no. 76408/ 2013 of 21 September 2015 
at para 21 where the court held that the status of a company in final liquidation does not bar the 
enquiry into financial distress in terms of section 128(1)(f). It would be difficult not to find that a 
company against which an order for final liquidation had been granted, to not be factually insolvent. 
It may be argued that the dictum of the court serves to emphasise that an enquiry into a company’s 
financial distress is a factual one, notwithstanding such company’s legal status. 
33
 In relation to the latter category, see section 131 of the new Companies Act. 
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the relatively late stage at which rescue proceedings could be initiated by an entity in 
terms of the previous judicial management regime, makes the following observations: 
     Considering that very few insolvent entities that have already reached the stage where they are so 
insolvent that they can be liquidated have been saved in the past, it is clear that South Africa should 
provide for a system of business rescue where the management of the debtor, for example, should 





Observing the above, the stage at which a company is able to have recourse to 
rescue proceedings may contribute to the success or failure of the intervention. It is 
submitted that the recommendations made by Burdette
36
 are echoed in the current 





4.2.3. REASONABLE PROSPECT  
The definition of ‘business rescue’ refers to a ‘likelihood of the company continuing 
on a solvent basis…’
39
 This has been interpreted by some as evidencing a further 
similarity to the judicial management test of ‘reasonable probability’.
40
 Section 128 
(1)(b)(iii) makes use of the word ‘likelihood’ while sections 129(1)(b) and 131(4)(a) 
make use of the words ‘reasonable prospect’.
41
 
The origins of ‘likelihood’ as a test may be traced back to section 457 of the 
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 Burdette (Part1) at 262. 
35
 Burdette (Part 1) at 262. 
36
 Burdette (Part 1) at 262. 
37
 This view seems to accord with that expressed by Cassim (2012) above. 
38
 Companies Act of 2008, section 22. Specific discussion of section 22 is unfortunately beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  
39
 My emphasis. Companies Act of 2008, section 128(b)(ii).  
40
 Loubser (2010) at 45 and 58. However, she later observes that the word ‘reasonable prospect’ must 
be taken to mean a ‘reasonable possibility’ as opposed to a ‘probability’. The varying tests for 
judicial management proceedings, on initial application and return date, have received specific 
discussion in Chapter 3. For a detailed discussion of this aspect, the reader is referred to the 
discussion in that chapter. 
41
 In the earlier Welman v Marcelle Props 193 CC and Another (33958/2011) [2012] ZAGPJHC 32 (24 
February 2012) matter, the court at para 28 held that business rescue is neither for the terminally nor 
chronically ill but rather for ailing corporations capable of recovery if given time. In Finance 
Factors CC v Jayesem (Pty) Ltd [2013] ZAKZDHC 45 (22 August 2013) the court at para 18 
observed that the requirement of ‘reasonable prospect’ within the context of setting aside a 
resolution in terms of section 130(1)(a)(ii) was a mirror image of that contained in section 
131(4)(a)(iii), which the court had to consider in making an order in favour of business rescue 
proceedings.  See the dictum of the court in Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd & others v Farm 
Bothasfontein (Kyalami) (Pty) Ltd and others 2013 SA 539 (SCA) at para 18. See Pouroullis v 
Market Pro Investments 106 (Pty) Ltd (South African Bank of Athens Ltd and Absa Bank Ltd 
(20370/2015) [2016] ZAGPJHC 12 (12 February 2016) (Unreported) where the court affirmed the 
approach of the SCA in Oakdene that establishing a ‘prima facie’ case was simply not enough. See 
further the recent unreported judgment Sutherland J in Paul de Robillard v Doltek Enterprises (Pty) 
Ltd (In Liquidation) and Others (High Court of South Africa, Gauteng Division, Pretoria) case no. 
36259/2016  of 14 September 2016 at paras 28-29.  
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Companies Act of 1973.
42
 The transplantation of this term into section 128 of the new 
Act appears superfluous and may result in unnecessary confusion. Both sections 129 




It must be shown, in initiating proceedings by board resolution as well as by 
court order that ‘a reasonable prospect’ for rescuing the company exists.
44
 A 
discussion of the ambit of ‘reasonable prospect’ as well as how this concept has been 
interpreted by the courts, is apposite. In Southern Palace Investments
45
 the court made 
the following observations: 
       The meaning of the term “reasonable prospect” as used in this subsection falls to be considered. 
[Section 427(1)] of the previous Companies Act, no 61 of 1973, a rather cumbersome and 
ineffective procedure was provided for reviving ailing companies. That section of the 1973 
Companies Act used the phrase “reasonable probability”…In contrast, section 131(4) of the New 
Act uses the phrase “reasonable prospect” in respect of the recovery requirement…The use of 
different language in this latter provision indicates that something less is required than that the 
recovery should be a reasonable probability. Moreover, the mind-set reflected in various cases 
dealing with judicial management applications in respect of the recovery requirement was that, 
prima facie, the creditor was entitled to a liquidation order, and that only in exceptional 
circumstances would a judicial management order be granted. The approach to business rescue in 




Noting the thresholds that had to be satisfied by an applicant seeking to place 
an entity in business rescue, the court further stated: 
       One would expect, at least, to be given some concrete and objectively ascertainable details going 
beyond mere speculation in the case of a trading or prospective trading company, of: 
         24.1. the likely cost of rendering the company able to commence with its intended business, or to 
resume the conduct of its core business; 
         24.2 the likely availability of the necessary cash resource in order to enable the ailing company to    
meet its day-to-day expenditure, once its trading operations commence or are resumed. If the 
company will be reliant on loan capital or other facilities, one would expect to be given some 
concrete indication of the extent thereof and the basis or terms upon which it will be available; 
         24.3 the availability of any other necessary resource, such as raw materials and human capital; 
         24.4 the reasons why it is suggested that the proposed business plan will have a reasonable      
prospect of success. 
      In relation to the alternative aim referred to in section 128(b)(iii) of the new Act, being to procure a 
better return for the company’s creditors and shareholders than would result from the immediate 
liquidation thereof, one would expect an applicant for business rescue to provide concrete factual 
details of the source, nature and extent of the resources that are likely to be available to the 
                                                     
42
 For a broader discussion, see Chapter 3. 
43
 My emphasis. This aspect is to receive discussion at a later stage.  
44
 Sections 129(1)(b) & 131(4)(a). 
45
 Southern Palace Investments 265 (Pty) Ltd v Midnight Storm Investments 386 Limited and others 
(WCHC) unreported case no. 15155/2011 of 23 November 2011. 
46
 At paras 20-21. 
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Slightly differing approaches in relation to this threshold have been followed 
in subsequent judgments, with the courts often citing the Southern Palace judgment 
with approval but adopting a different set of thresholds or outlining the said 
thresholds in obiter remarks. In DH Brothers the court accepted the above approach 
as correct without deciding.
48
 Citing the dictum of Eloff AJ in the Southern Palace 
Investments case
49
 with approval, Binns-Ward J provided further content to ‘a 
reasonable prospect for rescuing the company’ as follows: 
       …the applicant would be required to set out in the founding papers a reasoned factual basis for 
the alternative scenarios that the court will have to consider and lay a cogent foundation to enable 
the court to determine that there [is] a reasonable prospect that the better return evident on one of 
those scenarios can be achieved. Vague and speculative averments in the founding papers will not 
suffice to provide a proper basis for a court to make the required determination that there is a 
reasonable prospect, if the company were to be placed under supervision, that the contemplated 




The approach of the court in Southern Palace was, however, criticised in the 
Prospec Investments case.51 In relation to the threshold articulated in the earlier case 
regarding reasonable prospect, Van der Merwe J noted: 
       I agree that vague averments and mere speculative suggestions will not suffice in this regard. 
There can be no doubt that in order to succeed in an application for business rescue, the applicant 
must place before the court a factual foundation for the existence of a reasonable prospect that the 
desired object can be achieved. But with respect to my learned colleagues, I believe they place 




Articulating the preferred approach, he said:  
       In my judgment it is not appropriate to attempt to set out general minimum particulars of what 
would constitute a reasonable prospect in this regard. It also seems to me that to require, as a 
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 At paras 24-5. This approach was affirmed by the same division in the later Koen v Wedgewood case 
supra at para 18; AG Petzetakis International Holdings Limited v Petzetakis Africa (Pty) Ltd 2012 (5) 
SA 515 (GSJ) of 6 February 2012 and FirstRand Bank Ltd v Arbour Village (Pty) Ltd And Eii 
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section 131(4). 
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 DH Brothers supra at para 13. The dictum in Oakdene SCA was cited with approval by the court in 
Eveleigh v Dowmont Snacks (Pty) Ltd and Others (11982/2013) [2014] ZAKZPHC 1 (22 January 
2014) at para 24.     
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 Southern Palace Investments 265 (Pty) Ltd supra. 
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 Koen supra at paras 17-18. 
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 Prospec Investments (Pty) Ltd v Pacific Coast Investments 97 Ltd and another 2013 (1) SA 542 (FB) 
(28 June 2012). 
52
 Prospec Investments supra at para 11. 
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minimum, concrete and objectively ascertainable details of the likely costs of rendering the 
company able to commence or resume its business, and the likely availability of the necessary 
cash resource in order to enable the company to meet its day-to-day expenditure, or concrete 
factual details of the source, nature and extent of the resources that are likely to be available to the 
company…is tantamount to requiring proof of a probability, and unjustifiably limits the 




The dictum in Prospec Investments has been cited with approval by the Supreme 
Court of Appeal in the NewCity Group
54
 and Oakdene Square Properties
55
 cases.  
The approach in Prospec Investments is reflective of the current legal position. It may 
be argued in the converse that even though the prevailing view has provided an 
outline of what reasonable prospect is not, no comprehensive description of what it is 
has yet been articulated. One may, however, confidently posit the view that it is 
settled law that the content of ‘reasonable prospect’ envisages a slightly lower 
threshold than articulated in Southern Palace. 
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4.2.4. CREDITOR 
Despite reference to a ‘creditor’ as one of the categories of persons who may initiate 
proceedings by court order, the Act
56
 does not provide a definition for the term. A 
creditor is included in the definition of ‘affected persons’.
57
 It was defined in the 
Companies Bill
58
 but has since been omitted.
59
 In terms of section 130(1)(c) of the 
Companies Bill, a ‘creditor’ is defined as 
       … a person to whom a company owes money under any arrangement immediately before the 
beginning of the company’s business rescue proceedings, and for greater certainty, does not 
include a person who provides post–commencement finance to the company, as contemplated in 
section 138, except to the extent that such a person was a creditor of the company before 




A possible reason for its omission from the Act is advanced by Loubser
61
 who 
observes three primary deficiencies in the manner in which it was defined in the Bill. 
The first is that it specifically referred to persons to whom money was owed.
62
 This 
excluded instances where a creditor became such as a result of outstanding services or 
counter-performance due by the company.
63
 Reference to an ‘arrangement’ was found 
to limit an obligation to instances where there had been an express agreement, 
whereas the same obligation may have been due to a court order.
64
 The commentator 
observes that reference to post-commencement financing added further confusion to 
what was a somewhat circular definition.
65
  
The Companies Act defines an ‘independent creditor’ as: 
       …a person who 
         (i) is a creditor of the company, including an employee of the company who is a creditor in terms 
of section 144(2); and 




An employee’s employment in a debtor company does not negate the latter’s 
independence simply by virtue of the relationship of employment.
67
 Even though 
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 Act 71 of 2008. 
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 My emphasis. Loubser (2010) at 53. 
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66
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 128(1)(g). 
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‘independent creditor’, in comparison to the definition of ‘creditor’ in the Bill, is not 
as substantively defined in the Act, it is not to be inferred that the definition is without 
purpose.  
In Absa Bank v NewCity
68
 the court describes the direction that the new 
Companies Act has taken in re-invigorating the definition of a creditor, and how this 
would come to yield to a seemingly amorphous concept of public interest when 
compared to its predecessor, judicial management: 
       In plain terms, it seems now to be incorrect to speak of an ‘entitlement’ to a winding up order 
simply because the applicant is an unpaid creditor. The rights of creditors no longer have pride of 
place and have been levelled with those of shareholders, employees, and with the public interest 
too…The norm that infuses the law about governance of companies after the advent of the 
Companies Act, 2008, means that creditor supremacy is over…
69
   
 
It is submitted that the ‘public interest imperative’, which has received 
discussion in Chapters 1 and 2, has resulted in a metamorphosis of the traditional 
conception of the ‘creditor as lender’ into the ‘employee as creditor, with pride of 
place’ particularly within the context of company rescue as a result of the company 
law reform process. It may be argued that a similar trend, although to a lesser degree, 





4.3. INITIATING BUSINESS RESCUE PROCEEDINGS 
The Act provides for business rescue proceedings to be initiated by resolution of the 
company’s board
71
 or upon the granting of a court order.
72
 Whether through board 
resolution or court order, the Act requires that business rescue proceedings endure for 
a maximum period of three months.
73
 Where proceedings endure for a longer period, 
the practitioner is required to prepare a monthly report and deliver it to every affected 
person and (i) the court, where proceedings were initiated by court application
74
 or (ii) 
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 Companies Act 71 of 2008, Section 132 (3). This timeline is applicable where proceedings have not 
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74
 Section 132(3)(a) & (b)(i). 
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the Commission, where proceedings were originally initiated by board resolution.
75
 




4.3.1 COMMENCEMENT BY BOAD RESOLUTION 
The applicable provision
77
 in relation to initiating rescue proceedings by board 
resolution reads as follows: 
       (1) Subject to subsection (2)(a), the board of a company may resolve that the company voluntarily 
begin business rescue proceedings and place the company under supervision, if the board has 
reasonable grounds to believe that— 
(a) the company is financially distressed; and 
   (b) there appears to be a reasonable prospect of rescuing the company. 
       (2) A resolution contemplated in subsection (1)— 
(a) may not be adopted if liquidation proceedings have been initiated by or against the    
company; and 
   (b) has no force or effect until it has been filed. 
(3) Within five business days after a company has adopted and filed a resolution, as contemplated   
in subsection (1), or such longer time as the Commission, on application by the    company, 
may allow, the company must— 
(a) publish a notice of the resolution, and its effective date, in the prescribed manner to every 
affected person, including with the notice a sworn statement of the facts relevant to the 
grounds on which the board resolution was founded; and 
(b) appoint a business rescue practitioner who satisfies the requirements of section 138, and 
who has consented in writing to accept the appointment. 
(4) After appointing a practitioner as required by subsection (3)(b), a company must— 
(a) file a notice of the appointment of a practitioner within two business days after making    
the appointment; and 
(b) publish a copy of the notice of appointment to each affected person within five business 
days after the notice was filed. 
(5) If a company fails to comply with any provision of subsection (3) or (4)— 
  (a) its resolution to begin business rescue proceedings and place the company under 
supervision lapses and is a nullity; and 
(b) the company may not file a further resolution contemplated in subsection (1) for a period      
of three months after the date on which the lapsed resolution was adopted, unless a court, 
on good cause shown on an ex parte application, approves the company filing a further 
resolution... 
 
The company’s board may resolve to commence proceedings provided that 
liquidation proceedings have not been initiated.
78
 The board must resolve as a 
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 Companies Act 71 of 2008, Section 129.  
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collective rather than individually.
79
 A moratorium takes effect on the date of filing of 
the resolution and is further discussed later in the chapter.
80
 The board must ensure 
that the entity is both ‘financially distressed’ as well as meeting the requirements set 
out in the definition of ‘business rescue’.
81
 It has been argued that in initiating 
proceedings, the board is under no legal duty to consult with its shareholders.
82
 This 
view seems to accord with section 129, as the provision does not require the consent 
of shareholders in order for proceedings to be initiated. A justification for this 




4.3.1.1 NON-COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 129 
Section 129 imposes strict time limits in order to reduce possible delay and abuse of 
process and provides that non-compliance with time limits results in a lapsing of 
proceedings, nullifying them.
84
 This is however to be contrasted with section 130 (1), 
which provides that: 
(1) Subject to subsection (2), at any time after the adoption of a resolution in terms of section 129, 
until the adoption of the business rescue plan in terms of section 152, an affected person may 
apply to court for an order— 
(a) setting aside the resolution, on the ground that… 





Section 218(1) is also relevant: 
    (1)  Subject to any provision in this Act specifically declaring void an agreement, resolution or 
provision of an agreement, Memorandum of Incorporation, or rules of a company, nothing in 
this Act renders void any other agreement, resolution or provision of an agreement, 
Memorandum of Incorporation or rules of a company that is prohibited, voidable or that may be 
declared unlawful in terms of this Act, unless a court has made a declaration to that effect 
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The provision refers to making void certain legal engagements while section 
129(5) refers to a lapsing and nullity. The difference in terminology cannot be 
ignored. Whether the legislative drafters intended these terms to be applied 
synonymously is unclear. Depending on the manner in which the words ‘nullify’, 
‘lapse’ and ‘void’ are interpreted, a declaratory order confirming invalidity may have 
to be applied for by a creditor. 
 The sections may be reflective of a possible drafting inconsistency and have 
resulted in confusion in practice. The confusion relates to the moment at which 
proceedings become nullified, where non-compliance with time formalities in terms 
of section 129 has been identified. The question which arises is whether, where there 
is a failure to comply with section 129, the proceedings nullify as a matter of fact 
upon non-compliance or should a party lodge an application seeking a declaratory 
order confirming invalidity? 
These are important questions which have a tremendous effect on the ailing 
company and its creditors. The courts have repeatedly affirmed a legislative 
preference for the rescuing of companies rather than their liquidation.
87
  This 
imperative, however, must be seen in light of the desire to balance stakeholder 
interests as expressed in the Act’s purpose provisions
88
 discussed in Chapter 1. An 
additional complexity is that creditors often do not stand on equal footing, where 
some stand to gain more from liquidation than a business rescue and vice versa. Even 
though courts have in many instances provided insights in terms of reconciling this 
inconsistency, they have often (and perhaps deliberately) missed the opportunity to 
provide definitive guidance on this aspect as shown in the following cases. 
In Advanced Technologies
89
 the court affirmed the position that  
       …the relevant sections contained in chapter 6 that a substantial degree of urgency is envisaged 
once a company has decided to adopt the relevant resolution beginning business rescue 
proceedings. The purpose of s 129 (5), is very plain and blunt. There can be no argument that 
substantial compliance can ever be sufficient in the given context. If there is non-compliance with 
section 129(3) or (4) the relevant resolution lapses and is a nullity. There is no other way out, and 
no question of any condonation or argument pertaining to “substantial compliance”. The 
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Where non-compliance with section 129 results in a nullity as a matter of fact, 
a creditor is able to assert its rights by enforcing its claim against the defaulting debtor 
company without undue delay. This may, however, have the potential of prejudicing 
the already struggling company, forcing it into liquidation whereas it possesses great 
recovery potential. A possible response may be that an ‘affected person’ may request 
that the company be placed under business rescue
91
 by court application even where 
an application for liquidation has commenced or has been granted.
92
 The Act is clear 




Where a declaratory order is required to confirm the nullity referred to in 
section129 (a), this may potentially have a prejudicial effect on a creditor as a 
business rescue practitioner may, upon notice of application to declare proceedings a 
nullity, file an ex parte application for permission to file a further resolution.
94
 In 
addition, there may be additional litigation costs associated with filing an application 
seeking a declaratory order by an already (and potentially) cash-strapped creditor. 
Section 130(1)(a)(iii) is couched in permissive rather than peremptory 





 argue as follows: 
       It is difficult to align the apparent automatic lapsing of a business rescue resolution under the 
provisions of s 129 (5) with this provision. In terms of s 129 (5) it would appear that no Court 
application, or indeed any action at all, is required for the business rescue resolution to lapse and 
become a nullity where the procedural requirements of s 129 have not been met. Under s 130 
(1) (a) (iii) an affected person may approach the Court for an order setting aside the business 
rescue resolution on the grounds that the company has failed to satisfy the procedural requirements 




They observe the dangers of an interpretive approach favouring an automatic 
lapsing and express their preferred approach as follows: 
      The approach under s 130 (1) seems a far more sensible approach in providing clarity regarding 




                                                     
91
 In terms of section 131.  
92
 Provided that the prerequisites for business rescue, discussed earlier, have been met cf Absa Bank v 
Makuna Farm CC (South Gauteng High Court) case no. 2012/28972 of 30 August 2015. It must be 
noted that this may, however, result in additional costs attendant upon court applications. The 
consequences of Lazenby v Lazenby Vervoer and Others supra would need to be taken into account. 
93
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 131(6). See the Richter and Absa Ltd v Makuna Farm CC cases 
discussed below. 
94
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 129(5)(b).  
95
 My emphasis. 
96
 Meskin et al Henochsberg on the Companies Act of 2008 Issue 9 accessed online on 12 October 
2014 available at: http://www.mylexisnexis.co.za.ezproxy.uct.ac.za/Index.aspx. 
97
 At page 459. 
98
 Henochsberg Issue 9 at 461. 
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The Advanced Technologies judgment was subsequently confirmed In 
Madodza
99
.In DH Brothers Industries
100
 the potentially intrusive nature of the 
moratorium taking effect and the consequent limitations it places on the enforceability 
of a creditor’s rights during proceedings was observed. The court emphasised the 
common law doctrine that legislative intrusion on existing rights should be read 
restrictively.
101
 It was further emphasised that the time-bound nature of proceedings 
as well as the need for an expeditious approach to business rescue was a way of 
limiting the legislative incursion on creditor rights.
102
  
On the possible consequences of non-compliance with time limits in section 
129, Gorven J remarked: 
       I favour the approach that the failure to publish a plan within the given or extended period results 
in the termination of business rescue proceedings. This has the benefit of allowing creditors to 
enforce their rights against the company as soon as the time elapses. The need for certainty is met 




In Absa Bank limited v Caine N.O
104
 this inconsistency received the attention 
of the court.
105
 Despite having held that there was cogent authority for the view that 
the business rescue proceedings had lapsed or become a nullity, the court held that 
due to the circumstance of the case, the better approach would be to issue a 
declaratory order confirming invalidity based on non-compliance with other 
requirements of the Act.
106
 In a recent appeal judgment, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
in Panamo Properties (Pty) Ltd
107
 has resolved uncertainty around the application of 
sections 129 and 130 as well as the inconsistency observed by courts in earlier cases. 
Interpreting the relevant provisions, the court held as follows: 
       …when a court grants an order in terms of s 130(5)(a) of the Act, the effect of that order is not 
merely to set the resolution aside, but to terminate the business rescue proceedings. A fortiori it 
                                                     
99
 Madodza (Pty) Ltd v ABSA and others (North Gauteng High Court) case no. 38906/2012 of 15 
August 2012. 
100
 DH Brothers Industries (Pty) Ltd supra. 
101
 At para 26.   
102
 At para 27. In the earlier Koen case at para 10 the court made similar observations:  
        ‘…It is axiomatic that business rescue proceedings, by their very nature, must be conducted with 
the maximum possible expedition…Legislative recognition of this axiom is reflected in the tight 
timelines given in terms of the Act for the implementation of business rescue procedures if an 
order placing a company under supervision for that purpose is granted. There is also the 
consideration that the mere institution of business rescue proceedings - however dubious might be 
their prospects of success in a given case - materially affects the rights of third parties to enforce 
their rights against the subject company…’ 
103
 At para 28. 
104
 Absa Bank limited v Caine N.O (High Court of South Africa Free State Division) case nos. 
3813/2013 & 3915/2013 of 2 April 2014. 
105
 Absa Bank limited v Caine N.O (High Court of South Africa Free State Division) case nos. 
3813/2013 & 3915/2013 of 2 April 2014 at para 25. 
106
 At para 56; See also Homez Trailers And Bodies (Pty) v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 
(35201/2013) [2013] ZAGPPHC 465 (27 September 2013).   
107
 Panamo Properties (Pty) Ltd v Nel and Another NNO (35/2014) 2015 ZASCA 76 (27 May 2015). 
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follows that until that has occurred, even if the business rescue resolution has lapsed and become 





In relation to previous judgments on this point, the following comments were 
made: 
       The assumption underpinning the various high court judgments to the effect that the lapsing of the 





The court emphasised that, as a corollary, where non-compliance with section 
129(3) or (4) had been identified, a court would have to be approached for the 
resolution to be set aside and proceedings terminated.
110
 Notwithstanding the insights 
provided by the court on this aspect, an opportunity to provide guidance regarding the 
practical legal effect of the ‘lapsing’ and ‘nullity’ referred to in those sections has 
been missed. Apart from the observation that these were aspects that enabled an 
applicant to apply for a termination in terms of section 130, no content was provided 
regarding the legal implications of a supposed lapse or nullity. It is my view that the 
court’s interpretation has effectively rendered section 129(5) superfluous. The court 
explained its approach: 
       One further point in favour of this approach is that it largely precludes litigants, whether 
shareholders and directors of the company or creditors, from exploiting technical issues in order to 
subvert the business rescue process or turn it to their own advantage…the scope for raising 




      
For reasons advanced in the brief critique of the Panamo Properties judgment, 
both at this stage and as will be seen later in the chapter, even if it is accepted that in 
adopting this approach the court has placed a high premium on the rescuing of 
companies in general, it remains doubtful that in giving effect to the rescuing of 
companies as required by section 7, it has done so in a manner that balances the rights 
and interests of all relevant stakeholders as mandated by that provision.  
 
                                                     
108
 Panamo supra at para 28. 
109
 Panamo supra at para 28. 
110
 Panamo supra at para 30. 
111
 Panamo supra at para 34. 
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4.3.2 OBJECTION TO RESOLUTION COMMENCING PROCEEDINGS 
An affected person may make application to court for the purposes of setting aside the 
company resolution initiating business rescue proceedings.
112
 This right is exercisable 
from the period after adoption and filing of the resolution as required by section 129 
until prior to the adoption of the business rescue plan by creditors.
113
 
 An applicant may seek an order setting aside the resolution on ground that (i) 
there are no reasonable grounds for believing the company to be financially 
distressed
114
, (ii) that despite the possible existence of financial distress, there are no 
reasonable prospects of the company being rescued
115
 or (iii) where the company has 
failed to satisfy the procedural prescripts of section 129.
116
 The applicant may further 
request that the practitioner’s appointment be set aside on a number of grounds and 





4.3.3 COMMENCEMENT BY COURT ORDER 
Business rescue proceedings may, in addition, be commenced by court order. The 
applicable provision reads: 
       131. (1) Unless a company has adopted a resolution contemplated in section 129, an 
    affected person may apply to a court at any time for an order placing the company under    
supervision and commencing business rescue proceedings. 
               (2) An applicant in terms of subsection (1) must— 
                 (a) serve a copy of the application on the company and the Commission; and 
                 (b) notify each affected person of the application in the prescribed manner. 
               (3) Each affected person has a right to participate in the hearing of an application in 
                 terms of this section. 
               (4) After considering an application in terms of subsection (1), the court may— 
                  (a) make an order placing the company under supervision and commencing business rescue    
proceedings, if the court is satisfied that— 
                    (i) the company is financially distressed; 
                    (ii) the company has failed to pay over any amount in terms of an obligation under or in  
terms of a public regulation, or contract, with respect to employment-related matters; or 
                    (iii) it is otherwise just and equitable to do so for financial reasons, and there is a  
reasonable  prospect for rescuing the company…
118
 
                                                     
112
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 130. See The Commissioner SARS v The Business Zone 983 CC 
(9673/2015) [2015] (7 September 2015). On the effects of a non-joinder of creditors where an 
applicant had sought to set aside a business rescue plan and the applicable test in such 
circumstances, see Absa Bank Ltd v Naude N.O. and Others (20264/2014) [2015] ZASCA 97 (1 
June 2015). Subsequently followed in Stalcor (Pty) Ltd v Kritzinger NO and Others (1841/2012) 
[2016] ZAFSHC 6 (21 January 2016) at para 44. 
113
 See Ex parte Nel NO and Others (High Court of South Africa, Gauteng Division, Pretoria) 
unreported case no. 45279/14 of 28 July 2014, where the court considered the novel question of the 
effect of a section 129(1) resolution commencing proceedings being set aside and the company 
placed in final liquidation, particularly where an appeal against such order was lodged.  
114
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 130(1)(a)(i). 
115
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 130(1)(a)(ii). 
116
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 130(1)(a)(iii). 
117
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, sections 130(1)(b) and 130(5). 
118
 Companies Act of 2008. 
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The section provides for commencement of proceedings where the company’s 
board has not passed a resolution in terms of section 129.
119
 Application to court may 
be made by an ‘affected person’ consisting of a shareholder, creditor, registered trade 
union representing employees, and employees in their individual capacities.
120
 As 
with the section 129 procedure, notification requirements find application.
121
 The 
costs of the application are often borne by the company to be placed in business 
rescue where the applicant has been successful even though the court has inherent 
jurisdiction to determine the awarding of costs.
122
 
The consequence of commencement by court order becomes visible when 
analysing its effect on liquidation proceedings which may have already commenced: 
     (6) If liquidation proceedings have already been commenced by or against the company at the time 
an application is made in terms of subsection (1), the application will suspend those liquidation 
proceedings until— 
           (a) the court has adjudicated upon the application; or 




A moratorium on all claims or actions against the company comes into effect 
upon the issuing of the application by the Registrar of the High Court.
124
 In an 
application for business rescue by court order there is a time lag between the 
moratorium coming into effect and actual commencement of proceedings.
125
 




The granting of the application in favour of business rescue suspends 
liquidation.
127
 Proceedings may again be initiated only once business rescue has 
                                                     
119
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 131(1).  
120
 Companies Act of 2008, section 128(1)(a) read with section 131(1). It must be shown that business 
rescue will enable the company to continue on a solvent basis or, at minimum, derive a better 
dividend for creditors than in liquidation. See Swart v Beagles Run Investments 25 (Pty) Ltd (First 
Rand Bank Ltd and others intervening) 2011 5 SA 422 (GNP) (30 May 2011).   
121
 Sub-section (2). On the legal consequences of non-compliance with notice requirements in section 
131(2) read with regulation 7 and a brief critique of regulation 124, see Cape Point Vineyards (Pty) 
Ltd supra at paras 13-16; Kalahari Resources (Pty) Ltd v Arcelormittal S.A and Others (South 
Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg) case no. 12/16192 of 26 June 2013 at paras 57-63.     
122
 For authority on the question of who ought to bear costs in an application for business rescue, see 
Cape Point Vineyards (Pty) Ltd supra at paras 4-5. See generally on costs Bambanani Fruits 
Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Bambanani Farming Operations (Pty) Ltd (2839/2013) [2013] ZAFSHC 196 
(15 November 2013).   
123
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 131. 
124
 See Cassim et al Companies and Other Business Structures (2009) Oxford University Press: South 
Africa at page 169-170. 
125
 See section 131(1) read with 132(1)(b). This aspect is canvassed in the section discussing the 
moratorium. 
126
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 131(6).   
127
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 131(6).  
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terminated in terms of section 132(2). The right of an affected person to intervene in 
such application has been affirmed by the court in Everleigh v Dowmont.
128
 There has 
been disagreement, regarding interpretation of the phrase ‘If liquidation proceedings 
have already commenced’.
129
 The disagreement relates primarily to the scope of the 
term ‘commenced’
130
 as well as the moment at which a company in liquidation may 
be said to no longer be capable of having recourse to rescue proceedings. It is to be 
appreciated that the question has profound implications on the rights of creditors and 
on the company. 
In Van Staden
131
 it was held that even though a distinction could be drawn 
between legal proceedings relating to a winding up and a winding-up as overseen by 
liquidators, winding-up is a continuation of liquidation proceedings and that 
proceedings only come to an end where a final liquidation and distribution account is 
submitted and confirmed by the Master.
132
 The court found that where the practitioner 
formed the view that rescue proceedings would not be viable in a specific case, the 
company would revert to liquidation with a limited amount of costs having being 
                                                     
128
 See Everleigh supra at para 19.  
129
 My emphasis.   
130
 A related aspect was the question whether ‘liquidation proceedings’ related to the procedural aspect 
of acquiring a liquidation order or to substantive liquidation proceedings following the granting of a 
final order of liquidation. See the Makuna Farm CC and Richter cases supra. 
131
 Van Staden v Angel Ozone Products CC (Gauteng North, Pretoria) case no. 54009/11 of 10 October. 
132
 See further Absa Bank Ltd v Summer Lodge (Pty) Ltd case nos. 63188/2012, 63189/2012 & 63190/ 
2012 [2013] ZAGPPHC 544 (23 May 2013) at paragraphs 12 - 18; Firstrand Bank Ltd v Imperial 
Crown Trading 143 (Pty) Ltd 2012 (4) SA 255 (15 December 2011). In addition to drawing a 
distinction between the application of sections 129 and 131, the court found that an order for 
liquidation did not prevent a subsequent application for business rescue. It granted the provisional 
liquidation order with an extended return date so as to permit the company time to make application 
for business rescue proceedings. The  approach is to be contrasted with Sibakhulu Construction v 
Wedgewood Village Golf Country Estate (Pty) Ltd (Nedbank Intervening) [2011] ZAWCHC 439 
WCC (16 November 2011) where the court was not prepared to grant a provisional liquidation 
order. See Taboo Trading 232 (Pty) Ltd v Pro Wreck Scrap Metal CC (Kwazulu Natal Provincial 
Division) case no. 6366/13 of 10 July 2013 on the importance of complying with the procedural 
requirements set out in section 131. The court in Pro Wreck, at para 11.4, held that a business 
rescue application must be regarded as having been made only once the application is lodged with 
the Registrar, duly issued and served on the Commission and every affected person. See further 
Blue Star Holdings (Pty) Ltd v West Coast Oyster Growers CC (2544/2013) [2013] ZAWCHC 136; 
2013 (6) SA 540 (WCC) (23 August 2013) at para 29 where the court held that in applying the 
functional approach, lodging the application with the Registrar constitutes ‘making’ the application 
in terms of section 131(6). The decision in Taboo and Summer lodge cases supra was followed in 
Standard Bank of South Africa Limited v Gas 2 Liquids (Pty) Limited (45543/2012) [2016] 
ZAGPJHC 38 (10 March 2016) albeit for different reasons. See further Gormley v West City 
Precinct Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another, Anglo Irish Bank Corporation Ltd v West City Precinct 
Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another (19075/11, 15584/11) [2012] ZAWCHC 33 (18 April 2012); The 
Employees of Solar Spectrum Trading 83 v Afgri Operations Ltd and another (North Gauteng High 
Court, Pretoria) case numbers 6418/12, 18624/2011 and 66226/2011 of 8 May 2012; ABSA  Bank 
Ltd v Newcity Group (Pty) Ltd, Cohen v Newcity Group (Pty) Ltd & Another supra.  
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incurred.
133
 The court allowed the application for business rescue despite liquidation 
proceedings having progressed to an advanced stage.
134
 
A different conclusion was reached by the court in Absa Bank v Makuna 
Farm.
135
 Concluding that winding up proceedings only commenced once a winding 
up order was granted, the court held that the words ‘liquidation proceedings’ referred 
to proceedings following the granting of the order and not the application lodged for 
the purposes of obtaining an order.
136
 The court had no difficulty in finding that in 
applying for the final-order of winding up, the respondent was not barred by 
provisions of section 131(6).
137
   
This approach provides a level of much needed certainty and further curtails 
the prospect of abuse. By the time a final order has been granted (even before the final 
liquidation and distribution account has been lodged at the Masters Office) many fees 
and costs would have been incurred in winding up a company’s estate. An 
interpretation that leaves section 131(1) & (6) open-ended may prejudice a number of 
parties. 
The position has been settled by the Supreme Court of Appeal in the Richter v 
ABSA Bank case
138
. The Supreme Court of Appeal rejected the approach in the 
Bloempro and Molyneux cases as well as the decision of the court a quo. In this case, 
application for business rescue proceedings in terms of section 131 was made after a 
final order of liquidation was granted. Observing that the terms ‘liquidation’ and 
‘winding-up’ had historically been used interchangeably within the context of a 
company being dissolved, the court held that no significant distinction could be drawn 
between the term ‘liquidation’ and the phrase ‘liquidation proceedings’.
139
 The court 
concluded that a proper interpretation of ‘liquidation proceedings’ in terms of section 
                                                     
133
 Van Staden supra at para 34. 
134
 Van Staden supra at paras 30 & 32. 
135
 Absa Bank v Makuna Farm CC supra. The same approach was followed by the court in ABSA Ltd v 
Summer Lodge supra.  
136
 Makuna Farm CC supra at para 7. 
137
 Makuna Farm CC supra at paras 7-8. A similar approach was followed in the Richter v Bloempro 
CC and Others (North Gauteng Division) case no. 69531/2012 of 14 March 2014. The court further 
rejected the earlier approach of the court in Absa Bank v Summer Lodge (Pty) Ltd 2013 (5) SA 444 
(GNP). The Summer Lodge  approach was also criticised in ABSA  Bank Limited v Cardio Fitness 
Properties (GSJ) case no. 2008/12 of 28 November 2013. See further Janse van Rensburg NO & 
Another v Cardio Fitness Properties (Pty) Ltd & Others [2014] ZA GPJHC 40 4 March 2014. On 
the effect of a liquidation on a company’s ‘residence’ and ‘principal place of business’, see PMG 
Motors v First Rand Bank (866/2013) [2014] ZASCA 180 (24 November 2014) at paras 12-13. 
138
 Richter v ABSA Bank Limited (20181/2014) [2015] ZASCA 100 (1 June 2015). See further 
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v A-Team Africa Trading CC (7233/15) [2015] ZAKZPHC 51. 
139
 Richter v ABSA supra at para 11. 
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131(6) included proceedings following the granting of a final liquidation order until 
the deregistration of the company.
140
  
Unlike commencement by board resolution, commencement by court order 
contains an additional ground on which the court may grant an order for business 
rescue. This is where the court considers that it is ‘just and equitable’ to do so for 
financial reasons.
141
 Notwithstanding the additional ground on which the application 
may be granted, an applicant must satisfy the court that a reasonable prospect for 
rescuing the company exists.
142
 
Despite the presence of mechanisms which allow for initiating business rescue 
through court process, proceedings have, unlike those in terms of the Bankruptcy 
Code, been described as largely non-interventionist in nature.
143
 Even though this 
change in approach has been accepted in a positive light (due to its perceived cost 
saving nature), some have argued that less involvement on the part of the courts 
would imply less accountability during the process, possibly proving detrimental to 
the interests of creditors.
144
  A discussion of management control during proceedings 
follows.  
 
4.4. MANAGEMENT-CONTROL OF THE COMPANY DURING PROCEEDINGS 
4.4.1 THE PRACTITIONER 
The business rescue practitioner is tasked with the responsibility of achieving the 
purpose of business rescue.
145
 The practitioner is described as 
       …a person appointed, or two or more persons appointed jointly, in terms of this Chapter to oversee 





                                                     
140
 At para 18. This view has been cited with approval in the recent Burmeister and Another v Spitskop 
Village Properties supra where the court has remarked that the fact that a company was granted a 
final order of liquidation did not prevent the court from determining whether a company is 
financially distressed; Van Der Merwe and Others v Zonnekus Mansion (Pty) Ltd and Others 
(4653/2015) [2015] ZAWCHC 90; [2015] 3 All SA 659 (WCC) (10 June 2015).  See further the 
obiter remarks of the court in Knipe and Others v Noordman NO and Others (4817/2014) [2015] 
ZAFSHC 124 (25 June 2015); Van Zyl v Engelbrecht 2014 (5) SA 312 (FB).  
141
 Companies Act of 2008, section 131(4)(iii). Kalahari Resources (Pty) supra at paras 70. 
142
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 134(4)(a). The concept of a ‘reasonable prospect’ has been 
discussed earlier. 
143
 Paul J Omar (ed) International Insolvency Law: Themes and Perspectives (2008) Aldershot: 
Ashgate Publishing at 122. 
144
 Bradstreet (2011) at 362. 
145
 Be it the primary or secondary purpose. See definition of ‘business rescue’ discussed earlier. This is 
only possible with the support of creditors and other affected persons. 
146
 Companies Act of 2008, section 128(1)(d). 
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His/her responsibility entails developing and implementing a plan to rescue 
the company.
147
 Upon appointment, the practitioner must investigate the affairs of the 
company and form a view as to whether the company has reasonable prospects of 
being rescued.
148
 Conversely, directors of the company have a corresponding duty to 
assist the practitioner while conducting his/her investigations.
149
 In addition to 
investigating the prospects of rescue, the practitioner is required to rectify any legal 
transgression or non-compliance.150  This includes forwarding any information relating 
to illegality on the part of the company to the relevant authority.
151
  
The practitioner takes over management and control of the company in 
substitution for its board and existing management and is as such vested with the 
powers of removal and/or appointment.152 The practitioner may, in addition to 
appointing management, approach the court to appoint persons to advise where such 
persons have had a previous relationship with the company.
153
  
The practitioner is an officer of the court.154 Providing content to the term as 




       Essentially BRPs, like directors of the company, have non-negotiable fiduciary duties towards the 
company…The BRP may not be a dummy or puppet blindly following the instructions of a 
shareholder or anyone who appointed him. If he does so he commits a breach of his statutory duty.  
He also has a statutory duty to act bona fide in the best interests of the company irrespective of any 




Unlike the position in comparative jurisdictions such as the U.K. and U.S., the 
practitioner does not have an underlying fiduciary duty towards the company’s 
                                                     
147
 Section 128(d) read with sections 140(d), 150 and 152. For general reading on the proposed 
competencies of a business rescue practitioner see Marius Pretorius ‘Tasks and activities of the 
business rescue practitioner: a strategy as practice approach’ (2013) (University of Pretoria: Paper 
accepted in May 2013 for publication in the South African Business Review- Vol. 17 No.3 
December 2013). 
148
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 141(1). See generally the observations of the court in Jacobus 
Hendrikus Janse Van Rensburg v Nifdev (Pty) Ltd and Others (Western Cape High Court) case no. 
20300/15 of 21 December 2015. 
149
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 142. 
150
 This includes directing management to rectify non-compliance, see section 141(2)(c).   
151
 Such as fraud, reckless trading or other contravention.  
152
 This includes the power of delegation. Section 140(1). In relation to the practitioner’s powers of 
delegation, see Murgatroyd v Van Den Heever N.O and Others [2014] 4 All SA 89 (GJ) at paras 16 
& 17. See further Richard Bradstreet ‘The Leak in the Chapter 6 Lifeboat: Inadequate Regulation of 
Business Rescue Practitioners May Adversely Affect Lenders’ Willingness and the Growth of the 
Economy’ (2010) 22 SA Merc LJ  195 at 200. 
153
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 140(2)(a) &(b). 
154
 Companies Act 2008, section 140(3)(a). 
155
 Resource Washing (Pty) Ltd v Zululand Coal Reclaimers Proprietary Limited and Others 
(10862/14) [2015] ZAKZPHC 21 (20 March 2015). 
156
 Resource Washing supra at para 55. Where a practitioner acts improperly the court may grant a 
punitive cost order against him/her, see  African Banking Corporation of Botswana v Kariba 
Furniture Manufacturers & Others [2015] ZASCA 69 (20 May 2015) at para 37-38.  
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creditors and that in practice this aspect has contributed to the often-perceived lack of 
impartiality on the part of some practitioners (whether apparent or real).
157
 The 
position in these jurisdictions is discussed in the following chapter. 
The definition of ‘business rescue’
158
 enjoins the practitioner to implement 
measures, which seek to return the company to solvency as a primary objective. The 
Act vests the practitioner with the duties and liabilities of a director while the 
company remains in business rescue. The provisions of the 2008 Act in relation to 
directors’ standards of conduct require a director
159
 to act in the interests of the 
company rather than to those of its creditors.
160
 The practitioner must possess 





 observes that even though Chapter 6 prescribes the functions to be 
performed by the practitioner during rescue, the chapter does not stipulate 
competencies which the practitioner should possess.
163
 The manner in which the 
practitioner is appointed is regulated by section 129, where proceedings have been 




The practitioner may partially, entirely or conditionally suspend contractual 
obligations to which the company was party at commencement of proceedings.
165
 
Where a cancellation of a contract to which the company was party is contemplated, 
                                                     
157
 The practitioner’s fiduciary duties are stipulated in section 140(3) of the 2008 Act. 
158
 Discussed earlier. 
159
 And a practitioner during business rescue proceedings. 
160
 My emphasis. Companies Act of 2008, section 76(3). 
161
 The grounds for the practitioner’s removal have been briefly discussed in the context of objections 
that may be raised by an affected person. These are to be read with sections 138, 139 in conjunction 
with regulation 126. See Resource Washing (Pty) Ltd supra the court at para 56. In Breedt v P G 
Breedt Boorkontrakteurs CC and Others (10581 / 2012) [2013] ZAGPPHC 17 (4 February 2013) at 
para 16-17 the court seems to have found the perception of conflict as opposed to conflict proven 
through evidence as sufficient for finding the business rescue application to have been flawed. 
162
 Marius Pretorius ‘Business Rescue Status Quo report Final Report’ (University of Pretoria: 
Document Prepared for CIPC, 30 March 2015). 
163
 Marius Pretorius ‘A competency framework for the business rescue practitioner profession’ (2014) 
Acta Commerci 14(2), Art. #227 at 15 where Pretorius observes that existing selection guidelines 
for practitioner appointments are at most aligned with generally defined competencies of leaders 
and change agents but are generally vague. In this work however, he highlights four higher-order 
competencies considered important for business rescue practitioners to have. These consist of 
sense-making, collaboration, decision making and integration. These, in Pretorius’ view, should 
enable the practitioner to navigate through the process and achieve the best alternative in the 
circumstances. For further reading on Business Rescue Practitioner competencies, see Marius, 
Pretorius ‘Tasks and activities of the business rescue practitioner: a strategy as practice approach’ 
(2013) Vol. 7 No. 3 South African Business Review.  
164
 Both provisions have received discussion within the context of commencing proceedings. 
165
 Companies Act 2008, section 136(2). Employees are protected by section 136(2A) from the 
practitioner’s powers of suspension and cancellation of employment contracts.  
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the court must be approached on application.
166
 
The courts have however lamented the limited powers vested upon the 
practitioner.
167
 The following observations were made in Oakdene: 
       Sections 26-31 of the Insolvency Act of 1936 are available to a liquidator to impeach certain 
dispositions which are not available to a business rescue practitioner. The power of a business 
rescue practitioner to suspend “any obligation of the company that arises under an agreement” is 
highly contentious. It may lead to “cherry picking” where the practitioner selects certain 






 caters for removal of the practitioner by court order but does not 
expressly provide for a re-adoption of a company resolution and filing of a 
nomination for appointment, where a practitioner has simply absconded. Appointment 
of an alternative practitioner occurs on the assumption that the previous practitioner 
has been removed by court order from office
170
 or has resigned.
171
  It seems that 
absent voluntary resignation or death, a declaratory order would be required from the 
court.172  Even though provisions relating to removal may be said to reflect a level of 
rigidity on the part of the Act, it may be justified on the basis that it incorporates an 
element of certainty and prevents possible abuse on the part of directors where they 
are not in agreement with the practitioner. 
 
4.4.2 DIRECTORS 
The Act envisages a co-operative relationship between the company’s directors or 
members and the practitioner once proceedings have commenced.
173
 Directors have a 
duty to co-operate with the practitioner and are required to defer to his/her 
authority.
174
 Conversely, the extent of the practitioner’s authority and power in 
                                                     
166
 Whether the cancellation is conditional, partial or a cancellation of the complete contract. 
167
 In Oakdene Square Properties at a quo supra the court at para 49 briefly referred to the limitations 
to which the practitioner’ powers are subject when compared to his/her insolvency law counterpart, 
the liquidator. 
168
 Oakdene at a quo supra at para 49. 
169
 Section 139.  
170
 By court on grounds listed in section 139(2). 
171
 Companies Act of 2008, sections 139(1)(a), 139(3) and section 139(3). Equally troubling is that the 
Act does not stipulate the time period within which a new practitioner must be appointed. It may be 
argued that with a moratorium still in force (notwithstanding, removal, resignation or death of a 
previously appointed practitioner) directors and managers may not have an incentive to relinquish 
power to a new practitioner. 
172
 It does not seem entirely clear from the section whether, having removed the practitioner, the court 
may substitute his/her appointment with another. Specific reference is made to the company or a 
nominating creditor as potential appointers.  See section 139(3). 
173
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 142. Cassim (2012) at 894 correctly observes: ‘…It must be 
stressed that, while the practitioner takes over the full management and control of the company, the 
pre-existing management is not completely displaced. It would continue to function during the 
process under the authority of the practitioner…’ 
174
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 137(2). 
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Directors are required to respond positively to the practitioner’s requests for 
information regarding the company’s affairs.
176
 Where a director hinders the exercise 
of the practitioner’s functions or refuses to comply with a reasonable instruction, 
application may be made for that director’s removal.
177
 Where directors act without 
necessary approval from the practitioner, such act is legally void.
178
 It may be argued 
that this also applies in the context of transactions with bona fide third parties 
transacting with the company.
179
 The provisions, however, do not grant the 
practitioner carte blanche to do as he or she pleases. Restraints are placed by the Act 
on the practitioner’s powers. A clear example is in section 137(5) which, despite the 
general powers vested in the practitioner in terms of section 140, require court 




4.5. THE MORATORIUM AND PROTECTION OF PROPERTY INTERESTS 
The Act seeks to ensure a balance of stakeholder interests while allowing for the 
recovery of distressed businesses.181 The manner and degree to which this balance is 
achieved is critical to the entire scheme of business rescue.  A moratorium on 
enforcement actions against the debtor company has a significant impact on creditors 
as stakeholders during proceedings. It is for this reason that it is discussed. 
As with the U.K. administration procedure
182
, the Companies Act permits the 
application of interim and final moratoria. The interim moratorium finds application 
within the context of commencement through court application.
183
 Once the 
application has been issued by the Registrar of the High Court, an interim moratorium 
comes into force and freezes all claims against the company.
184
  
At this stage, only an application has been made and business rescue 
proceedings have not yet formally begun. The application of the moratorium will 
                                                     
175
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 137.  
176
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 137(3) read with section 142. 
177
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 137(5). 
178
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 137(4). 
179
 Cassim (2012) at 888. Therefore these parties are expected to exercise caution when dealing with 
the board of directors during business rescue. 
180
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 137(5) and 140(2)(a) & (b). 
181
  Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 7.  
182
 Discussed in Chapter 5. 
183
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 132(1)(b). This is similar to the approach in the U.K. Insolvency 
Act.  
184
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 133(1), unless falling under the exceptions therein. 
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either continue or cease, depending on whether or not proceedings receive sanction of 
the court.  The interim moratorium therefore comes into operation before proceedings 
have officially commenced. It may further be observed that due to the often time-
consuming nature of opposed applications, this avenue may be open to abuse by 
companies wishing to delay remedy enforcement by creditors or to delay the effect of 
a final order of liquidation by a competent court.
185
 
In relation to commencement by company resolution, a final moratorium takes 
effect on the date on which the resolution is filed with CIPC.
186
 The moratorium is 
governed by section 133, which reads: 
       (1) During business rescue proceedings, no legal proceeding, including enforcement action, against 
the company, or in relation to any property belonging to the company, or lawfully in its 
possession, may be commenced or proceeded with in any forum, except— 
     (a) with the written consent of the practitioner; 
  (b) with the leave of the court and in accordance with any terms the court considers suitable; 
  (c) as a set-off against any claim made by the company in any legal proceedings, irrespective 
whether those proceedings commenced before or after the business rescue proceedings 
began; 
  (d) criminal proceedings against the company or any of its directors or officers; or 
  (e) proceedings concerning any property or right over which the company exercises the 
powers of a trustee… 
       (2) During business rescue proceedings, a guarantee or surety by a company in favour of any other 
person may not be enforced by any person against the company except with leave of the court 
and in accordance with any terms the court considers just and equitable in the circumstances. 
  (3) If any right to commence proceedings or otherwise assert a claim against a company is subject 
to a time limit, the measurement of that time must be suspended during the company’s business 
rescue proceedings. 
 
The moratorium extends over all claims against the company. As a result, a 
creditor is as a rule unable to enforce its claim.
187
 The moratorium applies in favour of 
the company only and not to persons who may have executed suretyships for its 
                                                     
185
 Specifically in instances where there is some form of collusion between directors of the company 
and an affected person (for example, a non-independent creditor which may be a connected person 
or group company). 
186
 In terms of section 129. 
187
 Cassim (2012) at 880. Exceptions to this are listed in the section. The Act does however provide 
protection to creditors in that prescription in relation to a creditor’s claim is suspended while the 
company is in rescue.  
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benefit.
188
 Notwithstanding the wide application of the moratorium, certain divisions 
of the court have held that it does not apply to litigation against the business rescue 
plan, in contradistinction to a challenge to the procedure or the exercise of a remedy 
against the company’s assets or those in its lawful possession.
189
 In Moodley the 
following was observed: 
        The language of s 133, when read in context with other relevant provisions in Chapter 6 and 
having regard to its purpose, does not include within its ambit proceedings relating to the 
development, adoption or implementation of the business rescue plan…Legal proceedings, such 
as the present case, which seek that an adopted business plan be executed and implemented 
strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act, are legal proceedings against the 
business rescue practitioner and the company in business rescue in connection with the business 
rescue plan. They are not legal proceedings against the company or property belonging to the 




Having reached this conclusion, the court found: 
       Section 133, therefore, finds no application in legal proceedings against a company in business 
rescue and its business rescue practitioner in connection with the business rescue plan, including 
its interpretation and execution towards implementation. [I] respectfully consider the contrary 




                                                     
188
 See Investec Bank Ltd v Bruyns (19449/11) [2011] ZAWCHC 423; 2012 (5) SA 430 (WCC) (14 
November 2011) at paras 17- 23. The judgment was confirmed in Kritzinger and Another v 
Standard Bank of South Africa (3034/2013) [2013] ZAFSHC 215 (19 September 2013) at para 61. 
This issue has also been dealt with at length by the court in Tuning Fork (Pty) Ltd T/A Balanced 
Audio v Greeff and Another (18136/13) [2014] ZAWCHC 78; 2014 (4) SA 521 (WCC); [2014] 3 
All SA 500 (WCC) (28 May 2014) at para 14. The approach in Tuning Fork was criticised in an 
obiter remark of Wallis JA in Newpoint Finance Co (Pty) Ltd v Nedbank Ltd [2014] ZASCA 210  
at para 14. See further the obiter remarks in Absa Bank Limited v Haremza (12189/2014) [2015] 
ZAWCHC 73 (27 May 2015).  On an analysis of the cases it may be argued that, at minimum, the 
prevailing approach is that a surety cannot use the commencement of business rescue as a shield 
against liability. However, and more tentatively, where a debt is compromised in terms of a 
business rescue plan and in order for a creditor to retain the right to pursue the said surety, such 
right must be preserved notwithstanding the compromise of a claim as against the principal debtor 
in terms of the plan. Where the ambit of the suretyship agreement permits, a creditor may be 
entitled to excuss the surety for the full amount where the principal debtor is unable to pay its debt 
(provided that it is due and payable), even prior to business rescue proceedings commencing. This 
would, however, depend on the provisions of the suretyship agreement entered into. See further 
Absa Bank Limited v Du Toit and Others [2013] ZA WCHC 194 (13 December 2013) at para 18; 
Business Partners Limited v Tsakiroglou & Tsakiroglou (High Court of South Africa: Western 
Cape Division) case no. 17827/14 of 13 May 2015 at paras 29- 34. See further the obiter remarks of 
the court in New Port Finance Company (Pty) Ltd and Another v Nedbank Ltd; Mostert and 
Another v Nedbank Ltd [2015] JOL 32610 (SCA).  
189
 In Redpath Mining South Africa v Marsden supra the court at para 71 held that even where a party 
sought to litigate on the business rescue plan, it would have to convince the court that exceptional 
circumstances for doing so exist. This approach has been overturned by the same division in 
Moodley v On Digital Media (Pty) Ltd and Others (20456/2014) [2014] ZAGPJHC 137; 2014 (6) 
SA 279 (GJ) (11 July 2014) and in the recent Arendse and Others case infra. See Merchant West 
case supra where the court made reference to the need for a ‘well-motivated application…’ for 
leave.   
190
 Moodley supra at para 10. 
191
 This was cited with approval in Hlumisa Investment Holdings (RF) Limited and another v Van der 
Merwe NO and others [2016] JOL 34326 (GP) where the court held that proceedings in that matter 
were aimed at the Business Rescue Practitioners and not at the company under business rescue. For 
this reason, the court opined that neither consent nor leave of the court, as contemplated in section 
133, was necessary.  
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The consequence of the judgment is that a party does not require leave from 
court in an application seeking guidance on the manner in which an adopted plan has 
been executed by the practitioner.
192
 An aspect which has not received clear 
articulation in the Companies Act and which does not seem to have been given much 
attention by courts is whether it is sufficient for an applicant seeking leave to institute 
legal proceedings to incorporate this as a prayer in the main proceedings or must such 
applicant initiate a substantive, separate application seeking leave.  
In Safari Thatching Lowveld
193
 the court had to adjudicate an application for 
business rescue in terms of section 131, while an earlier application for the winding 
up of the Respondent remained pending. The court agreed that the effect of the 
application for business rescue was to notionally suspend the liquidation 
application.
194
 In an obiter remark, the court provided a brief discussion on the 
application of section 133, as the intervening party was found to have placed strong 
reliance on this section in seeking to halt the winding-up.   
Providing a brief canvass of the case-law in point
195
, the court distinguished 
between an application for relief where legal proceedings had already commenced 
and predated the application for business rescue versus an application to institute legal 
proceedings while rescue proceedings were in commencement.
196
 The court 
concluded that where an application for business rescue was made while legal 
proceedings against the debtor were in commencement, a litigant already engaged in 
litigation with the debtor could request leave in terms of section 133 during those 
same proceedings in order to proceed with the pre-existing legal process.
197
 In Elias 
Mechanicos
198
 the court came to a different conclusion, finding that a separate 
application needed to be launched and did not draw a distinction between pre-existing 
                                                     
192
 The court’s rejection of the requirement of ‘exceptional circumstances’ has been cited with approval 
in the subsequent Resource Washing (Pty) Ltd supra at para 10. 
193
 Safari Thatching Lowveld CC v Misty Mountain Trading 2 (Pty) Ltd (Jeroldi Intervening, Brink 
Intervening) (52115/2015) [2015] ZAGPPHC 832 (11 December 2015).  
194
 Safari Thatching Lowveld CC supra at para 4.6. 
195
 Specifically on the question whether an applicant has to institute separate legal proceedings for the 
purpose of lifting the stay or whether such requirement would suffice as a prayer in the main 
proceedings. 
196
 This in the court’s view distinguished the case from Elias Mechanicos Building and Civil 
Engineering Contractors (Pty) Ltd v Stedone Developments (Pty) Ltd and Others 2015(4) SA 485 
(KZD). In this case the court found that a separate application for leave to institute legal 
proceedings against the debtor would have to be made. It is to be highlighted that the case dealt 
specifically with section 133 while Safari Thatching Lowveld CC supra dealt primarily with section 
131. Compare with the Kariba Manufacturers case at court a quo supra. 
197
 Safari Thatching Lowveld CC supra at paras 4.13- 4.14. 
198
 At para 11-13. 
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or legal proceedings instituted subsequent to commencement.
199
 Clearly, our courts 
are not ad idem on this aspect.
200
 
In addition, a matter that remained largely uncertain until recently has been the 
test applicable to the granting of leave to institute legal proceedings. This aspect has 
received the attention of the court in the Arendse
201
 matter. Observing that no 
particular test has been devised in previous matters
202
, the court pertinently set out the 
ambit of the moratorium as follows: 
       But the moratorium is not an absolute bar to legal proceedings being instituted or continued 
against a company under business rescue. It is intended to be of a temporary nature only and 
cannot be utilised to indefinitely delay satisfaction of the claims of creditors; or result in the 




 It was held that an applicant seeking leave to institute legal proceedings 
against a debtor would have to establish a prima facie case against the latter.
204
 In 
determining whether this requirement has been satisfied the court will have regard to 
evidence presented by the applicant as a whole, without recourse to evidence 
presented by the respondent in rebuttal.
205
 The court observed that at this stage it 
would not be critical to show that the application would, of necessity, succeed.
206
 The 
                                                     
199
 It is not clear that this aspect formed the ratio of the judgment; see para 14. This is to be contrasted 
with the approach in Kariba Manufacturers where the court a quo accepted without discussion that 
such application could form part of the main application. The decision in Elias Mechanicos supra 
seems consistent with the earlier Msunduzi Municipality v Uphill Trading 14 (Pty) Ltd and Others 
(11553/2012) [2014] ZAKZPHC 64 (27 June 2014) where the court, adjudicating on the second and 
third respondent’s reliance on section 133, held at para 8 that leave of the court was required prior 
to any legal proceeding or enforcement action being commenced against a company in business 
rescue. In the view of the court, this meant that the leave sought could not simply be requested from 
the bar but had to be substantive and on affidavits, providing the company in business rescue with a 
proper opportunity to oppose it.  
200
 In the recent Booysen v Jonkheer Boerewynmakery (Pty) Ltd and Another (10999/16) [2016] 
ZAWCHC 192 (15 December 2016) matter the court has adopted a dissenting position to both the 
Moodley and Elias Mechanicos cases supra. At paras 54-57 the court held that it would be wrong to 
create a hard and fast rule in relation to the question whether or not a formal or separate application 
for leave was must requested by an applicant in terms of section 133. Concluding that the facts and 
circumstances of the matter would be determinative, it was held that where judicial discretion is to 
be exercised, such discretion must to be informed by convenience, fairness and the interests of 
justice. Therefore, the court opined, there would be instances where a separate court application 
requesting leave in terms of section 133 would be necessary. There would further be instances 
where such request can be made as a prayer on the same papers as the main application.  
201
 Mabote and Others v Van Der Merwe NO and Another (2015/40324) [2016] ZAGPJHC 185 (8 July 
2016). 
202
 See Merchant West and Redpath Mining cases supra. The court expressly rejected the approach in 
Redpath Mining. 
203
 Arendse and Others supra at para 15; Kythera Court v Le Rendez-Vous Cafe CC and Another 
(2016/11853) [2016] ZAGPJHC 172; 2016 (6) SA 63 (GJ) of 22 June 2016 at para 8. 
204
 Arendse and Others supra at para 16. 
205
 Arendse and Others supra at para 18. At para 19 the court observed that where there are real and  
fundamental disputes between the parties, a prima facie  case would have been established. 
206
 Arendse and Others supra at paras 22-23. 
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court considered it to be sufficient if the applicant is able to demonstrate a cause of 
action (whether or not this is capable of being contradicted by the respondent).
207
  
 Despite having adopted a lower threshold for establishing a prima facie case 
within the context of section 133(1)(b), it was the court’s view that an applicant 
would still be required to establish reasons why leave to proceed against the debtor in 
business rescue was, inter alia, both necessary and appropriate.
208
  
The Act imposes a moratorium on the disposal of property interests. During 
business rescue proceedings, the company may only dispose of its property in three 
instances:  (i) where this is in the ordinary course of the company’s business, (ii) 
where a bona fide transaction has been entered into by the company and a 3
rd
 party for 
fair value provided that prior approval has been granted by the practitioner or (iii) in a 
transaction that has been contemplated as part of the business rescue plan.
209
 
For the moratorium to come to effect, property potentially subject to it must be 
either owned by the company or in its lawful possession.
210
  The moratorium on 
property interests is so extensive that it is capable of imposing a restriction on 
property rights which a 3
rd
 party has in respect of property in the company’s 
possession even if the 3
rd
 party is the owner.
211
   
‘Property’ does not extend to a credit facility in favour of the company or to 
property being rented by the company.
212
 Where property is owned by a third party, it 
is a requirement that the company relying on the moratorium be in lawful possession 
                                                     
207
 Arendse and Others supra at para 27. 
208
 Arendse and Others supra at para 28. The court further re-iterated that the statutory discretion 
granted to courts in section 133 is wide and not subject to a closed list of factors. It provided guiding 
principles which would have to be considered when such leave is sought. These factors attempt to 
strike a balance between the rights of affected persons as against the debtor, the effect of recourse 
against the debtor’s chances of financial recovery and such recourse’s effect on the rights and 
interests of the debtor’s stakeholders as a whole. The approach in Arendse has received the support 
of the court in the recent Metboard Properties Limited v At Andrea Packaging (Pty) Ltd and 
Another (High Court of South Africa, Western Cape Division- Cape Town) case no. 12585/2016  of 
12 September 2016 at 6-10. 
209
 Companies Act of 2008, section 134(1)(a).  
210
 Section 133(1); See the dictum of the court in Madodza supra at paras 16 and 17. See further 178 
Stamfordhill CC v Velvet Star Entertainment CC (1506/15) [2015] ZAKZDHC 34 (1 April 2015). 
211
 Companies Act of 2008, section 134(1)(c). Although extensive, it is not without limitation. See 
section 134(3)(a)(b) read with 136(2A)(c); see further Merchant West Working Capital Solutions 
(Pty) supra at para 17. 
212
 See generally Cloete Murray NO and another v FirstRand Bank Ltd [2015] ZASCA 39 (26 March 
2015). 
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in order to shield the debtor-company from that party’s vindicatory claim.
213
 The 
practitioner may consent or withhold consent in relation to the disposal or release of 
property.
214




The suspension of actions or claims against the company excludes criminal 
proceedings, set-off rights against a claim made by the company in legal proceedings 
or proceedings concerning property or a right over which the company is a trustee.
216
 
The phrase ‘legal proceedings’ is to be interpreted in terms of its ordinary meaning 
and has been found to intimate a ‘lawsuit’, ‘hoofsaak’ or ‘geregtelike stappe, 
insluitende afdwingingsaksie’.217 The Supreme Court of Appeal in Cloete Murray 
NO
218
 articulated its view on the terms ‘legal proceedings’ and ‘enforcement action’ 
thus: 
       …in our legal parlance, ‘enforce’ or ‘enforcement’, usually refers to the enforcement of 
obligations. In the context of s133(1)  of the Act, it is significant that reference is made to ‘no 
legal proceedings, including enforcement action’. The inclusion of the term ‘enforcement action’ 
                                                     
213
 My emphasis. See Madzodza supra case at paras 16-17. See further the obiter remarks of the court 
in Lifman and Others v The Commissioner, SARS and Others (Western Cape High Court) case no. 
5961/15 of 17 June 2015 at para 35 where it was held that section 133 does not have retrospective 
application for steps taken prior to the filing of rescue proceedings. The court in Southern Value 
Consortium v Tresso Trading 102 (Pty) Ltd and Another (16139/2015) [2015] ZAWCHC 174 (23 
November 2015) further expanded the requirement of lawful possession to the application of 
section 134(1)(c). See Kythera Court v Le Rendez-vous Café CC t/a Newscafe Bedfordview and 
Another matter at para 9. The court’s interpretation of section 134 in the earlier Tresso Trading 102 
matter seems to have received the support of the court in the Kythera Court matter. On the content 
of the term ‘lawful’, see JVJ Logistics (Pty) Ltd v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd and 
others[2016] JOL 36313 (KZD). 
214
 In 2001 Management Services (Pty) Limited and Another v Anappa (88079/14) [2016] ZAGPPHC 
353 (20 May 2016) the court at para 37 affirmed its authority to entertain an application to consider 
lifting the moratorium in the absence of practitioner consent. It further held that in exercising its 
discretion, the bona fides of the initiator of business rescue proceedings would be a relevant factor. 
215
 Cloete Murray supra at para 35. It remains to be seen whether a practitioner will be able to suspend 
a bank’s right to renounce access to a credit facility, even if such act is accepted as not constituting 
an enforcement step on the part of the bank as has been held by the courts. It will be interesting to 
observe the development of the ambit of section 136. A party to such cancelled agreement would be 
entitled to damages only, see section 136(3). See however the obiter remarks of the court in Homez 
Trailers And Bodies (Pty) Ltd supra at para 25 where the court held that only the obligations of the 
company are susceptible to being cancelled by the practitioner. However, see obiter remark in the 
recent Kythera Court v Le Rendez-vous Café CC t/a Newscafe Bedfordview and Another supra at 
paras 15 and 16 and 30 where the court, citing the Cloete Murray matter, accepted that it would be 
possible for the practitioner to invoke section 136(2)(a) and suspend a counterparty’s right to cancel 
an agreement (i.e. a lease in that matter). It would seem that the courts have at this stage largely 
sought to distinguish between contractual obligations affecting third parties (such as credit 
agreements) and physical property belonging to a third party within the company’s possession 
during business rescue proceedings (such as goods sold on instalment).  
216
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 133(1).  
217
 Merchant West Working Capital supra; Van Zyl v Euodia Trust (Edms) Bok 1983 (3) SA 394 (T) at 
397; Lister Garment Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Wallace NO 1992(2) SA 722 (D) at 723 G-H]; Cloete 
Murray NO and another supra. 
218
 Cloete Murray supra. 
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under the generic phrase ‘legal proceeding’ seems to me to indicate that ‘enforcement action’ is 




The court further observed: 
       A ‘forum’ is normally defined as a court or tribunal…and its employment in s 133(1) conveys the 
notion that ‘enforcement’ relates to formal proceedings ancillary to legal proceedings, such as the 




The court found that the cancellation of a credit agreement was not prohibited 
by the application of the moratorium.
221
 Agreeing with the observations made in 
Henochsberg, to the effect that the moratorium is meant to be cast as widely as 
possible so as to provide the company with much needed protection against creditor 
claims, the court disagreed that the manner argued for by the appellants would be the 
best way of achieving this.222 
The Supreme Court of Appeal
223
 has in a recent matter extended the 
application of the moratorium to include arbitration proceedings.
224
  
It further concluded: 
       In my view once this purpose of business rescue- to give the practitioner breathing space- is 
properly understood, it becomes apparent that only an interpretation that includes arbitrations 
within, instead of excluding them from, the meaning of legal proceedings in s 133(1), allows this 
provision to be read harmoniously with s 142(3)(b)…There can be no reason why s 142(3)(b) 
obliges the company to provide details of arbitrations to the practitioner other than because they 
are also legal proceedings- as contemplated in section 133(1)- that may have a bearing on its 




                                                     
219
 Cloete Murray supra at para 32; See Cawood NO and others v Reaan Swanepoel t/a Reaan 
Swanepoel Attorneys and Others [2015] JOL 34283 (GP) where the court interpreted ‘execution’ as 
a process rather than a single event. 
220
 Cloete Murray supra at para 32. 
221
 Cloete Murray supra at para 33. 
222
 Cloete Murray supra at para 34-5. 
223
 Chetty v Hart (20323/2014) [2015] ZASCA 112; 2015 (6) SA 424 (SCA); [2015] 4 All SA 401 
(SCA) (4 September 2015). 
224
 Chetty v Hart supra at para 28. In relation to arbitration proceedings in terms of the Labour 
Relations Act of 1995 (LRA) see obiter remarks of Lagrange J in NUMSA obo Members v Motheo 
Steel Engineering (Labour Court of South Africa) case no. J 271/2014 of 7 February 2014 and the 
subsequent Bargaining Council jurisdictional ruling METS 3334 ruling delivered on 5 May 2014.  
However, see the earlier conflicting decision on this point in Fabrizio Burda v Integcomm (Pty) Ltd 
case no. JS539/12 (unreported) of 29 November 2013, where the Labour Court held that section 
133 had the effect of barring employment related disputes which were referred to the CCMA or the 
Labour Court. In the recent Sondamase and Another v Ellerine Holdings Limited (in business 
rescue) and Another (Labour Court) unreported case no. C669/12 of 22 April 2016, the Labour 
court declined to follow the approach in Moteo Steel.  Observing that the purpose of business rescue 
was to provide breathing space, it referred to the approach in Integcomm with approval and held 
that the SCA in Chetty v Hart had dealt with the issue of conflicting case law within the context of 
section 133 and arbitration proceedings. In the even more recent case of Ellerine Furnishers (Pty) 
Ltd and Others v FGWU obo Cleopatra Somtsewu (Labour Court) unreported case no. JR 1836/15 
of 26 April 2016 the Labour Court followed the Sondamase decision. It will be interesting to 
observe how the moratorium is applied within the context of employee arbitrations in future where 
regard is had to section 210 of the LRA as well as section 5 of the Companies Act of 2008.  
225
 Chetty v Hart supra at para 29. 
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The moratorium is critical for the success of any business rescue. It may be 
argued that the courts, apart from disagreeing on certain aspects, have recognised the 
importance of this mechanism in interpreting its ambit. It is also to be observed that 
the courts have attempted to provide some protection for creditors in widening the 
ambit of concepts such as the requirement of lawful possession, the non-retrospective 
application of the moratorium and a 3
rd
 party’s right to cancel credit agreements.  
 
4.6. POST-COMMENCEMENT FINANCING 
Securing post-commencement finance is an important aspect in developing and 
implementing a successful plan to rescue the company.
226
 It is, however, expected that 
lenders will be hesitant to borrow money to a company that may be perceived as 
having ‘shown’ itself as unable to manage its financial affairs.
227
 In addition, a 
financially distressed company may not have sufficient unencumbered assets to offer 
as security in order to obtain a much-needed cash injection. 
 It has been argued that post-commencement finance will present itself in two 
phases, namely to provide the necessary funds for the operational functioning of the 
company until the stage where the plan has received approval from creditors, as well 
as after plan adoption and during the implementation stage.
228
 In a manner similar to 
the super-priority provided for in § 364 of the Bankruptcy Code
229
, Chapter 6 creates 
a statutory framework providing a super-priority for financing granted after 
commencement of rescue proceedings.
230
  
The provision regulating post-commencement finance reads: 
       135(1) To the extent that any remuneration, reimbursement for expenses or other amount of money 
relating to employment becomes due and payable by a company to an employee during the 
company’s business rescue proceedings, but is not paid to the employee—  
                    (a) the money is regarded to be post-commencement financing; and 
                    (b) will be paid in the order of preference set out in subsection (3)(a) . 
             (2) During its business rescue proceedings, the company may obtain financing other than as     
contemplated is subsection (1), and any such financing— 
                     (a) may be secured to the lender by utilising any asset of the company to the  extent that it 
is not otherwise encumbered; and 
                    (b) will be paid in the order of preference set out in subsection (3)(b) . 
                                                     
226
 For a comprehensive analysis of this aspect as well as the practical implications thereof, see Wanya 
du Preez ‘The status of post-commencement finance for business rescue in South Africa’ (MBA 
Thesis, Gordon Institute of Business Science, 2012). 
227
 Similar observations are made by Pretorius, M. and Du Preeze, W. ‘Constraints on decision making 
regarding post-commencement finance in business rescue’ (2013) Volume 6 Southern African 
Journal of Entrepreneurship and Small Business Management 168 at 170. See further Marius 
Pretorius ‘Business Rescue Plans’ (2012) (Unpublished Research). 
228
 David A. Burdette ‘Some initial thoughts on the development of a modern and effective business 
rescue model for South Africa (Part 2)’ (2004) 16 South African Mercantile Law Journal at 422-
423. 
229
 Discussed in Chapter 5. 
230
 Referred to as ‘post-commencement financing’.  
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              (3) After payment of the practitioner’s remuneration and costs referred to in section 143, and 
other claims arising out of the costs of the business rescue proceedings, all claims 
contemplated— 
                    (a) in subsection (1) will be treated equally, but will have preference over— 
                        (i) all claims contemplated in subsection (2), irrespective whether or not they are 
secured;   and 
                        (ii) all unsecured claims against the company; or 
                      (b) in subsection (2) will have preference in the order in which they were incurred over 
all    unsecured claims against the company. 
             (4) If business rescue proceedings are superseded by a liquidation order, the 
               preference conferred in terms of this section will remain in force, except to the extent of any  
claims arising out of the costs of liquidation. 
 
If the company has unencumbered assets it may apply these in order to secure 
additional financing once proceedings have commenced.
231
  On an ordinary 
grammatical interpretation of the section, finance provided after commencement is 
preferent to any unsecured claim against the company. Cassim observes that due to 
the word ‘finance’ not having been defined in the Act, it remains unclear as to how 
widely the term is to be interpreted.
232
 Further, it has been argued that the terms 
‘employment-related payments’ or ‘money relating to employment’ are wider than the 
terms ‘wages’ or ‘salary’ which would mean that redundancy payments, although not 
wages or salary, could fall within the ambit of the section and enjoy the preference 
accorded by section 135.
233
  
An aspect inextricably linked to the priority created in the above provision is 
the ranking of creditor claims. This is because through its provisions, the 2008 Act 
invariably determines the rank and manner in which creditors are to be paid. It further 
sets the schematic context for the post-commencement treatment of claims as against 
pre-commencement liability during business rescue. The ranking of creditor claims is 
discussed next. 
 
4.7. THE RANKING OF CLAIMS  
With a moratorium on all claims against the company taking effect, the question 
arises as to whom to pay first, together with the question of how to restructure. The 
courts have provided some guidance on both ranking of creditor claims as well as 
post-commencement financing.  Although not strictly relevant to the issue it was 
asked to decide, the court in Redpath Mining articulated the ranking of creditor claims 
in the following manner: 
       Claims rank in the following order of preference: 
                                                     
231
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 135(2). 
232
 Cassim (2012) at 883.  
233
 Cassim (2012) at 884.   
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         60.1 The practitioner, for remuneration and expenses, and other persons (including legal and 
other professionals) for costs of business rescue proceedings. 
         60.2 Employees for any remuneration which became due and payable after business rescue 
proceedings began. 
         60.3 Secured lenders and other creditors for any loan or supply made after business rescue 
proceedings began, i.e. post-commencement finance. 
         60.4 Unsecured lenders or other creditors for any loan or supply made after business rescue 
proceedings began, i.e. post commencement finance. 
         60.5 Secured lenders or other creditors for any loan or supply made before business rescue 
proceedings began. 
         60.6 Employees for any remuneration which became due and payable before business rescue 
proceedings began. 




    
It may be argued that this form of ranking is not reflective of the ordinary, 
grammatical language employed in section 135.
235
 One of the significant differences 
between the ranking of claims by the court in the Merchant West case and section 
135(2) is that apart from monies referred to in sub-section 1, the section does not 
seem to distinguish between secured and unsecured post-commencement financing 
claims. Its focus is rather on the timing of the financing obtained.
236
  
Commenting on the judgment of the court, Meskin et al observe as follows: 
       [The ranking of the court in Merchant West] does not seem to be in accordance with the 
provisions of sub[-section] 3, inter alia because the subsection does not refer to secured claims 




The court further confirmed that the ranking is crystallised by section 135(4) 
where proceedings are followed by liquidation: 
       Section 135(4) of the Act provides that if business rescue proceedings are superseded by a 
liquidation order, the above preference will remain in force except to the extent of any claims 




A potential confusion may arise when the provisions of section 135(2) are 
analysed. Sub-section 2 states that in obtaining post-commencement finance, the 
company may use an asset as security in favour of the lender for the granting of post-
commencement financing ‘to the extent that it is not otherwise encumbered’.  The 
section therefore provides protection for assets which were already encumbered prior 
to commencement of proceedings.
239
  
                                                     
234
 Redpath Mining South Africa supra at para 60. See also paras 20-23 of the earlier Merchant West 
Working Capital case. 
235
 Companies Act 71 of 2008 discussed above.  
236
 It may be argued that the Act possibly envisaged a ‘first come first serve’ basis for ranking post- 
commencement creditor claims, whether or not such post-commencement financing was secured. It 
would seem at least at this stage, that the position has been changed by the court in the Redpath 
Mining case supra. 
237
 Henochsberg on the Companies Act of 2008 at 478. 
238
 Redpath supra at para 61.  
239
 See Henochsberg on the Companies Act of 2008 at 478. 
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The provisions of section 135(2) and ranking of creditor claims by the court in 
the Redpath and Merchant West cases are to be analysed in light of the protection of 
property interests clause which, despite granting the company authority to dispose of 
its assets in certain circumstances, places the following constraints: 
       (3) If, during a company’s business rescue proceedings, the company wishes to dispose of any 
property over which another person has any security or title interest, the company must— 
(a) obtain the prior consent of that other person, unless the proceeds of the disposal would be 
sufficient to fully discharge the indebtedness protected by that person’s security or title 
interest; and 
              (b) promptly— 
                     (i) pay to that other person the sale proceeds attributable to that property up to the   
amount  of the company’s indebtedness to that other person; or 





The company may not, without prior consent from a security or interest 
holder, encumber an asset already secured at the pre-commencement stage.
241
  As an 
exception, encumbrance may occur provided that the security interest or title-holder is 
promptly reimbursed for the value of his/her title interest in full.
242
 On a reading of 
the relevant sections, the ranking of creditor claims articulated in the above judgments 
is not reflective of an ordinary grammatical interpretation of the Act. A pre-
commencement secured creditor ought to be entitled to receive the value of its 




The court in Redpath further articulated the status of secured creditors during 
proceedings as follows: 
       It is my further view and finding that in a business rescue atmosphere secured creditors stand on 
the same footing during its subsistence as the other creditors. The common purpose and desire and 
objective is that each creditor ultimately get every cent he/she is owed, unlike in a liquidation or 
its predecessor, the judicial management system. Should the rescue plan run into difficulties and 
                                                     
240
 My emphasis. At section 134(3). 
241
 Even within the context of securing post-commencement finance. 
242
 This may include an interest secured by a cession of book debts. A debtor company may not cede its 
debtors book to a creditor and upon commencement of business rescue, wish to collect on debtors 
to the prejudice of the cessionary’ s rights in terms of section 134(3); see Kritzinger and Another v 
Standard Bank of South Africa supra at paras 49 and 51; Gormley supra at para 18. 
243
 See Senwes Limited v Zellenhen Boerdery CC and Others; Zellehen Boerdery CC v Senwes Ltd 
infra where the court, adjudicating on an application for an order that a creditor’s vote against the 
plan was inappropriate, held that nothing in section 134(3) compelled a creditor to surrender its pre-
existing security. Even though the court did not discuss the earlier Redpath Mining case, implicit in 
the judgment is a rejection of the ranking articulated in Redpath. In this regard, the court at para 31 
further observed:  
          ‘In my view, the legislature did not intend section 143(5) to override 134(3) of the Act, otherwise 
section 134(3) which affords protection to a secured creditor, would be rendered nugatory. It 
could never have been the intention of the legislature to frustra[te] a secured creditor by 
ensnaring the secured creditor in a long business rescue process coupled with the uncertainty 
and speculation as to whether or not the secured creditor is ultimately going to be paid. If the 
secured creditor is not prepared to indulge itself in such a risk it can surely not be said that its 
vote against such an uncertain risky plan is an inappropriate vote…’ 
  107 
the liquidation of assets become necessary, section 134(3) serves as a safeguard and assurance 
that the interests of secured creditors especially, are protected.
244
   
 
It is not clear to which secured creditor the court is referring.
245
 It is also not 
entirely clear what the court means when it is observed that ‘secured creditors stand 
on the same footing as other creditors’ as the section considered by the court clearly 
envisages a preference in ranking between creditors’ claims.  
The interpretation of section 135 in the Redpath and Merchant West cases 
seems to provide cold comfort for the pre-commencement secured creditor. It has 
essentially left the pre-commencement secured creditor potentially in a weaker 
position; where the strength of protection afforded by a notarial or mortgage bond 




 The distinction in ranking drawn may potentially create challenges of its own. 
A possible practical consequence may be in the form of banks consistently opposing 
business rescues or deliberately applying for liquidation. Even though safeguards 
                                                     
244
 Redpath at para 66. 
245
 Specifically, whether the court is referring to the pre or post-commencement secured creditor. 
246
 It is acknowledged that this could also potentially be applicable to employee creditors in relation to 
pre-commencement remuneration payments. A significant difference between this creditor and an 
ordinary pre-commencement supplier creditor is that employees, where retrenched, will have the 
legal benefits accruing in terms the Labour Relations Act in relation to retrenchment payments. 
This aspect is canvassed in Chapter 3. Where employees are retained by the company after 
commencement, their salary and remuneration payments have the status of super preferent post-
commencement financing as discussed above. This is a simple example of how protections granted 
to these two classes of creditors are significantly incongruent.  
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have been put in place by courts in evaluating reasonableness of liquidation 
applications, the manner in which section 135 has been drafted does not assist.
247
   
A further consequence of the judgments
248
 is that the pre-commencement 
secured creditor, who in the past could ordinarily resort to liquidation as a safety net, 
may find itself in a disadvantaged position. Section 135(4) ‘freezes’ the ranking 
stipulated in section 135(3).
249
 This means that in a subsequent liquidation, the pre-
commencement secured creditor may find itself ranking after costs of liquidation, 
costs of the failed business rescue (including practitioner fees)
250
, employee related 
payments after commencement and  post-commencement finance advanced during 




4.8. CRYSTALLISED RANKING AND THE UNDELIMITED GROUND 
Due to existing gaps in the Act
252
, the ‘freezing of ranking’ in section 135 (4) may in 
certain instances be practically ineffective. The premise, on which the section is 
based, is that if a plan is neither adopted nor successful, proceedings will ultimately 
                                                     
247
 See Nedbank Ltd v Bestvest 153 (Pty) Ltd; Essa v Bestvest 153 (Pty) Ltd 2012 (5) SA 497 (WCC).  
In the Oakdene Square Properties case the Supreme Court of Appeal, evaluating the 
reasonableness of a creditor’s desire to oppose a business rescue plan, held  at para 38 as follows:  
          ‘As I see it, the applicant for business rescue is bound to establish reasonable grounds for the 
prospect of rescuing the company. If the majority creditors declare that they will oppose any 
business rescue scheme based on those grounds, I see no reason why that proclaimed opposition 
should be ignored. Unless, of course, that attitude can be said to be unreasonable or mala 
fide…Moreover, the Court is unlikely to interfere with the creditors’ decision unless their 
attitude was unreasonable’  
     See Copper Sunset Trading 220 (Pty) Ltd v Spar Group Limited and Another (365/2014) [2014] 
ZAGPPHC 688; 2014 (6) SA 214 (LP) (9 May 2014) where the court described the conduct of one 
creditor in rejecting a business rescue plan as ‘self-serving and, with respect, unreasonable’. The 
approach in Copper Sunset was however rejected by the court in the later Shoprite Checkers (Pty) 
Limited v Berryplum Retailers CC and Others (47327/2014) [2015] ZAGPPHC 255 (11 March 
2015) case. However see Ex parte: Target Shelf 284 CC; Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Service and Another v Cawood N.O. and Others (21955/14; 34775/14) [2015] ZAGPPHC 740 (13 
October 2015). At paras 32 & 33 the court endorsed the tests devised in Shoprite but disagreed with 
the manner in which they were to be applied. Declaring the vote of a dissenting creditor to have 
been inappropriate, the court in KJ Foods CC v First National Bank (75627/2013) [2015] 
ZAGPPHC 221 (23 April 2015) at para 10 placed emphasis on a balancing of interests in favour of 
the protection of employee interests, where it was shown that in doing so, the interests of other 
creditors would not be adversely affected. This approach has been rejected in the recent Senwes 
Limited v Zellenhen Boerdery CC and Others; Zellehen Boerdery CC v Senwes Ltd infra matter at 
para 32; See Zoneska Investments (Pty) Ltd/ Bonatla Properties (Pty) Ltd v Midnight Storm 
Investments 386 Ltd Case no 9831/2011; 7811/2012 [2012] ZAWCHC 163 (28 August 2012) at 
para 67. See further Spitskop supra at para 47, where the court held that it would ignore an 
intervening creditor’s (in this case SARS) view where it was unreasonable or mala fide. 
248
 If the judgements are accepted as reflective of the correct legal position. 
249
 This position has been confirmed by the court in Merchant West at para 61. 
250
 The court in Diener NO v Minister of Justice 2016 JDR 0632 (GP) of 2 March 2016 at paras 56- 60 
dealt with the ranking of practitioner remuneration where a company in business rescue was 
subsequently liquidated, with practitioner fees not having been paid during rescue.   
251
 See further the omnious observations made by Meskin et al at 478. 
252
 Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
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convert to liquidation.253 The different legal bases in which rescue proceedings may be 
terminated are relevant in the context of critiquing this aspect. 
The Act allows for termination
254
 of proceedings where a notice of substantial 
implementation has been filed
255
; where the company is not financially distressed
256
 
or where there is a ‘deadlock’ in respect of voting on a plan
257
. The Act further allows 
for an essentially ‘undelimited’ ground on which proceedings may be terminated.
258
  
The question that must be answered is; on what basis may a practitioner terminate 
proceedings on the latter basis? The question is relevant because permissive 
provisions, which are open ended, often create fertile ground for abuse. 
The consequence of a ‘simple’ termination of proceedings (as opposed to a 
substantial implementation or a termination coupled with liquidation) is that it allows 
creditors to pursue their claims against the company without having to concern 
themselves with a moratorium that is in place. At termination, the veil of the 
moratorium ‘falls away’.
259
  Therefore where proceedings are terminated on the 
‘undelimited ground’ in section 132(2)(b)
260
, the immediate consequence is that a 
creditor may enforce its claim against the company and whichever creditor is ‘first in 
law’, has the benefit of enforcing its claim.
261
  I submit that protections for post-
commencement financing creditors in section 135(4) find practical application where 
the company is subsequently liquidated and not where proceedings have simply been 
terminated.  
Practically and where the company is not subsequently liquidated, creditors 
ranked in terms of section 135 are not in a particularly strong position as against 
ordinary concurrent creditors.
262
 The same situation prevails where proceedings have 
terminated without a plan having been adopted. Where proceedings have terminated 
                                                     
253
 In terms of section 141(2)(a), where there is no reasonable prospect for the company to be rescued. 
254
 Without necessarily having to convert business rescue to liquidation. 
255
 Companies Act of 2008, section 132(2)(c)(ii).  
256
 Companies Act of 2008, section 141(2)(b). 
257
 Companies Act of 2008, section 153(5). See The Commissioner of the South African Revenue 
Services (Intervening) In re: Primrose Gold Mines (Pty) Ltd (High Court of South Africa Gauteng 
Division) case no. 56581/2014 of 12 September 2014. 
258
 Companies Act of 2008, section 132(2)(b). Even if one were to argue that such ground is not 
undelimited, the Act does not clearly state the specific grounds on which the section may be 
invoked.  
259
 A termination on the basis of a ‘deadlock’ in terms of section 153(5) presupposes that the plan could 
not be adopted and therefore any proposed plan has no force or effect. 
260
 The interpretation of this section by the courts is discussed below. 
261
 Assuming that monies or assets available to the company are sufficient to cover the said claim. 
Levenstein in his thesis at 369- 371 seems to hold the view that this provision applies in instances 
where the practitioner concludes that there are no longer reasonable grounds to believe that the 
company is financially distressed.  
262
 Unless if they have some form of security over the assets of the company. 
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with a plan having been validly adopted, different consequences may follow 
depending on the conditions existing in the adopted plan.
263
  
The law largely remains unclear but some guidance has been provided by the 
court in Primrose. In this matter the second and third applicants were appointed as 
business rescue practitioners on 3 June 2013. Having presented a proposed plan for 
creditor approval after a number of months, it was found to be unacceptable by the 
company’s creditors and rejected on this basis. None of the affected parties took 
further action as contemplated in section 153 resulting in a lapsing of time periods in 
terms of the Act. The practitioners proceeded to file for termination of business 
rescue. The notice of termination was rejected by CIPC. The practitioners sought a 
declaratory order, which was granted by the court on the 30 May 2014.  
The issue that the court in Primrose was to decide was whether, in filing a 
notice of termination as contemplated in section 153 and in terms of the declaratory 
order granted on the 30 May 2014, the practitioners had validly terminated 
proceedings and thus had no locus standi in the current proceedings to liquidate 
Primrose. 
Articulating the interplay between the provisions of section 132 and section 
141 of the Companies Act
264
, the court observed: 
       There is a reason why the court ordered that s 132(2)(a)(ii) be read together with s 141 of the Act. 
This is simply because s 132(2)(a)(ii) cannot come into being before section 141, in particular 
subsection (2)(a)(ii) thereof has been complied with… When business rescue proceedings come to 
an end, either the court shall have converted the rescue proceeding to liquidation proceedings or 




Developing the point, the court further noted: 
       In order to reach the finality contemplated in s 132(a) and (b) of the Act, the practitioner must 
either apply for the discontinuance of proceedings or file a notice of termination… The business 
rescue practitioner is enjoined in terms of s 141(2)(a)(ii) of the Act to apply for the discontinuance 
of the business rescue proceedings or by 141(2)(b)(ii) of the Act to file a notice of termination in 
order for the business rescue process to end. The action taken by the business rescue practitioner in 
terms of s141(2)(a)(ii) of the Act will result in the ‘state of affairs’ in s 132(2)(a)(ii) of the Act; 
                                                     
263
 There is, however, a significant amount of uncertainty in this area. For example, what would the 
status be where there had been a validly adopted plan in the absence of a default/cancellation 
clause? Would the provisions of the plan as adopted by creditors still find application even if such 
plan fails but only in part? Would creditors only be entitled to collect the compromised portion of 
their claims or the full portion (see section 154) or would they have to approach the courts for an 
order declaring the plan, which is essentially a contract, to have terminated and the failure to 
implement in full to constitute a material breach? 
264
 Companies Act 71 of 2008.  
265
 Primrose at para 18. 
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and the action taken in terms of s141(2)(b)(ii) of the Act will culminate in the ‘state of affairs’ in s 




The court may have settled some of the concerns raised earlier. Where 
proceedings are to be terminated while the company remains in financial distress, 
such termination should be accompanied by a liquidation application in order for it to 
be valid.
267
 In the absence of above procedure, the purported termination is invalid.
268
  
Where, for example, a company terminates proceedings in terms of section 
132(2)(b) due to there not being sufficient funds on the part of the company to pay the 
costs of liquidation, a potentially negative consequence may arise.
269
 In light of the 
dictum in Primrose, creditors of that company would be unable to enforce their claims 
due to a moratorium on claims against the company remaining in force.  In addition, 
where a plan has been validly adopted it will not be possible for creditors to apply for 




On the facts of Primrose, recourse
271
 was possible due to the proposed plan 
having been rejected by creditors.272  The position has been complicated further by the 
recent judgment of the Eastern Cape Division in the Landosec case
273
. The facts 
                                                     
266
 Primrose at para 18. See Ex parte Target Shelf 284 CC; Commissioner, SARS and Another v 
Cawood and Others supra at para 73 where the court has held that in addition to the practitioner, a 
creditor is entitled to make application for the conversion of business rescue to liquidation 
proceedings in terms of section 132(2)(a)(ii) where the provisions of section 132(2)(c)(i) find 
application; Beer NO v Fozsa Logistics CC (North Gauteng High Court) case no. 23039/2014 of 18 
June 13 at para 16. In this matter the court expressed the view that ss 141 and 132 are to be read 
together. 
267
 Primrose at paras 18 & 20. Further reference to section 132(2)(b) & (c) is made by the Act within 
the context of section 81 relating to the winding up of solvent companies. The latter section is 
confusingly drafted. It is not clear why creditors (apart from non-independent creditors) would ask 
that a solvent company be wound up. If such company is indeed solvent (i.e. not ‘financially 
distressed’) it is difficult to see which circumstance would, in light of its solvency, result in (i) a 
business rescue plan being proposed to rescue a company that is solvent and, even more 
astonishingly, (ii) result in a situation contemplated in section 132(2)(c)(i). It is to be emphasised 
that it is a primary requirement that inter alia a company be ‘financially distressed’ before it can 
access Chapter 6 proceedings. For an analysis of the content of the term ‘solvent company’ in 
section 81 as well as a discussion into factual and commercial insolvency, see Boschpoort 
Ondernemings (Pty) Ltd v ABSA Bank Limited (936/12)[2013] ZASCA 173 (28 November 2013). 
268
 Primrose at paras 18-20.  
269
 I have observed this practice in industry in a number of business rescues. 
270
 See Kariba supra at para 59 and DH Brothers supra at para 53. This position has been confirmed by 
the Supreme Court of Appeal in Panamo Properties supra.  
271
 For setting the resolution aside on the ‘just and equitable’ basis in section 130(5). 
272
 It must be noted that an order sought in terms of section 130 has the consequence of terminating 
proceedings and does not result in an automatic liquidation. If a creditor desires that the company 
be liquidated, a firm foundation for this prayer must be made on the papers. 
273
 Landosec (Pty) Ltd t/a Lasertech and Another v Mclaren and Others (Eastern Cape Division- Port 
Elizabeth) case no. 2231/2015 of 29 October 2015. 
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contained some similarities with the earlier Primrose case.
274
 Finding that section 141 
of the Companies Act was irrelevant in the context of the matter, the court observed: 
       …The obligations placed upon a practitioner in terms of section 141 and 153 of the Act are meant 
to provide for two different scenarios. Section 141 envisages a situation  where a practitioner has, 
after his or her appointment, investigated the company’s affairs and concluded that there is no 
reasonable prospect for the company to be rescued, and thus would not have proposed a business 
rescue plan. Section 153 on the other hand spells out the obligations of a practitioner where a 
business rescue plan has been proposed and rejected. The provisions of section 141 of the Act are 




The court found that the practitioner’s appointment terminated once the notice 
in terms of section 153(5) was issued. This view implies that proceedings terminate at 
that stage without further action. Unfortunately the court does not seem to have made 
reference to persuasive authority of the earlier Primrose case on this point.  
Responding to the contention that this view would essentially leave the 
company in limbo, the court responded: 
       I can also not agree with Mr Jooste’s submission that a finding that the first respondent’s 
appointment had terminated after the issue of the notice in terms of section 153(5), will have the 
effect of leaving the company in “limbo”, to the detriment of the creditors. The fact of the matter is 
that the creditors themselves rejected the business rescue plan, and had been served with the 
aforesaid notice. It is therefore up to them to decide whether or not to exercise their remedies in 
terms of the common law or the Act.
276
   
     
The approach in the earlier Primrose case is to be preferred. Apart from not 
having expounded on the interplay between sections 132(2) and the practitioner’s 
duty in terms of section 153, the court seems to not have accounted for the fact that 
the duty to investigate the affairs of the company is a continuing one throughout the 
process (rather than being at a singular moment in time).
277
 
Further developments have resulted in the Primrose judgment being 
overturned on Appeal.
278
 Rejecting the approach of the court a quo, the court of 
appeal found that section 132(2)(b) stated in general terms that proceedings end upon 
filing of a notice of termination with CIPC and that there was nothing specifically 
limiting this to a filing in terms of section 141(2)(b)(ii).
279
 In the view of the court, 
section 132(2)(b) was sufficiently broad to include filing of a termination in terms of 
                                                     
274
 In that the court was primarily asked to decide the moment at which the practitioner ceased to 
exercise his/her powers as practitioner. 
275
 Landosec supra at para 10. 
276
 Landosec supra at para 12 
277
 The reader is referred to section 141(2)(a)(i) & (ii). Sub-section (2) specifically applies the phrase 
‘If, at any time during business rescue proceedings, the practitioner concludes that…’ Where the 
conditional ‘if’ is found to be true, the sub-section stipulates actions that the practitioner must take. 
278
 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Primrose Gold Mines (Pty) Ltd and Others 
(A932/14) [2016] ZAGPPHC 737 (23 August 2016). I refer this case as the ‘Primrose (Appeal)’.  
279
 Primrose (Appeal) at para 13. 
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sections 153(5) or 141(2)(b)(ii).
280
 On this basis, the court of Appeal found the 
approach of the court a quo to be both untenable and unduly restrictive.
281
 A 
discussion into the treatment of employees as a specific class of creditor follows. 
 
4.9. EMPLOYEE CREDITORS 
The employee is a creditor in more than one sense. He/she is a creditor individually, 
where not part of an employee representative union
282
 and a creditor in the collective 
sense where he/she is a member of a worker union.
283
 The employee is a preferent 




In addition, an employee may be a post-commencement financing creditor.
285
 
These different legal positions result in different degrees of protection. Employees 
who were employed by the company continue to be employed on the same terms 
during business rescue proceedings.
286
 The Act makes it difficult for the practitioner 
to unilaterally retrench employees or suspend employment contracts. Such action is 
permissible only in specific circumstances and through an order of court. The relevant 
provisions
287
 provide as follows: 
       (2A) When acting in terms of subsection (2)— 
            (a) a business rescue practitioner must not suspend any provisions of— 
                (i) any employment contract; or  
                 (ii) an agreement to which section 35A or 35B of the Insolvency Act, 1936 (Act 24 of 1936) 




Limitations on the court’s exercise of discretion are also outlined: 
(b)  a court may not cancel any provision of— 
(i) an employment contract, except as contemplated in subsection (1); or 
(ii) an agreement to which section 35A or 35B of the Insolvency Act, 1936 (Act 24 of 




                                                     
280
 Primrose (Appeal) at para 13. 
281
 Primrose (Appeal) at paras 14 & 15. Contrary to the view expressed by the court, it may surely be 
argued that the absence of an adopted plan may be a ground for holding a reasonable belief that the 
company (whilst still remaining in financial distress) does not have a reasonable prospect of rescue 
as contemplated in section 141(2)(a). Otherwise, how else will the company ensure that it receives 
buy in from its creditors and potential investors if the latter do not agree with the route proposed to 
relieve it of its financial burden? 
282
 Companies Act 71 of 2005, Section 128(1)(a)(iii).  
283
 Companies Act 71 of 2005, Section 128(1)(a)(ii). 
284
 Companies Act 71 of 2005, Section 144(2). 
285
 Section 135(2) discussed above.  
286
 Section 136(1). An exception to this is where changes occur as a result of attrition or where an 
agreement, which is in accordance with the Labour Relations Act, is entered into between the 
company and its employees. See Meskin et al at 478(14).  
287
 See Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 136. 
288
 My emphasis. Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 136(2A)(a). 
289
 My emphasis. Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 136(2A)(b). 
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A court will be entitled to cancel a contract of employment on the ground of 
attrition or where employees and the company agree on different terms and 
conditions. In Solidarity Obo BD Fourie & Others the court remarked that the phrase 
‘ordinary course of attrition’ in sub-section (1)(a) was irreconcilable with sub-section 
(1)(b) if it was interpreted as excluding all forms of lawful termination of employment 
which include retrenchment.
290
 Retrenchments resulting from cancellation will be 
subject to applicable provisions of the Labour Relations Act of 1995.
291
  
The Companies and Labour Relations Acts provide a framework through 
which employee contracts may either be terminated or amended.
292
 The latter 
Act
293
provides for the appointment of a facilitator, where requested by an employer
294
 
or where requested by employee representatives in order to resolve a dispute relating 
to proposed dismissals.
295
 Where facilitation has failed to resolve the issue within a 
specific statutory time period, an employer may provide notice terminating 
employment contracts.
296
 Employees may respond by either giving a notice of strike 
or referring a dispute in relation to the procedural or substantive fairness of the 
dismissal to the Labour Court.
297
 
To the extent that monies are owed to an employee’s medical, pension or 
provident scheme, the scheme ranks as an unsecured creditor.
298
 Any other benefits 
accruing to employees are incorporated by reference by sub-section 5.299  
Section 144(3) provides employees, alternatively registered trade unions with 
participation rights throughout the business rescue process inclusive of notification of 
                                                     
290
 Solidarity Obo BD Fourie & Others v Vanchem Vanadium Products (Pty) Ltd and Others; In re: 
National Union of Metalworkers (NUMSA) Obo Members v Vanchem Vanadium Products (Pty) Ltd 
and Another (J385/16 & J393/16) [2016] ZALCJHB 106 (22 March 2016) obiter at para 35 & 36.  
      See earlier case Clarke v EH Walton Packaging [2014] JOL 31234 (CCMA judgment) where it was 
commented that, being in management-control, only the business rescue practitioner had authority 
to terminate the services of an employee once business rescue proceedings commenced. 
Accordingly, it was found that the purported termination of the employee was in breach of the 
Companies Act. 
291
 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. It would seem that courts are endorsing the possibility of a 
practitioner being able to terminate contracts of employment prior to plan publication provided that 
this is done in a lawful manner (i.e. in compliance with the provisions of the Labour Relations Act). 
Such approach is welcome, especially in light of well-established protective mechanisms existing in 
our labour laws. 
292
 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 read with section 136(1)(a) (i) or (ii).  
293
 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, section 189A(3). 
294
 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, section 189A(3)(a). 
295
 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, section 189A(3)(b). 
296
 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, section 189A(7)(a) read with section 37 of the Basic Conditions 
of Employment Act 75 of 1997. 
297
 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, section 189A(7)(b) read with section 191(11). 
298
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 144(4). 
299
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 144.   
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proceedings
300
 as well as making submissions and motions to approve a business 
rescue plan.
301
 Rights of employees during business rescue were considered in Solar 
Spectrum Trading 83
302
. In this case rescue proceedings were initiated by employees 
of the company. The court, per Kollapen J, analysing the scope and existence of a 
reasonable prospect commented on the interests of employees in a company’s affairs 
as follows: 
       Clearly a shareholder is likely to possess greater details of a company’s financial position and its 
financial performance than an employee. On the other hand employees…would have peculiar 
information of a company’s performance being as it were at the centre and at the heart and soul of 
its operations. Their knowledge of the company’s history, the highs and lows of its performance, 





Kollapen J held further that  
       without suggesting that different tests should be applied in establishing whether the threshold of 
reasonable prospects has been met, if the Act is to be implemented in a manner that does not 
disadvantage an employee as an affected party, then regard must be had both in assessing whether 
there are reasonable prospects and in exercising the balance of competing rights to the different 




The court was careful to emphasise that it did not seek to create a different test 
for reasonable prospect.  However, even though not having substituted the test of 
reasonable prospect with another, it may have introduced an additional overarching 
dynamic of employee rights and interests as a specific consideration in its assessment 
of reasonable prospect. Due to the court not having expounded on this aspect at 
length, it remains to be seen how it will be dealt with in future, specifically where 
business rescues are initiated by the company’s employees. It is submitted that the 
concept of reasonable prospect should be limited to an analysis of the prospects of 
proceedings enabling the company to meet the objectives of business rescue. 
 
4.10. FUTURE OF THE COMPANY: ADEQUATE PROTECTION FOR WHOM? 
The business rescue practitioner must convene a meeting of creditors within ten 
business days of having published the business rescue plan.
305
 He/she must further 
provide notice at least five business days before the meeting setting out the venue, 
                                                     
300
 Section 144(3)(a), participation rights in relation to court proceedings and the development of a 
business rescue plan  are listed in sections 144(3)(b), (d) & 148. 
301
 To the extent that such employees are creditors of the company 144(3)(e) and (f). 
302
 The Employees of Solar Spectrum Trading 83 v Afgri Operations Ltd and Another supra. 
303
 At para 18. The concept of reasonable prospect has been discussed in the earlier part of the chapter. 
The judgment outlined this aspect within the context of its broader discussion of the role of 
employees in business rescue as affected persons.  
304
 At para 18. 
305
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 151(1).  
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In the meeting the practitioner is required to perform a variety of functions 
including introducing the proposed plan for consideration by creditors and 
shareholders (where applicable), informing creditors as to whether he/she believes the 
company to be capable of being rescued as well as entertain any motion to amend the 
business rescue plan.
307
 The Act distinguishes between ‘amending’ a plan and 
‘revising’ it.
308
 Where a creditor desires a plan to be amended a motion must put 
forward and seconded by another creditor in attendance before it can be voted upon 
by creditors.
309
 By contrast, where a creditor seeks a revision of the plan, the creditor 
may ‘direct the practitioner to adjourn the meeting in order to revise the plan for 
further consideration’.
310
 There is no further requirement of a secondment of a motion 
in the latter scenario. Possible reason(s) why such distinction is created by the Act are 
unclear. 
A proposed business rescue plan requires a 75% majority vote by creditors’ 
‘voting interest’.
311
 Of this percentage, at least 50% must comprise independent 
creditors.
312
  There does not seem to be any minimum quorum requirements by the 
Act. It would therefore seem that if a major creditor were not in attendance at such 




Discussing this provision, the court a quo in Kariba Manufacturing confirmed 
that once a plan is adopted, it is binding on the company as well as on each of its 
creditors and holders of security, whether or not they are present at the meeting, 
                                                     
306
 Section 151(2). The rights of employees to participate in the meeting are stipulated in the provisions 
of sections 144, 148 and 149 of the Act. 
307
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 152(1)(a) to (d). 
308
 The Oxford dictionary defines these terms as follows: Amend ‘1. To make minor improvements to 
(a document, proposal, piece of legislation etc.)  2. Put right’. Revise ‘1. Examine and improve and 
amend (something, especially written matter). Reconsider and alter (an opinion or judgment) 2. 
Reread work done previously to improve one’s knowledge, typically for an examination.’ 
309
 Companies 71 of 2008, section 152(1)(d)(i). It would seem that simple majority in support from 
creditors suffices; see section 147(3). However, this is somewhat unclear in light of the fact that 
section 151 cannot be read in isolation from section 152, which specifically deals with the content 
and procedure in relation to the proposed business rescue plan. 
310
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 152(1)(d)(ii).  
311
 The Act specifically makes use of this term in regulating voting by creditors.   A ‘voting interest’ is 
in turn determined by the value of a creditor’s claim against the company. It is seems rather 
peculiar that the Act does not make direct reference to the ‘value’ of a claim instead.  
312
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 152(2). 
313
 A creditor must submit its claim  against the company. The creditor must therefore be physically 
present or vote by proxy. Companies Act of 2008, section 152(4). 
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proved their claims or voted in favour of the plan.314 The provision was described as 
having the effect of sanctioning a plan where the requisite majority has been reached, 
despite dissenting creditors. This process is commonly referred to as a ‘cram 
down’.
315
 In relation to the application of ‘cram down’ in the United States, the court 
observed further: 
       Since ‘cramdown’, is a process by which creditors are forced to accept a re-organisation or a 
business rescue plan, even against their wishes, it has the incidental effect of discouraging 
creditors from resisting or holding out for better treatment, and it enables a business rescue or re-




A question remains. Are creditors not entitled to resist in the hope of a better 
offer? Where a creditor is unreasonable in its holding out, the practitioner or an 
affected person is entitled to have such rejection set aside on ground of being 
inappropriate.317 In such instance, the court would undoubtedly be in a better position 
to evaluate whether or not the actions of such creditor where inappropriate. The 
provision relating to a ‘binding offer’ reads as follows: 
       (ii) any affected person, or combination of affected persons, may make a binding offer to 
purchase the voting interest of one or more persons who opposed adoption of the business 
rescue plan, at a value independently and expertly determined, on the request of the practitioner, 
to be a fair and reasonable estimate of the return to that person, or those persons, if the company 




The provision has potentially far reaching effects, and is distinguishable in its 
content to section 144(2), providing rights which are not as equally far reaching to 
employees.
319
 The manner in which the two provisions
320
 have been drafted is 
somewhat similar even though the potential implications are vastly different in impact 
to the dissenting creditor. While section 144 makes reference to ‘present[ing] an 
offer’,  section 153 makes use of a firmer tone of language which may have resulted 
in possible confusion regarding the intended meaning and ambit of the phrase 
‘binding offer’ as well the envisaged purpose of section 153 by the legislature.
321
  
                                                     
314
 Kariba at court a quo at para 28.  
315
 Kariba at court a quo at para 28. 
316
 Kariba at court a quo at para 29. 
317
 Section 153(1)(a)(ii). See also the approach of courts in assessing the reasonableness of a creditor’s 
decision to vote against a plan, discussed earlier. On the content of ‘inappropriate’, see Ex parte: 
Bhidshi Investments CC (20189/14) [2015] ZAGPPHC 783 (7 October 2015): Shoprite Checkers 
(Pty) Ltd v Berryplum Retailers CC and Others supra at para 38; Senwes Limited v Zellenhen 
Boerdery CC and Others; Zellehen Boerdery CC v Senwes Ltd (50799/2015, 50486/2015) [2016] 
ZAGPPHC 373 (31 March 2016). 
318
 Section 153(1)(b)(ii). 
319
 Section 144(3)(g)(i-ii). 
320
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, sections 144(3)(g)(ii) and 153(1)(b)(ii). 
321
 See observations made by the court in DH Brothers supra at paras 49 & 50. 
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A binding offer, which cannot be rejected by the offeree, has a potentially 
detrimental effect for a creditor who may be vulnerable (due to a lack of security 
against the company) and attempts to get the best deal for itself out of the process 
through its voting power.  If a voting interest is capable of being expropriated without 
the creditor’s consent (if a binding offer is accepted as capable of effecting this), what 
further recourse does such creditor have in attempting to salvage monies invested and 
essentially lost in the ailing company under rescue in light of the effect of section 
152(4) and section 154(2)?
322
 Does such ‘offer’ not put the common law maxim 
regarding the permissible extent of infringement on a creditor’s rights at the mercy of 
an amorphous concept of public interest? As will be seen, the courts have not been ad 
idem regarding the concept of a binding offer. Greater scrutiny of this aspect, as 
interpreted in case law, follows. 
 
4.11. THE KARIBA DILEMMA323  
In this case the African Banking Corporation, the applicant, sought relief from the 
court in business rescue proceedings pertaining to Kariba Furniture Manufacturers. 
Having voted against the business rescue plan, a binding offer was made to the 
applicant, resulting in a divestiture of its voting interest. African Banking 
Corporation’s claim resulted from monies it had, as a bank, advanced to Kariba. The 
monies were covered by a general notarial bond, which was executed by the company 
in favour of the bank. 
The issue that the court had to determine related to the meaning of the term 
‘binding offer’ in the Companies Act of 2008. Specifically, the bank sought a 
declaratory order to the effect that the binding offer made by Kariba was only binding 
on the offeror (Kariba) and that the offeree (African Banking Corporation) was free to 
either accept or reject it, alternatively that section 153(1)(b)(ii) was unconstitutional. 
The court held that the binding offer in section 153(1)(b)(ii) had the effect of 
creating a legal obligation.
324
 This obligation was not in the same manner as an option 
or agreement.
325
 It was held that the offer rather comprised of a set of statutory rights 
                                                     
322
 A possible interpretation of these sections will be offered at a later stage. 
323
 African Banking Corporation of Botswana Ltd v Kariba Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd and 
Others (GNP) [2013] ZAGPPHC 259; [2013] 4 All SA 432 (GNP); 2013 (6) SA 471 (GNP) (29 
August 2013). 
324
 Kariba at a quo at para 29. 
325
 Kariba at a quo at para 29. 
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and obligations from which neither party could walk away.
326
  The court found that a 
binding offer, once made, had the effect of binding both offeror and offeree.
327
 
In determining the value of the divested interest as well as the moment at 
which divestiture occurs, the court in Kariba said: 
       The determination of the value of the voting interest, by an independent expert, will only be 
effected after adoption of the revised business plan on the request of the practitioner, and as 
prescribed in s 153(1)(b)(ii) of the Act. The Act does not require the determination of the value 
by the independent expert, and payment of the purchase price of the offer to be made in the five 
day period contemplated in s 153(4)(a) of the Act. That period is reserved purely to afford the 
practitioner the opportunity to make any necessary revisions or amendments to the business 
rescue plan, to appropriately reflect the results of the offer, and to set a date for a resumed 




In the context of this dictum, it may be argued that the court envisages a 
divestiture of a dissenting creditor’s voting interest without consideration being paid 
for the interest at the moment the divestiture occurs. The creditor finds itself no longer 
possessed of the voting interest as well as not knowing the actual value that it might 
receive for it. It is sufficient that an independent expert provides an estimate of value 
and this may occur after the re-vote and after divestiture has occurred.
329
 
The court in Kariba held that the practitioner would be entitled to commence 
implementation of the plan only once payment for the creditor’s interest was 
effected.
330
 This approach was viewed as providing an added layer of protection in 
that were the company to default in making payment, the company would be unable 
to implement the plan.
331
 The view was that in addition to a practitioner’s inability to 
implement the plan in such instance, the divested creditor would remain capable of 
enforcing any debt owed by the company prior to business rescue to the extent that 




If it is accepted that the binding offer is (i) a set of statutory rights and 
obligations rather than an ‘option’ or ‘agreement’ which (ii) finds application whether 
the offeree consents to it or not,
333
 which (iii) has the effect of divesting the offeree 
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 Kariba at a quo at para 29. 
327
 Kariba at a quo at para 29. This approach was rejected in the subsequent DH Brothers case. The 
court disagreed with the interpretation of a ‘binding offer’ as a ‘set of statutory rights and 
obligations’ at paras 39 and 40. 
328
 My emphases. Kariba a quo at para 30. 
329
 Kariba at para 30. There are a myriad problems regarding the determination of a hypothetical value 
that would have been receivable in liquidation. A comprehensive discussion of this aspect is 
unfortunately beyond the scope of this thesis.  
330
 Kariba a quo at para 33.  
331
 Kariba a quo at para 33.  
332
 Kariba a quo at para 34. 
333
 Accepting that the estimated value is in accordance to what it may have received at liquidation. 
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creditor of its voting interest, the legal basis on which it may still enforce its rights 
where it has not received payment for its interest is not clear.  
It would seem that the court distinguishes between a creditor’s voting interest 
and the underlying enforceable claim, which forms the basis of the interest. Therefore 
a creditor may forfeit the interest while retaining the underlying claim, which will 
enable enforcement as long as payment for the ‘divested’ voting interest has not 
occurred. Upon further analysis, in the court’s view the binding offer divests the 
interest while the enforcement right remains intact, with payment effecting a cession 
of the underlying right without prior agreement, explicit statutory injunction or 
consent. It would seem that the binding offer adverted to by the court results in a 
suspensive arrangement prior to payment occurring
334
 (and complete divestiture) 
taking place once payment has occurred.
335
 It is to be remarked that the relevant 
provision makes reference only to a binding offer to purchase a voting interest.
336
 
It is difficult to find any other basis on which a creditor would be entitled to 
enforce a claim in the circumstances outlined by the court. If the above understanding 
of the court’s articulation of ‘binding’ offer is correct, the conclusion reached in the 
judgment is seemingly contradictory. In addition and as the court correctly pointed 
out in DH Brothers, the determination of what would have been received by a creditor 
in liquidation presents a myriad of challenges and much room for abuse.
337
  
The legal point has been settled on appeal.
338
 Rejecting the decision of the 
court a quo, the court observed a primary distinction between the ‘binding offer’ 
referred to by the court of first instance and that finding application in the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code: 
       …However it seems to me that certain factors distinguish the process as provided for in our Act 
from the procedure provided for in the [United States] Bankruptcy Code…A further and more 
pertinent distinguishing factor is that the making of the binding offer in our business rescue 
procedure is a step separate and antecedent to the second round of voting on the adoption of the 
business rescue plan. Therefore the meaning of ‘binding offer’ falls to be considered on its own 




The court provided the following interpretation to the word ‘offer’ 
      …In everyday use, the word ‘offer’ signifies a presentation or a proposal to someone for 
                                                     
334
 And in this way results in a forfeiture of the voting interest only. 
335
 The divestiture of the underlying enforceable right. 
336
 Companies Act of 2008, section 153(1)(b)(iii). 
337
 The approach of the court in DH Brothers has received approval in subsequent cases. See the obiter 
remarks in the ABSA v Caine at para 37 and Dowmont cases supra. 
338
 African Banking Corporation of Botswana v Kariba Furniture Manufacturers & Others [2015] 
ZASCA 69 (20 May 2015). This judgment has been affirmed in the Ranier Maria Scherzinger and 
Others v Motorstars Action Vehicles CC and Others (Western Cape High Court) case numbers 
6765/2015 & 11191/2015 of 3 December 2015 (Western Cape High Court) at paras 45-7. 
339
 Kariba SCA at paras 16-17. 
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acceptance or rejection; it is ‘an expression of readiness to do or give something; [or] an amount 
of money that someone is willing to pay for something’. In South African legal parlance, an offer 
is an invitation to consent to the creation of obligations between two or more parties…Therefore, 
the settled meaning, both in the general use and in the more technical legal use of the word “offer” 




The court found that it is a legal requirement that an offer be clear, 
unambiguous and contain the minimum requirements of a proposed contract.
341
 The 
bank was entitled to know who was making the offer, the value of such offer as well 
as when and how payment was to be made.
342
 Mere regurgitation of the provisions of 
section 153 was insufficient for the purposes of constituting an offer.
343
  
On the meaning of the term ‘binding’, the court confirmed the approach of 
Gorven J in DH Brothers
344
, and held that this meant that once an offer was made, it 
could not be withdrawn by the offeror. The court further held that to adopt the 
interpretation of the court a quo was to deprive an offeree of an established right to 
accept or reject an offer, observing that had the legislature intended to do so, this 
would have been clear from the legislation.
345
 
The court of appeal has confirmed the layer of protection introduced by the 
court in the earlier DH Brothers case. This approach will go a long way to curbing 
potential abuse and collusion. The company has a remedy where a creditor’s vote is 
inappropriate.
346
 On a conspectus of available facts, the court is in a better position to 
determine this aspect.  
 
4.12. A REVERSIONARY RIGHT FOR DISSENTING CREDITORS? 
The provisions of the Act in relation to voting and adoption of the proposed business 
rescue plan have a tremendous impact on the rights of creditors.
347
 This impact 
becomes more pronounced when the provisions relating to the discharge of debts and 
claims against the company are considered.
348
 The relevant provision reads as 
follows: 
       154(1) A business rescue plan may provide that, if it is implemented in accordance 
                 with its terms and conditions, a creditor who has acceded to the discharge of the whole 
                 or part of a debt owing to that creditor will lose the right to enforce the relevant debt or 
                 part of it. 
                                                     
340
 Kariba SCA at para 18. 
341
 Kariba SCA at para 19. 
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 Kariba SCA at para 19. 
343
 Kariba SCA at para 19. 
344
 DH Brother supra at paras 40-41. 
345
 Kariba SCA at para 21. 
346
 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 153(1)(a)(ii). 
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 Companies Act 71 of 2008, sections 152 & 153. 
348
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             (2) If a business rescue plan has been approved and implemented in accordance with 
                 this Chapter, a creditor is not entitled to enforce any debt owed by the company 
                 immediately before the beginning of the business rescue process, except to the extent 




Section 154(1) states that once adopted, the business rescue plan may provide 
for the discharge of the whole or part of a debt owing to a creditor, causing the 
creditor to lose the right to enforce the relevant debt.
350
 The word ‘implement’
351
 is 
not defined, even though reference is made to ‘substantial implementation’ in Chapter 
6. 
Notwithstanding the above, the question to be answered is how are the 
provisions of sections 152 and 154 to be reconciled, especially in instances where a 
creditor has not consented to the compromise of a debt due and owing to it? Section 
154(1) provides a suspensive condition for the enforceability or non-enforceability of 
a claim on the part of a creditor. The provision specifically uses the words ‘acceded 
to’
352
, which may be accepted as being synonymous with the word ‘consent’
353
. It is 
submitted that the word presupposes the existence of consent, requiring positive 
action on the part of the person acceding or consenting. This may be contrasted with 
the word ‘acquiesce’
354
, where permission may be assumed in the absence of positive 
action on the part of the person ‘acquiescing’. With the latter, mere lack of positive 
action suffices.
355
 Where accession does not exist, there cannot be ‘discharge’.  I 
argue that if section 154(1) is interpreted in this manner; it may serve to add a further 
layer of protection for creditors.
356
 
How is the requirement of specific consent, as argued for above, to be 
reconciled with section 152(4) which deems an adopted business rescue plan to be 
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  My emphases. 
350
  Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 154 (1).  
351
 The South African Concise Oxford Dictionary (2009, Tenth Impression) at 579 defines the term’s 
secondary meaning as to ‘put into effect.’ 
352
 The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines the word as ‘1. assent or agree..’ 
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 Denoting ‘permission or to give permission, agree to something.’ Concise Oxford Dictionary supra 
at 245. 
354
 Defined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary at 9 as to ‘accept or consent to something without 
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355
 However, see the observations made by Meskin et al in Henochsberg at 536. 
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 As correctly observed by Meskin et al, section 152(4) and its possible effect on this view cannot be 
ignored. It provides that an adopted plan is binding on creditors and security holders of the 
company whether or not they were present, had voted for or against the plan or had proven their 
claim against the company. It may be argued that this provision imposes a deemed accession to the 
plan once the requisite majority has been satisfied therefore satisfying the condition in section 
154(1) and rendering an individual creditor’s dissent legally irrelevant. A contrary argument may 
be that section 152(4) refers to the legal effect of an adopted plan (i.e. binding) while section 154(1) 
refers to the existence of individual consent, notwithstanding the act of adoption (i.e. presence or 
absence of accession). 
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binding on all creditors irrespective of whether they were present or voted in favour 
or against the plan? The courts seem to be providing some guidance on this aspect. In 
an obiter remark, the Supreme Court of Appeal in Newpoint Finance Co observed the 
effect of section 154 on a creditor’s claim: 
       The key provision in that regard is s 154, which, in subsec 1, simply says that in certain 
circumstances a creditor will not be able to enforce a debt against a company in business rescue 
and, in subsec 2, says that the company may enforce a debt in accordance with and to the extent 
permitted by the terms of the business rescue plan. That section is capable of the construction that 
it deals only with the ability to sue the principal and not the debt itself. If that is the case then the 
liability of the surety would be unaffected by the business rescue, unless the plan itself made 
specific provision for the situation of sureties…
357 
 
 It would therefore seem that the section does not affect the anatomy of the 
claim itself but rather its enforceability. Therefore, once adopted by creditors, a 
creditor remains with its claim but is simply unable to enforce it. It would be unfair to 
the debtor company and contrary to the objective of business rescue
358
 if a creditor 
were to consent to the compromise of its claim in terms of section 152 and 
subsequently, for whatever reason, unilaterally seek to enforce the previously 
compromised claim in full in the absence of a breach of the rescue plan. It is 
submitted that such a situation is one which the legislature would clearly have sought 
to prevent and that the sub-section was intended for such instances. 
Section 154(2) states that where a business rescue plan has been ‘approved 
and implemented’, a creditor is not entitled to enforce any claim which arose 
immediately before the proceedings unless the rescue plan provides otherwise. The 
problem with this provision may be illustrated by the following: Company A enters 
proceedings. In terms of its proposed business rescue plan, there is an undertaking to 
perform actions x y in return for a compromise of claims. Creditors of Company A 
adopt the proposed plan. The practitioner performs only action x and files for 
substantial implementation.  
Due to the existence of ‘approval’ (in the form of plan adoption) and a degree 
of ‘implementation’ (whether complete or not) having taken place, the provisions of 
section 154 are in large part satisfied leaving the creditor unable to enforce its claim 
upon mal-performance.
359
  In this case a creditor is unable to set aside the resolution 
which placed the company in business rescue. Creditor recourse is unclear (even if it 
is assumed that the creditor has the financial capital to litigate).  Should one of these 
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 At para 14. 
358
 See definition of ‘business rescue’ in section 128. 
359
 However, some recourse is available to an affected person with respect to practitioner plan 
implementation as articulated in cases considered earlier. 
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two agreed upon conditions not be satisfied, a creditor ought to be entitled to enforce 
its claim.
360
 Interpreting the sub-section in this manner provides a positive response to 
the ambit of a creditor’s right to vindicate its claim against the debtor company.
361
  
The advantages of the provision being interpreted in this manner are (i) it 
resolves the challenge identified by the courts, regarding the Act not providing for the 
setting aside of the resolution once the business rescue plan has been adopted
362
 and 
(ii) counter-balances the potentially infringing effect that business rescue has on the 
enforcement rights of a creditor. This approach strikes a better balance between the 
common law maxim affirmed in DH Brothers and the socio-economic imperatives 
highlighted in the Act. 
The proposed approach is especially relevant in light of the fact that the scope 
for creditors to vindicate their rights seems to have been significantly limited by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in Panamo Properties (Pty) Ltd. The court disagreed with 
the approach of the court in the earlier DH Brothers case, where the court in DH 
Brothers, in order to reconcile the inconsistency between sections 130(1)(a) and 
130(5)(a) and avert potential injustice, introduced a fourth ground for setting aside 
proceedings (‘just and equitable circumstances’).
363
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 Where not entitled to unilaterally enforce its claim, such creditor ought to be entitled to approach 
the courts for the setting aside of the company resolution even after the plan has been adopted, 
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150…’ 
      However see Absa Bank Limited v Golden Dividend 339 (Pty) Ltd and Others (70637/13) [2014] 
ZAGPPHC 1048; 2015 (5) SA 272 (GP) (19 December 2014) where the court, notwithstanding the 
fact that an applicant sought to set-aside an already adopted plan, observed that it was relevant that 
proceedings were launched before the plan was adopted and that this distinguished it from Kariba 
at a quo where proceedings were launched after the plan was adopted. 
363
 DH Brothers supra at para 18. 
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The Supreme Court of Appeal held that despite non-compliance with the procedural 
requirements of section 129, resulting in nullity
364
, this would not result in a 
termination of proceedings.
365
 An application to court was a necessary pre-condition 
for termination.
366
  Having expressed caution regarding the court substituting its own 
view for what it believes the legislature may have intended a provision to mean as 
well as emphasising the ordinary language used as the primary point of departure, the 
court replaced ‘or’ in section 130 with ‘and’.
367
  
 On a reading of the judgment, in order for the court to set aside a resolution in 
terms of section 130(5)(a), for example, a creditor would, despite having possibly set 
a substantive basis in the form of showing absence of a reasonable prospect
368
, in 
addition have to show that it is ‘just and equitable’ for proceedings to be terminated. 
The same requirement would have to be met where an applicant seeks termination on 
the basis of non-compliance with what the court terms ‘obligations of an 
administrative or procedural nature’ in section 129. The applicant would have to 
satisfy the court that termination is just and equitable.
369
 
Unfortunately, the SCA seems to have further minimised if not eliminated the 
possibility of a reversionary right for creditors in Eravin Construction
370
. In brief, 
Ditona, a company under final liquidation, had made transfer to Eravin of an amount 
of R 389 593.49 after which the latter entered business rescue proceedings. The 
liquidator sought to avoid the transfer as a void disposition in terms of section 341(2) 
of the Companies Act of 1973. Finding that it was not necessary for creditors to have 
received notice of business rescue proceedings for section 154(2) to come into force, 
the court decreed: 
       …The meaning of the section is clear and unambiguous: all creditors- as opposed to creditors who 
had been given notice of the business rescue proceedings- are precluded from enforcing pre-
business rescue debts. I can see no justification for reading into the section a limitation that the 
legislature would have provided expressly, had it wished to…To the extent that some creditors 
may not know about the business rescue proceedings until after they have concluded, that may 
indicate a defect in the provisions of the new Act concerning  the giving of notice. If that is so, 
that is a matter for the legislature to attend to. It is not the proper function of the court to attempt 
to remedy such difficulties by means of interpretive sleight of hand.
371
   
 
                                                     
364
 In terms of section 129(5). 
365
 Panamo Properties supra at para 28. 
366
 Panamo Properties supra at para 28. This application would be in terms of section 130(5)(a). 
367
 At para 31. For further reading, see further Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni 
Municipality [2013] ZASCA 13 cited with approval by the same court at para 26. 
368
 Or an absence of financial distress in terms of section 130(1)(a). 
369
 Panamo Properties supra at paras 21, 32 and 33.  
370
 Eravin Construction CC v Bekker NO and Others (20736/2014) [2016] ZASCA 30 (23 March 
2016). The court further affirmed its own earlier ruling in Panamo Properties on the nullity debate. 
371
 At paras 27 and 29. See Stalcor (Pty) Ltd v Kritzinger NO and Others supra at para 41.  
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From a reading of the Panamo and Eravin Construction judgments, it would 
seem that proceedings commenced in a manner which is non-compliant with the 
formal prescripts of the Act are in substance putative rather than ‘a nullity’ as 
envisaged by the Companies Act.
372
 In addition, where for example a company fails 
(whether deliberately or through negligence) to publish relevant notice to affected 
persons and proceedings come to end (or even where they reach the stage where the 
plan was voted upon and adopted by creditors who were notified and participated), a 





4.13. FURTHER GAPS IN CURRENT LEGISLATION 
Business rescue provisions in Chapter 6 present a significant departure from the 
previous judicial management regime. Despite the level of innovation shown in the 
drafting of the chapter, the new regime contains loopholes and weaknesses not unique 
to newly drafted legislation. While others have been highlighted throughout the 
chapter, some are explored in the following paragraphs. 
Due to the degree of flexibility afforded to an entity in seeking recourse to 
proceedings, Chapter 6 may be subject to abuse by companies wishing to 
illegitimately receive the benefit of compromising debts due to creditors. This may be 
even more of a risk where proceedings are commenced by board resolution.
374
 
There is no explicit requirement in terms of the Act that the affidavit be 
accompanied by independently audited financial statements of the company as a way 
of verifying averments made when it is filed with the director resolution at CIPC
375
. A 
requirement to this effect would enable the Commission to better assess whether 
                                                     
372
 Putative in the sense that they are considered to be of force and effect until successfully challenged. 
373
 An example may be in the context of group structures. Time periods applicable to confirmation of  a 
liquidation order in one connected entity are not necessarily congruent with timelines applicable 
with timelines of a business rescue intervention to which another group company may be subject. 
By the time a liquidator’s appointment has been confirmed, it may be impossible to recoup monies 
or assets transferred to a connected company. Where there is knowledge of proceedings, this may 
not be much of a problem but as the Eravin Construction case shows, it is not infrequent that 
relevant parties gather knowledge when it is effectively too late. 
374
 Pretorius (Business Rescue Status quo report) having collated data on business rescue over three 
years (from 1 May 2011 until 31 July 2014) observed that 90% of filings were through resolution of 
the board of directors while commencement by court order accounted for just below 10%. With 
commencement by court order, a 50-50 split between creditors and shareholders making application 
to court was observed (with the exception of three cases where employees had made application). 
375
 Companies and Intellectual Property Commission. 
  127 
financial distress exists or not.
376
  
Within the context of inter-related entities, it is not entirely clear whether a 
suretyship obligation which becomes enforceable but is not yet enforced against a 
company in business rescue may cause the requirement of ‘financial distress’ to be 
met in a connected co-principal debtor company. In group structures, where there are 
a number of sureties in favour of connected parties, the financial distress of one of the 
companies often triggers business rescue proceedings in related companies who may 
be property owning, often not receiving sizeable income but whose business asset is 
often property over which a creditor may, through the suretyship, have security. 
 In this way, rescue proceedings may be used as a creditor ‘staving-off’ 
mechanism.
377
 This is not to detract from the fact that as surety and co-principal 
debtor, the connected company is potentially liable for debt incurred by the principal 
debtor.
378
 The question is whether considering this contingent liability and the 
definition of ‘financial distress’, would recourse to proceedings by such connected 
company be seen a valid use of the procedure? Such issues often bring the legitimacy 
of initiating proceedings into doubt. The question remains, whether this course of 
action was envisioned by legislators and therefore intended or whether it is a 
consequence that was neither foreseen nor intended.
379
  
                                                     
376
  Even if it is accepted that cash flow insolvency and the prospect of factual insolvency occurring 
within a six month period are the correct tests for the purposes of initiating business rescue. Even 
though a comprehensive discussion of this aspect is beyond the scope of this thesis, the approach 
adopted by Australian courts may assist us in unravelling this complex terrain. For further reading 
see Re Capital Annuities Ltd [1979] 1 WLR 170 at 182-188; Re a Company [1986] BCLC 261 at 
261; Re RHD Power Services Pty Ltd (1991) 3 ACSR 261Lewis v Doran [2005] NSWA 243; 
Sandel v Porter (1966) 115 CLR; Hymix Concrete Pty Ltd v Garrity; M & R Jones Shopfitting Co 
(Pty) Ltd v National Bank of Australasia (1983) 7 ACLR at 445. 
377
 The courts have commented on the fides of a party wishing to initiate proceedings intimating that 
they would be loath to sanction business rescue proceedings where such is initiated in bad faith and 
amounted to an abuse of process. See Sulzer Pumps (South Africa) and Beagle Run Investment 
cases supra. 
378
 Levenstein (LLD thesis) highlights additional complexity faced within the context of business 
rescue, as well as the effect  the construction of a suretyship agreement has on enforceability (i.e. 
the question whether a ‘co-principal’ debtor relationship exists between the principal debtor and 
surety or not): 
           ‘…Many financial institutions have removed reference to “co-principal debtor” from their 
standard suretyship agreements as a result of the provisions set out in the National Credit 
Act…However, it is submitted that this becomes problematic when one considers the 
implications of section 133 of the 2008 Companies Act in that no legal proceedings can occur 
against the company once business rescue proceedings have commenced. As a result, this 
would prohibit the bank from proceeding against a surety on the basis that 2008 Companies Act 
will prohibit action to be taken against the principal debtor, namely the company. Once such 
valid underlying obligation becomes tainted from an enforceability point of view, the bank will 
not be entitled to proceed against the surety itself.’   
379
 A related matter seems to be the Act’s silence on group companies business rescues. It would seem 
that this was not envisaged by the legislature. 
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There is no express requirement, on the ordinary wording of section 129, that 
the resolution to be filed to CIPC must be accompanied by a sworn statement at that 
stage. The section provides for a sworn statement where notice is to be sent to 
affected persons as the section makes use of the words ‘after the company has 
adopted and filed a resolution’.
380
 The current practice of CIPC is to require an 
affidavit to accompany the board resolution. In the absence of such affidavit the 
resolution is rejected. It may be argued that in insisting on an affidavit CIPC may be 
acting ultra vires and thus not competent to demand that an affidavit accompany the 
board resolution.  
Section 129 remains vulnerable to manipulation. For example, even though a 
practitioner is required to convene a first meeting of creditors within ten days after 
appointment in terms of section 147, a practitioner may request an additional 14 day 
adjournment during a first meeting of creditors so as to ‘investigate’ the company’s 
affairs and its capability of being rescued in terms of section 141 while it may be 
prima facie clear on the conspectus of the available facts and from an objective 
standpoint, that the company either does not have reasonable prospects of being 
rescued or is not financially distressed. In this way the practitioner is able to siphon 
funds out of an already struggling company for a longer period. Slightly stronger 
controls are imposed by section 150, requiring the publication of a plan within 25 
days after practitioner appointment.
381
 One may argue that a 24-day period may not 
be significantly detrimental to the company financially. In light of the fees and 
disbursements that such practitioner may be entitled to levy against the company, 
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 See section 129(3) whereas sub-section 3(a) requires a resolution to be sent to affected persons to 
‘includ[e] a sworn statement of facts’.   
381
  However see Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Berryplum Retailers CC and Others supra, where the 
court, disagreeing with the earlier DH Brothers case held that despite non-compliance with the 25 
day requirement, a litigant could on good cause request the court to extend this period even after its 
expiry. See further the discussion of the Panamo Properties case supra and its impact on this 
aspect. 
382
 On the practitioner’s entitlement to charge fees and disbursements, even where the conclusion was 
that the company did not have reasonable prospects of success, see generally Murgatroyd v Van 
Den Heerver N.O. and Others (20456/2014) [2014] ZAGPJHC 142; [2014] 4 All SA 89 (GJ); 2015 
(2) SA 514 (GJ) (29 July 2014) at para 49. 
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4.14. CONCLUSION 
It may be argued that business rescue contains significant improvements when 
compared to its predecessor, judicial management. Being a company rescue measure 
designed from a comparative framework with a multi-stakeholder orientation, it 
attempts to perform the arduous task of ensuring that a company’s stakeholders 
(rather than simply its creditors) are accorded varying degrees of protection when a 
company is liable to be liquidated.    
The task has been made even more challenging by the often open-ended and 
sometimes complex drafting style of the provisions of Chapter 6, which has 
contributed to both abuse of the process and litigation. Many of the concerns raised in 
the chapter will hopefully be rectified through legislative amendment and active 
judicial participation. 
The public interest orientation of business rescue has been consistently 
affirmed, placing a preference for rescue over liquidation where the requisite 
thresholds are met.  Unfortunately, this has in some instances led to abuse of the 
process, primarily due to the relatively low administrative requirements that have to 
be met by a company’s board in order to have recourse to the process.  
Even though the ease with which a company may be able to access the 
procedure is a significant improvement, it is necessary that current information 
requirements be revisited by CIPC so as to ensure that companies that should be 
under business rescue are the ones benefitting from the process. 
While not seeking to describe this new regime within a debtor (predominantly 
U.S. approach) or creditor in possession (primarily U.K. approach) mould, the 
nuanced manner in which Chapter 6 deals with stakeholders has received attention. In 
addressing this aspect, it has been argued that business rescue, despite its conceptual 
basis being from a collective-creditor orientation, places greater weight and protection 
on the rights of employees (as a specific category of creditors) when compared to 
other classes of creditors. 
Employee rights may summarily be categorised into three broad forms: job 
security, security of participation and security of ranking. Despite wide powers 
granted to the business rescue practitioner, he/she may not unilaterally suspend or 
cancel contracts of employment. Any retrenchment decisions must comply with 
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sections 189 and 189A of the Labour Relations Act of 1995.
383
 
Significantly, the practitioner may not approach the court to suspend or cancel 
employment contracts on any basis other than on the grounds outlined earlier. In this 
way the Companies Act of 2008 has limited the courts inherent jurisdiction in favour 
of employees, providing the latter with a limited form of exemption from judicial 
scrutiny. This reflects a significant paradigm shift, highlighted earlier in the chapter of 
the employee as the only creditor with ‘pride of place’ and reflects the permeating 
nature of labour legislation in the post-Constitutional context.
384
 
In relation to participatory powers, the Act articulates the bases, throughout 
the process, on which the employee is able to participate. These powers are granted 
both in the collective (as a member being represented by a trade union) and individual 
(where not part of a union) senses.  The manner in which the participatory rights of 
employees have been articulated have resulted to a large extent in duplication, as the 
employee is able to access certain rights both as an ‘employee’ as well as an ‘affected 
person’.  
Information rights (right of access to company financial statements) that 
employees are granted in the Act are to the exclusion of any other category of creditor 
(to the exception of a shareholder-creditor or judgment creditor in certain 
circumstances).
385
 Therefore the employee creditor becomes the only independent 
creditor able to exercise a significantly greater level of creditor activism. The above is 
                                                     
383
 Section 189 primarily vests employees with the right to be consulted by an employer where 
dismissals based on operational requirements are contemplated. The nature of the right is to 
procedural fairness. The purpose of consultations would inter alia be to explore options available so 
as to avoid or minimise dismissals, alter their timing, mitigate the negative effects of any proposed 
dismissals, as well as agree on a method for effecting dismissals. For cases on ‘procedural fairness’ 
within the context of the Labour Relations Act, see SACTWU v Discreto [1998] 12 BLLR 1228 
(LAC); FAWU v SA Breweries Ltd [2004] 11 BLLR 1093 (LC); Kukard v Molapo Technology (Pty) 
Ltd [2006] 4 BLLR 334 (LC) at par 20. The courts have been at pains to emphasise the link between 
procedural and substantive fairness. In this regard, see SACWU v Afrox Ltd [1999] 10 BLLR 1005 
(LAC); BMD Knitting Mills (Pty) Ltd v SACTWU [2001] 7 BLLR 705 (LAC); NEHAWU v Medicor 
(Pty) Ltd t/a Vergelegen Medi-Clinic [2005] 1 BLLR 10 (LC) at para 38. Section 189A provides that 
employees may in certain instances participate in a strike or lock-out during such period. 
384
 See section 210 of the LRA read with section 5 of Act 71 of 2008. 
385
 See section 31(3) of Act 71 of 2008. An ordinary creditor may only be able to access this 
information, in many instances, only after commencement of proceedings and after publication of 
the plan. Trade Unions are entitled to receive this information before proceedings have commenced, 
where they are desirous of initiating business rescue proceedings. 
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also reflective of possible structural information asymmetries
386
, which the Act may 
be said to be inadvertedly perpetuating. There are, in this manner, no equally 
comparable rights vested by the Act upon other ‘independent’ creditors. These 
creditors may, however, be able to access similar information in terms of external 
legislation or regulation even though such may come at an additional cost.
387
  
Chapter 6 articulates the manner in which employee claims are to be ranked 
both at the pre- and post-commencement stages. The ranking of employee claims 
evidences a clear departure from the judicial management regime, significantly 
swinging the pendulum in favour of employee creditors. The treatment of employee 
claims within judicial management has received discussion in the previous chapter.  
The following aspects are worth highlighting: Pre-commencement outstanding 
remuneration claims are ranked as preferent and payable prior to concurrent creditors. 
The employee, having an equally protectable interest in relation to an ordinary 
concurrent creditor, is vested with a stronger pedigree of claim during rescue despite 
stronger protections (in the form of a preference in ranking in terms of insolvency 
law) should the company succumb to liquidation. 
Further concern is evoked where the provisions regulating post-
commencement finance are analysed. Once proceedings have commenced, 
remuneration obligations incurred by the company thereafter are categorised as post-
commencement finance. While ranking ahead of pre-commencement concurrent and 
preferent creditors, wage claims falling into this category rank (i) only secondary to 
practitioner fees and business rescue expenses (ii) in priority to post-commencement 
secured and unsecured non-wage related financing/credit and in priority to (iii) pre-
commencement secured and unsecured credit.
388
 
Even more profound, is the impact of the above preference in a subsequent 
liquidation, where due to business rescue proceedings having been instituted, the 
ordinary preferent ranking of employees in terms of insolvency law is transformed 
                                                     
386
 See Mongalo in his presentation ‘Two steps forward and one step back is better than one step 
forward and two steps back: A limited comparative analysis of business rescue in South Africa’ 
presented at the University of Pretoria 7 October 2014. He aptly explains application of the concept 
within the context of Chapter 6 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 at 4. For a more comprehensive 
analysis, see Joseph Stiglitz ‘The Contributions of the Economics of Information to the Twentieth 
Century Economics’ (2000) 115 jstor 1441-1478; Le Roux, Ingrid and Duncan, Kelly ‘ The naked 
Truth: Creditor understanding of business rescue. A small business perspective SAJESBM Vol.  6 
pp 57-74.   
387
 Either through litigation mechanisms such as ‘discovery’ or by seeking recourse through 
information legislation such as the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000. 
388
 However see discussion of Senwes Limited v Zellenhen Boerdery CC and Others; Zellehen 
Boerdery CC v Senwes Ltd supra. 
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into a significantly stronger form of ranking and may create two categories of ranking 
for the employee.
389
  The crystalised ranking in the business rescue subsists in a 
subsequent liquidation. 
 These protections are disproportional in light of (i) the significant 
informational and participatory rights vested upon employees and (ii) the role played 
by other creditors in the functioning of the ailing company before and upon 
commencement of proceedings, specifically in view of (iii) the concessions expected 
from non-employee creditors as a collective in pursuance of company survival. In 
addition, an inherent risk is that the status quo may present room for legislative 
arbitrage and significant abuse. 
The chapter has highlighted similarities in approach between our rescue 
regime and the approaches of the U.S. and the U.K. In the introductory part of the 
thesis, the hybrid nature of our rescue regime as well as its roots in both chapter 11 
(U.S.) and administration (U.K.) procedures, has been affirmed. In light of business 
rescue’s mixed conceptual roots, and especially in light of the challenges currently 
observed, it is apposite that we proceed to analyse, in greater depth, the administration 
and chapter 11 procedures. In the context current experiences with our own business 
rescue procedure, the analysis may provide invaluable insights into how our regime 
may be enhanced.
                                                     
389
 A different set of objectives, interests and dynamics come into play within the context of Insolvency 
Law when compared to the Companies Act. Its preamble simply reads; ‘To consolidate and amend 
the law relating to insolvent persons and to their estates.’ A strong argument may be made that once 
a company has failed to be rescued within the prescripts of the Companies Act, which specifically 
sets out to achieve this, a preference in ranking created by it should not have the effect of creating a 
preference in another Act especially where this has not been articulated as a legislative intention, in 
either or both Acts. On the other hand it may be argued that this is a necessary concession on the 
part of all stakeholders, if the company is to have a sound opportunity at recovery. 
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CHAPTER 5: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES - BANKRUPTCY AND 
ADMINISTRATION 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
Since our new business rescue regime contains aspects which resemble the 
approaches of both the U.K. and U.S., albeit to differing degrees, it is for this reason 
that both are discussed. The benefits of engaging in this exercise are many. Because 
of comparative influence of these jurisdictions, there is an existing framework for 
comparability. The functional benefits of engaging in a comparative analysis of 
similar jurisdictions are well articulated by Zweigert & Kotz
764
: 
        The basic methodological principle of all comparative law is that of functionality. From this basic 
principle stem all other rules which determine the choice of laws to compare, the scope of the 
undertaking, the creation of a system of comparative law, and so on. Incomparables cannot 





 It is in this light that the chapter sets out to provide an analysis of the U.K. 
administration and U.S. chapter 11 procedures. The purpose of this analysis is two-
fold. The first is to evaluate the question of whether either or both jurisdictions better 
balance competing interests during company insolvency. In this regard the chapter 
evaluates whether the respective approaches mediate conflicting stakeholder interests 
during insolvency in an efficiency enhancing manner. If the answer to the above is in 
the affirmative, the second is to consider learnings which can be extrapolated in order 
to potentially resolve the challenges identified. 
The chapter discusses the mechanics of the administration and chapter 11 
regimes. In relation to both, a detailed discussion of the following is entered into: (i) 
Rules relating to accessing the procedure. This includes a discussion surrounding 
applicable tests to be satisfied by the debtor as well as notice requirements (ii) 
Management-control of the debtor during proceedings (iii) Ambit and effect of the 
moratorium against claims (iv) Protection of creditor interests including an analysis of 
the extent to which both jurisdictions protect existing property and (or) security 
interests of creditors (v) Rules regarding the proposed plan of reorganisation (vi) 
Treatment of creditor claims. The enquiry into the treatment of claims is expanded to 
a discussion on distributions to pre-commencement creditors, as well as the ranking of 
post-commencement claims. Thereafter, the ascendancy of the creditor in the form of 
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 K. Zweigert & H. Kotz An Introduction to Comparative Law (translation by Tony Weir) Oxford; 
Clarendon Press (1998). 
765
 Zweigert & Kotz (1998) at 15 and 34. 
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institutional lenders during the procedure is explored (vii) The treatment of employee 
creditors during proceedings is given specific attention and includes a brief 
examination of the extent to which obligations to employees may be varied as well as 
an evaluation of the prevalent trends in relation to the protection of employee 
interests.  
The chapter concludes with a discussion of international instruments in the 
form of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law and the extent to which 
the United Kingdom, United States and South Africa have followed its recommended 
approaches. Thereafter, an evaluation and brief comparison of the three regimes 
commences, highlighting features of the comparative jurisdictions which may assist in 
strengthening our own business rescue regime.  
 
5.2. THE UNITED KINGDOM 
5.2.1. NATURE OF ADMINISTRATION 
Administration may be defined as a procedure which enables an insolvent company
766
 
to enter into a process allowing it to either return to solvency or derive a higher 
premium for its creditors than in liquidation.
767
  There are a number of routes through 
which this may occur.
768
 Before delving into this in detail, an analysis of the purpose 
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 ‘Insolvent’ here is meant in both the cash-flow and balance sheet senses of the term. 
767
 A Keay and P Walton Insolvency Law: Corporate and Personal 2
 
ed (2008) Bristol: Jordan 
Publishing at 92.  
768
 Keay and Walton (2008) at 92. Some of these are given discussion in the chapter. 
769
 For a historical perspective, see Ian Fletcher The Law of Insolvency 2 ed (1996) London, Sweet and 
Maxwell at 13; Ian Fletcher ‘UK Corporate Rescue: Recent Developments- Changes to 
Administrative Receivership, Administration and Company Voluntary Arrangements- The 
Insolvency Act 2000, the White Paper 2001, and the Enterprise Act 2002’ (2004) European 
Business Organization Law Review 5(1) 119.The work of a number of committees, which included 
the Muir Mackenzie Committee (1906, Cd.4068), the Hansel Committee (1925, Cmnd. 2326) and 
the Blagden Committee (1957, Cmnd 221) is historically relevant; Insolvency Law Review 
Committee Insolvency Law and Practice also known as the ‘Cork Report’ Cmnd 8558 published in 
1982. For a brief synopsis of the history preceding this period see Harry Rakaj ‘The Culture of 
Bankruptcy’ in Paul J Omar (ed.) 2008 International Insolvency: Themes and Perspectives USA: 
Ashgate Publishing Company; J Cohen ‘The History for Imprisonment for Debt and its relation to 
the Development of Discharge in Bankruptcy’ (1982) 3 Journal of Legal History 153; DTi/ HM 
Treasury Report ‘ A Review of Company Rescue and Business Reconstruction Mechanisms’ 
(London, DTi, 2000); Government White Paper Insolvency- a Second Chance Cm 5234 (July 2001) 
at para 2.1. The Enterprise Act of 2002 effectively followed from this paper; Insolvency Service 
Productivity and Enterprise: Insolvency- A Second Chance Cm 5243 (July 2001); Insolvency 
Service Company Voluntary Arrangements and Administration Orders 1993; See John Armour, 
Audrey Hsu and Adrian Walters ‘Corporate Insolvency in the United Kingdom: The Impact of the 
Enterprise Act 2002’ (2008) 5 ECFR 148 at 154; Andrew McKnight ‘The reform of corporate 
insolvency law in Great Britain’ (2001) 16 (8/9) Journal of International Banking Law 213.  
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5.2.2. PURPOSE OF ADMINISTRATION 
Observations made in the Parliamentary Debates on the then Enterprise Bill by the 
House of Lords are instructive in providing a glimpse of some of the purposes that the 
reform to U.K. insolvency law hoped to achieve.
770
 Lord McIntosh of Haringey 
observed: 
       …Company rescue is at the heart of the revised administration procedure. We want to make sure 
that viable companies do not go to the wall unnecessarily. That is why we are restricting 
administrative receivership and revising administration to focus on rescue and to make it more 
accessible to companies as well as their creditors. That is not just good for the companies 






 caters for the achievement of a multi-purposed 
objective as the underlying raison d‘etre for the existence of administration 
proceedings. The relevant provision reads: 
       3(1) The administrator of a company must perform his functions with the objective of— 
(a) rescuing the company as a going concern, or 
(b) achieving a better result for the creditors of the company as a whole than would be likely 
if the company were wound up (without first being in administration), or  







 is to ensure that the company is rescued as a going 
concern. This envisages the rescue of the company as a corporate entity.
775
  Should it 
not be possible to rescue the company, the second objective entails that the 
administrator ensures that proceedings yield a dividend higher than that realisable in 
liquidation for the benefit of creditors.
776
 The administrator will attempt to salvage the 
business even if it means stripping it from its corporate shell. This may include the 
sale of the company’s business and machinery, goodwill, intellectual property and the 
transfer of employee contracts to a third party. 
It has been observed that no specific reference is made to the wider interests of 
shareholders and employees in the language of sub-paragraphs 1(b) and 2. Fletcher 
observes: 
                                                     
770




 1986, Schedule B1. 
773
 Schedule B1at para 3. 
774
 Even though the Insolvency Act applies the term ‘purpose’, the thesis makes use of both of this term 
and the term ‘objective’. The latter term is applied as a synonym for the former. 
775
 Sandra Frisby ‘In Search of a Rescue Regime: The Enterprise Act 2002’ (2004) 67 Mod.L.Rev. 247 
at 249 and 260, agrees with this view. She observes that the Enterprise Act has moved away from a 
selective approach to rescue, focusing on a complete rescue as the default position. 
776
 In relation to this objective, see Keay and Walton (2008) at 95.  
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       The policy approach underlying the combined provisions of paragraph 3(1)(b) and  (2) seems to 
have been the desire to perpetuate the traditional disposition of English insolvency law to elevate 
the interests of creditors above the other possible benefits of a corporate rescue, including the 
preservation of shareholder value and continuation of employment that might be achieved. 
However, it can also be observed that a further consequence of sub-paragraph (2) is that the 
collectivity principle is accorded priority over the pursuit of an objective aimed at benefitting 
certain individuals (notably secured creditors) at the expense of others…
777
   
 
Notwithstanding the observations made, employees, where affected, will 
likely fall into the broader category of creditors to whom the administrator owes a 
fiduciary duty and that no specific reference to employees is necessary.
778
 This raises 
the further question of the extent of preference for employee interests in comparison 
to other creditors. This is explored at a later stage. 
Where achieving the second objective is not possible, the administrator may 
break up the company and conduct a sale of the company’s assets in the interests of 
secured or preferential creditors.
779
 Due to it being virtually impossible to act in the 
interests of all creditors where the third objective is contemplated, the administrator’s 
duty is to be construed in the negative sense; being a duty not to harm the interests of 
creditors and, at most, consider the interests of unsecured creditors even though this 
category may no longer have a financial interest in the rescue.
780
 A criticism that has 
been levelled is that administration on this basis is in fact quasi-liquidation with no 
legitimate intention to rescue and that the better alternative would be for the company 
to enter liquidation proceedings.
781
  
Even though the Insolvency Act provides for a grading of objectives, if there 
is a belief that the company cannot be rescued as a going concern or where a better 
result may be achieved for the aggregate of creditors in following an alternative 
course than rescuing the company as a going concern, the administrator remains with 
                                                     
777
 Fletcher (2004) at 137. 
778
 Where the business is to be sold as a going concern, protective mechanisms in the form of the TUPE 
(Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations would find application. 
Therefore it may be incorrect to argue that the sale of a business of the company would, of 
necessity, prejudice employees more than any other category of unsecured creditor. 
779
 Schedule B1at para 3; see further The Explanatory Note to the Enterprise Act, 2002, Chapter 40 at 
para 647. 
780
 The purpose of the administration would be to seek to ensure a distribution to secured and 
preferential creditors in line with their security interests. See further Keay and Walton (2008) at 95. 
781
 Keay and Walton (2008) at 95. See further Katz and Mumford’s Study of Administration Cases 
available at  
http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insovencyprofessionandlegislation/research/corpdocs/studyofadminc
ases.pdf accessed on 23 September 2015. 
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ultimate discretion to determine what he/she considers to be achievable.
782
 
Notwithstanding this discretion, the administrator remains constrained to perform 
his/her functions in the interest of creditors as a whole.
783
  
 The U.K. Insolvency Act provides the administrator with flexibility to 
manoeuvre between objectives where this is justified. What is also pre-eminent is the 
premium placed on the desire to derive the best outcome for the company’s creditors 





5.2.3. COMMENCEMENT AND APPOINTMENT 
Administration proceedings commence once an administrator has been appointed.
785
 
The company remains in administration for the period in which the appointment 
persists.
786
 It is for this reason that a discussion into the appointment of the 
administrator is entered into at this stage; it is inextricably linked to the 
commencement of proceedings. A discussion of commencement through both the out 
of court and application procedures follows. 
 
5.2.3.1  OUT OF COURT PROCEDURE 
An administrator may be appointed ‘out of court’ by a holder of a floating charge over 
the assets of the company.
787
  The Act describes a ‘floating charge’ in the following 
manner: 
       …(2) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1) a floating charge qualifies if created by an instrument 
which— 
             (a) states that the paragraph applies to the floating charge, 
             (b) purports to empower the holder of the holding charge to appoint an administrator of the 
company,        
                                                     
782
  Paragraphs 3(1)(b) and 3(3). Loubser (2010) at 181 argues, correctly, that the choice of which 
objective to pursue in an administration rests solely with the administrator and that the courts are 
want to interfere in the absence of irrationality or bad faith. Frisby (2004) at 263 is of the view that 
this proviso reverses what may have been perceived as a shift towards a debtor-friendly system of 
insolvency in the Act, thus affirming the traditional form of a creditor-focused rescue regime. See 
Fletcher (2004) at 136.  
783
 As observed above, this may not be a positive obligation in all circumstances. See further Vanessa 
Finch ‘Control and co-ordination in corporate rescue’ (2005) 25 Legal Stud 374 at 378 who argues 
that the effect of the responsibilities imposed on the administrator is that he/she is not required to 
rescue the company at all costs.  
784
 McComack (2008) puts forward a similar view at pages 3 and 13. 
785
 The Insolvency Act defines an ‘administrator’ as ‘…a person appointed under [Schedule B1] to 
manage the company’s affairs, business and property.’ 
786
 Schedule B1at para 1(2)(a) & (b). There are however exceptions, see para 1(2)(d) of the same 
schedule.   
787
 Schedule B1 Insolvency Act of 1986 at para 14. See Fletcher (2004) at 122.  
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             (c) purports to empower the holder of the floating charge to make an appointment which would 
be the appointment of an administrative receiver within the meaning given by section 29(2), 
or 
             (d) purports to empower the holder of a floating charge in Scotland to appoint a receiver who 




Where an administrator has not been appointed by a floating charge holder
789
, 
appointment may be made by the company
790





 by directors or the company, notice of the proposed 
appointment must be given to a qualifying floating charge holder within a period of at 
least five business days (if there is an existing floating charge holder).
793
 The floating 
charge holder has the first preference in relation to the administrator to be appointed. 
This veto with respect to an appointment may be explained on the basis of political 
compromise.
794
 The notice of intention to appoint must state the identity of the 
proposed administrator as well as be in the prescribed form.
795
  
Once an appointment is made, a notice of appointment must be filed at court.  
Keay
796
 posits a possible reason as to why documentation relating to the out of court 
appointment must be filed, even if the substantive appointment for material purposes 
occurs outside the court: 
       Administration only commences once a notice of appointment has been filed…Why filing in the 
court is required is not clear…The more likely primary reason is to ensure that administrators 
appointed out of court can be recognised as officers of the court and, therefore, they are covered by 
the European Union Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings 2000, which is having a marked effect 
                                                     
788
 Schedule B1 at para 14(2). 
789
 Schedule B1 at para 14. 
790
 Schedule B1 at para 22(1) through a resolution by its shareholders. 
791
 Schedule B1 at para 22(2). Whether made by the company or its directors, a declaration by the 
appointing party must state that the company is or unlikely to be able to pay its debt, see paras 26 & 
27. This requirement is identical to that seen in para 11(a) regulating appointment through court 
application. 
792
 A distinguishing feature between the U.K. approach to its South African counterpart is that even 
though Schedule B1 allows for an out of court procedure for appointment of the administrator and 
commencement of proceedings, proceedings legally come into effect only once they have received 
court assent. The process may occur either through what may be perceived as procedural rubber-
stamping by the court, whether initiated via company shareholder resolution, director decision or 
floating charge holder appointment. In this instance filing at court is a necessary precondition. The 
alternative is through substantive application to court. In both instances the same purpose is 
achieved and in both, the court is required to provide its endorsement. In this way proceedings are, 
to a degree, court-orientated notwithstanding the impression often created of distinct entry routes to 
the procedure.  
793
 Schedule B1 at paras 22 & 26. The preference of the floating charge holder in relation to the 
appointment is given priority. See Schedule B1 at para 36(2). 
794
 See Fletcher (2004) at 129.  
795
 Schedule B1 at para 26(3). The applicable form is Form 2.8B.  
796
 Andrew Keay ‘A Comparative Analysis of Administration Regimes in Australia and the United 
Kingdom’ in Paul J. Omar (ed) (2008) International Insolvency Law: Themes and Perspectives 
United States: Ashgate. 
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on insolvency law and practice in the United Kingdom. Unless a court is involved in some way, a 




Within the context of director or company appointments, notice must be 
accompanied by the company resolution or directors’ decision.
798
  The proposed 
administrator’s consent to the appointment, a statement to the effect that in his/her 
view the purpose of administration is likely to be achieved as well as details of any 




Appointment by the company or its directors must be made no later than ten 
days of the notice of intention to make an appointment having been filed at court.
800
 It 
is submitted that in light of the documentary requirements in paragraph 29(3) 
requiring an administrator to be identified as well as make declarations (in addition to 
consenting to the appointment), an appointment will be incompetent where there is 
failure to comply. This means that paragraph 31 will not have been complied with and 
the appointment will not legally have taken effect.
801
  
 Keay and Walton argue that because appointment essentially occurs once the 
notice of appointment is filed with the court in terms of paragraph 31
802
 the appointer 
must inform the prospective administrator soon after filing.
803
  The newly appointed 
administrator must in turn notify the company, its creditors and the registrar of 




An appointment by the company or its directors may not be made if the 
company has been subject to administration within the immediately preceding twelve-
months (whether in terms of paragraph 22 or through court application by the 
                                                     
797
 Keay (2008) at 115 
798
 Where appointment is to be made by the company’s directors, see Insolvency Rule 2.22 read with 
2.25. It would also seem that the majority required for this purpose is a simple rather than a special 
majority. See Schedule B1 at para 105. 
799
 Insolvency Act 1986 Schedule B1 at para 29(3) and Rule 2.3(5) of the Insolvency Rules. 
800
 See Schedule B1 at paras 22 & 28(2). 
801
 By implication, administration proceedings will be deemed to not have commenced. On an analysis 
of these provisions it would seem that the Insolvency Act contains both a requirement in relation to 
timeline as well as one relating to procedural compliance from a substantive perspective. This is 
possibly aimed at ensuring that the process is initiated expeditiously and that the administrator has 
opportunity to apply his/her mind to the circumstances surrounding the company. 
802
 Which requires compliance with the notice requirements enumerated in para 29. This is a 
requirement in terms of para 32. Should such person fail to do so without reasonable excuse, such 
action attracts criminal penalty. 
803
 Keay and Walton (2008) at 106. 
804
 Schedule B1 at para 46 & Insolvency Rule 2.27. 
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company or its directors)
805
, where it has received the benefit of a moratorium in 
terms of a company voluntary arrangement and such arrangement ended 
prematurely
806
, where a winding up petition has been presented and not disposed or 
where an administrative receiver has assumed office.
807
  
This is an important control mechanism for ensuring that administration 
proceedings are not entered into by the company simply to (i) benefit from the 
temporary moratorium against creditor claims or to (ii) unduly alter or reject pre-
existing contractual obligations.  Initiation by court procedure is discussed next. 
 
5.2.3.2 COURT APPLICATION PROCEDURE 
As briefly discussed, proceedings may alternatively be commenced through a 
substantive application to court. For this to occur, two requirements must be satisfied. 
It must be shown that the company is either unable to pay its debts or unlikely to be 
able to do so.
808
  In addition, it must be shown that the administration order will 
achieve the purposes of administration in terms of the Act.
809
   
Paragraph 11(b) requires that it must be ‘reasonably likely’ that the purpose of 
administration will be achieved.
810
 In Auto Management Services Ltd
811
 the court 
interpreted this phrase to require that a reasonable prospect of a better result in 
administration be achieved.
812
 Two tests generally find application in determining 
whether a company is unable to pay its debts.
813
 These are the cash flow and balance 
                                                     
805
 Schedule B1 at para 23(2). Loubser (2010) at footnote 72 argues that this is an important measure 
for preventing frivolous or filings in bad faith. She correctly observes that this aspect has been 
omitted in our company legislation. The court in Lazenby v Lazenby Vervoer and Others supra has 
attempted to curb potential abuse and re-filings in bad faith. 
806
 Schedule B1 at para 24. 
807
 Schedule B1 at para 25.  
808
 Paragraph 11(a). Similar requirements relating to insolvency are applicable in relation to ‘out of 
court’ appointments by the company or its directors, see para 27(2). In terms of an appointment by a 
floating charge holder the only requirement is that the floating charge be enforceable, see para 16 
read with para 35(2). Therefore there is no requirement that the threshold of insolvency be met 
whereas a purported appointment by the company and its directors requires a declaration to the 
effect that the company is either unable to or unlikely to be able to pay its debts, see Schedule B1 
Insolvency Act of 1986 para 27(2). Loubser (2010) observes this aspect at 177. For further reading 
see Fletcher (1996) at 422. 
809
 See para 11(b). The purpose of administration is discussed in greater detail earlier in the chapter.  
810
 Insolvency Act 1986. 
811
 Auto Management Services Ltd v Oracle Fleet UK Ltd [2008] B.C.C.761 at 762. 
812
 Auto Management Services supra at 762. 
813
 As observed, these do not apply where an application for appointment of the administrator is made 





 In terms of the cash-flow test, the enquiry is whether the debtor 
company is able to pay debts as it carries on business.
815
 The balance sheet test 
considers the extent to which a company’s liabilities exceed its assets resulting in an 
inability to discharge debt.
816
  
A statutory demand for the payment of a debt exceeding 750 pounds by a 
creditor, which is served upon the debtor and remains unpaid for a period exceeding 
three weeks from date of service, is sufficient for the purposes of establishing an 
inability to pay.
817
 From the case law it appears that where an application for 
administration is made, a court must be satisfied regarding the probability of the 




The court in Re Colt Telecom
819
 has shed some insights regarding the 
applicable test. Finding against the petitioners, the court made a number of 
observations. It was held that the requirement in terms of section 123 of the 
Insolvency Act of 1986 was that the court be ‘satisfied’ that the company ‘is or is 
likely to become unable to pay its debts’. This envisaged that both cash flow and 
balance sheet insolvency be proven to the satisfaction of the court.
820
  The court 





                                                     
814
 Keay and Walton (2008) at 16. See further R M Goode Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (3
rd
 
ed) (2005) Sweet & Maxwell at 86-87; John M Wood ‘Defining corporate failure: addressing the 
‘financial distress’ concept: Part 1’ (2014) 27(3) Insolvency Intelligence 38-40; John M Wood 
‘Defining corporate failure: addressing the “financial distress” concept: Part 2’ (2014) 27(4) 
Insolvency Intelligence 56-58. 
815
 Insolvency Act 1986 Schedule B1 at para 111(1) read with section 123(1). 
816
 Insolvency Act 1986 Schedule B1 at para 111(1) read with section 123(2). In determining this 
aspect, both prospective and contingent liabilities are to be taken into consideration. These twin tests 
mirror those in the South African Companies Act for the purposes of determining whether a 
financially distressed company is able to have recourse to business rescue proceedings. Within the 
South African context there is some uncertainty regarding whether actual as opposed to prospective 
balance-sheet and cash flow insolvency will enable the company to have recourse to proceedings. 
The tentative view seems to be that business rescue is not suited to factually insolvent or ‘terminally 
ill ’entities. However, see discussion in Chapter 4 where it has been argued that from a practical 
perspective, no proper controls for determining the degree of insolvency currently exist within the 
context of a section 129 commencement. 
817
 See section 123(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act 1986. This is in addition to five other grounds on which 
an inability to pay debts may be established. 
818
 See Cheyne Finance plc (No. 2) infra at para74. 
819
 Re COLT Telecom Group Plc (No 2) [2002] EWHC 2815 (Ch). 
820
 Re Colt Telecom Group supra at para 34. 
821
 Re Colt Telecom Group supra at para 42, 52 and 53. 
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In Re Cheyne Finance plc (No.2)
822
  the court found that the balance sheet test in 
section 123 of the Insolvency Act was not precluded simply because the company was 
cash-flow positive. It interpreted the section to mean that both the cash-flow and 
balance sheet tests were to be seen as part of a singular exercise; this being the 
determination of a company’s ability to pay its debts. Briggs J held that the cash-flow 
component of the test in s 123(1)(e) incorporated  ‘key words of futurity’ in the form 
of the phrase ‘as they fall due’.
823
 As a result, the view of the court was that the 
Insolvency Act entailed a flexible and fact-sensitive injunction to consider the 
company’s future liabilities.
824
    
This approach was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Eurosail
825
. The court 
found that in construing the test for section 123(1)(e),  debts falling due in the 
reasonably near future had to be taken into consideration.
826
 The court, however, 
accepted that where a liability was distant it would be difficult to deem a company 
insolvent where it was paying its debts as they fell due. It was further held that in 
relation to section 123(2), the enquiry included an analysis of the company’s current 
assets, as well as its future liabilities while accounting for any contingencies or 
deferments.
827
 The court adopted the approach seen in the earlier In re Telecom matter 
in relation to onus.
828
  
Even though the English courts have provided insight and content to 
applicable tests, some uncertainty remains. A reading of the first part of paragraph 
11(a)  with the definition of ‘unable to pay debts’ in section 123(1) of Insolvency Act 
highlights that a company is insolvent where it is unable to pay its debts as they fall 
due.
829
 The U.K. courts have further expanded upon this to include an inability to pay 
                                                     
822
 In re Cheyne Finance plc (No. 2) [2007] EWHC 2402 (Ch); [2008] 2 ALL E.R. 987; [2008] Bus. 
L.R. 1562. 
823
 In re Cheyne Finance plc (No. 2) at para 53. 
824
 In re Cheyne Finance plc (No. 2) at paras 34, 51-54. 
825
 BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL Plc [2013] UKSC 28; [2013] 1 
W.L.R 1408 (SC). 
826
 BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL Plc supra at para 37. The court 
observed that an inquiry into the ‘reasonably near future’ would in turn depend on (i) the 
circumstances as well as (ii) the nature of the company’s business. The court cautioned that an 
enquiry which goes beyond this test will be purely speculative. 
827
 BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL Plc supra at para 37.  For a brief 
commentary, see John M Wood ‘BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL 
Plc: from the point of no return to crystal ball gazing’ (2014) 26(8) Insolvency Intelligence 124-
127. See further Casa Estates (UK) Ltd (In Liquidation), Re [2014] EWCA Civ 383; [2014] B.C.C. 
269 (CA (Civ Div)). See further, Re AA Mutual Insurance Co. Ltd, Re [2004] EWHC 2430 (Ch); 
[2004] WL 2577110.  
828
 BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL Plc at para 37. 
829
 See Schedule B1 at para 111(1).  
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debts as they fall due in future.
830
 While the section 123(1) determines present 
insolvency through its deeming provisions, it is the question of future probability 
(captured in the phrase ‘or is likely to become’
831
) and how this is to be determined 
from a temporal aspect, which has not been given strong clarification.
832
  
Notwithstanding these observations, a debtor is able to have recourse to 
administration even in instances where it is currently able to pay its debts as they fall 
due (i.e. is cash-solvent), preventing an instance of waiting until it is effectively too 
late to rescue the company.  





officer so designated in terms of the Magistrates Courts Act
835
, the company or by the 
company liquidator.
836
  Different rules regulate persons required to draft the affidavit 
in support of the court application for administration.
837
 Where the application is 
made by the company or its directors, the affidavit may be drafted by either one of the 
directors or by the company’s secretary.
838
 Where made by the company’s creditors, 
they may delegate the power to draft to either one of them or to a third party.
839
 
Attached to the application will be the proposed administrator’s written statement.
840
 




                                                     
830
 Which would include an analysis of inter alia contingent debt. See cases discussed above. 
831
 Schedule B1 at para 11(a). 
832
 Although not without its own challenges, it may be argued that the South African approach is more  
exact, requiring probability of financial distress occurring within a six month period. See section 
131(4)(a) read with the definition of ‘financial distress’ in section 128 of the Companies Act of 
2008 in Chapter 4. 
833
 Schedule B1 at para 12(1)(c) & (4). This includes a contingent or prospective creditor if able to 
show that it has a ‘good arguable case’; see Hammonds vs Pro-fit USA Ltd [2007] All ER  (D) 109 
at para 53. Loubser (2010) at footnote 81 remarks that in the absence of exceptional circumstances, 
the court will not make an order on the basis of a disputed claim. 
834
 By majority, see para 12(1)(b) read with para 105 of the Insolvency Act of 1986. 
835
 See Schedule B1 at para 12(1)(d) and Section 87A of the Magistrates Court Act 1980 (c 43). 
836
 In terms of Schedule B1 paras 38(1) and 12(1)(a). See McComack (2008) at 58, 122. In such 
instance an applicant (where not a qualifying floating charge holder making application in terms of 
paragraph 35) must declare via supporting affidavit, that the company is unable to pay its debts and 
is unlikely to be able to do so. It must further furnish a statement regarding assets and liabilities of 
the company as well as any security held by creditors. See Rule 2.4(2)(a)-(c). The content of the 
affidavit by a floating charge holder making an appointment in terms of para 35 is regulated by 
Rule 2.4 (3). 
837
 The affidavit is referred to as a ‘witness statement’. Both terms are used interchangeably in the 
thesis. 
838
 Rule 2.2(2) of the Insolvency Rules. Such person must state on whose behalf the statement is made. 
839
 Rule 2.2(3) of the Insolvency Rules. 
840
 As required by Rule 2.3(5) of the Insolvency Rules. 
841
 Schedule B1 at para 12(3). 
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The applicant must provide notice of the application at least five business days 
prior to the date of the hearing.
842
 Parties who are entitled to notice include the 
proposed administrator, the company (if it is not the applicant), where there is a 
pending winding-up the petitioner, the provisional liquidator (where applicable), a 
qualifying floating charge holder
843
 and a supervisor of a voluntary arrangement, if 
any.
844
 The court has wide powers in relation to the application. These include 
granting, dismissing or adjourning proceedings. In addition, it may make any further 
order it deems appropriate.
845
 As a disincentive for instituting proceeding too late, the 
Insolvency Act
846




                                                     
842
 Schedule B1 at para 12(2) and Rule 2.8(1) of the Insolvency Rules. 
843
 Who may substitute the applicants proposed appointment for his/her own in terms of para 36. See 
further McComack (2008) at 122. 
844
 Schedule B1 at para 12(2). Rule 2.12(1) further provides a list of persons who may appear or be 
represented at the hearing of the application.  Persons ordinarily not entitled to be heard may 
request permission from court if they are able to show that they have an interest in the matter. See 
Rule 2.12(1)(k). This aspect is also observed by Loubser (2010) at 188. 
845
 Schedule B1 at para 13(a)-(d) & (f). 
846
 Insolvency Act 1986, section 214. 
847
 This is starkly similar to the interplay between Chapter 6 of the South African Companies Act 2008 
and its reckless trading provisions in section 22.   
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5.2.4. MANAGEMENT CONTROL 
Upon appointment, there is a complete divestiture of management-control in favour of 
the administrator who will act as the representative of the company to the exclusion of 
its existing management.
848
 Existing directors may continue to exercise their functions 
where the administrator consents. The ultimate responsibility for the company, 






, in order to qualify as such, must be a member of 
a recognised professional body
851
 or must have been given the authority by a 
competent authority to so act.
852
 Despite meeting these conditions, an individual may 
not act as a practitioner where he/she is disqualified from acting as a director of a 
company
853
, remains an un-rehabilitated insolvent
854




                                                     
848
 Schedule B1 at para 64. For a more comprehensive discussion of this aspect as well as the 
theoretical justifications for it, see Brian Cheffins and David A Skeel Jr ‘Corporate Ownership 
Structure and the Evolution of Bankruptcy Law: Lessons from the United Kingdom’ (2002) 55 
Vanderbilt Law Review 1699. 
849
 See Schedule B1 at paras 61 & 64. Unlike in the U.S. and the seemingly growing trend in South 
Africa, U.K. administrators are predominantly accountants rather than lawyers. See Rajak in Paul J. 
Omar International Insolvency Law supra who makes similar observations. McComack (2008) at 
127 draws a link between the U.K. administration regime’s greater emphasis on assets sales rather 
than reorganisations of corporate structures (which are more prevalent in the U.S.) and the trend of 
accountants being appointed as administrators:  
          ‘Having an accountant at the helm makes sense if the process is really about valuation and asset 
sales, rather than running the business with a view to bringing about the return of profitable 
trading.’ 
850
 Section 388(1) of the Insolvency Act 1986 defines an ‘insolvency practitioner’ as a person, who in 
relation to a company is its liquidator, provisional liquidator, administrator or administrative 
receiver. It also includes a nominee or supervisor where a voluntary arrangement in relation to a 
company is proposed or approved. The thesis applies the terms ‘insolvency practitioner’ and 
‘administrator’ interchangeably even though the former term is broader in the categories of persons 
it encompasses. 
851
 And must be permitted to act as an insolvency practitioner in terms of its rules. See Insolvency Act 
1986 section 390(2)(a). 
852
 Insolvency Act 1986 sections 390(2)(a) and (b). The authorisation may be granted by the Secretary 
of State who has the power of delegation to another person or body, see section 392(2). The 
provisions relating to revocation of authorisation are stipulated in section 393. 
853
 This aspect is regulated by the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 sections 1- 6. 
854
 Schedule B1 at para 390(4)(a) refers to an ‘undischarged bankrupt’. 
855
 Insolvency Act 1986, section 390. In addition, an administrator may be removed from office on a 
number of grounds; see Schedule B1 at paras 87-97. It is to be observed that the U.K. Insolvency 
Act 1986, through its Regulations, contains significantly more controls in relation to the regulation 
of the profession of insolvency practitioners and by inference, administrators. A consideration of 
some of the control mechanisms in the U.K. Act would go a long way towards resolving some of 
the concerns raised in relation to the South African business rescue regime in Chapter 4. 
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Further controls are imposed by the Insolvency Regulations
856
 which enable 
an authorising body to assess whether an applicant-practitioner, whilst having acted as 
an insolvency practitioner, failed to disclose circumstances giving rise to actual or 
perceived conflict of interest or an instance of personal financial gain, amongst other 
factors.
857
 In order to streamline the required competencies of insolvency practitioners 
(whether they be members of professional bodies or not), it is a requirement that a 




The Insolvency Act vests the administrator with similar powers to a liquidator 
in relation to setting aside undervalued transactions, undue preferences, floating 
charges and extortionate credit bargains.
859
  The administrator may approach the court 
for recourse where the property of the company or to which the company is entitled is 
in the possession of a third party.
860
 In addition to the power to confirm or cancel 
certain transactions
861
, the administrator is vested with fiduciary duties and is 
expected to act in good faith.
862
  
                                                     
856
 Insolvency Practitioners Regulations of 2005. 
857
 The Regulations further provide for the factors to be considered for insolvency practitioners entering 
the field, in terms of practical education, experience or combined hours spent on insolvency related 
work. For example, see Regulation 7(1) to (6) and Regulation 8. 
858
 Loubser (2010) at 199. 
859
 Insolvency Act of 1986, sections 238, 239, 244 and 245. It is difficult to understand why the South 
African business rescue practitioner in terms of the new Act is not vested with similar, clearly 
defined powers seen in the previous judicial management regime. 
860
 Insolvency Act 1986, section 234. 
861
 It is submitted that this is not the same as the power to suspend or cancel contracts seen in the South 
African counterpart. Interestingly, the South African Companies Act does not have a clear statutory 
framework allowing the practitioner to set aside pre-commencement transactions which have the 
effect of prejudicing the general body of creditors (as seen with the previous judicial management 
regime). In contrast, the Bankruptcy Code allows for acceptance or rejection of contracts as well as 
the setting aside of certain transactions. Despite a lack of clear articulation of the administrator’s 
powers to cancel contractual agreements (excluding employment contracts) in the Insolvency Act, 
there is, however, no reason to believe that the administrator would be barred from invoking his/her 
broad powers in terms of the Act or requesting directions on the exercise of his/her powers from the 
courts. 
862
 Schedule B1 at para 5. The Insolvency Act of 1986 has ensured that the administrator, in addition to 
having to act in good faith, has an underlying duty to act in the interests of the company’s creditors 
as a whole, see para 3(2). Regrettably, apart from fiduciary duties towards the company there is no 
commensurate duty on the business rescue practitioner imposed by Chapter 6. See Re Charnley 
Davies Ltd (No.2) [1990] BCLC 760; [1990] BCC 605. In relation to the administrator’s power in 
with respect to contracts, see further  Professor R.M Goode Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law 
(1990) London, Sweet and Maxwell at 129. 
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 Frisby argues that the only real innovation in relation to the powers conferred 
upon the administrator in terms of the Enterprise Act 2002 is that he/she may make 
distributions to preferent and secured creditors without seeking leave from court.
863
 
It may be argued that the observations made by Frisby do not give much credence to 
the often indirect powers granted by the Insolvency Act to administrators in achieving 
the purposes of administration.
864
 Controls are placed on the manner which these 
duties are performed, with many of these having developed through the common 
law.
865
   
From a procedural perspective, the fiduciary duty towards creditors ensures 
that the wide powers vested upon the administrator are exercised in a manner that, at 
minimum, seeks to maximise the financial welfare of the debtor and its creditors.
866
 
This further ensures that during proceedings and in seeking to achieve any of the three 
purposes of administration, the appointed administrator remains cognisant of the 
competing rights which may be affected by his/her proposed course of action. In 
contrast to chapter 11 which is analysed later, the interests of creditors are placed 
squarely on the shoulders of the administrator, with no right on the part of creditors to 
propose alternative plans.   
 
5.2.5. MORATORIUM ON PROCEEDINGS 
The moratorium is arguably the most distinctive feature of administration. It allows 
the company to enjoy some relief from its creditors while attempting to restructure its 
affairs.
867
 The effect of the moratorium is to bar enforcement proceedings against the 
company or its property in the absence of consent.
868
  
 Due to the prejudicial effect that a moratorium has on creditors’ enforcement 
rights, a creditor catching wind of the prospect of administration proceedings may 
                                                     
863
 Frisby (2004) at 262. She observes, correctly, that leave of court is required in terms of para 65 (3) 
where a distribution is proposed contrary to the provisions of that paragraph, being a distribution to 
unsecured creditors in preference to both secured and preferent creditors. 
864
 Reference has been made above to the legislation’s drafting style which caters for the 
administrator’s use of subjective intention and discretion as to which objective to choose as well as 
how best to execute it; See Daniel Prentice ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Enterprise Act 2002’ 
(2004) 5  European Business Organization Law Review 153 at 158. 
865
 See the Re Charnley Davies and Re Home Treat Ltd cases cited above. 
866
 The powers of the administrator are listed in para 59 of Schedule B1 and Schedule 1 of the 
Insolvency Act of 1986.  The conduct of an administrator may be impugned in terms of para 74 of 
Schedule B1 in the case of unfair conduct which prejudices an affected party and para 75(3) where 
misfeasance or breach of fiduciary against the company is alleged. 
867
 Keay and Walton (2008) at 106. 
868
 Whether consent is received from the administrator or the court. Schedule B1 Paragraphs 42 and 43. 
See Keay and Walton (2008) at 107. 
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naturally wish to enforce its rights against the debtor company as soon as possible. It 
is for this reason that the moratorium presents itself in two forms: the interim and 
final moratoria. Unlike the ‘old’ Insolvency Act 1986
869
 the final moratorium comes 
into effect only once the administrator’s appointment has received court sanction.
870
 
In order to curb a potential flurry of creditors seeking legal recourse against the 
company prior to the formal commencement of proceedings, the Act allows for the 
operation of an interim moratorium.  
The interim moratorium operates in a number of cases. It comes into effect 
when an application for administration is filed at court and continues until the 
application is granted or dismissed.
871
 It applies from the moment a notice of intention 
to appoint an administrator has been filed until the appointment occurs or ten days 
elapse without the appointment having taken place.
872
 Where an appointment is 
proposed in terms of paragraph 14, the actual appointment should occur within five 
days after the notice of intention to appoint has been filed.
873
 During this period, 
directors remain in control of the company and are in a position to use, encumber and 




The final moratorium comes into force once appointment of the administrator 
has occurred. While the final moratorium is in force, petitions for the winding up of 
the company may not be made.
875
 Where consent is granted for legal process to 
                                                     
869
 Prior to its amendment by the Enterprise Act 2002. 
870
 Loubser (2010) at 192. Section 10 of the Insolvency Act 1986 prior to its amendment provided for 
the application of an automatic moratorium once the decision to place the company in 
administration was filed at court. 
871
 Schedule B1 at para 44(1). 
872
 Schedule B1 at paras 44(4). The ten day appointment period applies where the proposed 
appointment is by the company or its directors as per para 28(2). 
873
 Paragraph 44(2). The interim moratorium comes into force once the notice of intention to appoint 
has been filed. It is observed that a similar situation prevails within the context of applications for 
business rescue through court. This aspect is discussed in the previous chapter. 
874
  See para 13(3)(a) which commentators such as Loubser (2010) at 194 view as largely ineffective in 
instances where the application is in on unopposed motion but notes the potentially deterring effect 
for delinquent or wrongful behaviour of legislation such as the Company Director Disqualification 
Act 1986 (c46). 
875
  Schedule B1 at para 42. The same exceptions apply in relation to both the interim and final 
moratoria. These are exceptions on public interest grounds or where a European entity is in 
question. See section 12A of the Insolvency Act and s 367 of the Financial Services and Markets 
Act of 2000. Should there be breach of the moratorium, the consequences are well articulated by the 
court in Euro Commercial Leasing Ltd v Cartwright & Lewis [1995] BCC 830. The administrator is 
empowered to present a petition for the winding up of the company but would have to make 
application to court in terms of paragraph 79 for the termination of his/her appointment. 
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commence, it may be made subject to terms which the court deems fit.
876
 Arbitration 
proceedings (termed ‘quasi-legal proceedings’) in the U.K. are barred by the scope of 
the moratorium.
877




An owner’s right to repossession in a hire purchase agreement is prohibited in 
the absence of court sanction.
879
  Therefore, a property owner’s right to repossess 
his/her immovable property is prohibited except where such ‘peaceable re-entry’ is 
sanctioned by the administrator or the court.
880
 
Parties may approach the court for the purpose of lifting the stay.
881
 The 
Insolvency Act of 1986 and the development of case law in this area has ensured that 
courts are vested with discretion for the purposes of determining whether a creditor 
seeking to enforce its rights in an administration is able to do so. In many instances, 
the rights of a creditor to its property or the ability to enforce its claim against the 
debtor company must be weighed against the concept of collective creditor interest in 




5.2.6. PROTECTION OF PROPERTY INTERESTS 
The Insolvency Act provides for the protection of property interests. No action may 
affect the priority of secured and preferent creditors’ interests without the affected 
creditor’s consent.
883
 Should the administrator’s actions be contrary to the prescripts 
                                                     
876
 Schedule B1 at para 43(6). The Insolvency Act distinguishes between ‘enforcement’ and ‘legal 
process’ (which includes ‘legal proceedings’). The moratorium provisions of the South African 
Companies Act make use of both terms and in a similar vein require either practitioner consent or 
court sanction, with exceptions.  
877
  Bristol Airport v Powdrill [1990] Ch 744 at 766 at para F. Keay and Walton (2008) at 110-111 
argue that the moratorium in the older provisions (section 11(3)) had wider ambit and included an 
application by an employee to a tribunal under the Employment Rights Act 1996. They argue, 
correctly, that it is not entirely clear how the narrow phrase, ‘legal proceedings’ in the new 
provisions will be interpreted as the older provisions also referred to ‘other proceedings’. See Carr 
v British International Helicopters Ltd [1993] BCC 855.   
878
 See Air Ecosse Ltd v Civil Aviation Authority (1987) 3 BCC 492 at 495-6; Re Railtrack plc [2002] 1 
WLR 3002.  
879
 Schedule B1 at para 43(3). 
880
 Schedule B1 at para 43(4). 
881
 For further reading on the approach of the English Courts on this aspect see Bristol Airport plc v 
Powdrill [1990] Ch 744; Re Atlantic Computer Systems plc (No. 1) [1992] Ch 505 where the court 
provided an exposition of factors to be considered in the application of the previous section 11(3) of 
the Insolvency Act of 1986. See an article which provides a brief analysis of the judgment of 
Nicholls LJ by David Milman ‘Moratorium on Enforcement Rights: Revisiting Corporate Rescue’ 
(2004) Conveyancer and Property Lawyer March/April 89 at 99.  
882
 See Powdrill and Re Atlantic cases supra. 
883
 Schedule B1 at para 73. 
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of the section, it may be challenged at court.
884
 Even though the administrator has 
powers of disposal on assets over which a floating charge holder has a security 
interest
885
, the interest will attach to proceeds of the sale as well as to further assets 
purchased with the proceeds.
886
  
Where there is a fixed charge over property or where property is subject to 
hire purchase, the administrator must seek court approval and such approval may be 
granted if the court is satisfied that the disposal will promote the purpose of 
administration.
887
 Any deficit between the net realisable amount on disposal and the 





5.2.7. PUBLISHING THE PLAN 
The administrator must, within an eight-week period, send his/her statement of 
proposals on how he/she intends achieving the purposes of administration.
889
 The 
proposals must be circulated to the Registrar of Companies, to every known creditor 
and to members of the company.
890
  
 An initial meeting of creditors must be convened within at least ten weeks of 
commencement.
891
 Proposals must contain the history of the company, its current 
financial position, its expected future plans and information necessary to enable a 
creditor to decide whether or not to support the proposed plan.
892
  Information relating 
                                                     
884
 See Keay and Walton (2008) at 115. 
885
 Schedule B1 at para 70. 
886
 Schedule B1 at para 70(2). 
887
 Schedule B1 at para 71 & 72. 
888
 This is to ensure that the holder of the floating charge is not left out of pocket by the disposal. 
Schedule B1 at para 71 & 72. McComack (2008) at 197; Re ARV Aviation Ltd [1989] BCLC 664. 
889
 Schedule B1 at para 49(4) & (5) and Insolvency Rule 2.33.  
890
 Schedule B1 at para 49(4). The administrator may, however, publish a notice with instructions as to 
how the statement of proposals may be obtained.  See Schedule B1 at para 49(6) read with Rule 
2.33(7) & (7A). 
891
  Schedule B1 at para 51(2) and see the exceptions to this listed in para 52(1). It must be emphasised 
that the initial meeting may be convened before this period as the Insolvency Act makes use of the 
term ‘as soon as is reasonably practicable’. The proposals are to be presented at this meeting in 
terms of para 51(3).  There is a further requirement that details of the meeting be gazetted in terms 
of Rule 2.34 or in any other manner the administrator deems appropriate; see Rule 2.34(1A).  
892
 The administrator may obtain financial information by invoking the provisions of para 47 to 48 of 
Schedule B1. See McComack (2008) at 62. 
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to how the company has been managed since the administrator was appointed must be 
provided as well as information relating to future management and financing.
893
  
Where the administrator believes that the company has sufficient property to 
extinguish its debts in full (i.e. is solvent) or where there is insufficient property to 
make distributions to unsecured creditors (apart from the ring-fencing provisions in 
section 176A of the Insolvency Act, 1986), the administrator may elect not to hold an 
initial creditors’ meeting unless creditors holding at least 10% of the company’s debt 
request him/her to do so.
894
 
The administrator may sell certain categories of company assets without court 
or creditor approval if it can be shown that this is justified by the circumstances and 
will best further the objective of administration. It may include the sale of assets 
without convening a meeting of creditors to decide and vote upon proposals.
895
 The 
advantage of this approach is in expedited proceedings, certainty for the debtor 
                                                     
893
  Insolvency Rule 2.33(2)(o). It would seem that this aspect is left largely to the practitioner in 
drafting the proposed plan of rescue in the Companies Act of 2008. Our provisions do not contain 
specific informational requirements in relation to the future management of the company. The latter 
may be covered in section 150(2)(b)(iii) requiring that any proposals include a statement as to the 
on-going role of the company. 
894
 The decision for such election must be contained in the statement. Schedule B1 at para 52(1) & (2). 
On the non-compulsory nature of initial creditors’ meetings see McComack (2008) at 63; HL 
Debates 29 July 2002 at column 783 available at 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/hansard/lords/by-
date/#session=27&year=2016&month=4&day=12 accessed on 8 December 2016.; Sandra Frisby 
‘Not Quite Warp Factor 2 Yet? The Enterprise Act and Corporate Insolvency’ (2007) 22 
Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 327. The cost of the meeting 
shall be for the requesting creditors’ account. The administrator may convene a meeting prior to or 
after the initial meeting in term para 62. It has been observed by some commentators that in 
practice, a single meeting of creditors during the administration process is the norm. See L Doyle 
and A Keay Insolvency Legislation: Annotations and Commentary 2 ed (2006) Bristol: Jordans 
Publishing at 92; Louise Gullifer ‘The Reforms of the Enterprise Act 2002 and the Floating Charge 
as a Security Device (2008) 46 Canadian Business Law Journal 399 at 407. Loubser (2010) at 207 
observes that the administrator is not obliged to consult major creditors on any proposals involving 
significant action such as a sale of assets of the company. This view seems to find support in the 
exception listed in paras 52(1)(c) and 59 of Schedule B1.  
895
 Schedule B1 at para 52(1)(c). See the general powers vested upon the administrator in terms of para 
59 as well as the administrator’s powers of sale in terms of Schedule 1; Re Transbus International 
Ltd (In Liquidation) [2004] EW HC 932 (Ch), [2004] 2 All ER; Re Charnley Davies supra. This 
course of action has received sanction within the context of pre-packaged deals. For a more 
comprehensive discussion of pre-packs, see Keay and Walton (2008) at 125-130.  
      See the Explanatory Note to the Enterprise Act 2002 at para 642. It may be argued that the 
prejudice observed by the commentators is illusory as a pre-pack may be said to meet the prescripts 
of para 3(1)(c), where an administrator may pursue the interests of secured or preferred creditors 
rather than the general body. For further readings see P Walton ‘Pre-Packaged Administrations- 
Trick or Treat?’ (2006) 19 Insolvency Intelligence 113; A Bloom and S Harris ‘Pre-packaged 
administrations- what should be done given the current disquiet?’ (2006) 19 Insolvency Intelligence 
122; Vanessa Finch ‘Pre-packaged Administrations: bargains in the shadow of insolvency or 
shadowy bargains’ (2006) Journal of Business Law  568; On the cases, see DKLL Solicitors v HM 
Revenue and Customs [2007] EWHC 2067 (Ch); 2007 BCC 908 and Transbus supra.  
152 
 
company and its employees as well as respite from the stigma that attaches to a 
company by being in insolvency proceedings. Such flexibility may, however, create 
room for possible abuse. 
The proposal may be in the form of a corporate voluntary arrangement
896
, a 
compromise through a scheme arrangement with members in terms of the Companies 
Act
897
 or through a pre-packaged sale of the company’s business. A feature that 
makes administration a unique rescue mechanism is that it is designed as a gateway to 
other legally separate compromise mechanisms rather than a singular procedure as 
seen in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
898
 or South African Chapter 6 proceedings.
899
  
The company voluntary arrangement and the scheme of arrangement may be 
described as restructuring mechanisms which permit a compromise of company debt 
through assent by the majority of its creditors.
900
  Armour et al observe that due to 
these mechanisms facilitating financial restructuring, they may be categorised as 
rescue procedures and may exist independently of administration.
901
   
McComack observes that the company voluntary arrangement inclusive of a 
moratorium against claims is restricted to small companies on condition that their 
directors are able to provide evidence that the arrangement possesses reasonable 
prospects of succeeding and that there are sufficient funds in place for the purpose of 
continuing operations during the arrangement.
902
 Schemes of arrangements are often 
employed for compulsory buy-outs of creditors in that where a 75% in value approve 
a proposed scheme, it is binding on both abstaining and dissenting creditors.
903
 
Proposals require a simple majority of creditors by value present and voting, 
whether in person or by proxy, for approval.
904
 A secured creditor is entitled to vote to 
                                                     
896
 See Schedule B1 at para 49(3)(a). The company voluntary arrangement mechanism is regulated in 
part 1 of the Insolvency Act, 1986. 
897
 Previously section 425 of the Companies Act 1985 now 895- 899 of the Companies Act of 2006. 
898
 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. 
899
 Companies Act 71 of 2008. McComack (2008) emphasises this point throughout his analysis of the 
regime. See further similar observations made by Colin Anderson & David Morrison 
‘Commencement of Company Rescue: How and When does it Start’ in Paul J. Omar International 
Insolvency op cit; Goode (2005) at 328. 
900
 Armour et al (2008) at 156. Provisions in relation to schemes of arrangement were contained in 
section 425 of the Companies Act 1985 (now section 895 of the Companies Act of 2006) while the 
company voluntary arrangement is regulated by Part 1 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
901
 Armour et al (2008) at 156. 
902
 McComack (2008) at 65.  
903
 McComack (2008) at 66. 
904
 Insolvency Rule 2.43 & 2.38(4). Conversely, where 51% of independent creditors have voted 
against a resolution on a proposed plan such plan will have been rejected. See further Schedule B1 
at paras 53 & 55.  
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the extent to which its security is insufficient to cover the entire debt.
905
 The Act 
further imposes limitations on the extent to which the ranking of preferences may be 
overridden.
906
  Once the initial creditors’ meeting has concluded, the administrator 
must inter alia provide a report of any decision taken in such meeting to court.
907
 
The administrator may propose further amendments after the proposals have 
received creditor approval. This will occur where the administrator considers the 
proposed amendments to be substantial and a meeting of creditors must be summoned 
for a vote.
908
 Where an amendment to the proposal is sought by creditors at both the 
initial and proposal revision meetings, it must receive the consent of the 
administrator.
909
 After the conclusion of the meeting to consider further amendments 
to the initial proposal, the administrator is further required to submit a report to court 
detailing the content of the meeting.
910
 Where it is not possible to reach agreement 
regarding the inclusion of an amendment, the matter must be referred to court for 
resolution.
911
 The requirement of specific consent on the part of the administrator 
reflects the centrality of the discretion granted to the administrator by the Insolvency 
Act. 
 
5.2.8. EXPENSES OF THE ADMINISTRATION/POST-COMMENCMENT 
LIABILITY 
The Insolvency Act allows for the prioritisation of certain qualifying expenses once a 
company has entered administration. The concept of an expense of the administration 
allows for the preference in payment of certain expenses, costs, and disbursements 
incurred at the pre and post-commencement stages.
912
 This ensures that the company 
functions long enough to enable the achievement of one or more of the objectives 
                                                     
905
 Voting interest is determined by the value of the unsecured portion of the debt. Rule 2.40(1) read 
with para 73(1) & (2). However see the exception stated in Rule 2.40(2). 
906
 Schedule B1 at para 73(1)(a), (b) and (c) read with sub-section 2. 
907
 Schedule B1 at para 53(2)(a). 
908
 Schedule B1 at para 54(1) & (2). The phrase ‘…thinks that the proposed revision is substantial’ 
infers that the administrator’s subjective view is sufficient and that where his/her view is to the 
contrary, the provision need not be complied with. The administrator must in terms of sub-
paragraph 6 communicate the result of the meeting to the court, Registrar of Companies and other 
prescribed persons. 
909
 Schedule B1 at paras 53(1)(b) & 54(5)(b). 
910
 Schedule B1 at para 54(6)(a). 
911
 The court may uphold the administrator’s view despite creditor protest and opposition. See Schedule 
B1at para 55(2).  See Re Maxwell Communications Corp [1992] B.C.C. 465 at 374; Re Structures 
& Computers Ltd [1998] BCC 348 at 353; DKLL Solicitors supra at para 18. The court is vested 
with the discretion in terms of the same paragraph to order that the proceedings come to an end. 
912
 Rules 2.67, 2.67A read with 2.33(2)(ka).  
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envisaged in paragraph 3 of the Insolvency Act. Provision for post-commencement 
liabilities incurred by the administrator reads: 
       …(3) The former administrator’s remuneration and expenses shall be— 
(a) charged on and payable out of property of which he had custody or control     
immediately before cessation, and 
                   (b) payable in priority to any security to which paragraph 70 applies. 
             (4) A sum payable in respect of a debt or liability arising out of a contract entered into by the    
former administrator or a predecessor before cessation shall be— 
                   (a) charged on and payable out of property of which the former administrator had custody 
or control immediately before cessation and 




Pre-administration claims falling within this category include those incurred 
by the practitioner in the course of proceedings (necessary disbursements), expenses 
properly incurred, costs of any security provided as well as certain categories of 
unpaid expenses preceding administration.
914
 The administrator’s remuneration has a 
ranking stronger than that of a secured floating charge holder.
915
   
The Insolvency Act does not seem to contain provisions expressly providing 
for super-priority. The U.K. Government resisted attempts of introducing amendments 
that would have created a super-priority for post-commencement lenders.
916
 Finch 
argues that the fact that the Enterprise Act of 2002 did not introduce priority financing 
during administration has meant that powerful lenders such as banks are able to use 
their leverage as a way of advancing their interests.
917
 As post-commencement 
financing is essential for the success of any rescue intervention and in light of the 
seeming indifference displayed by the legislature on this aspect, the question of how 
post-commencement finance is catered for within administration deserves closer 
scrutiny. 
                                                     
913
 Schedule B1 at para 99. 
914
  Insolvency Rule 2.67, 2.67A read with Rule 2.33(2)(ka). See Re Trident Exeter City Council v 
Bairstow [2007] BCC 236. It has been held that statutory redundancy payments to employees do 
not constitute an expense of the administration as they are not ‘wages or salary’ but rather statutory 
employment liabilities see Re Allders Department Stores Ltd [2005] B.C.C 289 at 295-5. However 
see the dictum of the court in Gerald Morris Krasner (The Administrator of Globe Worsted 
Company Limited & Huddersfield Fine Worsteds Limited) v Mr McMath 2005 WL 1767590 at 
paras 31 and 32 where it was held that payments in lieu of notice and protective employment 
awards payable in terms of section 189(3) of the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act (‘TULR’) 
of 1992, where the requirements of para 99(5)(b) were satisfied  (i.e. upon adoption of the 
employment contract by the administrator), fell within  the definition of ‘wages or salary’ in terms 
of para 99(6)(d). 
915
 Schedule B1 at para 99(3)(b). 
916
 See House of Lords Parliamentary debates for 29 July 2002; McComack (2008) at 195. 
917
 Finch (2005) at 381. 
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Any contract entered into by the administrator, once proceedings have 
commenced, will rank in priority above both his/her remuneration and the floating 
charge holder’s security interest.
918
 This will include any contract relating to financing 
the rescue intervention and further credit advanced to the debtor. It has been observed 
that even though post-commencement creditors may not have a strictly enforceable 
‘expense of the administration’ claim against the company, where the administrator 
refuses to pay these expenses, creditors may have a strong case for the enforcement of 
their rights in court.
919
  
In spite of the popular view that the administration procedure does not provide 
for super-priority, from an analysis of the dictum of the court in Re Trident Exeter 
City Council it may be inferred that liabilities falling within paragraph 99 are 
accorded a limited form of super-priority.
920
 Having regard to the Act’s provisions 
and case law, legislators have been very careful to avoid creating super-priorities and 
have retained the preferences existing in insolvency law, should administration 
proceedings prove unsuccessful.
921
 This has ensured that long established and time 
tested measures for dealing with creditor interests are not unduly affected where this 
can be avoided. The obvious advantage of this approach is in the form of market 
certainty. 
 
                                                     
918
 Schedule B1 at para 99(4). In Centre Reinsurance International Co v Freakley [2007] Bus LR 284 
the court at para 16 interpreting the provision of the previous section 19 incorporated the 
requirement of specific approval from the administrator after administration has commenced. This 
judgment must be viewed in light of Re Trident Exeter City Council v Bairstow case supra, which 
deals with the current provisions.   
919
 See Keay and Walton (2008) at 131. 
920
 Re Trident Exeter City Council v Bairstow at 255. I have deliberately used the term ‘limited form’ 
because unlike the position with post-commencement liabilities seen in section 135 of the 
Companies Act of 2008, whose priority ranking endures in a subsequent liquidation, the court in 
this case held a different view.  
921
 Re Trident Exeter City Council v Bairstow at 255. 
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5.2.9. DISTRIBUTION TO CREDITORS 
The distribution to creditors is determined in proposals prepared by the administrator. 
Because administration is a ‘gateway’ procedure with a number of different legal 
routes that an administrator may have recourse to in achieving the purposes in 
paragraph 3
922
, the Insolvency Act provides guiding provisions.  
While the administrator may make a distribution to creditors, he/she must 
ensure that the distribution is in line with the preferences stipulated in the Act.
923
  
Paragraph 65 states that an administrator ‘may’ rather than ‘must’ make a distribution 
to creditors.
924
 This is in line with the Insolvency Act’s approach, vesting the 
administrator with discretion to determine the manner in which purposes of 
administration may best be met.
925
   
Schedule B1 invokes the general provisions of section 175 of the Insolvency 
Act, providing priority for secured and preferent creditors over debenture and floating 
charge holder creditors. The result is that the first payment will go to expenses in 
administration, preferential claims, amounts which have been secured by floating 
charge and lastly, general unsecured creditors.
926
 As observed, deviation from this 
ranking in favour of unsecured creditors requires court sanction.
927
 Where the 
administrator is able to show that a payment contrary to the provisions of paragraph 
65 of Schedule B1 will enable the achievement of the purpose of administration, 




                                                     
922
 Insolvency Act 1986. 
923
 Insolvency Act 1986, section 175. 
924
 Insolvency Act 1986. 
925
 Highlighted earlier in the chapter. 
926
 Section 175 and Rule 2.68 of the Insolvency Rules. 
927
 Schedule B1 at para 65(3). 
928
 Such deviation being necessary or incidental to the performance of his/her functions, see para 13 of 
Schedule 1 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
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5.2.10. EMPLOYEE CREDITORS - IMPACT OF TUPE AND EMPLOYEES ACT  
The treatment of employee creditors in insolvency is inextricably linked to the 
development of European Union (‘EU’) law. EU law has created minimum guidelines 
for employee engagement and provides a basis informing the manner in which 
employees are treated. The Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Acquired Rights 
Directive are of great importance.  
The Charter of Fundamental Rights
929
 speaks to the employer’s participatory 
and informational responsibilities while the Acquired Rights Directive
930
 finds 
application within the context of business transfers. The latter directive has been 
implemented in the provisions of TUPE.
931
 The current TUPE regulations replaced 
the 1981 regulations. McMullen
932
 highlights the process which led to the regulations 
coming into force in 2006: 
       The DTI issued an original consultation document in 2001 and then published certain aims that it 
wished to achieve, in a press release, on 14 February 2003. In March 2005 the DTI issued a 
consultation paper containing draft TUPE Regulations 2005 which were originally intended to 
come into force on 1 October 2005. Much delayed, the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of 
Employment) Regulations 2006 (TUPE 2006) were laid before Parliament on 7 February, 




The new TUPE Regulations introduced the following: (i) An expanded 
definition of TUPE inclusive of contracting out and business services in order to 
enhance certainty and reduce litigation and disputes, (ii) greater clarity on the effect of 
the Regulations within the context of dismissals occasioned by transfers as well as 
scope for employers to amend applicable conditions, (iii) a requirement that an 
existing employer provide information to a transferee employer on the identity of 
existing employees as well as the rights and liabilities transferable to the latter and 
                                                     
929
 Charter of Fundamental Rights Chapter IV, Article 27. 
930
 Acquired Rights Directive EEC Council Directive 187 of 1977 as amended and consolidated in 
Directive 2001/23/EC. 
931
 The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) 2006 regulations 13 and 14. For further 
reading on this aspect, see sections 188 & 189 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations 
(Consolidation) Act 1992 as amended. On the failure of an employer to consult with representatives 
within the required timeline, see the tests devised by courts in Susie Radin Ltd v GMB [2004] 2 All 
ER as confirmed in Sweetin v Coral Racing [2005] WL 3749701252 at paras 30-36. A 
comprehensive discussion of this aspect is unfortunately beyond the scope of the thesis. 
932
 John McMullen ‘An analysis of the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) 
Regulations 2006’ (2006) Vol. 35 No. 2 Industrial Law Journal 113. 
933
 McMullen (2006) at 114. 
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It is important to distinguish between employee salary and wage claims 
incurred prior to as well as after the administrator’s assumption of office. In relation 
to the former category of claims, there seems to be a dearth of literature specifically 
and comprehensively covering this topic.
935
 From a reading of the Act, the following 
is observed: Paragraph 65(2), stipulating the manner in which distributions are to be 
made in administration, provides that the provisions of section 175 apply as if the 
debtor is being wound up. Section 175(1), the general provision in respect of 




Upon analysis, an employee has a preferential claim in respect of outstanding 
salaries for a period of four months before the date on which the company entered 
administration, with a maximum preferential claim of £ 800.
937
 It is observed that the 
U.K. approach, while making provision for preference in respect of pre-administration 
wage claims, caps this entitlement. Wage claims falling outside of preference will, it 
is submitted, be subject to the administrator’s proposals.  
 Where an administrator’s proposal contemplates a sale of the business as a 
going concern, the provisions of TUPE in conjunction with the Employment Rights 
Act of 1996 find application. Within the context of transfer, regulation 8 of TUPE 
makes Part XII of the Employment Rights Act applicable to transactions where the 
transferor employer is not insolvent. In a transfer of business contemplated in terms of 
TUPE, regulation 8 deems the termination of employment requirement to have been 
satisfied for the purposes of the Employment Rights Act even if such termination has 
not occurred.
938
 Second and perhaps more significant, it makes the National Insurance 
                                                     
934
 McMullen (2006) at 115. For a brief outline of some of the criticisms raised against the Acquired 
Rights Directive 2001 and the TUPE Regulations 2006, see John Armour and Simon Deakin 
‘Insolvency and employment protection: the mixed effects of the Acquired Rights Directive’ (2003) 
22 International Review of Law and Economics 443-463. 
935
 The same observation is made by Chrispas Nyombi ‘Employees’ rights during insolvency’ (2013) 
55(6) International Journal of Law and Management 417.  In many of the articles read, the position 
often put forward is that where wage claims are found to fall outside of para 99 of Schedule B1, 
they will simply constitute unsecure claims, without specific analysis and enquiry into the 
possibility or extent (if any) of pre-administration wage preference. 
936
 Specifically section 386 which regulates categories of preferential debt and makes further reference 
to category listing in Schedule 6. 
937
 See Schedule 6, Category 5 at para 9 read with the definition of ‘relevant date’ in section 387(1) 
&(2)(2)(a). 
938
 See regulation 8(3) & (4) read with section 182(a) & (b). 
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The purpose of the National Insurance Fund is to guarantee payment of 
specified employee claims, should an employer become insolvent. It is an important 
safety net where the insolvent company is unable to meet statutory preferential 
employee wage claims for the period preceding administration. Pollard
940
 provides an 
illuminating example of claims payable by it, when compared to payments in terms of 
Schedule 6: 
       The preferential claim (even if paid in full) may not be enough to meet the national minimum 
wage. £ 800 spread over four months is less than £ 47 per week. This is less than £ 1.17 per hour 
for a 40 hour week. The claim on the National Insurance Fund is better (although it only covers 
the last eight weeks). £ 230 per week works out at £ 4.79 per hour for a 48 hour week. Only if the 




Where an employee’s claim exceeds payable limits, the excess must be 
claimed by the employee directly from the company.
942
 Once the Fund has paid out 




 Once a contract of employment has been adopted by the administrator, it 
ranks in preference to his/her claim for fees.
944
 Walters observes that this is an 
important mechanism for ensuring that employees are not exploited once it is 
                                                     
939
 Employment Rights Act, section 182. Even though the regulations do not clearly specify this, 
administration would arguably fall into the definition of ‘relevant insolvency proceedings’ in 
regulation 8(6). Section 183 of the Employment Rights Act of 1996 provides that the ‘insolvency’ 
condition will be satisfied where a company has commenced administration proceedings.  
940
 David Pollard Corporate Insolvency: Employment and Pension Rights 2 ed (2000) Butterworths. 
941
 Pollard (2000) at 46. 
942
 David Pollard (2000) at 52; Chrispas Nyombi (2013) at 421. In the case of a transfer, the transferee 
will be responsible for amounts exceeding these limits in terms of regulation 4(1). Upon the transfer 
of powers, duties and responsibilities to the transferee in terms of regulation 4(2) and consequent 
duty to pay amounts exceeding payable limits, it is not clear whether the subrogation in respect of 
claims paid by the Fund would be pursuable against the transferor or transferee. If those claims are 
actionable against the transferor, this would in virtually all instances be futile as after transfer, only 
a shell would likely remain. If it is against the transferee, this would constitute a significantly unfair 
result as the transferee is in any case liable for excess employee wage liabilities not paid by the 
Fund. From a reading of regulation 4(2)(a)&(b) and section 189 of the Employment Rights Act of 
1996  it would seem that the subrogation of claims in favour of the Fund would apply against the 
transferee.  
943
 David Pollard (2000) at 52. The Fund may therefore rank as preferential debtor in relation to certain 
claims. 
944
 It will constitute an expense of the administration and is regulated by Schedule B1 at para 99. This 
is in contrast to the position in the Companies Act 71 of 2008. Section 135 relating to the ranking of 
creditor claims ranks the practitioner’s fees in preference to that of employee, even if the latter’s 
entitlement constitutes post-commencement finance in terms of section 135. See the discussion in 
Chapter 4.  
160 
 
adjudged that either of the purposes of administration is achievable.
945
 Where a 
contract of employment is not renewed, an affected employee is entitled to 





, as amended, provides a significant level of employee 
protection in the form of safety nets within administration, redundancy or liquidation. 
Notwithstanding the above, it imposes important limitations on pre-commencement 
preferential wage entitlements. The effect of this is to ensure that the financially 
distressed company is able to relieve itself of any contractual undertakings which, 
although previously commensurate in light of the company’s historical performance, 
may be uneconomical for the company to comply with in light of its current financial 
circumstances.   
 
5.2.11. DISSENTING CREDITORS 
The Insolvency Act does not provide for the usurping of a dissenting creditor’s claim 
in the manner seen in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.  Schedule B1 does however provide 
instances where the court may veto creditor discretion and sanction a proposal by the 




                                                     
945
 Adrian Walters ‘The Impact of Employee Liabilities on the Administrator’s decision to Continue 
Trading’ (2005) 26(11) Company Lawyer at 321. 
946
 The provisions in relation to preference of wage claims are outlined in Schedule 6 read with sections 
386 & 387 of the Insolvency Act 1986.  
947
 Combined with developments in European Union law. 
948
 This is in terms of para 55(2)(e) which provides that the court may ‘make any other order (including 
an order making consequential provision) that the court thinks appropriate.’ See further cases cited 
earlier in the chapter.  
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5.2.12. APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE 
Where the approved proposal is in the form of a company voluntary arrangement, 
which may constitute a composition of creditors’ claims or a scheme of 
arrangement
949
, it is binding on a creditor, whether or not he/she would have been 
entitled to vote on the proposal had he/she received notice.
950
 Simply stated, a creditor 




 The proposal for a voluntary arrangement pursuant to Part 1 of the Insolvency 
Act may result in a composition and reduction of the amounts to be received by 
creditors in satisfaction of their claims.
952
 Alternatively, a proposed scheme of 
arrangement may be proposed which will not result in a compromise of debt but 




5.2.13. TERMINATION OF PROCEEDINGS 
The duration of administration is for a period of twelve months but may be extended 
by creditors for a period of six months or for a longer period by the court.
954
 The 
extension of an administrator’s term through creditor consent may occur only once.
955
 
In addition to an automatic termination, an administrator may make an application to 
court for the termination of an appointment where he/she believes that the objective of 
administration will not be achieved, where the company should not have had recourse 
                                                     
949
 Insolvency Act of 1986, section 1(1). 
950
 Insolvency Act 1986, section 4A read with section 5. 
951
 However, a creditor may have recourse in terms of section 6 in challenging the decision on the 
ground that the proposed voluntary arrangement is unfairly prejudicial to its interests or that a 
material irregularity has been perpetrated in relation to the meeting at which the proposal was 
tabled. 
952
 Sandra Frisby & Malcom Davis-White Q.C  Kerr & Hunter on Receivers and Administrators 9
 
ed 
(2010) Sweet and Maxwell at 395; Re Adam and Partners Ltd, IRC v Adam & Partners Ltd  [2000] 
1 B.C.L.C at 222.  
953
 Loubser (2010) at footnote 403 observes that the primary difference between the two is that for a 
composition, the company must pay some form of money in satisfaction for its debt to creditors, 
whereas this is not a requirement in a scheme of arrangement under the same section. 
954
  Schedule B1 at para 76(1) & (2) read with para 78. In terms of paragraph 4(2), the administrator has 
an underlying duty to perform his functions as quickly and efficiently as practicable.  
955
 Schedule B1 at para 78(4)(a). In determining the requisite percentage for this purpose, the voting 
interest of creditors who are absent or ignore an invitation to give or withhold consent is ignored. 
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 Where the administrator is of the view that the objective of administration has 
been achieved, he/she may file a notice
957
 with the court and Registrar, which 
automatically terminates both the appointment and proceedings.
958
  Termination may 
also occur through voluntary creditor liquidation provided that certain requirements 
have been met
959





The U.K. administration procedure provides for a multi-tiered purpose which caters 
for a return of the company to a position of solvency, the sale of its business to a third 
party, leaving its corporate shell behind or a piecemeal sale of its assets. It would 
seem that the litmus test for determining the success of administration is the value 
capable of being derived by creditors through the process when compared to the value 
of a dividend receivable in liquidation without recourse to administration. The Act’s 
emphasis on an administrator’s discretion ensures that, notwithstanding the route 
through which proceedings may continue, the administrator is able to determine the 
greatest derivable value in all circumstances. 
Linked to this multi-purpose approach is the collectivity principle, which 
presents itself in two forms. The first is in its attempt to derive the greatest financial 




 The second is in its 
balancing of often conflicting individual creditor interests on the one hand, with the 
administration being a success on the other. The courts are vested with discretion to 
engage in the latter exercise and determine an appropriate balance in the 
circumstances. Even though the collectivity principle underpins the Act, it is not 
inviolate and often yields to conventional notions of creditor interest and security.  
                                                     
956
  Schedule B1 at para 79(1) & (2). A creditor may approach the court for the termination of 
proceedings on the basis that the appointment was based on an improper motive in terms of para 81. 
In addition, a creditor may approach the court on the basis that in performing his/her functions, the 
administrator is not doing so as quickly or as efficiently as is reasonably practicable in terms of para 
74(2). The order that the court may grant is listed in sub-paras 3 and 4.   
957
 In the prescribed form. 
958
 Schedule B1 at para 80. 
959
 Schedule B1 at para 83. 
960
 Upon filing of the notice with the Registrar of Companies and sending a copy to court and all 
creditors, the company is deemed to be dissolved after a period of three months. See paras 84(1) & 
(6). 
961
 The importance of the collectivity principle as an underpinning value, which would further guide 
administration as a rescue procedure, is highlighted by the U.K. Insolvency Service at para 72.  
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From a practical perspective, the determination of whether or not the purpose 
of administration is capable of being achieved is not without financial cost. Where an 
application is made to court for an order of administration, an evidentiary foundation 
must be placed before the court, establishing both financial distress as well 
areasonable prospect that the purpose of administration will be achieved. Even within 
the context of appointment of the administrator by the company or its directors, it has 
been observed that prior to making the necessary declaration, the administrator will 




 A number of controls exist within the procedure, from regulations and 
statutory provisions stipulating qualifications, appointment, fiduciary duties and 
thresholds for administrator liability to timelines dictating the pace and content of 
proceedings. A feature that makes administration unique is that it is a gateway 
procedure to other mechanisms rather than a singular process. 
The Insolvency Act does not regulate the power of the administrator to accept 
or reject contracts once proceedings have commenced. Despite the lack of clear 
articulation of his /her powers to cancel contracts, there is sufficient scope for the 
administrator to do so in pursuance of his/her duty to do anything necessary or 
expedient  for the management of the company’s business or affairs in terms of 
paragraph 59(1).
963
 In addition, the Act provides a framework under which the 
administrator may seek directions from the court where uncertain as to the extent of 
the powers vested upon him/her when exercising statutory functions.
964
 
Even though the Insolvency Act has not legislated for super-priorities, it has 
been argued that the U.K. approach permits prioritisation of certain expenses, which 
has the effect of granting a limited form of super-priority. A blanket view that no 
room is made for super-priority in administration is, with respect, incorrect.
965
   
The procedure is characterised by flexibility, whether this presents itself in the 
form of extensions in relation to the presentation of proposals to creditors or no 
                                                     
962
 Loubser (2010) at 180. 
963
 It is submitted that the power to cancel contracts is narrower than the broad powers vested upon the 
administrator to set aside certain transactions. It would be counter-intuitive for the legislature to vest 
the administrator with powers similar to those of a liquidator in certain instances while deliberately 
excluding the power to cancel contracts which are unfair and (or)  financially onerous on the 
company. Surely such a state of affairs cannot be said to have been envisaged. 
964
 Schedule B1 at para 63. See further Transbus International Ltd [2004] supra. 
965
 See Gerard McComack ‘Super-priority new financing and corporate rescue’ (2007) Journal of 
Business Law 701 at 729-732. 
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proposals at all, ranking and distributions to creditors or amendments to proposals 
prior to and after creditor approval. Despite this flexibility, the Act attempts to 
facilitate expediency whilst ensuring that creditors have recourse where prejudice 
occurs. 
While pre-administration wage payments are to a certain degree subject to an 
administrator’s proposals, adopted employee contracts are vested with a special status 
in terms of ranking and priority. Due to the developments within the European Union, 
the rights of employees have been enhanced with a number of obligations imposed on 
the employer where transfers or redundancies are contemplated.  
Where wage and salary payments constitute an expense of the administration 
and afforded priority, such priority does not exist beyond administration should 
proceedings fail and the company be liquidated. There is a reversion in favour of 
preferences outlined in Schedule 6. This approach - in the absence of court scrutiny to 
which bankruptcy cases are subjected to in the U.S.
966
 to ensure the protection of 
existing secured creditors - strikes a fair balance between (i) the need to retain a 
critical and experienced workforce when the company needs it most while providing 
credence to the view that (ii) affected persons who stand to benefit most from the 
survival of the company should be expected to endure costs fairly commensurate to 
potential benefit for them.
967
  
There is no formal procedure for the cram down of creditors who do not 
support proposals made. The administrator may approach a court, which may 
substitute its view and grant approval for the plan despite creditor dissent. This 
reflects the centrality of the role played by the courts.  
 
5.3 UNITED STATES 
5.3.1. NATURE AND HISTORY OF AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW 
U.S. Bankruptcy law can be traced back to the late 19
th
 century era of railroad 
construction and development.
968
 Railroad companies often found themselves in 
financial distress with no existing reorganisation mechanisms, resulting in parties 
essentially being left to their own devices.
969
 In order to deal with the uncertainty that 
bankruptcy presented, equity receivership was invented as an instrument for 
                                                     
966
 This is discussed later. 
967
 As we will see later, chapter 11 introduces controls which ensure that certain creditors are not 
burdened disproportionately with the costs of the reorganisation. A simple example of this is seen in 
the application of the doctrine of ‘adequate protection’. 
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Despite the fair outcomes which were envisaged, creditors were often 
prejudiced during the process.
971
 The courts attempted to level the playing field, 
introducing doctrines such as the ‘absolute priority rule’. The rule demanded that 
shareholders of the bankrupt company could only retain their interest when all 
creditors had received payment.
972
 The New Deal
973
 led to the introduction of a new 
Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.
974
 The purpose of the chapter was to ensure 
the protection of public investors who were often senior bondholders and required 
mandatory appointment of a trustee who would replace existing management, a 




The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was geared not as a ‘debtor jubilee’, as one 
commentator remarked, but was aimed at facilitating equitable administration of the 
debtor’s estate to its creditors.
976
 In this way the 1898 Act was essentially procedural 
and administrative in its orientation.
977
 An additional Chapter was later introduced by 
the Chandler Act
978
 and was designed to cater for small private firms.
979
 Through its 
revision of certain parts of the 1898 Act, the Chandler Act reforms included an update 
of both substantive and procedural aspects in liquidation cases as well as the 
                                                                                                                                                        
968
 Yongqing Ren A Comparative Study of the Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganization Law of the US 
and China (2012) Netherlands: International Publishing at 5. 
969
 Ren (2012) at 5. 
970
 Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen ‘Control Rights, Priority Rights and the Conceptual 
Foundations of Corporate Reorganization’ (2001) 87 Virginia L.Rev. 921; Douglas G. Baird and 
Robert K. Rasmussen, ‘Boyd’s Legacy and Blackstone’s Ghost’ (John M. Olin Program in Law and 
Economics Working Paper no. 94, 2000); Douglas G. Baird Elements of Bankruptcy (2010) New 
York: The Foundation Press; Charles Jordan Tabb ‘The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the 
United States’ (1995) 3 American Bankruptcy Law Review.  
971
 Tabb (1995) at 22. 
972
 Tabb (1995) at 22. Others included the ‘upset price’ control mechanism; See further Northern 
Pacific Railway Company v Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 501-8 (1913). 
973
 Briefly discussed in Chapter 2. 
974
 Introduced through the Chandler Act of 1938. See Ren (2012) at 7. See further Adam C Pritchard 
and R B Thompson ‘Securities Law and the New Deal Justices’ (2009) 95(4) Va. L. Rev. 841. 
975
 Ren (2012) at 6. 
976
 Tabb (1995) at 25.  
977
 Tabb (1995) at 25. 
978
 Tabb (1995) at 29 observes that the Chandler Act was the culmination of a careful study of U.S. 
bankruptcy law. The Act was championed by Congressman Walter Chandler. It was introduced in 
1936 and enacted in 1938.  
979
 Chapter XI had two distinguishing features, namely that existing management of the debtor 
company was not displaced and, unlike Chapter 10, no Securities Exchange Committee evaluation 
of the plan was necessary. See further David A. Skeel, Jr ‘An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate 
Law and Corporate Bankruptcy’ (1998) 51 Vand. L. Rev 1325. 
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improvement of bankruptcy administration.
980
 The Act further provided a rework of 
the chapters governing corporate reorganisations, arrangements, property 
arrangements as well as provision for wage earner’s plans.
981
 
 The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States was later 
established in 1970 to study the existing bankruptcy law.
982
 The process resulted in 
comprehensive reforms being introduced in 1978 as an attempt at ensuring unification 
of Chapter X and XI of the 1898 Act
983
 and culminated in the enactment of the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.
984
 The new Code contained public protective 
mechanisms seen in the previous Chapter X
985
 but was also flexible enough to allow 
adjustment of debt, both secured and unsecured, and equity during reorganisation.
986
 
Having briefly discussed the history, I now turn to deal with an analysis of the 
relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.  
 
5.3.2. FILING FOR BANKRUPTCY: NOTICE REQUIREMENTS  
Upon filing a petition for bankruptcy, a debtor company must ensure that schedules 
listing inter alia its assets and liabilities, income and expenditure, executory contracts 
and unexpired leases as well as the company’s overall financial affairs are 
submitted.
987
 This information provides creditors with an outline of the debtor’s 
current financial status and creates a basis for them to adequately vindicate their rights 
should they deem necessary. It also enables an assessment into the legitimacy of the 
filing and the question whether a ‘reorganisation purpose’ actually exists. The latter 
concept is explored at a later stage.
988
 
                                                     
980
 Tabb (1995) at 29-30. 
981
 Tabb (1995) at 29-30. 
982
 In terms of Public Law 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 effective 24 July 1970.  
983
 The United States Congress appointed a commission to conduct an investigation into then existing 
Bankruptcy Laws in 1970. Three years later the commission filed its report in 1973, which resulted 
in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. See Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of 
the United States Parts I and II House Report Document number 137, 93d Congress, First Session 
(1973). 
984
 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 also known as the ‘US Bankruptcy Code’. This came into 
effect on the 1 October 1979. See Ren (2010) at 8. 
985
 Bankruptcy Act of 1938. 
986
 Ren (2012) at 7-8. For further reading see Kenneth N. Klee ‘Legislative History of the New 
Bankruptcy Law’ (1979) 28 Depaul Law Review 941. 
987
 Federal Rules Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 1007(b). It is to be observed that the term ‘executory 
contract’ is not defined in the Code. 
988
 This is in comparison to section 129 commencement proceedings in the 2008 Act, where a director 
resolution and an affidavit stating circumstances surrounding financial distress is sufficient. While 
certain creditors may be privy to company financial information before financial distress occurs, 
this right is not one which all creditors share. 
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A notice of filing is sent to the company’s listed creditors by the bankruptcy 
clerk. Where a creditor is not listed in schedules or where its claim is listed as 
contingent or unliquidated or disputed, the creditor must ensure that its proof of claim 
is filed in order to protect its rights.
989
 If a creditor claim is scheduled and is neither 
contingent nor disputed, a proof of claim need not be filed.
990
 The effect of chapter 11 
is to discharge the company from its debts even if claims, which formed the basis for 




5.3.3. FINANCIAL DISTRESS 
The chapter 11 bankruptcy process commences with the voluntary filing of a debtor 
company’s petition with a bankruptcy court.
992
 The petition must include a list of the 
company’s creditors as well as its assets and liabilities.
993
 It is generally not a 
requirement that the company be insolvent
994
 in order to access the procedure.
995
 This 
aspect makes chapter 11 unique in comparison to its comparative counterparts. A 
company may file for bankruptcy to avoid an impending liability for damages.
996
  
Creditors may force involuntary bankruptcy proceedings upon a debtor 
company. This may occur where creditors are owed a minimum amount of USD 
10 000, with the amount remaining unpaid by the debtor company.
997
 Where 
involuntary bankruptcy liquidation proceedings are commenced, the debtor may in 
                                                     
989
 Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 3003(c)(2); see Baird (2010) at 79. 
990
 11 U.S.C § 1111(a). 
991
 Baird (2010) at 79.  
992
 McComack (2008) at 123-4. 
993
 McComack (2008) at 123-4. 
994
 The term ‘Insolvent’ is defined in § 101(32) of the Code as one where the fair value of the 
company’s assets is exceeded by the sum of its debts.  
995
 However, slightly different approaches apply depending on whether the filing is voluntary or 
involuntary. Involuntary filings are regulated by § 303. Section 301 dealing with voluntary filings 
requires the applicant to be a debtor in terms of the Chapter. The definition of ‘debtor’ is in turn to 
be found in § 109.  
996
 Whether in contract or delict. An example of this maybe be seen in In re Texaco Inc 84 B.R. 893, 
902 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.1988). In this case Pennzoil had obtained judgment against Texaco for 
approximately 10 billion USD. Texaco’s shares were worth about 8.5 billion USD effectively 
rendering it insolvent. Texaco filed for bankruptcy in terms of chapter 11 and through the 
procedure, was able to reduce its exposure to 3 billion USD. 
997
 McComack (2008) at 79.   
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turn convert these into chapter 11 proceedings.
998
 There is, however, a requirement 
that the petition be filed in good faith
999
 with the intention of bringing about a 
corporate restructuring or a liquidation sale of the company.
1000
 A petition may be 




5.3.4. MANAGEMENT CONTROL 
Once bankruptcy proceedings have formally commenced, existing management 
remains in control of company operations; hence the term ‘debtor-in-possession’.
1002
 
One justification for this approach is that management can be depended upon to carry 
out their responsibilities in the same manner or even better than a trustee.
1003
  
Management may, however, be displaced under certain circumstances. An 
external trustee may be appointed ‘for cause’, where fraud, dishonesty, incompetence 
or gross mismanagement has been perpetrated by existing management.
1004
  American 
courts have been conservative on this aspect, stressing that the appointment of an 
outside trustee should be an exception rather than the norm.
1005
 It is to be observed 
                                                     
998
 11 U.S.C § 706. See Charles W. Adams ‘An Economic Justification For Corporate Reorganization’ 
(1991) Hofstra Law Review 117 at 134. Adams argues that reorganisation is borne out of two 
conditions. The first is that the value of a debtor’s assets, at going concern value, must be exceeded 
by its liabilities and that the same going concern value of assets must exceed their liquidation value. 
He sees reorganisation as playing the role of mediating the often conflicting interests of creditors 
and shareholders when insolvency occurs and as creating an ‘adequate equity cushion’ with the 
effect of mitigating shareholder risky behaviour at the expense of the debtor company’s creditor. 
For further reading, see B Carruthers, B & T Halliday Rescuing Business: The Making of Corporate 
Bankruptcy Law in England and the United States (1998) Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
999
 And not with the intention of delaying or frustrating creditors’ rights. 
1000
 McComack (2008) at 79 and 124.  See In re Integrated Telecom Express, Inc., 384 F. 3d 108 (3
rd
 
Circuit Division, 2004). 
1001
 See SGL Carbon Corporation 200 F. 3d 154 (3
rd
 Circuit, 1999). The fides of a petitioner is a 
relevant factor in the enquiry to be analysed in light of the objective assessment regarding the 
feasibility of the proposed reorganisation, see CAROLIN CORP. v. MILLER 886 F.2d 693 (4th Cir. 
1989). 
1002
 11 U.S.C § 1107(a). 
1003
 See Commodity Futures Trading Commission v Weintraub 471 US 343, 355 (1985); Jay Lawrence 
Westbrook ‘Reorganisation in the United States’ in Harry Rajak (1993) at 351. See further Richard 
Posner ‘Foreword’ in J Bhandari and L Weisseds (eds) Corporate Bankruptcy: Economic and 
Legal Perspectives (1996) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
1004
 See § 1104(a)(1). 
1005
 See Re Marvel Entertainment Group (1998) 140 F 3D 463 at 471. 
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5.3.5. MORATORIUM ON PROCEEDINGS 
Once a company files for bankruptcy, a moratorium
1007
 on proceedings against it 
comes into effect.
1008
  Any legal action in the form of a judgment or enforcement of 
security or other debt-collection measure may only proceed outside bankruptcy court 
once permission to proceed has been granted by the bankruptcy court.
1009
 In the 
absence of the court’s consent, a prospective litigant-creditor faces potential contempt 
of court actions as well as penalties.  
Criminal proceedings are not barred; therefore directors of the debtor may be 
held criminally liable for the company’s conduct.
1010
 In such instance, the Bankruptcy 
Code makes provision for the appointment of an external trustee as a measure of 
ensuring that operations continue.
1011
 The Code also provides sufficient flexibility 
regarding the powers of the court to impose a non-automatic stay of actions.
1012
 
There is an expansive list of exceptions to the application of the moratorium 
which has been explained on the basis of compromises reached through lobbying and 
political expedience.
1013
  A creditor may apply for the lifting of the stay and the court 
in such instance may confirm, annul, terminate or make the stay subject to certain 
conditions.
1014
 The stay may be lifted on a number of grounds. This includes instances 
                                                     
1006
 The debtor-in-possession’s fiduciary duties are to be found in §§1107(a) read with 1106(a)(1)  and 
704. § 704(a)(1) requires the Debtor-in-possession to act in the best interests of ‘parties in interest’ 
and provides a list of functions which must be performed. Upon a reading of the Code and its Rules, 
such party(ies) are inclusive of the debtor’s creditors as well as creditor committees. See In Re 
CoServ LLC 273 B.R. 487 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002) at 498, where the court held as follows:  
            ‘…The Court believes such a bridge exists in the debtor in possession’s role as the equivalent of 
a trustee…A debtor in possession, like a trustee, is a fiduciary holding the bankruptcy estate 
and operating the business for the benefit of its creditors and (if the value justifies) equity 
owners…’ 
      See further the observations of the court in In re Bear Stearns Litig., 23 Misc. 3d 447, 475 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 2008). See further Sherr v Winkler 552 F. 2d 1367, 1374 (10
th
 Circuit 1977). 
1007
 Referred to as a ‘stay’. 
1008
 11 U.S.C §362(a). This includes property belonging to the debtor as well as that belonging to a 
third party but within the debtor’s possession. 
1009
 Bankruptcy Code, §§ 362(a) & 362 (d). Different rules apply in the case of the single-asset real 
estate debtor. With this debtor, creditors are granted greater powers of recourse where the onus is 
shifted to the debtor company. See 11 U.S.C § 362(d) & 362(d)(3). 
1010
 11 U.S.C § 362(b)(4).  
1011
 11 U.S.C § 1104. 
1012
 11 U.S.C § 105. 
1013
 McComack (2008) observes this aspect at 160-161 and the Congressional impetus for a narrow 
interpretation of these exceptions.  
1014
 Bankruptcy Code, § 362(d).  
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where the applicant creditor is able to show that the petition fails to provide ‘adequate 
protection’ for the creditor’s interest in the property
 1015
, where property is applied in 
security for a lien and the debtor fails to show that it has an equity interest in the 
property or where the property is not essential for the carrying out of the 
reorganisation.
1016
 If a creditor is able to show that the debtor  no longer has any 
equity in the collateral, to avoid the lifting of the stay the debtor will bear the onus of 





5.3.6. PROTECTION OF PROPERTY INTERESTS 
In protecting the proprietary interests of stakeholders, the Code provides that the 
debtor company is not entitled to apply ‘cash collateral’ during or outside the ordinary 
course of business without consent of the court or the relevant secured party.
1018
 The 
debtor company may, however, sell, lease or use other property belonging to the 




 The Code’s imposition of limitations on the manner in which the debtor may 
apply ‘cash collateral’ ensures that the secured creditor does not unduly bear the costs 
of the reorganisation. It is submitted that this approach further provides a measure of 
protection for pre-bankruptcy contractual agreements as well as certainty in the 
lending markets.
1020
 Thus, where lending within the pre-bankruptcy context, creditors 
are better able to factor and account for risk in their lending agreements. 
 
                                                     
1015
 11 U.S.C §361 read with § 362(d)(1).  
1016
 11 U.S.C § 362(d)(2)(A) & (B).  Conversely, if the debtor is able to show that it has an equity 
interest in the property or that the property is essential for the carrying out of the reorganisation the 
creditor is likely to fail in its bid to have the stay lifted by court. 
1017
 See United Timbers Association of Texas v Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates Ltd 484 U.S. 365 
(1988). The debtor company may in certain circumstances have to ensure that ‘adequate 
protection’ is provided for the benefit of certain creditors in terms of § 361. 
1018
 ‘Cash collateral’ is defined in § 363(a) as inclusive of cash, negotiable instruments, documents of 
title, securities, deposit accounts or what the Code refers to as ‘cash equivalents’ whenever 
acquired and where a third party entity has an interest therein. 
1019
 11 U.S.C § 363(c). ‘Adequate protection’ may have to be produced by the debtor company to 
ensure that the relevant secured creditor’s interests are protected. 
1020
 This is in contrast with the South African approach where the practitioner may in certain instances 





The debtor is entitled to assume or reject non-personal executory contracts.
1021
 Where 
a contract is in default, this default (unless of a specified nature relating to insolvency 
or financial condition) must first be cured and an assurance of future performance 
must be provided before the contract can be assumed.
1022
  
The assumption, assignment (whether or not the contract by its terms prohibits 
assignment) or rejection of contracts occurs under court supervision.
1023
 The process 
is initiated through summary motion proceedings by the debtor or trustee and may be 
objected to by the debtor-in-possession’s creditors.
1024
 During the hearing, the court 
will make preliminary findings in relation to aspects such as the breach or cure of 
applicable contracts. In this regard the court will, in large part, defer to the debtor’s 
‘business judgment’ in respect of contracts which the latter may wish to assume or 
reject.
1025
 This also provides an opportunity for an affected party to state its case in 
relation to the proposed cancellation, assumption or assignment.
1026
 An approved 
cancellation or rejection constitutes a breach of contract, entitling an affected party to 
a pre-petition damages claim against the debtor.
1027
  
In addition to the power to assume or reject executory contract, the debtor may 
avoid certain transactions preceding the filing of the petition.
1028
 The Code refers to 
                                                     
1021
 11 U.S.C § 365(a) & (b). See further Westbrook at 356 in Rajak (1993).  Where an executory 
contract has not been properly rejected, obligations and responsibilities attendant upon it are 
accepted as having been assumed and will rank as an administrative expense, see  Adventure 
Resources Inc. v Holland 137 F.3d 786, 798 (4
th
 Cir. 1998)  at paragraphs 14-17.  
      For further reading on this point, see In re Mushroom Transport Co., Inc 78 B.R 754, 759 (Bankr. 
E.D.Pa 1987); LJC Corp. v Boyle 768 F.2d 1489, 1494 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ; In re French, 131 B.R 
138, 141 (Bankr.E.D.Mo. 1991). 
1022
 See § 365(b)(1)(A) & (C). The position is different where an executory contract is rejected. On the 
consequences, see In Re Thompson 788 F.2d 560, 563 (9th Cir. 1986). 
1023
 11 U.S.C § 365(a). The court in In re Prime Motor Inns 124 B.R. 378, 382 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991) 
affirmed  ‘business judgment’ as expounded upon by the Supreme Court in the earlier In re 
Bildisco infra case at 80 as the appropriate test for rejection of ordinary contracts: For a reading on 
the business judgment test, see In re Minges  602 F.2d 38 (2
nd
 Cir. 1979).  
1024
 In re Orion Pictures Corp. 4 F.3d 1095, 1099 (2d Cir.1993). 
1025
 However, the court will engage in its own ‘business judgment’ analysis of a debtor’s decision to 
assume a contract. See In re F.W. Restaurant Assocs. Inc., 190 B.R. 143, 148 (Bankr. D. Conn. 
1995). 
1026
 It is to be noted that the proceedings are ‘summary’ in nature.  
1027
 11 U.S.C § 365(g). In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. 138 B.R. 687, 707 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 
1992) at 707 the court, having broadly canvassed the literature on this point, concluded:   
         ‘…we believe that the plain language of § 365…compels the conclusion that a rejected contract is 
actually breached, and the breach is deemed to have occurred immediately preceding the 
bankruptcy filing…’  
     Where a damages claim arises as a result of the termination an employment contract, it will be 
subject to limitations imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(7). The termination of collective bargaining 
agreements is discussed below. 
1028
 The 11 U.S.C §§ 544(b), 547(b) and 548.  
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the trustee (debtor-in-possession) avoiding ‘…any transfer of an interest of the debtor 
in property or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable…’
1029
 This is an 
example of fraudulent conveyance law, which grants the debtor state law powers of 
avoidance.
1030
 For the avoidance of a voidable preference to occur, the debtor must 
have been insolvent when the transfer occurred and the transfer must have resulted in 
a distribution greater than that which would have been received had the debtor been 




5.3.8. POST-COMMENCEMENT FINANCING 
The debtor company may solicit financing after filing for bankruptcy. Where 
obtained, it may be categorised as an ‘administrative expense’ or accorded super 
priority over other administrative expenses already encumbering the property.
1032
  
It has been advanced that the reason why companies in chapter 11 proceedings 
require post-petition finance may be due to the fact that most, if not all, of the 
company’s cash is often subject to a lien as ‘proceeds of encumbered property’ or 
subject to a ‘right to set-off’.
1033
 In this way, the cash or cash equivalent is treated as 
‘cash collateral’ which requires court sanction for the debtor company to utilise it in 
the absence of a lienholder’s consent.
1034
  
Post-petition finance may be accorded a ranking higher to that of an 
administrative expense depending on the availability of assets belonging to the debtor 
company.
1035
 Should proceedings be converted into liquidation in terms of Chapter 7, 
the priority ranking remains.
1036
 If credit has been extended to the company in the 
ordinary course of business post-petition, the priority will be automatic while credit 
granted outside of the ordinary course requires court approval.
1037
  
                                                     
1029
 My emphasis. 11 U.S.C § 544(b)(1).The term ‘transfer’ is broadly defined in § 101(54). § 1107 
grants the debtor-in-possession similar powers to a trustee. See further the provisions of § 547(b). 
1030
 Baird (2010) at 139. See further § 548. 
1031
 11 U.S.C § 547(b). The transaction must have occurred 90 days before filing in the case of an 
‘outsider’ and up to a period of one year in the case of an ‘insider’. The ambit for avoidance is 
much greater (two years before filing) in the case of fraudulent transactions in terms of § 548. It is 
clear that the powers of the debtor-in-possession in this regard are significant, allowing for 
extensive recoupment of assets. 
1032
 Subject to certain conditions. 11 U.S.C § 364(c) & (d).   
1033
 Set-off provisions are stipulated in § 553. See Westbrook in Rajak (1993) at 355. 
1034
 11 U.S.C § 363(c)(2). 
1035
 David A. Skeel J ‘Creditor’s Ball: The “New” Corporate Governance in Chapter 11’ (2003) 152 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 917 at 923. 
1036
 11 U.S.C § 726. See further McComack (2008) at 85.  
1037
 11 U.S.C § 364(a) & (b). 
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Super-priority financing and debt priming occurs within specifically defined 
parameters which ensure that existing security interests are not unduly compromised. 
The first measure is that an application for obtaining such credit must be made to the 
court.
1038
 The second is that in deciding whether to permit or reject the application, 
the court will enquire whether adequate protection has been provided for existing 
creditors.
1039
 The consequence is that where a creditor is granted higher ranking in 
respect of post-petition finance advanced, for instance, and the debtor is subsequently 
liquidated; adequate provision would already have been made for the protection of 
pre-bankruptcy secured creditors. 
 
5.3.9. PLAN PUBLICATION 
The debtor is required to propose a plan within one hundred and twenty days after 
having filed for bankruptcy.
1040
 This is referred to as the ‘exclusivity period’ i.e. the 
period during which only the debtor may propose a plan.
1041
 The plan must be 
accepted by creditors within a period of one hundred and eighty days of filing for the 
exclusive period to continue.
1042
 The latter timeline may be extended by the court, on 
good cause shown, for a period not exceeding twenty months.
1043
 Some commentators 
have posited that despite the capping of the exclusivity period in the Code (as 
compared to its predecessor), it remains too long.
1044
  
A number of outcomes may result. The debtor may propose a ‘standalone 
plan’, which entails stakeholders concerned (secured, unsecured creditors and in rare 
instances, equity holders) consenting to a reorganisation without the intervention of a 
third party in the form of a purchaser for the business. The plan may seek to 
                                                     
1038
 11 U.S.C §364. 
1039
 11 U.S.C §364(c) &(d). 
1040
 11 U.S.C § 1121(c)(2). 
1041
 This period may be extended by a competent court to a period not exceeding 18 months after the 
date on which the petition was filed. See Bankruptcy Code para 1121(d)(2)(A). The 18 month 
period was introduced by Congress to allay fears by critics who argued that debtor companies 
could abuse the process to further their own ends. 
1042
 11 U.S.C 1121(c)(3). The acceptance must be by each class of creditor whose claim or interest is 
impaired by the plan. 
1043
 11 U.S.C 1121(d)(2)(B). 
1044
 Introduced by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005); Edward I. Altman ‘Evaluating the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy-
Reorganization Process’ (1993) 1 Columbus Business Law Review at 3; Foteini Teloni ‘Chapter 11 
Duration, Pre-Planned Cases and Refiling Rates: An Empirical Analysis in the Post-BAPCPA Era’ 
(2015) 23 American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review  571 at 573 observes that shorter timeframes 
have been linked with higher refiling rates due to the amendments forcing the debtor to ignore 
operational problems in pursuit of expedited proceedings. For further reading, see M Bradley and 
M Rosenweig ‘The Untenable Case for Chapter 11’ (1992) 101 Yale Law Journal 1043. 
174 
 
compromise of the claims of creditors.
1045
 Alternatively, the plan may envisage a sale 
of the business, distributing the proceeds to creditors. A third party investor may be 
introduced for a capital injection on loan account or in exchange for equity. Another 
option may be in the form of a ‘liquidation plan’, provided that each creditor receives 
at least what it would have received in liquidation.
1046
  
The Bankruptcy Code allows the company’s creditors to propose their own 
plans after the expiry of the exclusivity period, which may well compete with the 
debtor-in-possession’s proposed plan.
1047
 The approach is justified on the basis that 
creditors are best placed to determine whether a proposed plan furthers their 
interests.
1048
   
 
5.3.10. DISCLOSURE STATEMENT  
A disclosure statement and plan of reorganisation must be filed at court. It is only 
after approval of the disclosure statement by the court that the debtor company may 
approach and persuade its creditors to accept the proposed plan.
1049
 The disclosure 
statement must contain ‘adequate information’ which is described as 
       …information of a kind, and in sufficient detail, as far as is reasonably practicable in light of the 
nature  and history of the debtor and the condition of the debtor’s books and records, including a 
discussion of the potential material Federal tax consequences of the plan to the debtor, any 
successor to the debtor, and a hypothetical investor typical of the holders of claims or interests in 
the case, that would enable such a hypothetical investor of the relevant class to make an informed 




The Code distinguishes a ‘small business case’
1051
 providing that in such a 
case the court may deem it unnecessary for the debtor to circulate a disclosure 
statement to creditors in soliciting their vote, once the court has determined that the 
                                                     
1045
 This is termed a ‘composition’. 
1046
 11 U.S.C § 1129. 
1047
 11 U.S.C §1121(c).  
1048
 Bank of America v 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership 526 US 434 (1999). In addition, the 
debtor would have had the advantage of an exclusivity period in order to try and get its preferred 
plan accepted. 
1049
 11 U.S.C § 1125(b). For a multi-staged bargaining process analysis of chapter 11 through the prism 
of game theory, see Amira Annabi, Michele Breton & Pascal Francois ‘Resolution of Financial 
Distress under Chapter 11’ (2012) 36 Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 1867-1887. 
1050
 11 U.S.C § 1125(a)(1). This provision, which regulates information to be provided to creditors, is 
similar to that seen in section 150(2) of the Companies Act of 2008. The enquiry, being one into 
whether information provided to a creditor will enable it (or a hypothetical creditor) to make an 
informed judgment about the plan, is made by the bankruptcy court. In South Africa, the court has 
to be invited to make this determination. The South African provision is discussed in the previous 
chapter. 
1051
 The definition of the term is found in § 101(51C) and a ‘small business debtor’ in § 101 (51D). 
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plan itself contains adequate information.
1052
  The Code allows for modification of the 
plan before or after it has been confirmed by the court.  The conditions for 
modification are that the plan must comply with §§ 1122 and 1123 of the Code. In 
addition, where the debtor-in-possession seeks to modify the plan after confirmation 





Once the disclosure statement has received the requisite approval from the court, 
creditors may vote to approve or reject the plan. For the purpose of voting, the Code 
distinguishes between unimpaired and impaired creditors. A creditor is impaired if its 
pre-bankruptcy rights are to be compromised. It is the latter category whose votes are 
relevant for the purposes of plan adoption.
1054
  
Creditors are designated into classes and the plan must provide for 
classification of claims and the manner in which claims will be treated.
1055
 A plan is 
adopted by a class where it receives favourable votes from a two-thirds majority in 
value and a simple majority in the number of allowed claims in a class.
1056
 A plan is 
deemed to have been accepted by a class of shareholders or other interest holders if 
those holding atleast two-thirds in the amount of the total allowed interests held by 
members voting, vote in support.
1057
 Where a class of impaired creditors rejects the 
plan, the absolute priority rule is revived in relation to that class.
1058
 To the extent that 
a class will not receive any interest in terms of the plan, it is deemed to have voted 
against it.  
 
                                                     
1052
 11 U.S.C § 1125(f). Despite a relaxing of informational requirements in relation to small 
businesses, such enterprises are still required to present their proposed plan to court. 
1053
 The Code makes use of the term ‘substantial consummation’. § 1127(a) & (b). 
1054
 U.S.C. 11 § 1129(a)(7)(A). See further § 506 which provides for the splitting of an under secured 
claim into two separate claims, taking into account the value of the security as well as the value of 
the deficiency. The Companies Act 2008 adopts a different approach, focusing on the full amount 
owed to a creditor (to determine voting interest) and does not factor the extent to which such 
creditor is secured. This aspect is discussed in Chapter 4. See Maria Brouwer ‘Reorganization in 
US and European Bankruptcy law’ (2006) European Journal of Law and Economics 22 at 12. 
1055
 Chapter 11, §§ 1122 and 1123(a)(2)(3). 
1056
 11 U.S.C § 1126(c). 
1057
 11 U.S.C § 1126(d). 
1058
 Brouwer (2006) at 12 argues that secured creditors are deemed to have accepted the plan as they 
are not an impaired class where pre-petition loan conditions are continuing, post-petition. The 
commentator further observes that under-secured creditors have an election of having their entire 
claim secured without receiving immediate payment or to be paid at foreclosure value, thus voting 
with the body of impaired creditors to the extent that their claim is unsecured. 
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5.3.12. TREATMENT OF CREDITORS 
5.3.12.1. CRITICAL VENDORS 
The debtor company may seek judicial sanction to pay unsecured creditors falling into 
what is termed ‘critical’ vendors. These are payments to vendors whose supplies are 
deemed essential for the company to continue its business.
1059
 Even though not 
crystallised in chapter 11, the critical vendor doctrine has been said to predate the 
1978 Code. The Code’s silence on this aspect has been interpreted by some as implied 
recognition for its application and viability. Proponents have argued that the lack of 






 observes the historical origins of the doctrine: 
        The doctrine of necessity--that is, court-approved payment of unsecured pre-bankruptcy claims 
before a Chapter 11 plan is confirmed—has its origin in the nineteenth century railroad 
receivership cases. Two similar doctrines developed at that time. First, railroad receiverships in 
the 1800s recognized an equitable rule of priority, known as the “six-months rule”, which 
authorized receivers to pay the unpaid claims of “operating creditors” arising within the six-
month period immediately preceding the receivership case…Similar in concept to, but separate 
and distinct from, the six months rule, “the necessity of payment doctrine” also developed in 
nineteenth-century railroad receivership proceedings. Since first enunciated in the 1882 decision 
of the U.S. Supreme Court in Miltenberger v Logansport Railway Co., the doctrine became an 




He further outlines its pedigree as distinguishable from its erstwhile counter-
part, the ‘six-month’ doctrine: 
       …the “doctrine of necessity,” as it came to be known later, is not a rule establishing priority of 
claims; rather, it is a doctrine giving courts the discretion to deviate from the otherwise applicable 
rules of priority by making early payments to certain creditors to achieve the goal of a successful 
reorganization. Whereas the six month rule directly changes the priority of claims by paying 
ordinary course claims incurred within six months prior to a railroad reorganization before 
secured claims, the doctrine of necessity permits payment of pre-bankruptcy unsecured claims 
only when such payment is needed so that trade vendors or other creditors will not refuse to 




                                                     
1059
 McComack (2008) at 83. 
1060
 Others have in turn argued that a lack of codification indicates intent of its demise. For further 
reading on the different arguments raised on this aspect see Joshua A Erhrenfeld ‘Quieting the 
Rebellion: Eliminating Payment of Prepetition Debts Prior to Chapter 11 Reorganizations’ (2003) 
70 Chicago Law Review 621; Victor A Vilaplana ‘Stretching the Code for Critical Vendors: 
Necessity is the Mother of Invention’ in 26
th
 Annual Current Developments in Bankruptcy and 
Reorganization (2004) 491 at 528 New York: Practising Law Institute. 
1061
 Alan Resnick ‘The Future Doctrine of Necessity and Critical Vendor Payments in Chapter 11 
Cases’ (2005) 47 Boston Law Review 183. The courts have relied on their broad equitable powers 
in § 105(a) for payment of certain pre-petition vendors. 
1062
 Resnick (2005) at 187-88.  
1063
 Resnick (2005) at 187-188. Anthony Michael Sabino ‘The Death of Critical Vendor Motions and 
the Potential Demise of the Doctrine of Necessity: Farewell to Two Misbegotten Doctrines’ (2004) 
Vol. 6 Transactions: The Tennessee Journal of Business Law 47. 
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The doctrine has been applied in the payment of employee wages claims 
accrued prior to bankruptcy as distinct from post-petition wages, which would 
constitute an administrative expense.
1064
 The equitable powers granted in § 105(a) 





5.3.12.2. ASCENDANCY OF THE CREDITOR 
McComack observes that recent developments have seen a shift in emphasis from 
reviving the corporation towards maximising returns to creditors.
1066
 The increase in 
debt trading has been viewed as a contributing factor, where institutions buy up debt 
of distressed companies, while having no real interest in long-term relationships with 
the company or sustaining trading links.
1067
   
This view has been advanced further, with some arguing that chapter 11 has 
come to represent the specific interests of secured creditors.
1068
 While conceding the 
position that lender-creditors have become dominant in large bankruptcies, Gross
1069
 
disagrees with the view that it is only the interests of secured creditors which are 
accorded primacy. She observes:  
                                                     
1064
 Resnick (2005) at 192. See however its seeming rejection by the court in Re Kmart Corp 359 F 3d 
866, 871 (7
th
 Circuit, 2004) as a doctrine expressly sanctioned by the Code. Further developments 
have occurred with the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2005. 
1065
 In other instances, it has received outright rejection.  On the approach adopted the courts, see 
Official Committee of Equity Holders v Mabey 832 F. 2d 299 (4
th
 Circuit 1987) at 302.  B &W 
Enterprises Inc v Goodman Oil Company (In re B &W Enterprises Incorporated) 713 F.2d 534 at 
537 (9
th
 Circuit, 1983); Chiasson v J Louis Matherne & Associates (In re Oxford Management 
Incorporated) 4 F. 3d at 1334 (5
th
 Circuit 1993) cf In re CoServ LLC supra. At 493 the court 
expressed doubt in relation to §§ 549 and 363(b)(1) as support for the  court’s exercise of power to 
authorise pre-petition claims. It further held that even though it could exercise equitable powers in 
terms of § 105(a), these powers were severely circumscribed. The judgment, having been delivered 
by the same judge in both matters, was followed in In re Mirant Corp. 296 B.R. 427 (Bankr. N.D. 
Tex. 2003). However see the dictum of the court in the more recent Kmart case: In reKmart 
Corporation 359 F.3d 866 supra. In this case the court rejected the critical vendor doctrine as a 
basis for paying pre-petition supplier creditors, suggesting that such payments may be sanctioned 
in terms of § 363(b) and further rejected its proposed basis in § 105(a). It would seem that the 7
th
 
circuit’s approach has received application from the Florida Bankruptcy court in In re Tropical 
Sportswear International Corporation 320 B.R. 15 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005). From an analysis of 
the case law, it would seem that the courts are far from agreement on this aspect. See further In re 
Just for Feet, Inc 242 B.R. 821 (Bankr. D.Del. 1999) per the dictum of McKelvie J at 825 where 
the motion for the payment of a ‘critical vendor’ was permitted. The court further exemplified § 
105 as a modern day extension of the pre-Code doctrine of necessity. 
1066
 McComack (2008) at 113. 
1067
 McComack (2008) at 112.  
1068
 See James J White ‘Death and Resurrection of Secured Credit’ (2004) 12 American Bankruptcy 
Institute Law Review 139. 
1069
 Karen Gross ‘A response to J.J. White’s Death and Resurrection of Secured Credit: Finding Some 
Trees but Missing the Forest’ (2004) 12 American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 203 at 207. 
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        Traditional secured lending… is asset based lending used by companies to obtain (among other 
things) relatively short-term monies for working capital. But, conventional secured lending is not 
always available, particularly for companies where their current and future wealth is found in 
their cash flow, not their hard assets. It is in this context that there has been enormous 
development in the bond market, particularly in the high yield debt market, and much of the high 
yield debt that is issued is unsecured. Specifically, the market size of the U.S. high yield market 
in 1978, the year before the Code went into effect was 26 billion USD. With some ups and 
downs, the market size of the U.S. high yield market in 1992 was 205 billion USD. In 2000, the 




Gross proceeds to argue that the tenor of chapter 11 as it currently exists has 
not been due to Congressional intent but rather as a result of the interplay of market 
forces: 
       These developments occurred not because of [C]hapter 11; they occurred as a function of our 
capital markets and the development of those markets. They, indeed, have changed the nature of 
what occurs in [C]hapter 11 cases; again, however, that is not a change necessarily based on the 
role of secured creditors. So today, real [C]hapter 11 cases must deal with a vast array of new 




Debtor-in-possession financing arrangements have been applied as both a 
financing as well as a corporate governance mechanism by lender-creditors.
1072
 These 
creditors have been found to use their financial leverage in order to influence the 
manner in which managers and directors make their decisions during a bankruptcy.
1073
  
Examples are seen in loan schedules from DIP lenders containing specific 
dates on which the reorganisation plan is to be confirmed, with failure to meet 
timelines often being met by auctioning of company assets and calculated financial 
tightening.
1074
 Even though this rise in creditor influence has been lauded on the basis 
that it has enabled faster proceedings, it has been criticised by some on the basis that 
bankruptcy has been converted into a quasi-liquidation process.
1075
 
The Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 has raised concern 
regarding the potential consequences of certain conditions in loan covenants.
1076
 In its 
recommendations on the reform of chapter 11, it has observed that condition carrying 
                                                     
1070
 Gross (2004) at 207. 
1071
 Gross (2004) at 208. 
1072
 Skeel (2003) at 917.  
1073
 McComack (2008) at 113. For further reading on this aspect see Andrew B. Dawson ‘Labour 
Activism in Bankruptcy’ (2015) 89 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 97 at 105- 106.  
1074
 McComack (2008) at 188. 
1075
 McComack (2008) at 188; Douglas G Baird and Robert K Rasmussen ‘The End of Bankruptcy’ 
(2002) 55 Stanford Law Review 751 at 751-2. 
1076
 American Bankruptcy Institute Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 (2012-2014) (2014) 





 often had a detrimental effect on the substantive efficiency of the 
chapter 11 process. The Commission found that while bankruptcy rules
1078
 sought to 
ensure that affected parties had sufficient information prior to the hearing of a motion 
for the court to permit conditional financing, in many instances parties in interest 
either did not have sufficient time or information to evaluate the impact of such 
loans.
1079
   It has been argued that because the U.S. envisages the debtor-in-possession 
approach, creditor lending agreements have been used as a measure to achieve, albeit 
indirectly, the creditor-in-possession approach seen in administration in the U.K.
1080
   
 
5.3.12.3. EMPLOYEE CREDITORS: WAGE CLAIMS 
In addition to participation rights
1081
, the Code provides for payment of pre and post-
petition wage claims, with differing levels of protection and a limited preference for 
pre-petition wage claims. The relevant provision in relation to pre-petition wages 
reads: 
(a) The following expenses and claims have priority in the following order: 
… 
(2) Fourth, allowed unsecured claims, but only to the extent of $10,000 for each individual or 
corporation, as the case may be, earned within 180 days before the date of the filing of the 
petition or the date of the cessation of the debtor’s business, whichever occurs first, for— 





Outstanding pre-petition wages are preferent over general unsecured claims. In 
order for this preference to apply, the wages must have been earned within a period no 
                                                     
1077
 These include conditions placing time periods within which the debtor’s assets should be 
auctioned, concessions applicable to pre-petition financing arrangements, periods within which a 
disclosure statement and proposed plan must be filed as well as waivers applicable to surcharges. 
1078
 Such as Bankruptcy Rule 4001(c). 
1079
 American Bankruptcy Institute (2014) at 81. At 83 the Commission has recommended that 
bankruptcy courts should not approve such conditions within 60 days of the petition date or date of 
the order for relief (whichever is the later date), as part of the conditions of an approved interim 
order or where such conditions conflicted with a provision of the Code. 
1080
 McComack (2008) at 190. McComack notes, regrettably, that such approach is without the controls 
one sees in a creditor oriented jurisdiction such as in the U.K.  
1081
 Chapter 11 provides creditors with participation rights during bankruptcy. A creditor falls within 
the definition of a ‘party in interest’ and the Bankruptcy Rules further provide employee unions 
with the right to participate in discussions or negotiations relating to a published plan of 
reorganisation where employees’ rights are affected. The participation of employees may include a 
seat in a creditors committee, which must be appointed by the United States trustee once the 
petition has been filed. The committee generally consists of creditors who hold the largest claims 
against the debtor company. The committee’s mandate includes consulting with the debtor 
company as well as investigating its financial position. 
1082
 My emphasis. § 507(a)(4)(A). 
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longer than 180 days before filing and is capped.
1083
 Pre-petition wage claims may in 
exceptional circumstances be paid in priority to post-petition administrative expenses 
as a form of interim or final relief immediately following filing. The court must be 
approached for the purpose of authorising payments provided that the applicant is able 
to establish a prospect of immediate and irreparable harm should this not be done.
1084
    
There is provision for post-petition wages. This liability is categorised as an 
administrative expense and accorded preference: 
       …(b) After notice and hearing, there shall be allowed administrative expenses, other than claims 
allowed under section 502(f) of this title, including 
… 
(1)  
     (A) the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate including— 
           (i) wages, salaries, and commission for services render after commencement of the case;     
and  
           (ii) wages and benefits pursuant to a judicial proceeding or a proceeding of the National 
Labour Relations Board as back pay attributable to any period of time occurring after 
commencement of the case under this title, as a result of a violation of Federal or State law 
by the debtor, without regard to the time of the occurrence of unlawful conduct on which  
such award is based or to whether any services were rendered…
1085
 
   
Resnick argues that in order to avert prejudice caused by a delay in payment, 
the debtor company can, on motion, request the court to authorise payment of pre-
                                                     
1083
 This amount is capped at $ 11 725( as at August 2012) per employee and is subject to adjustment 
every three years in terms of § 104(b). See 
https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/bankruptcy/b/bankruptcy-law-
blog/archive/2012/02/08/prebankruptcy-planning-related-to-employee-issues-and-claims.aspx 
accessed on 28 June 2016. The American Bankruptcy Institute Commission at 93-94 has 
recommended a base aggregate cap of $ 25 000 per employee for wage and benefit plan 
contributions. It has been recommended further that it not be necessary for the debtor to file its 
first day motion in order for the court to authorise payment of this amount as a priority payment in 
terms of section 507.  
1084
 Rule 6003, Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. An administrative priority claim need not be 
paid up until the stage where the plan is to be confirmed. In this way there is a gap between 
priority in ranking versus immediacy of payment. See Michigan Bureau of Workers’ Disability 
Compensation v Chateaugay Corporation (In re Chateaugay Corporation), 80 B.R. 279, 286-7 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Gulf Air Incorporated, 112 B.R 152, 153-4 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1989). 
However this is to be contrasted with the opposite approach of the courts in In re FCX 
Incorporated, 60 B.R. 405,411-12 (E.D.N.C. 1986); In re Structurelite Plastics Corporation, 86 
B.R. 922, 932 (Bankr.S.D. Ohio 1988). On the use of the doctrine of necessity as a basis for 
payment of a pre-petition employee contract, see In re Eqalnet Communications Corporation 258 
B.R 368 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2001). A ‘covered’ employer is, in terms of the Worker Adjustment 
Retraining Notification Act (Warn Act 29 U.S. §§ 2101-2109) required to provide employees with 
sixty days advance notice prior to closing its plant or effecting mass retrenchments (11 U.S.C § 
2102(a)). Where requisite notice has not been provided, employers may be liable for back pay and 
benefits, for each day in which notice has not been provided, to a maximum period of sixty days. 
See In re Flexible Flyer Liquidating Trust, 511 Fed.  (5th Cir. 2013). 
1085
 My emphasis, 11 U.S.C § 503(b)(1)(A). 
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petition wages in the ordinary course of business to the extent that such claims would 
have been granted priority by § 507(a)(4).
1086
  
  The priority granted to employee claims arising in bankruptcy is justified on a 
number of bases.
1087
 Unlike an ordinary trade creditor, the employee is viewed as 
unable to diversify its income and therefore cannot adequately mitigate its risk against 
an employer’s failure to honour its wage obligations.
1088
  In transacting with its 
employer, the employee does not factor the risk of the employer failing to make 
payment of wages as employees often accept employment even where they may not 
have sufficient (financially sensitive) information regarding the employer 
immediately.
1089
 Even where information is available, employees may lack the 
mobility necessary to mitigate risks attendant upon an employer’s bankruptcy. 
Further, the dependence of the bankrupt company on its workforce is cited as an 
incentive for ensuring that employee rights are protected where financial distress 





5.3.12.4. BARGAINING AGREEMENTS 
Employees, as a constituency, have an interest in the company being viable and 
financially stable. This interest extends to the expectation that wages will be paid by 
the employer when due, provision for employment benefits, continued future 




It has been argued that bankruptcy courts have often made concessions in 
favour of corporate rehabilitation at the expense of already won employee wage and 
benefits.
1092
 This may be attributed to the largely contractarian approach of the U.S. 
and stands in stark contrast to the approach observed in the U.K. Recent 
developments have seen a change in the prioritisation of existing collective bargaining 
agreements and less protections being provided to employees during bankruptcy. 
                                                     
1086
 Resnick (2005) at 193. The section has, however, not been used exclusively for the payment of 
wages and has included customer and warranty claims. 
1087
 Donald R. Korobkin ‘Employee Interests in Bankruptcy’ (1996) 4 American Bankruptcy Institute 
Law Review 5 at 6. 
1088
 Korobkin (1996) at 6.   
1089
 Korobkin (1996) at 6. He refers to this as the ability to ‘assume the risk’ of the employer’s default.   
1090
 Korobkin (1996) at 6. 
1091
 Korobkin (1996) at 11. 
1092
 McComack (2008) at 211. 
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 The National Labour Relations Act 1935
1093
 provides that an employer may 
not make unilateral changes to the conditions of employment where a collective 
bargaining agreement has been entered into.
1094
 The Act imposes a duty on the debtor 
company to engage in the process of bargaining negotiations first. Where a 
modification of employment conditions is contemplated, it must receive union 
consent.  
The application of the National Labour Relations Act during bankruptcy has, 
however, been diluted by the Third Circuit in NLRB v Bildisco.
1095
 In brief, the facts 
of the case are as follows: In April 1980 the respondent filed for bankruptcy, having 
previously entered into a collective bargaining agreement with its workers’ union. 
This agreement was due to expire in 1982.  
The respondent breached the agreement by, amongst other things, the failure 
to pay health and pension benefits, remit union fees and increase wages. It sought 
leave from the bankruptcy court to cancel the agreement and the union was granted a 
period of 30 days in which to file its claim for damages. The court of appeal found no 
evidence that collective bargaining agreements were intended to be excluded from the 
scope of § 365.
1096
 Having observed that collective bargaining agreements in terms of 
the Railway Labor Act were specifically excluded from the provision’s ambit, it was 
the court’s view that the inference was that Congress did not intend to distinguish 
between collective bargaining agreements and executory contracts in general.
1097
  
Acknowledging that a collective bargaining agreement, while capable of being 
rejected, was a different pedigree of contract, the court (citing the ratio of the earlier 
Kevin Steel matter
1098
 with approval) articulated the test for rejection thus: 
       The second circuit in Kevin Steel, speaking through judge Feinberg, accommodated the interests 
of the workers by holding that rejection of a collective bargaining agreement requires “thorough 
scrutiny, and a careful balancing of equities on both sides"…We accept this formulation of the 
appropriate relationship between the competing statutory policies. It accommodates the statutory 
policies of the Labor Act by demanding a greater evidentiary showing than for a typical executory 
contract, but does not erect impossible barriers to rejection of labor contracts in violation of the 
policies underlying Chapter 11. It plots a middle course between the possible extremes, requiring 
                                                     
1093
 The National Labour Relations Act 1935 (49 Statute 449) 29 U.S.C § 151-169. 
1094
 (NLRA) at U.S.C § 158(a)(5). 
1095
 In re Bildisco US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit- 682 F. 2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982). 
1096
 In re Bildisco supra at 79. 
1097
 In re Bildisco supra  at 79. 
1098
 Shopmen’s Local Union No. 455 v Kevin Steel Prods., Inc 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975) this case 









The debtor may reject a collective bargaining agreement if the bankruptcy 
court finds that the agreement burdens the estate and where the equities are balanced 
in favour of its rejection.
1100
  When approaching the court for the purpose of rejecting 
a collective bargaining agreement, it is sufficient for the debtor to show that the 
rejection will be in the best interests of the estate and its creditors.
1101
 Before 
sanctioning the rejection the court is required to satisfy itself that having received the 
proposal, the union in question opposed it ‘without good cause’.
1102
  
The approach taken by the court in Bildisco lends credence to the view that the 
law is often rigid and due to this, it may sometimes create inefficiencies that run 
contrary to the objectives of rescuing a struggling business.  It may have been a view 
on the part of the court that every affected creditor, including employees, has to ‘chip-
in’ and take a cut in the interests of the company’s future.
1103
 This view, it is 
submitted, seems to find support in the court’s affirmation of the earlier Kevin Steel 
case
1104





The Congressional response to was to introduce § 1113, which bars the debtor 
from cancelling or modifying a bargaining agreement without a bankruptcy court 
                                                     
1099
 In re Bildisco supra at 80. 
1100
 In re Bildisco supra at 82. The courts have articulated a nine-step procedure to determine whether a 
collective bargaining agreement should be rejected, See In Re American Provision Co (1984) 44 
BR 907 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984). A ‘balancing of equities’ includes an analysis of employees not 
protected by the collective bargaining agreement, the possible effect of the failure to reorganise as 
well as the timing of the rejection or request for modification of the proposal. For further reading, 
see S Becker ‘Bankruptcy Law’s Effect on Collective Bargaining Agreements’ (1981) 81 
Columbia Law Review 391 at 402-3. The court in In Re Mile Hi Systems, Inc., 889 F.2d 887, 892 
(10
th
 Circ. 1990), recognising the necessity for public policies seeking to prevent unfair labour 
practices, emphasised the importance of chapter 11 in preventing debtor liquidation with attendant 
job losses.  This, in the view of the court, justified interpreting labor laws in a manner that takes 
account of policies of the Code. 
1101
 Conversely, the debtor must demonstrate that the continuation of the agreement will burden the 
estate; see In re Bildisco supra at 82. The debtor is required to have acted in good faith in coming 
to this conclusion in terms of § 1113(b)(2). See Mark S Pulliam ‘Rejection of Collective 
Bargaining Agreements under Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code’ (1984) 58 American 
Bakruptcy Law Journal 1 and the cases cited therein. 
1102
 See Bildisco supra and § 1113(c)(2). George S. Roukis & Bruce H. Charnov ‘NLRB v Bildisco and    
Bildisco and the Legislative Aftermath: A New Frontier for Arbitrators?’ (1986) 41(2) The 
Arbitration Journal at 46.  
1103
 Bildisco supra at 80; See the judgment of the Court of Appeals in the earlier Brotherhood of 
Railway Employees v REA Express, Inc 523 F.2d 164 infra. 
1104
  Shopmen’s Local Union No. 455 v Kevin Steel Prods., Inc supra. 
1105
  Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks v REA Express, Inc 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 
1975). 
1106
 See Bildisco supra at 80-81. 
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adjudicating on the matter first.
1107
 Therefore instead of overruling this case, Congress 
introduced standards intended to regulate its application.
1108
  
Should the court fail to rule on the application for rejection within thirty days, 
the debtor may unilaterally amend or cancel the terms of the bargaining agreement 
pending adjudication.
1109
 Sirianni observes that the introduction of § 1113 has served 




Congressional amendments have seen application in more recent matters, 
where the courts have affirmed that although § 1113(c) referred only to requirements 
relating to rejection, the same would apply within the context of modifications.
1111
 






 the court granted a motion sought by the debtor for the 
rejection of its collective bargaining agreement, which meant that the worker’s 
union
1114
 was left without a collective bargaining agreement in place.
1115
 Due to the 
effect of continuous acrimony between the debtor and the Baker’s union (continuous 
strikes) on approved loan covenant conditions and the failure of mediation between 
both parties, an order for the winding up of the company was ultimately granted.
1116
 
                                                     
1107
 11 U.S.C § 1113(e) & (f).  Introduced by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act 
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353. 98 Stat 333 (1984). The history of this section is discussed in In re 
Royal Composing Room, Inc., 848 F.2d 345, 352-354 (2
nd
 Cir. 1988).   
1108
 See In re Fiberglass Indus., Inc., 49 B.R. 202, 203 (Bankr. N. D. N. Y. 1985); International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters v IML Freight, Inc,. 789 F.2d 1460 (10
th
 Cir. 1986). 
1109
 11 U.S.C § 1113(d)(2). 
1110
 Sirianni (1987) at 444. This provision received interpretation from the court in Wheeling- Pittsburg 
Steel Corporation v United Steelworkers 791 F. 2d 1074 (3d Cir. 1986). 
1111
 In re Garofalo’s Finer Foods, Inc., 117 B.R 363, 369 (Bankr. N.D. Illinois 1990) at 370.  
      See In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 483 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2007) at paras 38 & 39; In re Walter 
Energy Inc. 542 B.R. 859 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2015); In In re Trump Entertainment Resorts 810 F.3d 
161 (3
rd
 Cir. 2016) the Court of Appeals confirmed that § 1113 finds application within the context 
of both expired and unexpired CBAs (Collective Bargaining Agreements). 
1112
 In re Garofalo’s Finer Foods supra at 369. The court affirmed the approach of the earlier In re 
Walway Co., 69 B.R. 967(Bankr.E.D.Mich.1987); In re National Forge Co., 279 B.R. 493, 500 
(Bankr.D.Del. 2002).  
1113
 In re OLD HB, Inc. (f/k/a Hostess Brands, Inc.), et al., Case No. 12-22052 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan 11 
2012). 
1114
 The Bakery, Confectionary, Tobacco Workers and Grain Millers International Union hereinafter 
the ‘Baker’s union.’ 
1115
 However, its motion to reject the terms of its collective bargaining agreement with the second 
union, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, was denied with leave to amend the motion 
having being granted. 
1116
 The order was granted in terms of §§ 105, 363, 365 and 503(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
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The rejection of an existing collective bargaining agreement was a success in 
American Airlines
1117
 and resulted in the emergence of a merged entity. 
 Roukis and Charnov argue that even though the Bildisco decision has done 
very little to further promote labour peace or company survival, it has presented new 
opportunities for labour arbitration. They observe that there existed a fundamental 
conflict between the labour legislation and Bankruptcy Amendment Acts, with this 
conflict having been resolved in favour of management.
1118
 
Pulliam in turn observes that the court in Bildisco may be commended on the 
basis that it drew a line in relation to the progressive non-interpretive approach to the 
standard to be applied where a collective bargaining agreement is in question. He 
however criticises the judgment on the basis that the line was drawn in the wrong 
place and ignored an array of case authority which seemed, from an interpretive 
perspective, consistent with the language and structure of the scheme of 
bankruptcy.
1119
 The rejection of collective bargaining agreements, within strictly 
prescribed parameters, may serve to provide the debtor with necessary breathing 
space (and more importantly, liquidity) needed to enable it to sail out of insolvency. 
The treatment of dissenting creditors is discussed next. 
 
5.3.13. DISSENTING CREDITORS 
The Code allows for a ‘cram-down’ of an objecting class of creditors in certain 
instances. A class of creditors may be forced to go along with the plan despite 
rejection.
1120
  The applicable provision reads: 
       …(b) 
                (1) Notwithstanding section 510 (a) of this title, if all of the applicable requirements of 
subsection (a) of this section other than paragraph (8) are met with respect to a plan, the 
court, on request of the proponent of the plan, shall confirm the plan notwithstanding the 
requirement of such paragraph if the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and 





                                                     
1117
 In re AMR Corp., et al., Case No. 11-15463 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y, Nov. 29 2011). The debtor merged 
with U.S. Airways. 
1118
 Roukis & Charnov (1986) at 44. With applicable provisions being section 8(d) of the National 
Labour Relations Act Public Law No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (of 1935), as amended and 11 U.S.C § 
365(a).  
1119
 Pulliam (1984) at 31. 
1120
 Westbrook in Rajak (1993) at 362. 
1121
 My emphasis. § 1129(b)(1). The Code contemplates 16 requirements to be satisfied for the plan’s 
confirmation. Paragraph 8 of § 1129(a) requires, as a condition, that each class of impaired claims 
or interests must accept the plan. 
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Even though dissenting classes may be subject to a ‘cram-down’, they remain 
protected. The plan must treat similarly placed creditors comparably (the rule against 
unfair discrimination) and it must be fair and equitable.
1122
 The fair and equitable 
standard requires that the plan not impose an unreasonable risk on the secured creditor 
for potential plan failure.
1123
  
For dissenting secured creditors, an additional set of criteria finds application 
and contemplates one of three requirements. The plan may provide for a secured 
creditor to retain its security (with the debtor transferring or retaining the collateral) 
while allowing it to receive cash deferred payments.
1124
 The deferred cash payments 
must aggregate to at least the amount of the allowed secured claim and are required to 
have a present value equivalent to the collateral.
1125
 Collateral may be sold free of the 
security interest, with the security interest attaching to the proceeds of the sold 
collateral.
1126
 In the alternative, the plan may provide for an ‘indubitable equivalent’ 




5.3.14. EXIT AND DISCHARGE 
Once the plan has been confirmed, its provisions bind the following categories of 
persons: 
       …the debtor, any entity issuing securities under the plan, any entity acquiring property under the 
plan, and any creditor, equity holder or general partner in the debtor, whether or not the claim or 





In addition, the debtor company is discharged from its debts whether or not a 
creditor, equity or security holder or partner accepted the plan.
1129
 Discharge applies 
in respect of pre-petition creditor claims and includes claims which were either not 
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 § 1129(b)(1) & (2). 
1123
 § 1129(b)(2)(A). 
1124
 11 U.S.C § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i). 
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 § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i). In this regard § 1111(b)(2) may find application.  Benjamin Weintraub & Alan 
Resnick Bankruptcy Law Manual (3rd ed) (1992)    Warren, Gorham & Lamont: New York at 8-
138. 
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 11 U.S.C § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
1127
 11 U.S.C § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii). 
1128
 11 U.S.C § 1141(a). 
1129
 Unless otherwise stipulated, § 1141(a) & (c). Further exceptions to discharge are contained in § 
1141(d)(6). 
1130




A number of factors have been attributed to the perceived success of bankruptcy 
proceedings in practice. These have touched upon the Code’s theoretical 
underpinnings as well as the regime’s emphasis on practicality.  
The Bankruptcy Code does not require a company desiring to avail itself of 
the benefits of chapter 11 proceedings to be factually or commercially insolvent. It is 
sufficient for the company to have filed its petition in good faith and have a 
reorganisation purpose. With the procedure being substantively court oriented, the 
courts are often best positioned to determine whether the good faith requirement has 
been satisfied by a petitioner. A combination of the above permits a level of flexibility 
in terms of accessing the procedure. 
Once proceedings have commenced the debtor is able to derive the benefit of 
the application of a moratorium against claims. Directors and management of the 
company remain in control unless exceptional circumstances warrant the appointment 
of an examiner or trustee to displace management. It is for this reason that the regime 
is referred to as that of the debtor-in-possession.  
This approach has received justification on a number of bases including the 
view that management, having a deeper knowledge and understanding of business 
operations, is best placed to sail the company out of the perilous waters of financial 
difficulty (with the obvious benefit in the form of relief from creditor enforcement). A 
related observation is that unlike comparative jurisdictions, the Code does not contain 
specific provisions regulating wrongful conduct on the part of directors. Control over 
director conduct remains regulated by directors’ fiduciary duties, which are of 
common law origin. It has been argued that this approach provides an additional 
incentive for directors to access proceedings as soon as signs of distress appear, thus 
increasing the intervention’s chances of success. 
When the corporation enters bankruptcy, there is a shift in fiduciary duties 
from the duty of directors and managers to act in the best interests of the corporation 
(i.e. in the interests of its stockholders) to the debtor-in-possession’s duty to act in the 
interests of its creditors.
1131
 Upon bankruptcy, it is the creditors who replace 
shareholders as residual risk bearers.
1132
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 Florence Shu-Acquaye ‘American Corporate Law: Directors’ Fiduciary Duties and Liability 
During Solvency, Insolvency, and Bankruptcy in Public Corporations’ (2011) University of Puerto 
Rico Business Law Journal Vo 2(1) 1. The commentator observes that the Delaware Court of 
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The court-oriented procedure plays an important role in mediating between the 
interests of the debtor, in terms of ensuring a procedural environment conducive to 
company reorganisation, as well as those of its creditors. Bankruptcy courts therefore 
serve as an important mechanism for placing controls on potentially self-serving 
behaviour on the part of the debtor’s management.  
The procedure is characterised by an emphasis on creditor participation. This 
occurs through creditor committees (both official as well as unofficial),
1133
 the 
purpose of which is to ensure that the position of creditors is clearly articulated during 
proceedings. The views of creditor committees become an important consideration 
when plan confirmation is sought from the bankruptcy court. In addition to 
participation rights, the committee of creditors (or parties in interest) is entitled to all 
necessary information regarding the debtor. 
The existence of bankruptcy courts is highlighted as an aspect which has 
enhanced the efficiency of the procedure. It has been argued that specialised courts 
contribute to the creation of sophisticated centres of excellence where judges possess 
many years of experience, often having previously practiced as bankruptcy 
lawyers.
1134
 The inherently practical nature of proceedings and the proactive approach 
of bankruptcy courts have been observed as effective in addressing and adapting to 
often unpredictable economic circumstances. This has been evidenced in the 
procedure allowing multiple-tiered special purpose vehicles, which may have been 
designed to be theoretically bankruptcy-remote, to access proceedings, introduction of 
‘roll-ups’ to encourage pre-existing lenders to advance further lending to the debtor, 
sufficient flexibility for the company to pay certain vendors whose products or 
services are critical for the running of the company, pre-packaged deals, and 
permitting asset sales at an early stage provided that certain requirements are met.  
                                                                                                                                                        
Chancery has charted significant ground in this area of the law, having over 200 years of legal 
precedent as a maker of U.S. corporation law. See North American Catholic Education 
Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A. 2d 92 (Del. 2007). The court at 102-103 
opined that during insolvency, a creditor cannot bring a breach of fiduciary action to recover 
individually (i.e. directly) but that a derivative claim on behalf of the corporation could be brought 
in such case. Compare with earlier matters: Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland N.V. v. Pathe 
Commc’ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. 1991); Geyer v Ingersoll 
Publications Company 621 A.2d 784 (1992).  
1132
 Shu-Acquaye (2011) at 11 and 14. 
1133
 11 U.S.C § 1102(a)(1). The committee may further file a proposed plan of reorganisation once the 
exclusivity period has elapsed, see 11 U.S.C § 1121(c). 
1134
 Philip Mindlin Presentation to the Company Law Symposium organized  by The South African 
Department of Trade and Industry & The Specialist Committee on Company Law ( 1 March 2013) 
available at http://www.thedti.gov.za/business_regulation/presentations/symposium1of6.pdf.  
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Chapter 11 makes provision for super-priority ranking of post-petition 
financing. This mechanism is used to encourage lenders to advance finance to the 
debtor company with the confidence that their monies will be paid in priority to pre-
petition unsecured and secured creditors as well as post-petition administrative 
expenses. Should the debtor subsequently be liquidated, the superior ranking endures.  
Bankruptcy provides the debtor with the opportunity to propose a plan for the 
future of the company during the exclusivity period, to accept or reject executory 
contracts and to engage in the sale of company assets with or without the court’s 
approval (provided that certain requirements are met). The debtor is further permitted 
to negotiate outside of bankruptcy as evidenced through work-outs as well as pre-
packaged deals. Creditors may propose competing plans where the exclusivity period 
has expired without extension or where the plan has not been approved, which places 
pressure on the debtor to present a plan which results in a better outcome for creditors.  
Once the disclosure statement has received approval from the court and after 
considering any creditor objections to the adequacy of the disclosure statement, the 
plan is voted upon by creditors. Once adopted, it must be confirmed by court.
1135
  
Creditor ascendancy has received the attention of commentators who have 
observed its growth in bankruptcy. The market for distressed debt has been said to 
contribute to expedited proceedings, with lenders applying contractual mechanisms as 
corporate governance levers. The rise of bankruptcy investment allows for smaller 
creditors to sell their claims to experienced debt traders and avert the risk attendant 
upon participating in proceedings. 
The Code provides protection for creditors through the application of concepts 
such as ‘adequate protection’, ‘absolute priority’ and the ‘fair and equitable’ principle 
among others. Despite these, in exceptional circumstances, it permits a cram-down of 
dissenting classes and allows approval of the proposed plan by the courts even in the 
face of creditor rejection.  
Due to the development of case law and subsequent statutory amendments, 
employee bargaining agreements may be amended or rejected during chapter 11 
proceedings. This has resulted in a dilution of protection for employees but has been 
justified on the basis that the efficacy of a rescue intervention often requires a 
                                                     
1135
 As required by 11 U.S.C § 1128 &1129(a). The purpose of this exercise is for the court to verify 
that certain information which was necessary to enable creditors to make a decision on the plan, 
is/was in fact incorporated.  
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compromise on the part of each creditor in order to ensure business continuity. Some 
commentators have argued that corporate rehabilitation has been at the expense of 
hard won employee gains. Therefore, the treatment of employee creditors may be 
described as involving a ‘mixed bag of compromises’ between continued employment 
and continued survival of the entity.  
Provision is made for both pre and post-petition wage claims.  While pre-
petition claims are capped in respect of claim period and amount, post-petition wage 
claims are characterised as an administration expense and granted priority over 
general unsecured claims. Even though post-petition wage claims are granted this 
status, it may be of a lower ranking in relation to post-petition financing. This 
approach strikes an appropriate balance between the need to retain human capital for 
the continued operation of the company and much needed financial capital for the 
continued survival of the entity enabling it to achieve reorganisation.  
The advent of a plan’s confirmation and the discharge of debt present an 
opportunity for third party investors to acquire the business free of liability and 
onerous contractual obligations. This creates the necessary conditions for, at 
minimum, the survival of the business as a going concern. In addition, the Code 
provides for the reversal of certain transactions entered into which may have resulted 
in the debtor enduring undue financial hardship. 
Despite the strengths of the procedure, some of which have received 
discussion, a number of criticisms have been levelled and these are by no means 
exhaustive. It has been argued that the relative ease with which a debtor can access 
proceedings has resulted in ‘bankruptcy arbitrage’ or forum shopping where debtors 
file in particular jurisdictions specifically to derive outcomes which may not have 
materialised had they filed elsewhere.
1136
  
The court orientation of proceedings has contributed to the perceived 
expensiveness of proceedings, often characterised by the need for both financial 
advisors as well as lawyers who often charge exhorbitant fees. It has been observed 
by some that this factor has made bankruptcy inaccessible for smaller enterprises due 
to being financially prohibitory. The Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 
has highlighted the potentially prohibitory nature of bankruptcy proceedings for small 
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 See generally Omer Kimhi & Arno Doebert ‘Bankruptcy Law as a Balancing System: Lessons 
from a Comparative Analysis of the Intersections Between Labor and Bankruptcy Laws’ (2015) 23 
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 491.  
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to medium sized enterprises as one of the factors which have sparked the need to 
consider potential reform of the U.S. Bankruptcy system.
1137
 
Commentators such as Lubben have argued that fees in a bankruptcy are in 
fact determined by aspects such the complexity of the matter.
1138
 Even though 
legislative amendments in the form of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act have contributed to expedited proceedings by imposing 
limitations on the exclusivity period, some have argued that this has resulted in 
refilings due to the debtor not having been given sufficient time to engage in a proper 




5.4 UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW 
This part of the thesis proceeds to briefly consider international best practice models 
on corporate insolvency. Of particular relevance are the recommendations of the 
United Nations Commission on Internal Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in the form of the 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law
1140
, which may be accepted as an 
authoritative source on insolvency law and corporate rescue in the international law 
domain.   
Before delving into its content, it is appropriate to contextualise UNCITRAL 
as part of a broader organisational framework as well as to highlight methods 
employed by the Commission to influence legislative developments within the 
international terrain. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) was established on the 17 December 1966.
1141
  The purpose of the 
Commission is to facilitate both harmonisation and modernisation of international 
                                                     
1137
 American Bankruptcy Institute (2014) at 10 & 58. 
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 Foteini Teloni (2015) at 591. A related aspect observed has been the rise of § 363 asset sales. 
1140
 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (United Nations, 2005) available at 
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on 19 September 2016.  
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South Africa was listed as a UNCITRAL member State during 2004- 2013, 
this being squarely within the period in which the South African company law reform 
process commenced.
1143
 The commission employs the use of three forms of legislative 
texts consisting of conventions, legislative guides and model provisions.
1144
 In broad, 
the following distinctions may be observed in relation to these forms: The objective of 
a convention is to unify the law by creating binding legal obligations between 
participating States.
1145
 As a consequence, the law of the participating State is, at 
minimum, required to be consistent with the content of the adopted convention.
1146
  
A model law is a legal text recommended for enactment in an adopting State’s 
domestic law, providing sufficient flexibility for its adjustment in order to contend 
with domestic requirements which may vary between States.
1147
  Legislative guides 
provide an alternative where it is not always possible or convenient to draft uniform 
provisions in the form of a convention or model law. In this way, a legislative guide 
functions as a uniform text, the content of which proposes either a set of principles or 
legislative recommendations.
1148
  Legislative guides are often applied by governments 
as a standard by which they review the content or sufficiency of their existing 
legislation.
1149
 Having briefly discussed UNCITRAL and the international 
instruments applied to influence and uniformalise legislation (from an international 
perspective), I turn to an analysis of the relevant provisions of the Legislative Guide 
on Insolvency Law. 
In its introduction, the guide articulates the objective of an effective 
insolvency system in the following: 
       When a debtor is unable to pay its debts and other liabilities as they become due, most legal 
systems provide a mechanism to address the collective satisfaction of outstanding claims from 
assets (whether tangible or intangible) of the debtor. A range of interests needs to be 
accommodated by that mechanism: those of the parties affected by the proceedings including the 
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 UNCITRAL (2013) at 1. 
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 UNCITRAL (2013) at 13. 
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 UNCITRAL (2013) at 13. 
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debtor, the owners and management of the debtor, the creditors who may be secured to varying 
degrees (including tax agencies and other government creditors), employees, guarantors of debt 
and suppliers of goods and services, as well as the legal, commercial and social institutions and 
practices that are relevant to the design of insolvency law and required for its operation. 
Generally, the mechanism must strike a balance not only between the different interests of these 
stakeholders but also between  these interests and the relevant  social, political and other policy 





The guide provides a set of key objectives regarding the proposed structure for 
an efficient system of insolvency law.  These include the ability of the proceedings to 
maximise the value of assets in order to facilitate higher distributions for creditors and 
reduce the cost of insolvency while maintaining a balance between liquidation and 
reorganisation, treating similarly placed creditors equally, providing for timely and 
impartial resolution of insolvency, preserving the estate to enable equitable 




The ability of a regime to maximise the value of assets occurs through a 
framework which permits the setting aside or avoidance of pre-commencement 
transactions in certain circumstances in order to ensure equitable treatment between 
creditors.
1152
 The balance between liquidation and reorganisation entails an analysis 
of potential advantages to be derived from liquidation (which may accrue to secured 
and preferent shareholders) versus reorganisation (which may accrue to unsecured 
creditors).
1153
 Where reorganisation is viewed as desirable from a social policy 
perspective, it ought not to involuntarily reduce the proposed dividend for creditors to 
below an amount which they would have received in liquidation.
1154
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 UNCITRAL (2005) at 9. It is to be observed that in the glossary section, ‘Insolvency proceedings’ 
are defined as ‘collective proceedings, subject to court supervision, either for reorganization or 
liquidation’. The guide further acknowledges that even though it assumes the existence of court 
supervision throughout proceedings, such reliance ought to be taken as a general principle rather 
than as a prescriptive position. Within the guide’s context, proceedings include corporate/business 
rescue whether through a court oriented regime or not. Therefore in this part of the thesis, the word 
‘insolvency’ is a broad reference to describe a company’s inability to pay its debts where due and 
‘insolvency proceedings’ may include liquidation or business rescue. Further, references to 
‘insolvency law’ in this part are to be read as references to company law unless otherwise 
specifically stated, as our rescue regime resides in a company rather than an insolvency statute.   
1151
 UNCITRAL (2005) at 10-13. 
1152
 UNCITRAL (2005) at 10. It has been observed that both U.K. and U.S. insolvency procedures 
provide a framework for avoidance of certain pre-bankruptcy transactions.  
1153
 UNCITRAL (2005) at 11. 
1154
 UNCITRAL (2005) at 11.  
194 
 
Equal treatment of similarly placed creditors requires that creditors whose 
claims are in the same class should not be unfairly discriminated against.
1155
 Timely 
and impartial resolution of insolvency entails that proceedings are completed 
expeditiously so as not to disrupt the debtor’s business activities.
1156
 This ensures that 
the cost factor is minimised and entails distinguishing between viable and non-viable 




Recognising and enforcing certain pre-commencement rights that creditors 
have in relation to the debtor creates certainty in the market and enhances the latter’s 
ability to access further credit.
1158
  Due to the voluminous and comprehensive nature 
of the guide, for our purposes the discussion is limited to a discussion of the 
following: access to the procedure, the moratorium, post-commencement finance, pre-
existing (labour) contracts, transaction avoidance upon commencement, ranking of 
claims and post-adoption plan amendment.  
A commencement standard which is transparent, flexible and certain 
encourages access to the procedure.
1159
 This is qualified by the need for safeguards 
which ensure that the procedure is not used improperly by companies which are not in 
financial distress so as to benefit from the moratorium and aim to avoid or delay 
having to pay creditors.
1160
 This element is to be understood within the context of a 
properly functioning institutional framework with sufficient capacity to either 
adjudicate the insolvency process or regulate the manner in which some or all 
participants conduct themselves during proceedings.
1161
 
An automatic moratorium on enforcement action is considered essential for 
the preservation of property belonging to the insolvent estate, curtails the diminution 
of a debtor’s assets and allows for proper administration.
1162
 Post-commencement 
                                                     
1155
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 UNCITRAL (2005) at 13. 
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 UNCITRAL (2005) at 45. 
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such as the U.S.) or through vesting powers on a regulatory authority which monitors the process 
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 UNCITRAL (2005) at 83.  
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finance is essential to the success of any rescue intervention, especially where 
reorganisation is envisaged. In this way, access to liquid funds, whether in the form of 
cash, existing cash-flow or assets that can be converted into cash, becomes 
important.
1163
  Where the business does not have access to cash resources, it may have 
to seek this from third parties. Importantly, the guide acknowledges that financing 
may be through lenders or extension of trade credit by vendors.
1164
 While sourcing the 
requisite finance, the need to protect pre-existing secured interests is emphasised.
1165
 
It is observed that priority ranking is often based on socio-economic concerns 
which may be better dealt with outside of insolvency law.
1166
 The problem with 
factoring in such concerns is that the law dealing with the insolvency of a debtor 
provides an inadequate solution to social problems as its direct concern is the question 
of debt and the debtor’s financial situation.
1167
 Additionally, it may render an 
insolvency (rescue) regime less efficient.
1168
  
While highlighting concerns regarding a strong emphasis on social welfare 
objectives in insolvency, in relation to the treatment of employee claims, the guide 
provides an endorsement for differential treatment: 
       …In a number of cases [employee claims] rank higher than most other priority claims, 
specifically tax and social security claims, and in a few cases, as noted above, above secured 
claims. The approach of providing priority for workers’ claims is generally consistent with the 
special protection that is afforded to employees in other areas of insolvency law, as well as with 
the approach of international treaties on protection of workers. In some insolvency laws, the 
importance of maintaining continuity of employment in priority to other objectives of insolvency 
proceedings…is evidenced by a focus on the sale of the business as a going concern (with the 
transfer of existing employment obligations), as opposed to liquidation or reorganization where 




The guide suggests that employee claims may be ranked in a variety of ways; 
for instance, in priority to tax and social security claims or equally with such claims or 
(in some cases) above secured claims.
1170
 In other instances employees may be ranked 
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commencement finance provisions in Chapter 6 is the apparent limitation to monies extended by 
lenders (in addition to post-commencement outstanding remuneration claims). This seems to 
arbitrarily exclude vendors who may have extended a critical supply of trade credit of goods to the 
debtor.   
1165
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 UNCITRAL (2005) at 271. 
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Protection of Workers’ Claims (Employer’s Insolvency) Convention of 1992 (No. 173), Article 8. 
1170
 UNCITRAL (2005) at 272. 
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with ordinary concurrent claims (with or without a State guarantee or insurance fund 
settling a specified portion of the claim).
1171
 Where an insurance or guarantee fund 




Irrespective of treatment, the claim of employees is largely seen as an 
exception to criticism of ordinary priority claims whose objective is simply to 
advance socio-welfare objectives. There seems to be some international consensus 
that employees, whose pedigree of claim is ordinarily unsecured, cannot be treated in 
the same manner as other creditors holding a similar type of claim. It is only in 
relation to the extent of preference/ differential treatment where States largely differ. 
Contracts are an important part of economic reality, playing a role both in and 
outside the context of company insolvency. As a result, and in pursuance of the 
maximisation of the insolvent estate (whether through liquidation or reorganisation), 




An impending insolvency may provide an opportunity for the debtor to 
attempt to hide assets from its creditors or provide a preference to certain categories 
of creditors, which may be to the detriment of the general body.
1174
 This may occur 
through an actual disposal of assets or the incurring of obligations which result in 
encumbrance.
1175
 The substance of such transactions results in a reduction of the net 
worth of the debtor.
1176
 The benefits of a regime that permits avoidance of such 
transactions are thus stated: 
       … Provisions dealing with avoidance powers are designed to support these collective goals, 
ensuring that creditors receive a fair allocation of the insolvent debtor’s assets consistent with 
established priorities and preserving the integrity of the insolvency estate. Avoidance provisions 
may also have a deterrent effect, discouraging creditors from pursuing individual remedies in the 
period leading up to insolvency if they know that these may be reversed or their effects nullified 
on commencement. Transactions are typically made avoidable in insolvency to prevent fraud (e.g 
transactions designed to hide assets for the later benefit of the debtor or to benefit the officers, 
owners or directors of the debtor); to uphold the general enforcement of creditors’ rights; to 
ensure equitable treatment of all creditors by preventing favouritism where the debtor wishes to 
advantage certain creditors at the expense of the rest…
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In line with the benefits of a procedure that allows for the avoidance of certain 
transactions, the guide recommends that States must endeavour to achieve a balance 
between competing social benefits, in the form of an ability to maximise the value of 
an insolvent estate for collective creditor benefit, with the possible effect of such 
powers potentially undermining contractual predictability and commercial 
certainty.
1178
 It is for this reason that a regime must establish a set of objectively clear 
criteria for application of avoidance powers.
1179
  
The guide provides scope for the amendment of the plan after approval by 
creditors.
1180
 Such an approach incorporates flexibility, where an adopted plan is 
incapable of being implemented in its original form.
1181
 To facilitate expediency, 
proposed plans may be voted upon by creditors (or parties) whose rights are affected 
by the amendment rather than requiring a vote by the general body.
1182
 Alternatively, 
creditors who supported the original plan may be given an opportunity to accept or 
reject proposed amendments within a specified period once notice has been given.
1183
 




In relation to successful plan implementation (and the failure of same), the 
following is observed: 
       [Where the debtor defaults in performing in terms of the plan] Some insolvency laws provide that 
the court can terminate the plan and convert the proceedings to liquidation. Other laws provide 
that the plan will only be terminated in respect of the obligation breached (it otherwise remains 
valid). The creditor whose obligation is breached will not be bound by and will have its claim 
restored (in the event that it agreed to receive a lesser amount under the plan) to the full amount. 
In some cases, this will occur where the debtor has fallen significantly into arrears in the 




An alternative may be to deem proceedings to have come to an end, where 
creditors are permitted to freely pursue their claims against the debtor.
1186
 However, 
certain challenges may arise depending on the extent of the plan’s implementation 
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prior to the occurrence of breach.
1187
 Having briefly discussed the UNCITRAL model 
on insolvency law, a summary comparison of approaches in U.K., U.S. and South 
Africa follows. 
 
5.5 COMPARISON OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, UNITED STATES AND 
SOUTH AFRICAN APPROACHES 
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code’s chapter 11 is described as pro-debtor in its orientation in 
comparison to the U.K. administration procedure. Commentators have argued that the 
U.K. rescue regime- through the enactment of the Insolvency Act of 1986 and its 
amendment by the Enterprise Act 2002- has moved in the U.S. direction, placing 
emphasis on reorganisations rather than on the sale of company assets, which have in 
the past dominated English rescue discourse.  
Chapter 11 and the administration procedure cater for the preservation of the 
business as a going concern as a primary objective while permitting the achievement 
of alternative objectives.
1188
 A distinguishing feature with administration is that it is a 
gateway procedure to other mechanisms such as schemes of arrangements, company 
voluntary arrangements and pre-packs as opposed to the singular procedure as seen in 
the Bankruptcy Code or Companies Act of 2008.  
In terms of section 3(1)(c), the Insolvency Act mandates the realisation of 
property in order to make a distribution to secured or preferred creditors. This is in 
further contrast to the South African provisions, which make reference to the broader 
category of creditors and shareholders, without specific reference to the nature of 
security interest held. This is particularly relevant in light of the fact that our 
procedure allows for the weakening of real security interests without incorporating 
protective doctrines for real security holders in the form of ‘adequate protection’ as 
seen in the U.S. discourse. 
Administration requires that a debtor demonstrate a degree of insolvency as 
well as the potential benefits to be derived from recourse to proceedings in light of the 
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  This is not required by chapter 11. The Code contains a 
requirement of good faith in that the filing must not be for the purpose of frustrating 
creditors or for an improper purpose.  
Chapter 6 makes use of a test which is arguably more precise than that of its 
comparative counterparts. However, the current provisions have contributed to ‘bad 
faith’ filings where a debtor is either not financially distressed or does not possess 
reasonable prospects of success 
Administration effects a complete displacement of existing management upon 
sanction of appointment by the court and acceptance of the nomination by the 
administrator. The U.K. Insolvency Regulations provide a clear framework for an 
administrator’s qualifications as well as the criteria for appointment. This does not 
exist within the chapter 11 framework as the default position is that the existing 
management remains in control. The South African approach may be described as 
more of a co-operative/compromise model with ultimate control vesting in the 
appointed business rescue practitioner. In light of this factor, it is foreseeable that 
existing management will be reluctant to initiate proceedings where the signs of 
financial distress begin to appear.  
This may in a similar vein provide an explanation as to why both the South 
African regime and its U.K. counterpart contain wrongful/ reckless trading provisions 
which penalise directors for late filing. Apart from requiring that the proposed 
practitioner be a member in good standing with an accredited profession as well as not 
be disqualified to act as a director, the Act does not provide a concrete set of criteria 
regulating the qualifications, competencies and further requirements which should be 
satisfied prior to assuming appointment. 
An essential feature for success of proceedings is the application of a 
moratorium against claims. Its effect is to suspend legal and enforcement proceedings 
against the debtor company’s property. While this finds application in both U.K. and 
U.S., there are slight differences in relation to the degree of its application and 
exceptions to it. A clear example is that while chapter 11 does not bar criminal 
proceedings against the debtor during bankruptcy, these proceedings are barred by the 
moratorium during administration except where courts in the latter jurisdiction order 
the contrary. The U.S. approach contains listed exceptions to the moratorium’s 
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application, providing creditors with greater certainty regarding instances when it may 
be lifted. For the latter to occur, application must be made to court.  Within the U.K. 
context, in the absence of a court application, the administrator may consent to 
enforcement or legal process being commenced.   
The moratorium provision in our Act contain elements seen in both 
jurisdictions; vesting discretionary powers on both the courts and the rescue 
practitioner, while also providing a closed list of exceptions to the moratorium’s 
application.  A feature unique to our moratorium provisions reinforcing the concern 
raised regarding Chapter 6’s balancing of creditor interests is that despite the 
extension of the moratorium to include contractual arbitration proceedings by our 
courts, it is not clear whether this will include employee arbitrations if regard is had to 
relevant provisions of the Labour and Companies Acts. On the current wording of the 
relevant section, it is my view that employee arbitration proceedings may continue 
notwithstanding the application of the moratorium. 
The U.K. has historically sought to place the interests of a debtor company’s 
creditors at the forefront, resulting in a highly concentrated institutional creditor 
market with marked dominance of banks. A view has been advanced that this been 
diluted in favour of the broader benefit of unsecured creditors, post enactment of the 
Enterprise Act 2002.  By contrast, an observation has been made that U.S. 
bankruptcy, traditionally viewed as pro-debtor, has seen the ascendance of creditor 
power during proceedings through contractual leveraging mechanisms which have 
included the creative use of post-petition loans. It is expected that this trend will grow 
within the South African context as well.  
Both the U.K. and the U.S. make provision for the prioritisation of certain 
qualifying pre-commencement costs and expenses, whether secured or not. 
Administration permits a narrow range of pre-commencement costs and expenses to 
fall into the category of expenses of the administration. Chapter 11 caters for this 
aspect through critical vendor motions/necessity of payments doctrine.  
In respect of both the U.K. and U.S. jurisdictions, pre-commencement wage 
claims are delimited in terms of the time period within which employee creditors are 
entitled to preference. These are in addition capped in terms of the monetary value 
which may be claimed as preferent. Outstanding amounts which exceed the 
‘claimable time period’ or maximum amount are treated as ordinary concurrent 
claims. This approach ensures that there is a limit on financial value being extracted 
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from the company.  It is submitted that neither of the comparative jurisdictions 
discussed go as far as the South African approach in terms of the degree of pre-
commencement wage claim preference. In this way pre-commencement wage 
entitlements may well be paid in full in terms of the proposed plan (leaving little or 
nothing left for concurrent creditors), while post-commencement wages are payable in 




Related to the above point and from a statutory interpretation perspective, the 
following is observed:  Under the South African system, while post-commencement 
finance includes remuneration claims as well as funds advanced by a lender (termed 
‘financing’), the provision does not specifically include the monetary value of actual 
goods or services supplied by a supplier-creditor after proceedings.
1191
 On an ordinary 
grammatical interpretation, the possible effect of this is that a goods/services supplier 
creditor could well find that its post-commencement claim for goods services/supplied 
in fact ranks below a credit facility or money advancing lender, advancing finance 
instead of trading goods/services to the debtor. In short, the post-commencement 
finance provision of the Companies Act potentially excludes suppliers of 
goods/services which are not money or credit facilities from its ambit.  Such 




In relation to the voting on a proposal by an administrator or the debtor-in-
possession, both the U.K. and U.S. jurisdictions allow creditors to vote only to the 
extent to which their claims against the debtor are not paid in full (i.e. impaired). 
Therefore, the value of voting rights is determined by the level of impairment. This 
approach reflects a greater level of fairness in relation to creditors inter partes as a 
creditor participates in proceedings only to the extent that it is affected financially by 
the rescue intervention.  
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nature of costs incurred by an applicant in bringing business rescue proceedings. A possible 
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monetary value of goods or services advanced by suppliers, after commencement, whether or not 
they are financial institutions. 
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The U.S. Bankruptcy Code allows for the creation of super preferences during 
chapter 11 proceedings as well as the ‘priming’ of pre-existing liabilities in certain 
instances and these preferences subsist should the debtor be liquidated.  It has been 
argued that from an analysis of the U.K Insolvency Act provisions, administration 
provides a limited scope for super-priority preference. Where the debtor is ultimately 
liquidated, the rules of insolvency come into play in substitution to any preferences 
which may have prevailed in administration. Super-preferent ranking of claims in 
terms of the South African Companies Act resembles the American approach without 
similar controls for pre-existing creditors.  
Both the U.S. and U.K. regimes allow for the rejection of contracts by the 
administrator or debtor-in-possession. This power seems to have found extension 
within the U.S. context, where executory contracts have been found to include 
bargaining agreements. The Bankruptcy Code, through a structured process, allows 
for the amendment or rejection of existing employee bargaining agreements. This 
flexibility assists in facilitating the financial recovery of a debtor and is further 
reflective of a practical approach to the exigencies of commerce. The latter power is 
significant in light of the limitations imposed on cancellation and rejection of 
employee contracts specifically in the South African procedure. Chapter 6 permits this 
but through strictly defined parameters. It has further become accepted that even 
though business rescue practitioners may suspend or cancel contracts, this does not 
extend to the avoidance of various transactions. This is viewed as a significant 
limitation of the new regime when compared to its predecessor, judicial management. 
Chapter 11 provides for the cram-down of dissenting classes of creditors. 
This entails forcing of a vote in favour of the plan notwithstanding lack of support 
from a specific class of creditors. It is observed that such action may occur only 
through court sanction, provided that the court is satisfied that the fair and equitable 
standard has been complied with as well as compliance with the absolute priority rule. 
In contrast, the U.K. courts are vested with the power to substitute a vote of creditors.  
Our courts have affirmed that a ‘binding offer’ only binds the offeror. However, a 




Having engaged in a discussion of the approaches of comparative jurisdictions, it is 
observed that both contain important mechanisms capable of enhancing our own 
rescue regime. While applying different methods in resolving the same problem in 
certain respects, both have sought to incorporate protections for (i) the debtor vis-à-vis 
its creditors and vice versa as well (ii) creditors inter partes. In relation to the latter, 
this has summarily been observed in the manner in which both jurisdictions regulate 
the extent of participation rights, allocation and reallocation of claim rights as well the 
degree to which creditors are expected to make concessions for company survival. 
The manner in which some of these approaches may be incorporated into our own 




CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION  
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Guidelines for Corporate Law reform effectively set the tone for a significant 
departure from the previous company law regime.
1
 Part of this exercise entailed a 
paradigm shift in thinking of the purpose of the company as being primarily to further 
the interests of its shareholders as residual claimants.
2
 The nexus now includes the 
relationship between the company and creditors, employees, the state, the 
environment, consumers, suppliers and broader Black Economic Empowerment 
(BEE) initiatives.
3
 Without committing to one jurisprudential position (in the form of 
the traditional shareholder-oriented model, the enlightened or the pluralist approach) 
the DTi Guidelines affirm that equally important are economic factors. Whether this 




The South African regime fares fairly well when viewed in the light of 
instruments such as the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency law, this being 
an authoritative source on insolvency and corporate rescue law within the 
international domain.
5
 It would seem that having incorporated some of the approaches 
recommended in the Guide, South Africa has sought to take into account its unique 
economic and socio-economic circumstances. While the approach in Chapter 6 of the 
2008 Act complies with many recommendations made in the Legislative Guide in 
many respects, it deviates in certain respects. The differences between ours, 
comparative approaches in the United Kingdom and United States, in light of the 
Legislative Guide, have been explored in the previous chapter. 
                                                     
1
 In a brief but insightful analysis of the DTi’s Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform, Pippa Faul The 
Impact and origins of employee rights in chapter 6 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (LLM Thesis, 
UKZN, 2015) available online at 
https://researchspace.ukzn.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10413/12376/Faul_Phillippa_Mary_2015.pdf?sequ
ence=1&isAllowed=y (accessed on 1 October 2016) at 24 argues that that the current South African 
company law model has modified the enlightened shareholder model with the inclusion of pluralist 
elements in certain instances. 
2
 Department of Trade and Industry (2004) at 26. 
3
 Department of Trade and Industry (2004) at 10.  
4
 From a gloss of the policy framework outlined at 25 of the DTi’s Guidelines supra, it would seem 
that the enlightened shareholder approach may have, at least at this stage, been a guiding principle. It 
is at this juncture worth emphasising that central to the thesis, is the view that the manner in which 
stakeholder interests have been balanced, has for practical purposes subordinated the desire to 
achieve company financial recovery (as a primary goal) to prioritising socio-economic imperatives 
which lean towards a pluralist approach, with a weighting in favour of certain stakeholders. The 
Guide in certain parts seems to openly endorse the pluralist approach, albeit in limited form; see pp 
25-6. 
5




The introductory chapter put forward the view that the current business rescue 
provisions balance stakeholder interests in a manner that potentially negatively affects 
the objective of returning the company to a position of solvency as a primary 
objective. The reasons have summarily been attributed to (i) the definition of business 
rescue aggregating creditor welfare. In this way treating the general body of creditors 
as if they fall into the same class or grouping, as well as (ii) the regime’s narrow 
scope of practitioner’s fiduciary duties. Fiduciary duties are limited to the company 
rather than including the company’s creditors once rescue proceedings have 
commenced and (iii) employees, as a category of stakeholder, being granted 
significant protections in comparison to other unsecured creditors and, in certain 
instances, in preference to secured interests.  
 Acknowledging the expansive nature of the injunction in section 7(k) which 
requires providing for the efficient rescue of financially-ailing companies in a manner 
that strikes a balance between competing stakeholders interests, the thesis has sought 
to narrow its analysis to a critique of the manner in which the Act balances the diverse 
interests of the company’s creditors when it enters business rescue proceedings.  
Making the balance even more difficult to achieve from a legislative 
perspective is the often ‘high conflict’ environment of company insolvency, where 
creditors are in large part prevented from mitigating their losses by initiating 
enforcement proceedings against the debtor.
6
  In this regard, legislation often has to 
balance the need to (i) create a conducive environment which accommodates 
economic growth and encourages entrepreneurship, (ii) provide an opportunity for 
financial recovery for a company which has succumbed to financial hardship due to 
unforeseen economic circumstances (or internal factors) whilst still possessing good 
prospects of financial recovery, and (iii) take cognisance of these factors while 
providing a degree of protection  for pre-insolvency contractual promises but in a 
manner that does not result in the ultimate demise of the debtor. 
The differences in judicial approach by our courts in some of the case law 
evidences the difficulty and complexity of the injunction imposed by section 7 in light 
of section 128 of the Act. Courts are often required to adjudicate on a business rescue 
                                                     
6
 A critique or analysis into the manner in which creditor interests are balanced and (or) protected is no 
easy task. Citing Porter et al , with cautious approval, Brouwer (2006) at 9 captures the difficulties 
often faced when such task is undertaken: 
        ‘La Porta et al concede that measuring the strength of creditors’ rights is more complicated than 
measuring shareholders’ rights as the rights of some creditors must prevail at the expense of 
others...’     
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with limited information, where time is ‘of the essence’ for company survival.  To 
dismiss interpretive challenges often faced by our courts simply as being a result of 
poor legislative drafting is to fail to comprehend the often nuanced variables and 
interests at play during business rescue.
7
  
The thesis has posed the question whether is it the role of the corporation or 
government to fulfil socio-economic imperatives. An answer to this question is far 
from clear and not without controversy. However, it has been observed that the socio-
economic impact of corporations on surrounding communities justifies regulation. 
While the theory of the corporation informs us of different attributes with which we 
may wish to vest our own conception of company law, it does not inform us which 
theory or corporate model will work better within a South African society. In the light 
thereof, it has been argued that in seeking to balance interests within the context of 
company insolvency, the question of which stakeholder
8
 is most deserving of 
protection is one which must be considered.   
The view has been advanced that concessionary and stakeholder theories best 
account for the multifaceted nature of interests in the corporation and provide a 
framework for understanding the ethos underpinning the Companies Act of 2008. I 
have argued that shareholder theory fails to adequately account for the multi-faceted 
nature of interests mandated by the 2008 Act’s purpose provision and thus is unable 
to provide for a reconciliation of such interests. Conversely, I have put forward the 
view that stakeholder and concessionary theories are able to better illuminate the 
position adopted in the Act’s purpose and business rescue provisions. 
 In the introductory chapter it was observed that the new regime was 
precipitated by a number of company liquidations.
9
 This was viewed as a scathing 
affirmation of judicial management’s inefficiency as a company rescue mechanism. In 
order to track the pace of improvement since the enactment of our new company 




                                                     
7
 Further, the infusion of our company law with both Constitutional as well as socio economic 
imperatives has made the task that much more challenging.  
8
 The term ‘stakeholder’ has been observed to include the company’s suppliers, customers, employees, 
investors, the community, ethical pressure groups et cetera. It is non-exhaustive. See Chapter 1. 
9
 See discussion in Chapter 1. 
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6.2 RECENT LIQUIDATION STATISTICS 
Statistics released by Statistics South Africa for January 2015 indicate that liquidation 
figures overall increased by 6.5% (from 402 to 428) in the three months ending in 
January 2015 compared to the figures for January 2014.
10
 The percentage increase 
was largely due to a 7.7% rise in voluntary liquidations (with a recorded increase of 
one case in respect of compulsory liquidations).
11
  Positively, preliminary statistics 
released during this quarter reflected a downward trend in liquidations between 
















Figures for September 2016 reflected a 15.4% increase in liquidations overall 
when compared to September 2015 figures.
13
 The statistics, however, observed a 
decrease in liquidations in respect of businesses in community, social and personal 
service industries.
14
 A downward trend was further observed in relation to 
compulsory liquidations overall in the period January 2010 to December 2015.
15
   
The above figures may have been influenced by a variety of economically 
intervening factors whether in the form of financial collapse (or ripple effects thereof 
felt at a much later stage), a downturn in commodity prices or the effect of a 
                                                     
10
 Statistics South Africa Statistics of Liquidations and Insolvencies (preliminary) January 2015 
(expected release date March 2015) at 2. 
11
 Statistics South Africa (2015) at 2. 
12
 Statistics South Africa (2015) at 2. 
13
 Statistics South Africa Statistics of Liquidations and Insolvencies (preliminary) September 2016 
(expected release date 28 November 2016) at 2. 
14
 Statistics South Africa (2016) at 2. 
15
 Statistics South Africa (2016) at 5.  
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breakdown in labour relations and continuous strike action.
16
 A closer analysis of 
possible reasons behind the 2016 figures would require a comprehensive analysis and 
critique, unfortunately beyond the scope of this thesis. The statistics, however, 
provide a basis upon which business rescue statistics are to be analysed. 
The Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC) has published 
status reports on business rescue proceedings.
17
 From recent figures
18
, the following 
can be observed: From the year 2011 (when the business rescue procedure came into 
force) to period ending March 2016, the total number of business rescue proceedings 
formally commenced stands at 2148.
19
 This is in comparison to the total number of 
cases terminated at 1019, which is roughly 47% of the total number of cases 
commenced. From the latter figure, 197 of the cases terminated were followed by 
liquidation, while 319 cases were terminated through the filing of the CoR 125.2 
Form
20
.  There were 310 cases terminated through the filing of a CoR 125.3 Form
21
.  
 A further but brief explanation of the figures is important. I have advanced the 
view
22
 that a CoR 125.2 Form will be filed where an appointed practitioner concludes 
that there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the company is in financial 
distress (even if directors made averments alleging this while initiating the section 
129 resolution procedure or where an affected person commenced proceedings 
through the court application in terms of section 131). The CoR 125.3 ‘Substantial 
Implementation’ notice is filed where an adopted business rescue plan has been 
implemented in accordance with its terms and conditions.
23
  
A substantial implementation filing infers that business rescue proceedings 
have been successful, at least in the practitioner’s subjective view.
24
 This does not 
necessarily mean that a termination on this basis is as a result of the company having 
returned to a position of solvency. To amplify the point, the figure of 310 may include 
                                                     
16
 It is to be emphasised that this is not a closed list. 
17
 Department of Trade and Industry Status of Business Rescue Proceedings in South Africa (March 
2016) available at 
http://www.cipc.co.za/files/9614/6857/6141/Status_of_Business_Rescue_Proceedings_in_South_AF
rica_March_2016.pdf  [accessed on 31 October 2016]. 
18
 Year ending March 2016. 
19
 Department of Trade and Industry (2016) at para 2.   
20
 Filed where the practitioner concludes that there are no longer reasonable grounds to believe that the 
company is financially distressed. 
21
 Also known as a Notice of Substantial Implementation. 
22
 See discussion in Chapter 4. 
23
 See section 152(6) read with 154(1) & (2) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
24
 Section 132(2)(c)(ii). It is acknowledged that there are differing and conflicting views on the correct 
interpretation of this aspect. 
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entities where a wind down and piece-meal sale of assets (including a termination of 
employment contracts) was contemplated as part of the process of business rescue.
25
 
 Commencement data from CIPC indicates that overall, the largest number of 
business rescues which were commenced consisted of private companies at a figure of 
1354, followed by Close Corporations at 701 and Publicly traded companies at 83.
26
 
















From a statistical perspective, business rescue, at least at this stage, finds most 
application in small to medium sized entities.
28
 While the reasons therefor have not 
been comprehensively documented in the South African literature, a few inferences 
may be drawn. Popularity among small to medium sized businesses (i.e. private 
entities and close corporations) may be attributed to the perceived ability of the new 
regime to effect a restructure of a financially ailing company’s affairs. There are 
currently a number of challenges in terms of objectively determining the ‘bottom-line’ 
value of the new regime; specifically in terms of the extent to which companies are 
rescued in the primary sense (i.e. returned to a position of solvency). 
                                                     
25
 How this is in fact a ‘rescue’ remains unclear. This, it is submitted, is a possible reason why it has 
been challenging to quantify the bottom-line benefit of the new procedure on our economy as the 
wind-down and sale of company assets in a piecemeal fashion significantly resembles liquidation, 
albeit without similar protections for stakeholders. 
26
 Department of Trade and Industry (2016) at para 3. 
27
 Source: Department of Trade and Industry (2016) at para 3.  
28
 From figures provided by CIPC, a downward trend in public company filings is observable. While 
the total number of filings during 2011-12 years stood at 53, this number has significantly decreased 
to five between the years 2015-16. 
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It may further be the case that while the new business rescue regime permits 
easy access, its ability to facilitate a wind-down with the benefit of i) the company 
being able to retain a measure of goodwill, which may presumably be sold at a higher 
value during business rescue than in liquidation and ii) vaguely defined powers of 
recoupment on the part of the practitioner relative to those of a liquidator or the 
previous judicial manager, may make the procedure more attractive for wayward 
directors than liquidation.  
The statistics may further indicate the extent to which small to medium sized 
companies are vulnerable to negative economic circumstances, as well as an inability 
to negotiate with creditors without a protective mechanism in the form of a 
moratorium against the enforcement of claims. Conversely, the reduction in filings by 
public companies from 2011 to date may indicate the relative unattractiveness of the 
regime for public companies when regard is had to i) the effect that a publicised 
business rescue filing may have on a publicly-traded company’s share price especially 
in light of ii) greater negotiating power that public companies have (often due to a 
larger asset pool) in relation to their creditors and thus their ability to restructure 
outside of the rescue process. 
  The statistics are further significant because small to medium sized 
companies often have a broad pool of small to medium sized creditors who, due to 
their size, are often limited in terms of their ability to exercise creditor activism to 
same extent observed in relation to institutional creditors.
29
 This aspect renders the 
need to effectively and fairly balance competing stakeholder interests, when the 
process is commenced, more pertinent. 
6.3    PROPOSED REFORMS 
A number of shortcomings have been identified in respect of the new regime in 
previous chapters.
30
 This part recapitulates on these and explores the possibility of 
introducing reforms in relation to the following: (i) the aggregation of creditor 
                                                     
29
 This may be due to a creditor’s inability to access the most perfect information at the most perfect 
time (or an inability to maximise the value of information received even where the timing is 
opportune) or due to a lack of financial resources which enable creditor activism. 
30
 It is appreciated that there is a growing literature on proposed reforms in this area. The thesis has 
made recommendations throughout the business rescue chapter. The purpose of this chapter is to 
discuss specific recommendations which, it is hoped, will enhance our regime’s ability to better 
balance conflicting interests in an efficiency enhancing manner. Loubser (2010) has charted 
significant ground in her LLD thesis recommending reforms to the Companies Act. This work does 
not intend to repeat or critique the learned commentator’s recommendations. 
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welfare, (ii) weak administrative controls to accessing the procedure, (iii) bankruptcy 
courts as a mechanism for interest balancing, (iv) the scope of fiduciary duties 
imposed on the practitioner, (v) powers in relation to avoiding certain transactions, 
(vi) the protection of property interests, (vii) the treatment of pre and post-
commencement creditors, (viii) the rights accorded to employees in relation to other 
categories of creditors, (ix) voting on the proposed plan, (x) the termination of 
proceedings as well as the (xi) interplay between adoption of the proposed plan and 
(xii) discharge from debt. I now turn to discuss possible measures that may be taken 
in resolving each. 
6.3.1 AGGREGATION OF CREDITOR WELFARE 
It is appropriate to begin with the definition of ‘business rescue’ in section 128. It has 
been observed that the U.K. legislation provides specifically for three purposes, which 
envisage rescuing the company as a going concern or achieving a better result for  
creditors of the company as a whole than would be likely if the company were wound 
up (without first being in administration) or realising property in order to make a 
distribution to one or more secured or preferential creditors.  
While the U.K. provides for a grading of objectives, it grants sufficient 
discretion to an appointed administrator to determine which course to take. Equally 
important, where an administration envisages the second purpose, the procedure must 
ensure that creditors as a whole receive a result better than they would have received 
than in liquidation (and not simply a benefit to certain classes to the exclusion of 
others). Where a distribution is envisaged, it must be to the benefit of secured or 
preferential creditors. In this way the U.K. approach is clear as to which category of 
creditor should be the beneficiary of a proposed course of action. 
   I have argued that the South African approach aggregates creditor
31
 welfare in 
its definition, without specifically stipulating that, where the alternative purpose is 
envisaged, for which category of creditor proceedings are meant derive a ‘better 
return’.
32
 The current wording makes it possible for directors to initiate proceedings 
                                                     
31
 This may be illustrated as follows: A plan may propose that a (minority) creditor who is preferent in 
liquidation (e.g. The South African Revenue Service) receives nothing in terms of the rescue plan 
while a certain number of concurrent creditors receive a dividend in terms of the plan, even if the 
former would in this instance have been entitled to a dividend in liquidation. What happens in such 
instance? Can it not then be argued that the rescue initiative falls foul of the provisions of section 
128 because this category of creditor would clearly have received a better return? 
32
 Companies Act of 2008, section 128(1)(b)(iii). 
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only to have a piecemeal sale of company assets without similar protective 
mechanisms for creditors found in liquidation.
33
 
It is unclear why a better return for shareholders is an alternative to a better 
return for creditors as a group. Reference to ‘shareholders’ should be removed. The 
definition ought to cater either for the return of the company to a position of 
solvency
34
 or for the sale of a whole or part of its business to a third party in order to 
derive a better return for the company’s concurrent, preferred and secured creditors 
than in liquidation.
35
 The piecemeal sale of the company’s assets (and thus a ‘wind-
down’) in order to derive a better return to preferred and secured creditors ought to be 




Even more unclear is the confusing reference to the term ‘likelihood’ while 
both sections 129 and 131 make use of ‘reasonable prospect’ as the appropriate test. It 
has been observed that while the origins of ‘likelihood’ as a test may be traced back to 
section 457 of the Companies Act of 1973, the transplantation of this term into section 
128 of the new Act may result in unnecessary confusion. I recommend that the section 
be amended to read as follows
37
: 
 ‘business rescue’ means proceedings to facilitate the rehabilitation of a company that is financially 
distressed by providing for— 
(i) the temporary supervision of the company, and of the management of its affairs, 
business and property; 
(ii) a temporary moratorium on the rights of claimants against the company or in respect 
of property in its possession; and 
(iii) the development and implementation, if approved, of a plan to rescue the company 
by restructuring its affairs, business, property, debt and other liabilities, and equity in 
                                                     
33
 The proposed business rescue plan may envisage a sale of business or assets or both as opposed to 
returning the company to a position of solvency. 
34
 Financial revival through a restructure of its affairs, debt, business, property or equity.  
35
 Loubser (2010) makes a similar argument in her thesis at 332-333. She further argues for a 
secondary purpose of rescuing the business or a major part of it. It is my view that this is a better 
approach than the current wording and resonates with the observations made by Levenstein (2016) 
where, at 73, he observes as follows:  
‘… Business rescue, as its name suggests, recognises the value of the business entity as a going   
concern, rather than the entity itself. This is in line with the modern trend of international 
corporate rescue regimes, which places primary emphasis on saving the enterprise and the real 
business carried on by the juristic person, in whole or in part, rather than on the survival of the 
juristic person itself…’ 
36
 It is acknowledged that in liquidation, the business of the company may be sold to a third party. 
However, the sale of business may be construed as falling within ‘rescue’ as a concept and properly 
be catered for within the procedure without the degree of stigma ordinarily attaching to liquidation 
as the latter may be value diminishing (i.e. a negative effect on business’ goodwill). Where a ‘wind-
down’ of the company is envisaged, it is submitted that Insolvency Law contains better protective 
mechanisms for creditors. 
37




a manner that maximises the likelihood ensures a reasonable prospect of the 
company continuing in existence on a solvent basis or a sale of its business to a third 
party, including the transfer of its obligations where applicable, resulting in a better 
return for the company’s secured, preferent and concurrent creditors than would 
result from the immediate liquidation of the company. if it is not possible for the 
company to so continue in existence, results in a better return for the company’s 
creditors or shareholders than would result from the immediate liquidation of the 
company; 
 
6.3.2 WEAK ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 
In conjunction with recommended amendments to the definition of ‘business rescue’ 
it is proposed that administrative requirements for accessing the procedure be 
strengthened to require more than simply a board resolution and an affidavit for 
financial distress to be established. This could be in the form of inserting a provision 
which requires a company to submit audited financial statements to the 
Commission.
38
 The filing requirements finding application in chapter 11, which 
include a list of creditors as well as company assets and liabilities, may be a helpful 
starting point. It has been observed that the requirements for commencing 
proceedings by resolution are unduly lax in comparison to those applicable in a 
commencement through court procedure.
39
  
A further advantage of producing concrete financial information of the 
company is that it may help resolve information asymmetries between the company’s 
various stakeholders and enable those affected to take steps to protect their interests 
earlier in the process.
40
 It is recommended that the resolution procedure in section 129 
be amended to read as follows: 
 
 
                                                     
38
 In line with the Companies Act and depending on the size of the company. This course of action 
could both force the company to comply with the Act in relation to accounting records and financial 
statements, provide a greater degree of transparency for creditors earlier in the process and possibly 
minimise time spent by a rescue practitioner, thus reducing the cost of the intervention. Levenstein 
(2016) argues for the use of pre-assessments by a prospective practitioner in order to determine the 
prospects of success of a proposed business rescue before the procedure is commenced. 
39
 A related challenge is that of repeated filings permitted by section 129, especially within the context 
of prevailing weak administrative controls. It recommended that an embargo be imposed where 
within the immediately preceding twelve months, directors of the company initiated business rescue 
proceedings through board resolution or a compromise procedure in terms of section 155. In such 
instance affected persons should only be entitled to commence proceedings through the section 131 
court procedure. The court would be in a much better position to consider the facts and any objection 
that creditors may have. This approach would resemble the restrictions seen in para 23 of the 
Insolvency Act of 1986, albeit departing from its stricter counterpart in favour of flexibility. 
40
 Creditors would have access to more or less the same information much earlier in the process. See 




   129 Company resolution to begin business rescue proceedings 
     …. 
   (3)  Subject to subsection (4) Within five business days after a company has adopted and filed a 
resolution, as contemplated in subsection (1), or such longer time as the Commission, on 
application by the company, may allow, the company must— 
 (a) publish a notice of the resolution, and its effective date, in the prescribed manner to every 
affected person, including with the notice a sworn statement of the facts relevant to the grounds 
on which the board resolution was founded; and 
  (b) appoint a business rescue practitioner who satisfies the requirements of section 138, and who  
has consented in writing to accept the appointment. 
     (4) A resolution contemplated in subsections (1) & (3) must— 
       (a) be accompanied by a sworn statement of facts in the form of an affidavit; and 
       (b) include financial statements as contemplated in sections 28- 30 of the Act, where applicable 
and regulations 25, 27, 28  & 29 of the Companies Regulations 2011, where applicable 
(4) (5) After appointing a practitioner as required by subsection (3) (b), a company must— 
  (a) file a notice of the appointment of a practitioner within two business days after making the 
appointment; and 
  (b) publish a copy of the notice of appointment to each affected person within five business days 
after the notice was filed. 
(5) (6) If a company fails to comply with any provision of subsection (3) or (4)— 
  (a) its resolution to begin business rescue proceedings and place the company under supervision 
lapses and is a nullity; and The purported filing is legally invalid and of no force or effect; and 
  (b) The Commission shall be entitled to reject the filing on the basis of non-compliance with 
subsection (4)  
(b) the company may not file a further resolution contemplated in subsection (1) for a period of 
three months after the date on which the lapsed resolution was adopted, unless a court, on good 
cause shown on an ex parte application, approves the company filing a further resolution. 
(6) (7)  A company that has adopted a resolution contemplated in this section may not adopt a 
resolution to begin liquidation proceedings, unless the resolution has lapsed in terms of subsection 
(5), or until the business rescue proceedings have ended as determined in accordance with section 
132 (2). 
(7) (8) If the board of a company has reasonable grounds to believe that the company is financially 
distressed, but the board has not adopted a resolution contemplated in this section, the board must 
deliver a written notice to each affected person, setting out the criteria referred to in section 
128 (1) (f) that are applicable to the company, and its reasons for not adopting a resolution 
contemplated in this section. 
 
 
6.3.3 BANKRUPTCY COURTS AS A MECHANISM FOR INTEREST 
BALANCING 
A question that ought to be considered is whether bankruptcy (or business rescue) 
courts would serve to enhance the effectiveness of our rescue regime in light of (i) the 
distinction between chapter 11 and our Chapter 6 proceedings, (ii) the administrative 
and drafting weakness observed in our legislation and (iii) the perceived financially 
prohibitory nature of court- oriented proceedings.
41
  
There is currently an existing framework within the 2008 Act for the 
allocation of judges within the various district courts for the purpose of specifically 
                                                     
41
 A contrary argument can be made to the effect that a regime with a strong court orientation may in 
fact be better suited to providing a voice to smaller supplier-creditors who may not have the 
necessary funds to initiate and sustain a legal challenge on an issue they consider critical during 
commencement of proceedings. A court oriented procedure may in fact enable them to ‘piggy back’ 
while incurring significantly less cost. 
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adjudicating on business rescue matters.
42
 Factors that may be relevant to responding 
to the above are (i) capacity and cost constraints - availability of courts and re-
allocation of resources within our court system, (ii) the possible risk of judges 
making, rather than following the letter of the law in line with what the respective 
judge considers to be equitable
43
  - specifically a risk where the law is vague and (iii) 
the risk of judges vesting more rights to parties than those statutorily injuncted. In 
addition, the infancy of our own system as well as the size of the South African 
economy and market for debt trading, when compared to that of the United States, 
may militate against such route. 
Courts have been found to be helpful in resolving many of the practical 
challenges facing companies in distress within the U.S. context and have further been 
instrumental arbiters for what is in the interests of not only the debtor company but of 
its creditors as well.
44
  
In the light of the fact that many business rescue filings to date have largely 
been in relation to small and medium sized companies, the question of a court-
oriented bankruptcy system becomes even more pertinent. The Commission to Study 
the Reform of Chapter 11 observed that while larger corporations dominated the 
media, a significant number of Chapter 11 filings consisted of small to medium sized 
corporations.
45
 Concern was expressed regarding the perceived inefficiency of the 
bankruptcy process for these enterprises, particularly in relation costs and delays 
associated with the process.
46
 The bankruptcy process was viewed by some as simply 
to sell the debtor’s assets as a going concern in terms of a section 363 sale or to 
liquidate the company for the sole benefit of the secured lender.
47
  
                                                     
42
 Companies Act of 2008, section 128(3). 
43
 Possibly as a result of being ‘too invested’ in the matter, having dealt with the case from its 
inception.  
44
 In his thesis at 293, Levenstein (2016) observes factors at play when court involvement is 
contemplated in a rescue mechanism: 
            ‘The role of the courts internationally and the extent of their involvement in reorganisation 
and/or rescue matters is important and is a key rescue theme. Court process is often time 
consuming, costly and protracted. This serves to delay matters which can result in the loss in 
value of the business which is the target of the rescue. In addition, courts play a fundamental 
role in the jurisprudential development of the rescue process, even more so when the 
legislation is new and subject to interpretation. Furthermore courts are instrumental in 
providing the mechanism for the entry of a company into a rescue process…’ 
45
 American Bankruptcy Institute (2014) at 1. 
46
 American Bankruptcy Institute (2014) at 276 and references cited therein. The commission observed 
written submissions which indicated that from the perspective of output, small to medium enterprise 
revenues were found to surpass the US top 100 companies in terms of capitalisation and were 
equivalent to approximately 40% of the United States’ gross domestic product (GDP). 
47
 American Bankruptcy Institute (2014) at 277 see footnote 986 therein. 
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The introduction of business rescue courts may occur in two ways. The first 
could be to adopt a strictly court oriented regime similar to the U.S. A challenge here 
is that it could make the procedure slower as well as more expensive for affected 
parties due to fees which may be levied by lawyers in addition to other professionals. 
Commentators such as Lubben disagree that a court-oriented system is inherently 
expensive and argue that cost is driven by the complexity of a matter rather than by 
the process being court driven.
48
  
An alternative could be in diluted form, where a business rescue division of 
the court (through assigned judges) is established for the purpose of adjudicating on 
particular disputes in a manner similar to that of the Labour Court Division. It is my 
view that the latter approach is to be preferred and would serve to create expertise 
within our courts, enhance the procedure, enable expeditious resolution of disputes 




6.3.4 SCOPE OF PRACTITIONER FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
The business rescue practitioner is an essential component of the success of 
proceedings. From an analysis of the U.K. and U.S. jurisdictions, there is nothing to 
infer that an accounting-dominated--- as opposed to lawyer-dominated--- procedure is 
better suited to enhancing the efficacy and sustainability of rescues.  
 I have argued that the current articulation of the practitioner’s fiduciary duties 
has created challenges regarding actual or perceived bias on the part of practitioners. 
A fiduciary duty to the company and a statement to the effect that during rescue a 
practitioner is an officer of court, does not give a clear injunction to the appointed 
practitioner to act in the interests of the company in distress as well as in the interests 
of that company’s creditors. Fiduciary duties imposed on the practitioner in section 
140(3) should be expanded to include a fiduciary duty to the company’s creditors 
during proceedings.
50
 It is further suggested that the failure to act in the interests of 
                                                     
48
 Lubben op cit. 
49
 I have highlighted how the court oriented procedure in section 131 may be open to abuse in Chapter 
4, specifically in relation to the operation of an interim moratorium against claims. Such a system 
could include a mechanism for plan feasibility analysis to be conducted by the court in light of the 
often vague and poorly drafted plans observed in a number of business rescues. A contrary argument 
is that courts are not business experts and that the question of a plan’s feasibility should not be one 
for the court to decide 
50
 An expanded fiduciary duty framework creates an appropriate platform for mediating competing 
interests, and enables an analysis into (i) the question of which stakeholder is most deserving of 
protection (whilst equally cognisant of the company’s financial position) and (ii) how best to provide 
such protection.  
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the latter be a ground for removal in terms of section 139 rather than a basis for the 
practitioner’s personal liability articulated in section 140(3).
51
 I recommend that 
section 140(3) be amended as follows: 
   140 General powers and duties of practitioners 
      … 
(3)  During a company’s business rescue proceedings, the practitioner— 
(a) is an officer of the court, and must report to the court in accordance with any applicable 
rules of, or orders made by, the court; 
(b) must perform his/her functions in the interest of creditors as a whole; 
(b)(c) has the responsibilities, duties and liabilities of a director of the company, as set out in 
sections 75 to 77; and 
(c)(d) other than as contemplated in paragraph (b)(c)— 
(i) is not liable for any act or omission in good faith in the course of the exercise of the 
powers and performance of the functions of practitioner; but 
(ii) may be held liable in accordance with any relevant law for the consequences of any 
act or omission amounting to gross negligence in the exercise of the powers and 
performance of the functions of practitioner. 
(4)  If the business rescue process concludes with an order placing the company in liquidation, 
any person who has acted as practitioner during the business rescue process may not be appointed 
as liquidator of the company. 
 
 
6.3.5 POWERS IN RESPECT OF AVOIDING TRANSACTIONS 
While the practitioner is vested with certain powers in respect of transactions which 
fall foul of the provisions of section 141(1)(c), the manner in which these have been 
articulated in the Act has been lamented by our courts.
52
 It has been observed that 




Section 141(2)(c) ought to specifically state that in relation to voidable 
transactions, the business rescue practitioner shall be vested with the same powers of 
avoidance as an appointed liquidator acting in terms of the relevant provisions of the 
Insolvency Act.
54
 Such an approach will have the effect of removing any uncertainty 
caused by the current provisions thus enhancing the regime. It has been observed that 
both the administration and bankruptcy procedures expressly allow for transaction 
avoidance within parameters.  The reasons why such powers have been largely 
omitted in the new regime are unclear. I propose that the relevant provisions of 
section 141(2)(c) be amended as follows: 
 
                                                     
51
 It is submitted that to expand it further would unduly rupture the schema of the Act, thus fixing one 
problem only to create another. 
52
 See discussion in Chapter 4. 
53
 See discussion in Chapter 4. 
54
 The Act’s current reference to the practitioner ‘..tak[ing] any necessary steps to rectify the matter’ 
and the ability to ‘direct the management to take appropriate steps’ is vague and unhelpful. 
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   141.   Investigation of affairs of company 
     … 
 (2)  If, at any time during business rescue proceedings, the practitioner concludes that— 
  … 
(c) there is evidence, in the dealings of the company before the business rescue proceedings 
began,  of— 
                 (i) voidable transactions, or A the failure by the company or any director to perform any 
material  obligation relating to the company, the practitioner must take any necessary steps 
to rectify the matter and may direct the management to take appropriate steps; 
               (ii) Any disposition of its property which if made by an individual could for any reason be set 
aside in the event of his insolvency, may, if made by a company unable to pay its debts, be 
set aside by the Court at the suit of the business rescue practitioner in the event of the 
company being placed under business rescue, and the provisions of the law relating to 
insolvency shall mutatis mutandis apply in respect of any such disposition; 
         [Sub-para. (i) substituted by s. 91 of Act No. 3 of 2011.] 
              (iii)(ii) reckless trading, fraud or other contravention of any law relating to the company, the 
practitioner must— 
(aa) forward the evidence to the appropriate authority for further investigation and 
possible prosecution.; and 
(bb) direct the management to take any necessary steps to rectify the matter, including 
recovering  any misappropriated assets of the company. 
(2)  A court to which an application has been made in terms of subsection (2) (a) (ii) may make the 
order applied for, or any other order that the court considers appropriate in the circumstances. 
6.3.6   PROTECTION OF PROPERTY INTERESTS 
The protection of property interests is important in the schema of Chapter 6.
55
 While 
the Act delimits the circumstances under which property belonging to the debtor 
company may be disposed
56
, it grants a business rescue practitioner the power to 
dispose of any property over which a third party has a security or title interest.
57
 On a 
closer reading, it would seem that the Act permits a disposal even if it is not pursuant 
to an adopted business rescue plan and irrespective of whether a holder of the title or 
security interests consents to it.
58
 It is sufficient if the practitioner ‘promptly’ pays the 
third party security holder for the interest.
59
 An argument may be mounted to the 
effect that the provision permits arbitrary deprivation of property.
60
   
The section should be amended for consent to be a prerequisite for the 
disposal.
61
 In order to ensure that proceedings are not unduly hampered by a 
                                                     
55
 More so in light of the regime’s incursion on the ability of creditors to proceed to collect the debt 
owed to them. 
56
 Companies Act of 2008, section 134(1) & (2). 
57
 Companies Act of 2008, section 134(3). 
58
 Companies Act of 2008, section 134(1) which permits the sale of property in the ordinary course of 
business or in a bona fide transaction for fair value approved in advance and in writing by the 
practitioner. 
59
 Companies Act of 2008, section 134(3). 
60
 Act 108 of 1996, section 25. Even if implemented through a law of general application in the form of 
the Companies Act of 2008. 
61
 The current wording further applies the inexact term ‘promptly’ which may further compound 
potential prejudice to a security holder. 
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belligerent security or interest holder, the latter should not ‘unreasonably’ withhold its 
consent. I recommend that the relevant section be amended to read as follows: 
   134 Protection of property interests 
     … 
(3)  If, during a company’s business rescue proceedings, the company wishes to dispose of any 
property over which another person has any security or title interest, the company must— 
(a) obtain the prior consent of that other person, unless the proceeds of the disposal would be 
sufficient to fully discharge the indebtedness protected by that person’s security or title 
interest; and 
(b) promptly within a period of 10 business days after the disposal— 
(i) pay to that other person the sale proceeds attributable to that property up to the 
amount of the company’s indebtedness to that other person; or 
(ii) provide security for the amount of those proceeds, to the reasonable satisfaction of 
that other person. 
(4)  The interest or security holder may not unreasonably withhold consent in terms of subsection 
(3)(a), having regard to— 
(a) the purposes of this Chapter; 
(b) the circumstances of the company; and 
(c) the nature of the property, and the rights claimed in respect of it. 
(5) The business rescue practitioner or an affected person shall be entitled to approach the court for 
the purpose of authorising the disposal of property subject to such security or title interests. 
 
 
6.3.7 TREATMENT OF PRE AND POST-COMMENCEMENT CREDITORS  
An aspect that has received much attention is the treatment of creditor claims. It has 
been observed that the Act does not provide specific protection for unsecured 
creditors who may have provided goods or services within a specific period 
immediately prior to the commencement of proceedings. This category of creditor, 
despite having provided goods or services which may be critical to the business of the 
company, remains at the mercy of the business practitioner (and hence the plan) 
where it does not have any form of security over the debtor’s assets in the form of a 
cession of book debts, notarial or mortgage bond. This is even more pertinent where 
the creditor is a provider of specialised goods or services or where the debtor 
company is its largest client. 
Supplies made to the debtor within a specific time period before proceedings 
should be given some form of preference in terms of payability.
62
 In this way, a 
limited preference for vendors who supply goods or services within a specific time 
period preceding business rescue proceedings (with a cap on the value of preference 
                                                     
62
 This could mitigate the prospect of a ripple effect where the financial distress of a debtor results in 
the financial distress of its creditor due to a dividend proposed in terms the rescue plan not being 
sufficient to ensure the liquidity of the latter or the honouring of debt to its own creditors. 
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accorded to this category) could be explored.
63
 The U.S. critical vendor doctrine or 
the U.K. expenses of the administration may be a good starting point.
64
 To 
recapitulate, the critical vendor doctrine permits the payment of certain pre-
commencement claims upon motion by the debtor-in-possession while the U.K. 
expenses of the administration allows for the prioritisation of certain specified pre-
administration costs and expenses.   
This may, in conjunction with the above proposal, include a monetary or time 
period) cap on pre-commencement outstanding wage claims which are currently 
provided preference for their full value. In this way, supplier creditors whose claims 
fall within the relevant time period and amount are granted automatic preference in 
respect of the qualifying amount rather than the current approach which grants pre-
commencement preference to employees for outstanding wages.
65
 I recommend that a 
clause be incorporated to read as follows: 
    Limited preference for suppliers of goods or services immediately preceding business rescue   
proceedings 
(1) Where an independent creditor who is not an employee of the company provides goods or 
services within a period of 10 days before; 
(a) The adoption and filing of a company resolution commencing proceedings as 
contemplated in section 129; or  
(b) The issuing of an application by the High Court Registrar as contemplated section 131, 
provided that such application is confirmed by an order commencing proceedings; 
 
Provided that such independent creditor has not received any form of security for goods or services 
supplied and delivered, it shall be entitled to a limited preference on its claim for supplies made 
within the period in subsection (1) not exceeding a monetary value gazetted and published from 
time to time by the Minister of Trade and Industry. Such limited preference shall rank in priority to 
any concurrent claim and shall be due and payable at any time prior to the publication and voting 
on the proposed rescue plan as contemplated in sections 150, 151 & 152. 
 
This however leads to the broader challenge with the Act; a failure to stipulate 
how preferent claims are to be treated in terms of the proposed business rescue plan. 
The order of preference applicable in terms of the plan is largely left to the 
practitioner’s discretion in terms of section 150(2)(b)(v). The Act also makes various 
references to insolvency law. Section 150(2)(a)(iii)  requires the proposed plan to 
provide an indication of which creditors would qualify as secured and statutorily 
                                                     
63
 Here the cap may relate to time period (e.g. supplies made within ten business days of the relevant 
documentation having been filed as CIPC or before the section 131 application is issued by the High 
Court Registrar, provided that proceedings receive court sanction) or monetary value (e.g. to a 
maximum value of R12 000) or both. 
64
 A doctrine similar to that of the critical vendor or the granting of equitable powers to our courts 
would work best with a court-oriented procedure.  
65
 Which are not capped in terms of time period or monetary value.  
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preferent in terms of insolvency.
66
 The proposed plan must further illustrate (1) the 
probable dividend that would have been received in liquidation
67
 and (2) the benefits 
of adopting the plan in comparison to a probable position in liquidation.
68
 The binding 
offer provisions in section 153(1)(b)(iii) make a similar reference.
69
 
It is therefore not clear whether a pre-commencement creditor ranking as 
preferent is to be paid in full before payment of concurrent creditors or whether it may 
like any other creditor be subject to a compromise in terms of the proposed plan, 
without reference to its preferent status.
70
 Only pre-commencement employee 
remuneration claims on the current wording seem to fall within this category.
71
 
Section 136(1)(a) stipulating that, upon commencement, employees continue to be 
employed on the same terms does not seem to be of much assistance in interpreting 
the treatment of preference. However, such preferent creditor (including a secured 
creditor) may advance the argument that, in terms of the definition of ‘business 
rescue’, it would have derived a higher return in liquidation and that as such the value 
of its proposed dividend may not be less than a dividend receivable in liquidation.
72
 It 
is recommended that the Act be amended to clarify this aspect (i.e. the extent to which 
such category of claim may be compromised in terms of the plan). References to 





6.3.8 RIGHTS ACCORDED TO EMPLOYEES 
The regime may be lauded on the basis that it limits forum shopping on the part of 
directors/ managers in relation to relieving themselves of employee responsibility.
74
 
For instance, even though liquidation may relieve the company of certain obligations, 
                                                     
66
 Companies Act of 2008, section 150(2)(a)(ii). The provision has been rendered largely irrelevant in 
light of Commissioner of South African Revenue Services v Beginsel NO and Others (15080/12) 
[2012] ZAWCHC 194; 2013 (1) SA 307 (WCC) (31 October 2012). 
67
 Section 150(2)(a)(iii). 
68
 Companies Act of 2008, section 150(2)(b)(vi). 
69
 See further section 153(7)(c) stipulating factors to which the court may have regard in setting aside a 
dissenting vote. 
70
 See section 150(2)(b)(v).  
71
 Companies Act of 2008, section 144(2). 
72
 In terms of section 128(1)(b)(iii). However, see concern raised regarding the Act’s aggregation of 
creditor welfare and the example of a creditor such as SARS above. 
73
 This is especially more so in light of the difficulty faced in relation to accurately quantifying the 
probable value of a liquidation dividend before lodgement of a final liquidation and distribution 
account to the Master. This factor makes the exercise somewhat speculative and open to abuse. 
74
 John Armour and Simon Deakin ‘Insolvency and employment protection: the mixed effects of the 
Acquired Rights Directive’ (2003) 22 International Review of Law and Economics 443. 
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being in liquidation may impose significant costs on both viability and overall 
profitability. In this way the costs of initiating business rescue for managers and 
directors may be less in comparison to the costs of being in liquidation, especially 
when weighed against potential benefits of recourse to each.   
However, the current provisions present a real risk of legislative arbitrage for 
employees as creditors in business rescue rather than in insolvency.  This is due to the 
strength and ranking of employees’ claims within business rescue proceedings in 
comparison to a ranking in liquidation.
75
 It is recommended that ranking of claims in 
terms of section 135 be set out as follows and in descending order: (i) costs of 
business rescue, (ii) practitioner remuneration, (iii) pre-commencement secured 
claims, (iv) capped pre-commencement preference for certain categories of creditors 
as recommended above, (v) post-commencement remuneration entitlements, (vi) post-
commencement secured and unsecured claims and (vii) pre-commencement 
concurrent claims subject to the practitioner’s proposals. I recommend that ‘post-
commencement finance/ing’ be defined as follows: 
      ‘Post-commencement finance’ means the value of money, whether cash or otherwise, advanced 
by a lender or financial institution to the company after commencement of proceedings. This shall 
include the provision of goods or services on credit made by a supplier during this period.  
 
Section 135 should be amended to read as follows: 
     135 Post-commencement finance 
(1)  To the extent that any remuneration, reimbursement for expenses or other amount of 
money relating to employment becomes due and payable by a company to an employee during 
the company’s business rescue proceedings, but is not paid to the employee— 
                     (a) the money is regarded to be post-commencement financing; and 
(b) will be paid in the order of preference set out in subsection (3) (a). 
(2)  During its business rescue proceedings, the company may obtain financing other than as 
contemplated is subsection (1), and any such financing— 
(a) may be secured to the lender by utilising any asset of the company to the extent that it 
is not otherwise encumbered; and 
(b) will be paid in the order of preference set out in subsection (3)(b) (c). 
(3)  After payment of the practitioner’s remuneration and expenses referred to in section 143, 
and other claims arising out of the costs of the business rescue proceedings, all claims 
contemplated— 
(a) in subsection (1) will be treated equally, but will rank below- 
    (i) Pre-commencement secured claims; 
   (ii) limited pre-commencement preferent claims for the supply of goods or services 
immediately preceding commencement of proceedings as contemplated in this 
Chapter; 
(a) (b) Notwithstanding the ranking in paragraph (3)(a) claims in in subsection (1) will be 
treated equally, but will have preference over— 
   (i) all claims contemplated in subsection (2), irrespective of whether or not they are 
secured; and 
(ii) all unsecured claims against the company; or 
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 See discussion in Chapter 4. 
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(b) (c) claims in subsection (2) will have preference in the order in which they were incurred 
over all pre commencement unsecured concurrent claims against the company. 
(4)  If business rescue proceedings are superseded by a liquidation order, the preference 
conferred in terms of this section will remain in force, except to the extent of any claims 
arising out of the costs of liquidation. 
 
It is recommended that a concept similar to ‘adequate protection’ in the U.S. 
be incorporated into our Act. Within the context of our regime this could be 
interpreted to mean that before any further encumbrance of a secured creditor’s 
interest in order to obtain additional finance, there must be a sufficient ‘cushion’ to 
ensure that an existing interest is not diluted and its value diminished. In this way it is 
suggested, for example, that a debtor be permitted to further encumber an already 
existing secured interest only where the existing creditor is ‘over secured’ in relation 
to the debt owed.
76
 This will ensure that where company property is to be further 
encumbered to procure much needed finance, pre-commencement security interests 
are not unduly diminished without consent or effective protective mechanisms in the 
Act. If the company is not able to provide this protection when seeking to obtain 
critical finance, it is submitted that, in line with the practitioner’s duty to continuously 
investigate the company’s prospects in terms of section 141(2), proceedings terminate 
and the company be liquidated. This will act as an important safety mechanism in 
light of the crystalising effect of section 135(4).  
In the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, adequate protection seeks to ensure that pre-
existing contractual security interests are protected. This may occur by requiring the 
debtor to provide some form of equity cushion; where the value of existing collateral 
is at a certain percentage in relation to debt (for instance, such as a collateral-to-debt 
ratio of 150%) or through the debtor ensuring that an ‘indubitable equivalent’ of the 
creditor’s interest in the property is in place.
77
  
It may be tempting to recommend that (in a manner similar to the treatment of 
pre-bankruptcy bargaining contracts in terms of the U.S. chapter 11 procedure) the 
amendment of employee-bargaining agreements be expressly sanctioned during 
commencement of the procedure. It has been observed that in terms of section 136, an 
employee’s contract of employment (as a default position) remains intact. Where a 
retrenchment is contemplated, it must comply with the provisions of sections 189 and 
                                                     
76
 This may occur where the property over which a creditor has security for its claims appreciates in 
value beyond the amount owed to it by its debtor. 
77
 These are by no means the only way in which adequate protection may be created for an existing 
debtor. See 11 U.S.C § 361 and discussion in Chapter 5. 
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189A of the Labour Relations Act.
78
 The Labour Relations Act contains important 
parameters for labour contract rejection.
79
  
An employer contemplating retrenchments must ensure that its engagement 
with employees is both procedurally and substantively fair. It is important for the 
Companies Act to clarify whether or not employee related arbitration proceedings (as 
opposed to purely contractual arbitrations) are subject to the moratorium in terms of 
section 133.
80
 In light of section 210 of the Labour Relations Act read with sections 5 
and 136 of the new Companies Act, it is unlikely that such proceedings are barred. 
 
6.3.9 VOTING ON THE PROPOSED PLAN 
An aspect that has received attention in both the analysis of business rescue and 
chapters discussing comparative law is the difference in approach, adopted in relation 
to the manner in which a creditor’s voting percentage is determined. In light of the 
discussion in the previous chapter, it is unclear why creditors whose claims have been 
submitted are entitled to vote on the full value of their claim (without regard to the 
extent of any security held for such claim).
81
  
The current approach may be justified on the basis that the South African post-
commencement financing provision has a significant (and potentially diminishing) 
effect on existing security interests without attendant protections seen in jurisdictions 
such as the U.S. in the form of adequate protection. This aspect has been compounded 
by the manner in which section 135 has been interpreted by the courts.
82
 It would 
seem that the current approach compensates a secured creditor for the risk of having 
its security potentially diluted, by providing it with greater participatory power 
through voting. 
The danger with this approach is that it may, in certain circumstances, make 
the right subject to abuse, where a limited number of secured creditors ‘high-jack’ 
proceedings without their security legitimately being at risk. The incorporation of 
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 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
79
 It would seem that as long as a practitioner complies with due process as envisaged in the Labour 
Relations Act (s 189A), the termination of an employment contracts need not only occur in terms of a 
proposed business rescue plan and may in fact precede plan publication. See Solidarity Obo BD 
Fourie & Others v Vanchem Vanadium Products (Pty) Ltd and Others supra (obiter) at para 35. 
80
 The dispute resolution and arbitration processes may take a considerable amount of time, which the 
financially ailing company cannot afford, considering its circumstances. 
81
 A related matter is the confusing manner in which section 145(4) has been drafted and particularly its 
reference to a ‘concurrent creditor who would have been subordinated in a liquidation’ when 
determining the value of a voting interest.  
82
 See Chapter 4. 
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doctrines such as adequate protection (recommended above) and amending a creditor 
vote to reflect only the deficiency between its claim and any security held for the 
purpose of calculating a voting interest, may serve as an important buffer between the 
ordinary concurrent creditors viz-a-viz their secured counterparts. In addition, 
recommendations made in relation to section 135 of the Act have proposed 
protections for pre-commencement secured creditors which will (if adopted) render 
the current approach to voting interests unnecessary. I recommend that section 145(4) 
be amended to read as follows:  
       145 Participation by creditors 
          … 
(4)  In respect of any decision contemplated in this Chapter that requires the support of the 
holders of creditors’ voting interests— 
(a) a secured or unsecured creditor has a voting interest equal to the value of the amount 
owed to such creditor by the company, taking into account any security interest held by 
it over the existing debt. Such creditor shall be entitled to vote on a proposed business 
rescue plan to the extent that there is a deficiency between its security interest and the 
full amount owed to that creditor by the company; and 
(b) a concurrent creditor who would be subordinated in a liquidation has a voting interest, 
as independently and expertly appraised and valued at the request of the practitioner, 
equal to the amount, if any, that the creditor could reasonably expect to receive in such 
a liquidation of the company. 
 
 
6.3.10 TERMINATION OF PROCEEDINGS  
A provision enabling the setting aside of the resolution and terminating proceedings
83
 
on the basis of material non-(or mal) performance
84
 of the terms of the adopted 
business rescue plan may go a long way in strengthening the rights of affected 
persons during proceedings. The courts have provided scope for affected persons to 
challenge the manner in which a practitioner is implementing an adopted plan but 
have repeatedly held that, once a plan has been adopted by creditors, there is virtually 
no scope or clear direction for an application to be made by a  creditor for the 
resolution to be set-aside and proceedings terminated.
85
 The potential effects have 
been discussed at length in Chapter 4. A clause providing for an affected person to 
apply for termination of proceedings specifically where substantial/material breach of 
the business rescue plan has occurred could incorporate a much-needed level of 
accountability. It is recommended that section 130(1) be amended as follows: 
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 A deemed termination or at minimum a lifting of the moratorium against legal proceedings once 
notice and an opportunity to remedy has been provided to the debtor to remedy the breach. Such a 
provision would, however, have to be given careful attention when drafting. 
84
 Or substantive non-performance. 
85
 See discussion in Chapter 4. 
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   130 Objections to company resolution commencement of proceedings 
      (1)  Subject to subsection (2), at any time after the adoption of a resolution in terms of section 129,   
until prior to the filing of a notice of termination of business rescue proceedings to the 
Commission in terms of section 132(2)(b) or (c),the adoption of a business rescue plan in terms 
of section 152, an affected person may apply to a court for an order— 
(a) setting aside the resolution, on the grounds that— 
(i) there is no reasonable basis for believing that the company is financially distressed; 
(ii) there is no reasonable prospect for rescuing the company; 
(iii) The company has breached  a material provision of the adopted business rescue plan 
and has despite receiving notice, failed to remedy or provide an undertaking to 
remedy the breach; or 





To circumvent creditors who may be unduly aggressive in their approach by 
deliberately seeking to have the company liquidated despite its recovery potential, it is 
recommended that a clause that allows for post- adoption plan amendment (within 
limitations) be incorporated into the Act. This is important in light of the fact that the 
Act does not have a framework for post- adoption plan amendments (currently finding 
application in industry).  
Post-adoption plan amendment often occurs where the plan, due to a change in 
circumstances
87
, cannot be performed in its original adopted form. This approach 
could resolve the lacuna that currently exists. I recommend that the provision reads as 
follows: 
     Modification of business rescue plan after adoption 
(1) The business rescue practitioner shall be entitled to amend an adopted business rescue 
plan where in his/her view, circumstances prevent the full implementation of the rescue 
plan in its original form subject to subsection (2); 
(2) The practitioner shall not propose to amend an adopted rescue plan more than once. 
Where an amendment to an adopted plan is contemplated, such amendment must— 
(a) Be reasonably necessary for the full implementation of the initially adopted rescue 
plan; 
(b) Include a notice to creditors indicating the proposed revisions with a notice of the 
meeting sent to each creditor and any other holders of a security interest as if the 
meeting is one contemplated in section 151; 
(3) In addition to subsection (2), the original plan must— 
(a) not have been substantially implemented; 
(b) be presented with proposed amendments incorporated to be voted upon by creditors, 
to the extent that individual creditor claims have not been paid in full, as if the 
meeting to consider the proposed amendments is in terms of sections 150 and 151. 
(4) The provisions of sections 151, 152 & 153 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the meeting 
contemplated in sub-section (2).  
 
 
                                                     
86
 A few factors may, however, have to be considered. While post-commencement finance contracts 
may be binding on the company once entered into, the possible effect of such an approach on the 
binding agreement of an already adopted plan would have to be considered, especially where the 
remedy sought entails a simple termination of proceedings without the company being placed under 
liquidation, particularly where the company is yet in financial distress. 
87
 Or certain assumptions upon which the adopted plan was contingent, not being met. 
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6.3.11 DISCHARGE FROM DEBT 
Section 154(1) requires that a creditor accede (through the proposed plan) to a 
discharge of the whole or part of debt owing to it. However, section 152(4) provides 
that if the requisite majority of creditors voting in favour of the plan requirement has 
been satisfied, it is effectively binding whether or not a particular creditor was present 
or voted against it. The latter provision effectively renders the requirement of specific 
assent legally superfluous, creating unnecessary uncertainty. To remove any 
uncertainties and resolve some of the potential areas for abuse identified in Chapter 4, 
I recommend that ‘Substantial Implementation’ either be defined or alternatively, 
references to it be removed in favour of a requirement of ‘full implementation’
88
. 
 In the light of the recommendation relating to the post-adoption plan 
amendment and the practitioner’s continuing duty to investigate the company’s affairs 
for reasonable prospect of the rescue initiative succeeding, there is no reason why a 
new requirement of ‘full implementation’ would be unreasonable in the 
circumstances. It is my view further that this approach is consistent with the reference 






6.4   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The impetus behind business rescue as a regime has been much discussed and need 
not be repeated.  From a legislative perspective, there has been an incremental and 
positive shift from the need to create a regime solely to protect ‘institution[s] which 
helps the country’ to one containing multiple purposes underpinned by our 
Constitution and a rescue regime accessible to companies. While challenges in 
identifying the ‘bottom-line’ value of the new regime for the economy have been 
highlighted
91
, business rescue is an innovative and fresh approach when compared to 
the previous regime. In line with internationally recommended approaches, it sets out 
to encourage economic enterprise, whether through returning an entity to a position of 
solvency or salvaging whatever value is left in its business; transferring this value it to 
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 This may be defined as entailing ‘satisfying all requirements and conditions stipulated in the adopted 
or subsequently amended plan to the exclusion of any legal/natural/ commercial impossibility which 
may render the performance of obligations in terms of the plan impossible or financially unfeasible’. 
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 Sub-section (1). 
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 Sub-section (2). 
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 In terms of the regime’s ability to restore companies to a position of solvency as a primary objective. 
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a new or existing market competitor in a way that contributes to economic 
development and employment creation. 
 Provided that the new regime obtains the proper buy-in from all relevant 
stakeholders and is implemented in accordance with its overarching spirit and purport, 
the multiple objectives set-out in section 7 of the Companies Act 2008 are well 
capable of being achieved. It is also inevitable that due to its infancy, teething 
challenges (both conceptual and practical) will be encountered and must be rigorously 
addressed. In this sense ours is, at minimum, a responsibility to ensure that business 
rescue remains responsive and perhaps even more importantly, that its value is 
unlocked for our developing economy; that a new path, different to that of judicial 
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